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a C k n O w l e d g m e n T S

In a few years, there will be no living survivors of the Holocaust. Although 
many commentators have acknowledged this fact, few have made sustained 
efforts to draw out its full implications. Will the disappearance of the last 
witness affect the way public discourse deals with the Holocaust? Will the 
Holocaust become, perhaps for the first time, truly “past history”? How will 
writers and filmmakers who may have no personal connection to the event 
engage with that history: what kinds of stories will they tell, and will they 
succeed in their effort to keep the public memory of the event from being 
lost? Indeed, what has allowed some narratives of the Holocaust produced 
over the past half-century to survive and become “classics”? And will these 
same properties ensure their survival in the future? What can we learn from 
the recent history of Holocaust narratives, both fictional and nonfictional?
 These were among the starting questions for the research project that 
forms the basis for this book, and implicit in them are some more specific 
issues that we believe will be crucial for the new period of Holocaust nar-
rative and Holocaust criticism.1 When we ask, “What kinds of stories?” or 
“How do stories live beyond their immediate moment, and what can we 
learn from previous works?” we are in part asking questions about aesthetics. 
But since these questions concern the Holocaust, we are also necessarily ask-
ing about the relation between aesthetics and ethics, and about the relation 
between aesthetics and transmission. At least since Theodor W. Adorno’s 
famous (and often misunderstood) claim that “writing poetry after Ausch-
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witz is barbaric,”2 scholars and others have been justifiably concerned with 
the ethics of aestheticizing the Holocaust. At the same time, one of the les-
sons of the past half-century is that the narratives that endure, and that have 
the greatest chance of transmitting the story to future generations, all possess 
a significant aesthetic dimension. Responding to this characteristic feature of 
Holocaust narratives, the essays in this volume all address in some way the 
interrelation of ethics and aesthetics. Some also address, implicitly or explic-
itly, the issue of politics, whether in relation to the role of Holocaust narrative 
in the political and social history of Israel or in relation to the representation 
of Nazi perpetrators in fiction. Because the political uses of Holocaust nar-
rative, both in Israel and elsewhere, have been amply discussed and debated 
in recent years, they are not the principal subject of this volume. At the same 
time, the essays are informed by our contributors’ awareness of what the last 
few decades of cultural theory have convincingly demonstrated; namely, that 
the aesthetic and the political—whether defined in terms of gender, class, 
race, or nation—are deeply intertwined.
 These sixteen wide-ranging essays comprise discussions of literary works 
(from early testimony to contemporary memoirs and fiction, with a heavy 
emphasis on the latter), biography, film, and photography, and they represent 
narratives from numerous national and cultural locations—Germany, Eng-
land, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Israel, Japan, Norway, and the United 
States. We have included discussions of some works that have long been 
in the Holocaust canon, but we have particularly emphasized outstanding 
works of literature and film that are not (or not yet) well known internation-
ally, including very recently published works.
 The word “after” in our title merits further discussion. As we have sug-
gested, it refers first of all to the historical fact that we are nearing an age 
“after testimony,” an age where first-person accounts by Holocaust survivors 
will no longer be forthcoming. But “after” also has another meaning, refer-
ring not to chronology but to artistic creation: a painting “after” Michelan-
gelo is one that situates itself self-consciously in a position of imitation or 
homage. Using the word in conjunction with “testimony,” we shift its mean-
ing slightly: the phrase seeks not to describe artistic imitation but rather to 
suggest that all works dealing with the Holocaust must in some way come to 
terms with the historical reality that the accounts of survivors have tried to 
communicate. In that broad sense, all works relating to the Holocaust that 
deserve our attention, even the most speculative or experimental novels or 
films, are bound by a certain obligation to the history referred to in those 
testimonies. But to come “after” also implies an obligation to the future: in 
that respect, this volume is turned toward thinking about the future of Holo-
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caust narrative and about the afterlife of Holocaust narratives in different 
cultures.
The Question of Aesthetics in holocaust
Literature and Criticism
A Brief Overview
In the years immediately following World War II and the return of survi-
vors from Nazi concentration and labor camps, the overwhelming need 
appeared to be to testify, independently of considerations of art or artful-
ness. As many witnesses stated, they lived only for the day when they could 
tell the world about the unimaginable horrors they had experienced—and 
many also feared that no one would believe them or, worse still, that no one 
would care. In The Drowned and the Saved, Primo Levi tells of a recurrent 
nightmare that he and many other survivors experienced (and that he had 
already mentioned in his first book, Survival in Auschwitz), of attempting 
to tell their stories but finding that no one believed them, not even their 
own families (12). Indeed, despite the large number of testimonies that 
were published in the years immediately following the war, their recep-
tion was not encouraging. Levi’s own Se questo è un uomo (If This Is a 
Man [Survival in Auschwitz]), first published in 1947, did not attain a wide 
readership until its reprinting in 1958 and did not attain the primary place 
it has today in the Holocaust canon until the 1960s. The historian Annette 
Wieviorka has shown that in France, the first large wave of testimonies was 
soon followed by responses of “no more!” (Déportation et génocide). What 
Wieviorka later called “the era of the witness” did not actually begin until 
the early 1960s, when the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem inaugurated the era 
of Holocaust awareness that is still with us and that has brought us count-
less survivor accounts, both written and oral, as well as innumerable works 
of fiction and film by both survivors and others born after the events of the 
Holocaust.
 Not surprisingly, critical works about Holocaust literature did not emerge 
until the 1970s, by which time a considerable body of Holocaust writing, both 
fictional and nonfictional, was available for discussion. However, the ques-
tion of aesthetics—and its relation to ethics, for the two were seen from the 
very start as inextricably connected in this domain—arose earlier. Adorno’s 
pronouncement in 1949 about the “barbarity” of writing poetry after Ausch-
witz influenced much of the critical discourse to follow. Fifteen years later, 
in an article in Commentary that was among the first critical discussions of 
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Holocaust literature published in English, A. Alvarez seemed to be respond-
ing to Adorno when he defended art as a means to greater ethical conscious-
ness: “from the fragile, tentative, individual discriminations of art emerge 
precisely those moral values which, if understood and accepted, would make 
totalitarian atrocities impossible” (65). Alvarez, relying on modernist cri-
teria of irony and understatement, considered Elie Wiesel’s Night—which 
was already acquiring a foundational status in Holocaust literature after its 
translation into English in 1961—as less than an artistic success, because it 
indulged too much in “rhetoric.” Alvarez much preferred the bitterly ironic 
works of Tadeusz Borowski and Piotr Rawicz, both of them camp survivors 
who had published acclaimed fictional works based on their own wartime 
experiences.3 One could argue that Wiesel was simply using aesthetic strate-
gies that Alvarez did not value, for Night is a highly stylized work in many 
ways. However one evaluates these individual works, the larger point is that 
discussions of aesthetic success and its relation to ethical, even historical, 
awareness (Alvarez sees great art as somehow being able to prevent further 
atrocities) were present in critical reflections on Holocaust writing from the 
very start.
 Perhaps even more significantly, questions of aesthetics also preoccupied 
many survivors who were seeking ways to write about their experiences—
even as those experiences provided a warrant for their turn to aesthetics. 
Jorge Semprun, a survivor of Buchenwald and the author of several acclaimed 
novels and memoirs about the Holocaust, has explained that he refrained for 
many years after the war from writing anything at all. He did not want to 
write a “straight” testimony, for he was convinced of the paradox that only 
the artifice of literary writing, which allows for invention and for various 
kinds of “poetic license” in addition to factual reporting, could convey the 
truth of that experience.4 Wiesel, who is known for a statement that is quoted 
almost as often as Adorno’s, “A novel about Auschwitz is not a novel, or else it 
is not about Auschwitz,” has nevertheless written novels in which Auschwitz 
figures prominently, represented in the memory of the survivor protagonist.5 
Still, whether provocatively defending the right to artifice like Semprun, or 
adopting a more ambivalent stance like Wiesel—or like Charlotte Delbo, 
who, in her highly poetic memoir None of Us Will Return, often reflects on 
the impossibility of fully conveying the truth of the camp in language—writ-
ers who are also survivors can rely on the authority of their lived experience 
to vouchsafe their “right” to aesthetic expression. Sara Horowitz has pointed 
out that in debates about aesthetics and Holocaust representation, many who 
acknowledge that testimonial writing can have an aesthetic dimension also 
argue that the aesthetic dimension of fiction about the Holocaust renders it 
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unreliable and open to suspicion.6 The authority of a survivor allays some of 
that suspicion.
 Lawrence Langer was the first literary scholar to offer, unapologetically, a 
book-length study of Holocaust writing as art—what he called a literature of 
atrocity. In The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination (1975), Langer argued 
vigorously against theorists like Adorno (as he was understood at the time) 
or George Steiner, who in his 1967 book Language and Silence had expressed 
deep distrust of anything that could be construed as an aestheticizing of the 
horrors of the Holocaust. Langer, contesting the idea (which he attributed to 
Steiner) that since language is incapable of capturing those horrors, silence 
about them is preferable (a version of Wittgenstein’s famous dictum that 
“about that which cannot be spoken of, one must be silent”), proposed to 
study precisely the “aesthetics of atrocity” (22). He took as his corpus literary 
works by writers who had lived through the Holocaust, either as survivors of 
persecution (ranging from camp survivors like Wiesel or Semprun to chil-
dren who had lost their parents or their whole families, like Yakov Lind or 
André Schwarz-Bart) or as bystanders or even soldiers in the German army 
(like Heinrich Böll). These writers, Langer argued, had produced memorable 
literary works based on their own experiences, succeeding in transmuting a 
horrendous, incomprehensible reality into verbal art.
 Langer did not study literary works by writers who had no personal 
memory of World War II and the Holocaust, for the simple reason that there 
were no such works to speak of when he was writing his book. In addition, a 
number of great books by survivors had not yet been written. For example, 
Semprun, whose autobiographical novel about deportation, Le grand voyage 
(1963), had been immediately translated and was included in Langer’s and 
other studies, published a beautiful memoir about Buchenwald only much 
later, sixty years after the events (L’écriture ou la vie 1994 [Literature or Life]). 
The Hungarian Auschwitz survivor Imre Kertész’s brilliant autobiographical 
novel Fatelessness (Sorstalanság) was published in Hungary in 1975, but was 
not translated into English until 1992 and did not become widely known 
until after Kertész had been awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2002. 
The unavailability or international invisibility of works written in “minor” 
languages—including works that later become internationally canonized—
affects Holocaust literature as it does any other.
 After Langer’s pioneering work, Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi and James Young 
(who studied with Ezrahi in Israel) wrote extensive studies in the 1980s 
that have become standard references for students of Holocaust literature.7 
We see here a phenomenon of generations that concerns critics rather than 
writers: neither Ezrahi, born in the United States during World War II, nor 
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Young, born almost a decade after the war ended, has a personal biographi-
cal connection to the Holocaust. Indeed, Young prefaces his book by noting 
that it arose from his realization “that none of us coming to the Holocaust 
afterwards can know these events outside the ways they are passed down 
to us” (vii). Young’s work subsequently moved on to the study of Holocaust 
memorials in Europe and the United States, and to the complex issues of 
visualization and transmission they involve.
 The study of Holocaust memory has now become an immense field in 
its own right (part of an even larger field of memory studies inaugurated in 
1984 by the collective project directed by Pierre Nora, Les lieux de mémoire), 
and much of it is concerned with what Marianne Hirsch has called post-
memory, which is precisely a “passed down” memory inherited by those who 
were born after the events and can have no personal recollection of them.8 
The issues raised by transmission culminate in problems of pedagogy, as the 
Holocaust becomes an institutionalized area of study in both secondary and 
higher education. The collective volume published in 2004 by the Modern 
Language Association, Teaching the Representations of the Holocaust, coed-
ited by Hirsch and Irene Kacandes, is simultaneously an excellent guide for 
teachers, an assessment of the contemporary state of Holocaust studies, and a 
wide-ranging examination of current and recurrent issues of Holocaust rep-
resentation in different media and genres, especially history, prose fiction, 
photography, and film.
 Meanwhile, the question of aesthetics in Holocaust representation has 
continued to be posed in renewed and challenging ways. In 1982, Probing 
the Limits of Representation, the important collective volume edited by Saul 
Friedländer (who is a child survivor of the Holocaust and the author of the 
beautiful memoir When Memory Comes, in addition to his acclaimed work 
as a historian of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust) brought together histori-
ans and literary scholars to “probe the limits of representation.” In 1992, the 
collaborative work by Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony, brought 
together the perspectives of a practicing psychoanalyst (Laub too is a child 
survivor of the Holocaust) and of a deconstructionist critic to examine some 
of the ways in which witnessing functions in therapeutic as well as artistic 
settings. Rounding off the progression of influential works that happened to 
appear at ten-year intervals, in 2002 an exhibition organized by the Jewish 
Museum in New York became a cause célèbre for several weeks, prompting 
numerous and conflicting responses in the press as well as some demon-
strations outside the museum. Titled “Mirroring Evil: Nazi Imagery/Recent 
Art,” the exhibition (curated by Norman L. Kleeblatt and accompanied by a 
catalog with the same title) presented visual works and installations by thir-
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teen artists from the United States, Europe, and Israel, all of them born in 
the 1950s or later; all the works focused in controversial ways on figures of 
Nazis. As Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi wrote in her catalog essay (one of six essays 
by well-known scholars of the Holocaust), this was perhaps “the most dar-
ing exhibit ever mounted by the Jewish Museum”—not only because of the 
transgressive presence of this crowd of “Nazis” within the museum’s walls 
but also because of the unusually demanding personal engagement that was 
required on the part of the spectator (“Acts” 17–18). Indeed, the visitor to 
the exhibition was constantly challenged to judge the appropriateness as well 
as the aesthetic success or failure of works ranging from a Lego model of a 
concentration camp to a pseudo-kitschy visual biography of Hitler’s mistress 
Eva Braun. As Ezrahi points out, there were no “correct” ways to confront 
this work, which illustrated in particularly striking fashion the indissociabil-
ity of aesthetic from moral issues in art about the Holocaust.
 An important recent approach to Holocaust literature and film puts the 
Holocaust in relation with other traumas, whether personal or historical. In 
Present Pasts (2003), Andreas Huyssen shows how discussions and debates 
about Holocaust memorials have influenced the construction of other 
memorial sites unrelated to the Holocaust, such as the Memory Park in Bue-
nos Aires or the projected 9/11 memorial in New York City. Janet Walker, in 
her 2005 book Trauma Cinema, argues that trauma theory can productively 
span both historical documentaries about the Holocaust and films about 
incest. Michael Rothberg, in his 2009 book Multidirectional Memory, exam-
ines and theorizes the ways in which postcolonial literature and the literature 
of decolonization intersect with Holocaust writing and film.9 Other recent 
works reconnect in new ways with the reflections and debates about aesthet-
ics that have been a constant preoccupation of Holocaust criticism. Thus 
Brett Kaplan states on the very first page of her 2007 book Unwanted Beauty 
that her subject is the highly fraught one of “aesthetic pleasure in complex 
and multivalent texts” about the Holocaust. The apparently contradictory 
notion that beauty in Holocaust works is both “unwanted” and beneficial 
to deeper understanding is one that Kaplan shares with a number of other 
recent theorists—such as Ernst Van Alphen, whose 1997 book Caught by 
History argued strongly for the value of innovative contemporary art about 
the Holocaust—and indeed with a whole line of earlier critics as we have 
tried to suggest.
 Berel Lang, in his introduction to one of the first major collective vol-
umes about Holocaust literature, Writing and the Holocaust (1988), wrote 
that the main premise behind that collection of essays was “that there is a 
significant relation between the moral implications of the Holocaust and the 
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means of literary expression. . . . .What constraints, whether in the use of fact 
or in the reach of the imagination, are imposed on authors or readers by the 
subject of the Holocaust? How does that subject shape the perspectives from 
which it is viewed . . . ? Is the enormity of the Holocaust at all capable of lit-
erary representation?” (2–3). These questions are still relevant today, but our 
questions in this volume focus not on “whether” Holocaust representation 
is possible, or ethically permissible, for the former question has been settled 
once and for all by the huge number of works that continue to be produced 
about the Holocaust, and the latter question is argued all over again each 
time some “trespass” occurs, as exhibitions such as “Mirroring Evil” and 
myriads of other controversial films, literary works, and public events testify. 
The question, therefore, is not whether but how: how is it done, how has it 
been done most effectively, so that it can reach readers who have neither per-
sonal nor familial nor historical nor geographical connections to the event? 
In a sense, this is the question that literary interpreters are always asking 
about works of literature, whether they deal with the Holocaust or any other 
subject. But the stakes involved are higher when it comes to literature that 
deals with historical events that still matter to readers. The Holocaust is one 
such event, perhaps the principal such event of the twentieth century.
The Contributions of narrative Theory
The area of literary studies that has devoted the most rigorous attention to 
questions about the techniques of representation, especially representation 
through storytelling, is narrative theory. Narrative theory begins not with 
the development of its well-known toolbox of analytical concepts but with 
the observation that storytelling is a distinctive way of making sense of our 
experiences of the world, particularly our experiences of time, process, and 
change. Narrative, whether fictional or nonfictional, whether in print, paint, 
or pixels, has the capacity to offer us explanations about our experiences 
that often elude other modes such as expository descriptions, abstract argu-
ments, or statistical analyses. Narrative depends on both selection (any nar-
rative implicitly says “out of all the events that happened during this period 
and all the people involved in those events, these are the ones that matter 
most”) and detailed attention to what is selected. At the same time, narra-
tive combines its focus on concrete details with an interest in their broader 
significance: narrative implicitly or explicitly thematizes its characters and 
events. Furthermore, narrative engages us on multiple levels—intellectually, 
emotionally, ethically, aesthetically. In addition, narrative is a highly flexible 
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mode of expression, one that is open to all kinds of subject matter and that 
can bend its usual forms in order to meet the special demands of extraordi-
nary experiences.
 Narrative theory sees questions about the what of representation (events, 
characters, and their settings) as closely related to questions about the 
how (who tells the tale, whose perspective is employed, how the events are 
ordered, and so on). Furthermore, over the last forty years, the field has 
sought to be responsive to both narrative’s explanatory power and its flex-
ibility. As a result, narrative theorists have developed a very rich set of con-
cepts for analyzing just about all elements of narrative, even as they have 
developed several distinct and productive approaches (structuralist, rhetori-
cal, feminist, cognitive) to the various deployments of those elements. Thus 
the field has both expanded its capacity to analyze the formal dimensions 
of narrative and found ways to connect those analyses with narrative’s other 
dimensions. Contemporary narrative theorists are interested, for example, 
not just in identifying distinct combinations of vision (who sees or perceives) 
and voice (who speaks) but also in analyzing the ethical, affective, and aes-
thetic consequences of a given narrative’s deploying a particular combination 
in a particular context.
 We are aware that any mode of representation, even one as powerful 
as narrative, will at times seem inadequate to our efforts to respond to the 
Holocaust. In Reading the Holocaust, Inga Clendinnen notes that all her 
studying and thinking about the event gave her no sense of “accumulating 
comprehension. . . . I could not frame the kinds of questions that would let 
me make the human connections—connections with both perpetrators and 
victims—which lie at the root of all purposeful inquiry” (3). This critical 
humility is one of the reasons why Clendinnen’s study is a significant con-
tribution to attempts to grapple with the apparent incomprehensibility of 
the Holocaust. The narrative artists whose work is discussed in this volume 
frequently demonstrate a similar kind of humility. These authors approach 
the topic of the Holocaust with trepidation, yet they also show remarkable 
courage and perseverance in their efforts to come to terms with something 
that may remain at least partly incomprehensible even after years of study. 
Narrative proves to be a great resource in these attempts, even, paradoxically, 
when it comes up against the limits of its ability to explain. Precisely because 
it is such a powerful mode of exploration and explanation, narrative can 
take those involved in its production—author, narrator, character, reader—
to a point where the comprehension of experience threatens to disintegrate 
into fragments. At the same time, in many Holocaust narratives the author’s 
and narrator’s motivation to narrate seems to be prompted partly by such a 
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quality of loss and absence—a blank that, because it both suspends conven-
tional causality and draws attention to the underlying but ultimately elusive 
events of the Holocaust, demands to be filled in, or rather, since that is not 
possible, identified, addressed, and explored.
 As the following essays demonstrate, authors writing about the Holo-
caust often subject conventional forms of narrative to unusual and even 
extreme transformations: they distort chronology, offer fragmented stories, 
leave conspicuous gaps in what would otherwise be coherent accounts, and 
experiment with relations between vision and voice and between represen-
tations of individual and collective consciousness. They also adapt familiar 
techniques such as unreliable narration to their distinctive purposes. Even 
as these techniques emphasize their authors’ difficulty in coming to terms 
with the Holocaust, they simultaneously challenge—and often place a con-
siderable interpretive burden on—their audiences. In this way, the authors’ 
efforts to find the appropriate aesthetic forms of representation raise ques-
tions about the ethics of their relationship to their audiences. The authors 
inevitably address an ethics of the told (in their attention to the specific expe-
riences of perpetrators, victims, bystanders, and others), while their tech-
niques also direct attention to the ethics of their telling.
 The traumatic events of the Holocaust are not only unusually difficult to 
comprehend; they are also ones in which the links among history, memory, 
and narrative are particularly strong and insistent. As Dominick LaCapra 
writes in History and Memory after Auschwitz, “the traumatic event has its 
greatest and most clearly unjustifiable effect on the victim, but in differ-
ent ways it also affects everyone who comes in contact with it: perpetra-
tor, collaborator, bystander, resister, those born later” (8–9). There is, notes 
LaCapra, an “effect of belatedness” (9) linked to the Holocaust, an effect 
observable in several of the narratives discussed in this volume, underlying 
and influencing the ways in which they are presented. One aspect of this 
belatedness is that at a point in time when the last survivors are passing away, 
we realize there is still too much we do not know. A related aspect is that only 
recently, after a period of latency, has it become possible to identify and ana-
lyze significant elements of the Holocaust, not least elements pertaining to 
perpetrators and bystanders, that were earlier too painful to talk about. As a 
way to respond to both aspects of this belatedness, many authors have turned 
to the resources of narrative fiction, and their work has a prominent place in 
this collection.
 The contributors to this volume would all agree with Lang’s point that 
“there is a significant relation between the moral implications of the Holo-
caust and the means of literary expression,” but they work by induction in 
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order to explore the specific relations proposed and developed in the narra-
tives they analyze. The contributors all draw on one or more concepts from 
narrative theory—ranging from focalization to the fiction/nonfiction dis-
tinction and from generic plot structures such as the bildungsroman to the 
ethics of unreliable narration—as they pursue their particular inquiries, but 
these concepts enable rather than control the move from the details of rep-
resentation to the larger conclusions about their ethics and aesthetics. The 
role of narrative theory in these essays is not to determine their conclusions 
but rather to provide ways of seeing and meeting the challenges implicit in 
the various ways that the narratives under discussion come to terms with the 
extraordinary events of the Holocaust.
The Shape of This book
As noted above, this collection addresses a broad spectrum of Holocaust 
narratives and a correspondingly broad set of issues about the aesthetics and 
ethics of representation. At the same time, the essays speak with and to each 
other in various explicit and implicit ways. We have organized them into 
three distinct groups that reflect some overarching interests among the con-
tributors, but we see the boundaries between the groups as permeable rather 
than rigid. The essays in the first group, “The Powers and Limits of Fiction,” 
all focus on how writers have adapted the resources of fictional narrative in 
their efforts to address one or more aspects of the Holocaust. Those in the 
second group, “Intersections/Border Crossings,” all examine how artists have 
found it necessary to cross traditional boundaries—between testimony and 
imagination, the verbal and the visual, or some other conventional divide—
in their efforts to represent distinctive experiences of the Holocaust. The 
essays in the third group, “The Holocaust and Others,” all discuss the rela-
tionship between the Holocaust and another significant historical event or 
another cultural context.
 The opening essay, J. Hillis Miller’s “Imre Kertész’s Fatelessness: Fiction as 
Testimony,” poses some of the key questions discussed in the volume over-
all: Is it possible to bear witness to the Holocaust in a work of fiction, even 
autobiographical fiction? If so, how? Miller’s careful reading of Kertész’s use 
of character narration for ironic and other effects answers the question in 
the affirmative and opens Fatelessness to other readers. As Miller notes in a 
concluding point, this autobiographical fiction may “contribute to the cre-
ation of a community of readers who may, if not know, at least not forget, 
Auschwitz” (49). The questions Miller raises about the efficacy of fiction 
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as a response to the Holocaust appear in different ways in the other essays 
of part I. In “Challenges for the Successor Generations of German–Jewish 
Authors in Germany,” Beatrice Sandberg considers the difficult challenges 
faced by the successor generations of Jewish writers in Germany. One such 
challenge—forcibly present in the work of Esther Dischereit—is the problem 
of identity and narration in postwar societies in which the perception of the 
past gradually changes. As the narratives discussed by Sandberg helpfully 
remind us, Germany does not dispose of a common memory, since the pop-
ulation has to live with a traumatized memory of the war in general and the 
Holocaust in particular.10 Sandberg’s essay highlights the fact that, although 
all post-Holocaust Germans can be said to have traumatized memories, the 
nature and consequences of the remembered trauma are different for Jews 
than for non-Jews. Variants on this problem are observable in many coun-
tries, including France, where, as Philippe Mesnard shows in “Recent Litera-
ture Confronting the Past: France and Beyond ,” novelists born decades after 
the war but writing about that period reproduce specific narrative schemas 
that fit into the wider movement of memorialization in which the Holocaust 
occupies a central place.
 Not surprisingly, the perpetrators of the Holocaust have offered little tes-
timony about their participation in it, but fiction writers have combined his-
tory with acts of the imagination to represent the perpetrators’ perspective. 
These representations often involve the interplay of reliable and unreliable 
narration, as Susan Rubin Suleiman and James Phelan demonstrate in their 
respective essays, “Performing a Perpetrator as Witness: Jonathan Littell’s 
Les Bienveillantes” and “The Ethics and Aesthetics of Backward Narration 
in Martin Amis’s Time’s Arrow.” Amis’s and Littell’s novels set out to capture, 
albeit in very different ways, the psychology and motivations of those who 
participated actively in the Nazi genocide. While Suleiman analyzes the lay-
ered aesthetic and ethical performances of Littell and his first-person narra-
tor, a former SS officer who looks back on his participation in the Holocaust 
and World War II, Phelan examines the aesthetic and ethical consequences 
of Amis’s decision to use “backward” narration to tell the story, from death to 
earliest consciousness, of his chosen protagonist, a Nazi doctor who worked 
at Auschwitz.
 The first three essays of the second part, “Intersections/Border Cross-
ings,” shift the focus from fiction to nonfiction as they discuss examples of 
testimony, biography, and family memoir. In “The Face-to-Face Encounter in 
Holocaust Narrative,” Jeremy Hawthorn analyzes testimonies by Holocaust 
survivors (including Charlotte Delbo and Primo Levi) and a fictionalized 
account by Auschwitz survivor Tadeusz Borowski, all of which include rep-
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resentations of dramatic one-to-one interactions between a victim and one 
or more perpetrators or others. Hawthorn finds a range of human behavior 
in these encounters, but each point on the range deepens the reader’s under-
standing of their sometimes complex, sometimes brutally simple, ethical 
dimensions. In “Knowing Little, Adding Nothing: The Ethics and Aesthetics 
of Remembering in Espen Søbye’s Kathe, Always Lived in Norway,” Anniken 
Greve discusses Søbye’s biography of a young Jewish girl born and bred in 
Oslo, who was deported to Auschwitz at the age of fifteen and killed on 
arrival. Emphasizing Søbye’s distance from the events he recounts, Greve 
argues that, paradoxically, it is fundamental to the biography’s recognition of 
Kathe Lasnik’s individuality that she remains largely unknown to the reader. 
Different solutions for dealing with gaps in the historical record are explored 
in Irene Kacandes’s “‘When facts are scarce’: Authenticating Strategies in 
Writing by Children of Survivors.” After discussing a number of such strat-
egies, Kacandes concludes that memoirs of children of survivors provide 
valuable examples of attempts to use our imagination to advance our under-
standing about what the persecuted experienced and how they felt about that 
experience.
 The last four essays of part II move beyond verbal narrative to consider 
various intersections between the verbal text and visual image. In the context 
of the concerns of this volume, a significant question about visual images is 
whether—and if so, to what extent and in what ways—they possess a narra-
tive dimension. The same question can be asked about other visual objects 
such as memorials—does an abstract memorial like Peter Eisenman’s 2005 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, a photograph of which we 
feature on our cover, contain a narrative element? One could certainly sug-
gest several narratives implied by the labyrinthine design of the gray stones 
that cover close to an acre of ground in the center of the city, and even more 
so by the photograph of a single human figure with a red umbrella among 
the stones. But the designers of the memorial also included a more explicit 
form of narration by supporting the stones with an underground Informa-
tion Center that presents the historical narrative of the Nazi regime’s racist 
policies from 1933 to 1945 and then focuses on individual families and life 
stories to convey the experience of persecution. 
 Photographs often possess an intrinsic narrative element, especially when 
they evoke historically or affectively significant sites or personages. As view-
ers we tend to link a photo of, say, the gate of Auschwitz, with its infamous 
inscription “Arbeit macht frei” (“Work liberates you”), to what happened 
to the many prisoners who went through that gate. Moreover, as Marianne 
Hirsch has shown in Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmem-
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ory, family photographs—not least one of a child, woman, or man murdered 
by the Nazis—may preserve ancestral history and perpetuate memories. In 
her contribution to this volume, “Objects of Return,” Hirsch traces the role 
of objects and photographs in reviving memory and analyzes the plot engen-
dered by return journeys to lost homes as well as the promises of revelation 
such journeys hold out—and ultimately do not fulfill. Jakob Lothe, in “Nar-
rative, Memory, and Visual Image: W. G. Sebald’s Luftkrieg und Literatur and 
Austerlitz,” demonstrates that the incorporation of visual images into written 
narratives about the Holocaust, whether fictional or nonfictional, can have 
wide-ranging thematic, aesthetic, and ethical consequences. Lothe considers 
Austerlitz as a strangely compelling fiction whose oblique rendering of the 
Holocaust insists on this particular event’s historical veracity while at the 
same time demonstrating the crisis and unavoidable shortcomings of human 
memory.
 Unsurprisingly, filmic narratives of the Holocaust have predominantly 
adopted a documentary approach. Yet, as Anette H. Storeide and Janet Walker 
show, the “documentary” element of these narratives is frequently shaped in 
the service of ethical and political ends. As Walker observes in Trauma Cin-
ema, “the more closely one studies the documentary and fictional modes, 
the more obvious it becomes that ‘pure documentary’ and ‘pure fiction’ are 
heuristic categories” (24). In her essay in this volume, “Moving Testimonies: 
‘Unhomed Geography’ and the Holocaust Documentary of Return,” Walker 
maps the transposition and transmission of Holocaust testimonies genera-
tionally, across a geographical distance, and into the audiovisual space of the 
moving image. Storeide, in her essay “Which Narrative of Auschwitz? A Nar-
rative Analysis of Laurence Rees’s Documentary Auschwitz: The Nazis and 
‘the Final Solution,’” assesses Rees’s effort to establish a widely accepted nar-
rative of Auschwitz sixty years after the Holocaust. Focusing on the combi-
nation of documentary strategies and dramatized scenes, Storeide interprets 
Rees’s documentary as a “docudrama” and points out both its successes and 
its limitations.
 As the essays in the third group show, our understanding of the Holo-
caust is inevitably, and increasingly, colored by other significant historical 
events and by cultures and societies not directly involved in the crime com-
mitted by the Nazis. In “From Auschwitz to the Temple Mount: Binding 
and Unbinding the Israeli Narrative,” Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, taking her cue 
from Adorno’s often-quoted statement, considers aspects of “the barbaric” 
by exploring forms of border crossing in the context of recent Israeli politics. 
She traces a move in public rhetoric from a narrative of boundaries to a nar-
rative of sacrifice and then elaborates a model of self–other relations that is 
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based not on rigid categories leading to violence but rather on a variety of 
negotiated, ultimately comic possibilities. She finds these possibilities exem-
plified in the Hebrew poetry of Dan Pagis, in the fiction of David Grossman, 
and, most pointedly, in her revisionist reading of a central text in the Hebrew 
Bible, the Akeda or binding of Isaac. Grossman’s work is examined in a some-
what different perspective relating to Israeli society by Daphna Erdinast-
Vulcan, in “The Melancholy Generation: David Grossman’s Book of Interior 
Grammar.” Erdinast-Vulcan argues that though ostensibly not “about” the 
Holocaust, Grossman’s 1991 novel in fact challenges the normalizing drive 
of a post-Holocaust society that needed to suppress its recent traumatic past 
and reinvent itself in order to survive.
 The two last essays of the volume explore different yet related aspects of 
memory and memorialization. In “Fractured Relations: The Multidirectional 
Holocaust Memory of Caryl Phillips,” Michael Rothberg shows how the con-
temporary novelist and travel writer Caryl Phillips uses various narrative 
means to bring together the histories of the Holocaust, slavery, and colonial-
ism. Rothberg argues that Phillips’s project is not to establish an equation 
between black and Jewish history but rather to highlight similar structural 
problems within those histories and in the missed encounters between 
them, thus producing a version of “multidirectional memory.” Anne Thelle 
also links the Holocaust, an event that occurred at the center of Europe, to 
another culture. In “Hiroshima and the Holocaust: Tales of War and Defeat 
in Japan and Germany—A Contrastive Perspective,” Thelle analyzes the ways 
in which Japan’s narratives of the bombing of Hiroshima have contributed to 
a repression of other war narratives, like those of Japanese wartime aggres-
sion. She argues that Japan’s embrace of the narrative of victimization has 
significantly influenced its self-understanding and postwar identity, and has 
resulted in a radical difference in the world’s perceptions of Japanese and of 
German aggression during World War II.
 We offer this diverse yet unified collection as a contribution to the ongo-
ing current reflections on the Holocaust’s implications for contemporary his-
tory and for contemporary thinking about culture and aesthetics. Geoffrey 
Hartman has noted that there can be “no statute of limitations” on research 
or interpretation involving the Holocaust: closure in this area is neither pos-
sible nor desirable, at least not now or in the foreseeable future (Longest 
Shadow 4). In the realm of artistic representation, this absence of closure 
allows for invention and renewal as antidotes against the clichés and trite-
ness that threaten Holocaust art as much as any other: “even so estranging 
an event as the Shoah may have to be estranged again, through art,” Hart-
man writes (53). We agree. Hartman’s work—he was a well-known scholar 
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of English Romantic poetry before he turned his attention to problems of 
Holocaust representation and Holocaust memory—demonstrates another 
important truth about many of the essays in this book: one need not be a 
“Holocaust specialist” in order to become passionately engaged in the prob-
lems posed by Holocaust representation.11 And just as the Holocaust has 
become ever more part of a “global memory,” an event whose significance 
goes far beyond any single group or nation, we believe that Holocaust nar-
ratives can become the ground for ever-widening reflections on the relation 
between ethics and cultural production.
notes
 1. The project first took shape as part of a yearlong international research group 
on narrative theory and analysis, led by Jakob Lothe at the Centre for Advanced Study 
in Oslo. Some members of the group had already worked extensively on problems relat-
ing to the Holocaust; others were just starting. As the project developed into a collective 
volume, we invited some of the most distinguished contemporary scholars of the Holo-
caust to contribute to the book; the full group met for a three-day conference in Berlin in 
June 2007, where drafts of all the projected essays were discussed in detail, and where the 
group also discussed the overall design of the volume. We are pleased to know that other 
scholars are also addressing the questions associated with “after testimony.” A conference 
held in Paris in June 2009, for example, focused on how to write the history of Holocaust 
literature with the passage “from witnesses to inheritors” (“Des témoins aux héritiers: 
une histoire de l’écriture de la Shoah” conference organized by the Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, June 5–6, 
2009). The proceedings will be published, edited by Luba Jurgenson and Alexandre Prsto-
jevic.
 2. Adorno first wrote the sentence in 1949 in his essay “Cultural Criticism and Soci-
ety,” published in 1951. The lapidary style and categorical tone of the statement no doubt 
contributed to its ubiquity in later critical discourse; Adorno himself reiterated and quali-
fied his assertion several times in subsequent years. For a careful reading of these itera-
tions, see Rothberg, Traumatic Realism, 34–56.
 3. Borowski’s collection of short stories, This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
was published in English (translated from Polish) in 1967, but the title story that Alvarez 
comments on had appeared in Commentary in July 1962; the work has been part of the 
Holocaust canon for many years. Rawicz’s Blood from the Sky (Le sang du ciel), published 
in French in 1961 and in English in 1964, dropped out of sight for many years but is now 
the object of serious study in France.
 4. See Semprun, L’écriture ou la vie (Literature or Life), which contains the fullest 
exposition of his views about the necessity of artifice. Semprun’s first work was the auto-
biographical novel Le grand voyage (The Long Voyage), published in 1963.
 5. See, for example, Dawn and The Accident. While the action of these novels takes 
place after the war, the hero (very much modeled on Wiesel himself) is haunted by his 
memories of the camp. The statement about novels and Auschwitz, first made in 1975, 
has been widely quoted (e.g., in Horowitz, Voicing the Void, 15), and reiterated by Wiesel 
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himself with some variations. In his essay collection A Jew Today, Wiesel goes so far as to 
say that “there is no such thing as Holocaust literature . . . the very term is a contradiction” 
(197). He implies that survivors can at least attempt to communicate their experience, but 
that those who have not lived through it cannot possibly imagine or “reinvent” it (198). 
This is of course a highly debatable assertion.
 6. Voicing the Void, 5–7. Horowitz’s introductory chapter offers a wide-ranging dis-
cussion of some of the same issues we are concerned with here.
 7. Ezrahi, By Words Alone (1980); Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust 
(1988). It is noteworthy that the first serious studies of Holocaust literature were all written 
in English, despite the fact that the works they discussed were most often translated from 
European languages. The academic study of Holocaust literature has taken considerably 
longer to become established in some of the countries where the most important literary 
works were written. In France, it is only in the last decade or so that scholars have started 
devoting serious attention to Holocaust literature, and there are no university departments 
devoted to Holocaust studies. In Germany, Holocaust studies have been predominantly 
historical, but research centers such as Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen (http://
www.kwi-nrw.de/home/kwi.html) focus on narrative memories of the war and on the 
Holocaust in Germany, as well as in a European comparative perspective. The Arbeitsstelle 
Holocaust-Literatur at Giessen University has done important work charting and defining 
the concept of “Holocaust Literature,” and the research activities of the Simon Dubnow 
Institute for Jewish History and Culture at Leipzig University include studies of literary 
Holocaust memory (http://www.dubnow.de/index.php?id=2&L=1).
 8. Hirsch, Family Frames and a forthcoming book of essays, The Generation of Post-
memory. On Holocaust memory, see (among many others) Bal et al., eds., Acts of Memory; 
Hartman, The Longest Shadow, and Hartman, ed., Holocaust Remembrance; Huyssen, Pres-
ent Pasts; Langer, Holocaust Testimonies; Robin, La mémoire saturée; Suleiman, Crises of 
Memory and the Second World War; Wieviorka, Era of the Witness (L’ère du témoin); Zel-
izer, Remembering to Forget; Levi and Rothberg, eds., The Holocaust, especially 189–226.
 9. Both trauma studies and postcolonial studies would deserve extensive discussion 
insofar as they have appropriated—and been appropriated by—Holocaust studies.
 10. Looming large in Holocaust studies, the issue of traumatized memory offers rich 
and varied illustrations of the reciprocal relationship between memory and narrative. One 
indication of the complexity of traumatized memory of the Holocaust is that for the indi-
vidual concerned, it can be linked to and prompted by memories of all those involved in 
the event, including perpetrators, victims, and bystanders. See Hilberg, whose 1992 book 
makes systematic use of this tripartite distinction; Vetlesen, especially 1–13 and 235–57; 
and the studies of Holocaust memory referred to above.
 11. Hartman, born in 1930 in Frankfurt, is a child survivor of the Holocaust who was 
sent on a children’s transport to England when he was nine years old. He has explained 
that he chose deliberately to be “future-oriented” (Longest Shadow, 19) rather than dwell 
on his past experiences; it was not until the late 1970s, after he had been teaching English 
at Yale for many years, that he became involved in Holocaust studies, becoming a founder 
and director of Yale’s Fortunoff Videoarchive of Holocaust Testimonies.
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p a r T  I
The Powers and Limits of Fiction

. . . the survivors bore witness to something it is impossible to bear wit-
ness to.
—giorgio agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz:  
The Witness and the Archive
a novel about auschwitz is not a novel—or else it is not about auschwitz.
—elie Wiesel, preface to Day
we read books on auschwitz. The wish of all, in the camps, the last wish: 
know what has happened, do not forget, and at the same time never will 
you know.
—maurice blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster1
Preliminary Statement of the Problem
How to Testify to Auschwitz in a Work of Fiction
Imre Kertész is a Hungarian Jew who was born in Budapest on November 
6, 1929. At age fourteen he was deported to the death camps along with 
hundreds of thousands of other Hungarian Jews, most of whom died in the 
camps. Like the hero of his novel Fatelessness, Kertész probably survived by 
lying about his age, since all those under sixteen were immediately gassed 
and cremated. Those old enough and strong enough were separated out at 
the initial Selektion and sent to work camps instead. Kertész was imprisoned 
at Buchenwald. After the liberation of the camps Kertész returned to Buda-
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imre kertész’s Fatelessness 
C h a P T e r  1
J. hilliS miller
Fiction as Testimony
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pest and became a writer. His first novel, Sorstalanság (Fatelessness)2 was 
published in 1975, that is, twenty years after his liberation from the camps, 
though the novel had been completed earlier. Kertész has insisted that the 
novel is not autobiographical and that it is not even a novel. Nevertheless, the 
story it tells of a fifteen-year-old boy from Budapest who is transported to 
Auschwitz and survives there obviously bears some relation to Kertész’s own 
experience. It also looks like a novel to me, whatever Kertész says. It employs 
sophisticated novelistic techniques, and it is apparently not just a transcrip-
tion of history. Fatelessness was first translated into English, as Fateless, in 
1992, and then, in a translation by Tim Wilkinson, as Fatelessness in 2004. 
I cite the latter translation in this essay. A film based on Fatelessness, titled 
Fateless, was made in Hungary in 2005, with a script by Kertész. Kertész has 
published in Hungarian many other works since then, many of which have 
been translated into English. His best known other work is probably Kaddis 
a meg nem született gyermekért (1990) (Kaddish for an Unborn Child [2004]). 
Kertész’s work was initially not greatly successful in Hungary. He moved to 
Germany and now resides in Berlin, though he continues to write in Hungar-
ian. In 2002 Kertész was awarded The Nobel Prize in Literature.
 The central questions of this essay are the following: Is it possible to bear 
witness to the Holocaust in a work of fiction? If so, just how might that be 
done, by what narrative procedures? Does Fatelessness succeed in performing 
that work of testimony? What, if anything, should I do after reading Fateless-
ness? Is a critical analysis of the novel’s narrative procedures an appropriate 
response, or would some other action be better to perform? Just what does 
critical or narratological analysis contribute by mediation to what might be 
called the performative force of Fatelessness? I mean by “performative force” 
the novel’s ability to do something with words, for example, possibly to bear 
witness to Auschwitz.3
 The writing of Fatelessness, like the writing of any novel about Auschwitz, 
was subject to a double obstacle, or even what might be called a double dou-
ble bind or double blind alley, a complex “aporia.” “Aporia” means in Greek 
a dead end or no thoroughfare. An aporia is an impasse in an argument in 
which two conclusions follow from the premises, but contradict one another, 
though neither can be chosen over the other. The aporia in this case perhaps 
blocks the project of bearing witness to Auschwitz in a novel or indeed in 
any other form of words, even the most factual or autobiographical. Kertész, 
like anybody who writes about the Holocaust, was confronted with these 
obstacles. The narrative form Fatelessness took was, this essay argues, his way 
of dealing with this double obstacle and making his way forward in spite of 
it. Here are the aporias I have in mind:
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 First aporia: The facts of Auschwitz are, it may be, inherently unthink-
able and unspeakable, by any means of representation. One must be careful, 
however, in using such terms, because if they are taken in one possible way, 
they assimilate Auschwitz, illicitly, to a species of negative theology. They 
imply that just as God is unthinkable and unsayable, so is Auschwitz. Taken 
another possible way, saying Auschwitz is unthinkable and unsayable falls 
into the hands of the Nazis and into the hands of the deniers, the revisionists. 
The Nazis taunted their victims by telling them that what the SS was doing 
was so awful that no one would believe the few who might survive to bear 
witness. It would be easy to pass it off as Allied propaganda (Simon Wiesen-
thal, cited in Levi, The Drowned 11–12). The bare facts of Auschwitz, the 
Selektion, the deadly gas, the crematoria, the approximate number of those 
murdered, the starvation and forced labor, can be said in so many words. 
Those facts are irrefutable because they are backed up by so much documen-
tary evidence. Nevertheless, as almost every survivor agrees, bearing witness 
to the actual experience of the camps presents big linguistic, and more than 
just linguistic, difficulties. Episodes at the end of Fatelessness, discussed later, 
dramatize these difficulties.
 Jean-François Lyotard succinctly identifies a core aspect of Auschwitz 
that resists being said and transmitted to others: “To have ‘really seen with 
his own eyes’ a gas chamber would be the condition which gives one the 
authority to say that it exists and to persuade the unbeliever. Yet it is still nec-
essary to prove that the gas chamber was used to kill at the time it was seen. 
The only acceptable proof that it was used to kill is that one died from it. But 
if one is dead, one cannot testify that it is on account of the gas chamber” 
(Lyotard, cited in Agamben 35). Kertész’s hero comes up against this impasse 
when he confronts an Auschwitz denier on his return to Budapest, as I shall 
show. This impasse may be at least part of what Agamben means when he 
says that witnesses to Auschwitz must bear witness to something to which it 
is impossible to bear witness. That does not mean, however, that such bear-
ing witness should not be attempted, in the teeth of its impossibility. Fateless-
ness tries to do that.
 Matters are not quite so simple as Lyotard says, however. One signifi-
cant class of prisoners was the Sonderkommandos, or “Special Squads.” These 
were prisoners, usually Jews, who were, horrifyingly, conscripted by the SS to 
perform the dirty work of the gas chambers, that is, to kill and then cremate 
their fellow prisoners, sometimes their own relatives or friends. Though the 
SS made a point of periodically sending the Sonderkommando teams them-
selves to the gas chambers and replacing them with a new batch, so that no 
witness would remain, nevertheless a few did leave written records or did 
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survive to testify to their inhuman experience. These survivors had seen 
the gas chambers at their work of extermination with their own eyes and so 
could bypass Lyotard’s aporia.
 Second aporia: Turning the Nazi genocide into a fiction of any kind, “aes-
theticizing” it, is inherently a deeply suspect operation, perhaps a form of 
putting the reader under anesthetic. On the one hand, the more successful 
the novel is as a novel, the further away it may be from Auschwitz. Perhaps. 
That is what Elie Wiesel says in my second epigraph. On the other hand, 
Imre Kertész may have been right when he said more than once in a recent 
oral communication that all testimony to Auschwitz, even the most overtly 
autobiographical, is “fiction.”4 He certainly did not mean that the Holocaust 
is a fiction in the sense meant by Holocaust deniers who say the Shoah never 
happened. Quite the reverse. It is crucial to be clear about this. I think Ker-
tész meant that any narrative of the Holocaust is a selective and ordered 
sequence. I extrapolate on my own from what Kertész said to affirm that any 
narrative of a concentration camp experience by a survivor, from the most 
autobiographical to the most fictional transposition, is a putting together of 
somewhat arbitrarily chosen details to make a story out of them. This “put-
ting together” is not inherent in the details themselves. Any narrating puts 
the facts in constructed form, though the facts remain facts. I would express 
this by saying that Auschwitz narratives, whether autobiographical or fic-
tional, are not just an ordering of facts but an interpretation of them, a pass-
ing judgment on them—in short, a bearing witness to them.
 This essay centers on the claim that the form of storytelling Kertész 
employs in Fatelessness made it possible for him to bear witness to Ausch-
witz more effectively than he could otherwise have done and that the novel 
itself dramatizes within itself the reasons for this.
 Performing a “rhetorical reading” or a “narratological reading” of a novel 
like Fatelessness, with close attention to the text, to the way it operates its 
performative magic of testifying to Auschwitz, may just compound that pos-
sible shame of writing fiction about Auschwitz. I distinguish between the two 
forms of reading I have just named. A rhetorical reading, in the sense I mean 
it, especially attends to patterns of tropes, to the function of recurrent terms, 
to stylistic features such as irony. A narratological reading concerns itself 
with narrators, points of view, plot structure, and other matters of narrative 
form. My reading somewhat uneasily combines these two. They cannot in 
any case be sharply divided. Either form or any combination may be subject 
to the obstacle Maurice Blanchot identifies in The Writing of the Disaster: “all 
theories, however different they may be, constantly change places with one 
another, distinct each from the next only because of the writing which sup-
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ports them and which thus escapes the very theories purporting to judge it” 
(80).
 How can we in good conscience perform either sort of theory-based 
analysis, or any combination, with something so serious as bearing witness 
to Auschwitz? On the one hand, analytical commentary, with its scrupulous 
distinctions, such as I am performing here, is perhaps just a way to protect 
oneself from the affective force of Fatelessness, so disabling its testimonial 
force, anesthetizing oneself as reader. The story this novel tells is certainly 
hard to take. The reader resists confronting it directly. On the other hand, 
can a critical analysis of a novel that bears witness to Auschwitz be itself a 
form of testimony or at least a form of testimony’s effective transmission, in 
defiance of Paul Celan’s assertion, mentioned again below, that no one bears 
witness for the witness (179)?
impediments to bearing Witness to Auschwitz
The obstacles to testifying to Auschwitz are inscribed in the novel itself in 
the displaced form of difficulties Kertész’s protagonist, Gyuri,5 has in getting 
his experiences understood by those he encounters on his way home after 
being liberated and when he first arrives back in Budapest. These encoun-
ters dramatize the problems Kertész himself may have felt he faced in trying, 
a good many years after his experience in the camps, to write a novel that 
would work as a successful testimony to Auschwitz. Though these episodes 
come at the end of the novel, I need to discuss them now in order to establish 
the problem of bearing witness to Auschwitz as Kertész’s protagonist expe-
rienced that problem. I hope the reader will forgive my metalepsis, putting 
the cart before the horse. My procedure may be especially unforgivable, and 
therefore in need of forgiveness, because Kertész himself follows such a strict 
chronological order in his own narration. The logic of my own argumenta-
tion, the story I am telling, is different, however, from that of the novel itself. 
Expressing cogently my reading of the novel necessitates turning at this point 
to the end of Gyuri’s story.
 My hypothesis is that the choice of writing a work of fiction rather than 
a memoir, and the choice of the narrative strategies Kertész employs in Fate-
lessness, were his solutions to an experience of blank incomprehension such 
as he ascribes to Gyuri when he comes home from Buchenwald after its 
liberation. I must now show how that encounter with incomprehension is 
dramatized by displacement to a fictional protagonist. After that, I shall then 
move on to consideration of the function of irony and other stylistic features 
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in the novel and then to the way Kertész’s narrative strategies are employed 
in the climactic episode of the novel, its peripeteia or turning point: Gyuri’s 
almost becoming what was called at Auschwitz, a Muselmann, that is, some-
one near death from starvation, overwork, and abuse. That episode includes 
another example of the way Gyuri’s cool irony serves an essential narrative 
function in this fictional testimony. I shall return finally to an explanation of 
the title and the title’s relation to Kertész’s choice of a strictly chronological 
narration as the right way to testify to the Shoah. These three sections are 
approaches from different perspectives to giving an account of Fatelessness.
 At the end of the novel, Gyuri, having miraculously survived until the 
liberation of the camps, makes his way back home to Budapest, penniless 
and still wearing his prison uniform. Along the way and when he reaches 
his native city, he has four confrontations that bring home to him the dif-
ficulties of communicating what he has experienced, five if you count the 
meeting with his mother he is starting toward as the novel ends and which 
he anticipates as though it were fated to happen in a certain way. The reader 
is not told how that reunion comes off, though Gyuri says, “My mother was 
waiting, and would no doubt greatly rejoice over me” (262).
 The first encounter takes place on the way home, in an unnamed city 
where Gyuri hears “a lot of Hungarian being spoken as well as Czech” (240). 
As Gyuri waits for the next train, a stranger in the street approaches him 
and asks whether he “personally, however, did not ascertain this [the exis-
tence of the gas chambers] with your own eyes.” When he answers, truth-
fully, “no,” since, as he says, he would be dead if he had, the stranger says, 
“I see,” and walks away “unless I was very much mistaken, satisfied in some 
manner” (242). “Unless I was very much mistaken” is one of those either/or 
reservations characteristic of Gyuri’s narration. The significance of these is 
discussed below. The implication is that the man who interrogates Gyuri is 
an Auschwitz denier whose refusal to believe will now be confirmed. That 
implication is less explicit in the film version, since the sentence I have just 
quoted about his interlocutor’s satisfaction is, naturally, missing, as it is part 
of the narrator’s report of Gyuri’s thoughts. You cannot film thoughts or 
internal monologue, except by the extremely awkward and anti-cinematic 
device of a disembodied voiceover. In the film we have only the denier’s facial 
expression to go by.
 The second confrontation is with Bandi Citrom’s sister and mother in 
their apartment on Forget-me-not Road. Bandi was Gyuri’s only true friend 
in the camps, though he abandons Gyuri when the latter is on the way to 
becoming a Muselmann. Bandi had spoken with nostalgia about what a won-
derful place Forget-me-not Road is, though Gyuri finds it shabby enough 
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when, even before going home, he goes to Bandi Citrom’s house to see if 
Bandi has survived and made it home. The painful confrontation with Ban-
di’s sister and mother reveals that Bandi has not returned and that almost 
certainly he has died in the camp. Gyuri makes no attempt to tell Bandi’s 
sister and mother what the camps were like.
 The third confrontation is a most unsatisfactory conversation with a 
journalist. Gyuri meets this reporter on a tramcar on his way home from 
Bandi Citrom’s house. This man tries, unsuccessfully, to get Gyuri to acqui-
esce to a whole set of clichés about the camps, for example, “Can we imagine 
a concentration camp as anything but a hell?” (248). The journalist is greatly 
annoyed when Gyuri says he knows nothing about hell, but the difference, 
he guesses, is that it is impossible to be bored in hell, whereas he was some-
times bored, even in Auschwitz. He tells the journalist that his primary feel-
ing, now that he is back home in Budapest, is “hatred.” Hatred of whom? 
“Everyone.” The journalist asks, “Did you have to endure many horrors?” 
To which Gyuri replies, “it all depended what he considered to be a horror” 
(247). Finally, the journalist says, “No, it’s impossible to imagine it” (250), 
with which the narrating Gyuri remembers being in silent agreement. He 
soon ends the conversation, though the journalist wants to help him write 
and publish his memories of the camps.
 The implication is that journalistic clichés about the camps are not a suc-
cessful bearing witness, while the narrative strategies Kertész uses in Fate-
lessness may possibly succeed, for example, in the passage the reader is at 
that moment reading. Writing a novel about Auschwitz rather than a factual 
account within the constraints of journalistic conventions is here implicitly 
defended as the right way to bear witness, in blank contradiction to what 
Wiesel was later to assert, as cited in the second of my epigraphs for this 
essay.
 The fourth encounter is an equally unsatisfactory meeting with two 
members of what is left of Gyuri’s original community. His father has died 
at Mauthausen, and his stepmother has remarried. An impassioned speech 
from Gyuri only angers his Uncle Fleischmann and his Uncle Steiner. (They 
are apparently not blood relatives, but are called “uncles” because they are 
intimate friends and neighbors of his family.) Uncle Fleischmann asks him 
about his plans for the future. Gyuri answers that he has not given it much 
thought, whereupon Uncle Steiner tells him that he “must put the horrors 
behind you. . . . in order . . . to be able to live” (256). “Live freely,” adds Uncle 
Fleischmann. Gyuri reacts negatively to these suggestions. For one thing, he 
says, he would be unable to forget unless he were to suffer some injury or 
disease that would affect his mind. Moreover, he does not want to forget.
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 This painful confrontation is the climax of Gyuri’s discovery that though 
he feels an obligation to testify to his experiences, a direct account of them 
seems to convey nothing. It confirms, rather, the second half of Blanchot’s 
contradictory injunction in my third epigraph: “know what has happened, 
do not forget, and at the same time never will you know.” Gyuri’s explanatory 
speech to his uncles just makes them angry. His visit to them is broken off 
in the recognition that they have understood nothing and did not want to 
understand anything: “But I could see they did not wish to understand any-
thing, and so, picking up my kit bag and cap, I departed in the midst of a few 
disjointed words and motions, one more unfinished gesture and incomplete 
utterance from each” (261). This is the hyperbolic climax of Gyuri’s experi-
ence of the difficulty of testifying to Auschwitz.
ironic narration as Witnessing
The narrative strategies of Fatelessness repay with interest minute rhetorical 
and narratological analysis. Just what is that interest? It comes back as a kind 
of supplementary repayment, a plus value, for close attention to the words on 
the page. That plus value may include a deeper understanding of what is at 
stake in trying to bear witness to Auschwitz in a fictional work.
 As I said above, a powerful film of Fatelessness, with a script by Ker-
tész, called Fateless, is available on DVD. Space limitations here forbid the 
extended analysis this admirable film deserves. Moving and disturbing as the 
cinematic version is, however, partly through putting before the viewer’s eyes 
the atrocities and sufferings the reader of the novel must imagine on the basis 
of the words on the page, the film has great difficulty finding graphic equiva-
lents for the verbal complexities of Gyuri’s narration in the novel proper. 
These are essential to the novel’s meaning. As is always the case, the juxtapo-
sition of novel and film has great value as a means of identifying distinctive 
features in each medium by way of differences between one and the other.
 The film makes intermittent and quite effective use of the protagonist’s 
speech in voice-over. That disembodied voice repeats some important things 
that are said by the first-person narrating-I or by the experiencing-I in the 
novel. Nevertheless, only part of this level of discourse is given. The perva-
sive irony of the novel is more or less missing, naturally, from the film. I say 
this is natural because irony is essentially a linguistic effect, not a visual one, 
though of course something somewhat like irony can arise from the juxtapo-
sition of images. What is given in the novel as Gyuri’s sharp vision of things, 
a vision that makes him a kind of camera eye, becomes in the film the actual 
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“camera eye” vision, often a vision of Gyuri’s silent and more or less impas-
sive face, seen, naturally, from the outside, something the novel nowhere 
presents. The explicit theme of the Muselmann, so important in the novel 
and in my reading of it later in this essay, is absent, oddly, from the film, 
though the film powerfully presents Gyuri’s near-death in a way that closely 
follows the novel.
 I have seen the Hungarian original of the novel. It was available online in 
2007, though the site is now unavailable. Happily, I downloaded it in time. 
The Hungarian original has been helpful to my reading, even though I do 
not know Hungarian. My ignorance means that it is an act of chutzpah to 
pretend to be able to talk intelligently about this novel. A painful inability 
by Gyuri to understand what is being said around him in the camps, since 
so many different languages are spoken there, is one of the ways the survival 
of community is endangered in Fatelessness. To compare great things with 
small, my inability to read Fatelessness in the original Hungarian may possi-
bly give me a vague idea of what it must have been like for Kertész (or Gyuri) 
to be surrounded by a Babel of languages he did not understand. The differ-
ence, and it is a huge difference, is that a failure to understand in Auschwitz 
was likely to be a matter of life or death, whereas nothing more is at stake in 
my linguistic inability than my scholarly competence to write about Fateless-
ness at all.
 Kertész’s solutions to the aporias I have identified included his choice 
of a first-person mode of narration and his use of irony as the basic form of 
discourse in that narration. The narratological presupposition of Fatelessness 
is to tell in the first person the story of a fifteen-year-old Hungarian Jew-
ish boy’s experiences of arrest in Budapest in 1944, near the end of World 
War II; his deportation to Auschwitz along with hundreds of thousands of 
other Hungarian Jews, most of whom died; and then his survival in the labor 
camps at Buchenwald and Zeitz, that is, the Wille subcamp of Buchenwald, 
nearby to the town of Zeitz. Zeitz was a labor camp for work in the synthetic 
oil factory in that town. The story that Kertész’s hero tells matches closely 
many details about life in the camps given, for example, in the overtly auto-
biographical accounts by Primo Levi in Survival in Auschwitz and by Elie 
Wiesel in Night.
 Gyuri is presented as a “cool,” detached, ironic, more or less affectless 
teenager, who nevertheless (or perhaps as a result) has an extremely sharp 
eye for details of what he witnesses, for example, what other people look like. 
He also has an extraordinary ability to put in retrospect what he has seen into 
words, a sharp intelligence devoted to figuring things out for himself, and a 
quiet “stubbornness” (138) that contributes to his extremely unlikely, and in 
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many ways fortuitous, survival. “Stubbornness” is an important word in the 
novel, as I shall show.
 Gyuri’s experiences are narrated in strict chronological order. No confus-
ing time shifts for Kertész. The novel narrates one vivid present after another, 
in “fateless” sequence. I shall identify later the significance of this narrato-
logical choice. The past is rarely explicitly remembered in the present by the 
protagonist whose story the narrator is telling, the experiencing-I, and the 
future is almost completely unpredictable to him.
 I call the hero then “the protagonist,” or “the experiencing-I,” and the 
hero now narrating his past experiences “the narrator,” or “the narrating-I,” 
in this first-person novel. Protagonist and narrator are two aspects of the 
same person, separated by the gulf between the unidentified present of the 
narration and the past of what is narrated. They are also separated by the fact 
that the narrator knows that Gyuri survived to return to Budapest, while the 
protagonist lived from moment to moment in danger of imminent death. 
The narrator is granted, apparently, the ability to remember everything, as is 
a common convention of first-person novels. These differences between the 
narrating-I and the experiencing-I require distinguishing, as with most first-
person novels, the language of the protagonist then from the language of the 
narrator now. Sometimes, however, that may be difficult or even impossible 
to do. This is parallel to the ambiguities of telling whose language is being 
used in free indirect discourse: that of the protagonist or that of the narra-
tor who speaks in the third-person past tense on the protagonist’s behalf. 
Periodic use of the present tense in Fatelessness (as in the opening sentence: 
“I didn’t go to school today” [3]) plays an important role in reinforcing the 
experiencing-I’s absorption in the present moment when the events now 
narrated in retrospect actually took place.
 Gyuri is granted by Kertész an extremely active mind. That activity is 
devoted to interpreting what he sees, hears, and feels, even when starvation 
and infections bring him to the brink of death, almost to the state of the 
Muselmänner in the camps. The basic narrative assumption of Fatelessness 
is that Gyuri has no understanding of the details of what he sees and hears 
until he figures them out firsthand for himself. He is fooled into thinking 
he is leaving Hungary for work, not to be starved, beaten, and most prob-
ably gassed and cremated. Many other deportees were similarly fooled. The 
reader knows, the retrospectively narrating Gyuri knows, and Kertész knows, 
but the experiencing Gyuri does not at first know, that the strange smell at 
Auschwitz is the burning bodies of the gassed in the crematoria. He thinks at 
first that those chimneys with billowing black smoke are tanneries. He does 
not understand at first that those sent to the right-hand group in the initial 
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Selektion at Auschwitz will be immediately gassed and cremated, including 
boys in the group arrested with him who are too fat or who have poor eye-
sight or weak muscles. However, Gyuri figures all this out by the end of his 
first day in Auschwitz. His understanding is based on the evidence of his 
senses and on what he hears other prisoners say. Part of the force of the novel 
depends on presenting these unspeakable atrocities as an understanding of 
them gradually replaces the ignorance and innocence of an intelligent and 
observant teenager. The reader knows these atrocities already in a general 
way, but seeing them in this new form, through the eyes of someone who was 
from moment to moment in mortal danger and who only gradually realized 
this, brings these “horrors” home to the reader, proves them on his or her 
pulses, in a particularly unforgettable way.
 Fatelessness is told throughout in a mode of ironic understatement that 
matches Gyuri’s detached observation. Irony is an aspect of Gyuri’s teenage 
“coolness” (Eszter). The irony is related to another salient stylistic feature 
of Fatelessness. This feature is a cognitive or discursive counterpart to the 
distressing performative uncertainty of that trope that is not a trope: irony. 
Irony is a way of doing something with words, but that something is to put 
the reader in a suspended condition of uncertainty. If irony says two incom-
patible things at once, cutting both ways, Gyuri’s explicit judgments, though 
they are based on his stubborn innate commitment to seeing clearly and to 
understanding correctly, also are an enunciation in cognitive terms of ironic 
suspension or parabasis. Gyuri registers his cognitive uncertainty as part of 
his truth-telling testimony.
 Gyuri is systematically unwilling or unable to make any straightforward, 
unequivocal judgment about anything he sees. He is, moreover, too honest to 
pretend otherwise. Even though he says more than once “no two ways about 
it” (154), as if to put an end to his “either/or,” his judgments are characteristi-
cally accompanied by an often extraordinary series of qualifications, provi-
sos, revisions, contradictions, and assertions of uncertainty. For Gyuri, there 
are “two ways about” more or less anything he sees. Here is one example 
among many: “I noticed that the emotion gratified them, gave them some 
sort of pleasure, the way I saw it. Indeed—and I could have been mistaken 
of course, though I don’t think so . . .” (213). This qualified assertion is mov-
ingly ironic because it comes as part of an episode in which one of the doc-
tors who are treating Gyuri in the camp hospital gets him to tell the story of 
how he was arrested and sent to Auschwitz. The doctor then passes that story 
on to other doctors and patients. The emotion in question is pity: “In the 
end, I found that people on all sides were looking at me, heads shaking, and 
with a most singular emotion on their faces, which was a little embarrassing 
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because, as best I could tell, they were feeling sorry for me. I felt a strong 
urge to tell them there was no need for that after all, at least not right at that 
moment, but I ended up saying nothing, something held me back, somehow 
I couldn’t find it in my heart to do so, because . . .” (213). Then follows the 
passage already cited: “I noticed the emotion gratified them,” and so on.
 Gyuri doesn’t say anything not because he thinks pity for him is justified, 
but for the strange and ironically dissonant reason that he cannot bring him-
self, in this concentration camp hospital, to deprive the doctors, orderlies, 
and patients of the pleasure of feeling sorry for him. He is not even sure that 
he is right about the emotion he thinks they are feeling, but he says they were 
feeling sorry for him “as best I could tell.” In saying this, Gyuri is being true 
to one important law of this first-person narration. This law decrees that no 
direct access is possible to the minds of other people, such as an omniscient 
or telepathic third-person narrator might have.
 The sequence is a good example of the ironic disjunction between the 
language of the experiencing-I and the language of the narrating-I. It also 
exemplifies the difficulties of distinguishing with certainty between those 
two languages, particularly in a narrative that is ironic through and through. 
The statement “I noticed that the emotion gratified them, gave them some 
kind of pleasure, the way I saw it” must be, the reader thinks—if she thinks 
about it at all—the narrating-I reporting in the past tense what the expe-
riencing-I noticed and saw. The statement “I could have been mistaken of 
course, though I don’t think so,” the reader assumes, must be the narrating-
I’s present judgment on the accuracy of the experiencing-I’s judgment. But 
is this absolutely certain, plausible as it seems? “I noticed that the emotion 
gratified them,” and the rest, could be either the narrating-I putting words in 
the experiencing-I’s mouth, or it could be a transposition into the past tense 
of Gyuri in the past thinking to himself in the present tense: “The way I see 
it, the emotion gratifies them, gives them some sort of pleasure. I could be 
mistaken of course, though I don’t think so.” After all, the narrating-I has 
earlier in the sentence told in the past tense about the pity that the expe-
riencing-I discerned in those who had just heard his story, “as best I could 
tell.” That seems clearly to be a reporting of the experiencing-I’s evaluation. 
Still, “I don’t think so” seems indubitably a statement of the narrating-I’s 
judgment in the present of what the experiencing-I saw and judged in the 
past. This linguistic mixture corresponds to the psychological or phenom-
enological mixture within any person’s consciousness at a given moment of 
features that belong to the past and features that belong to her or his pres-
ent memory of the past. It is hard to tell, in a given sample of first-person 
narration, whether the words on the page reflect the experiencing-I’s trans-
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formation of perhaps initially wordless thoughts, feelings, and observations 
(if there are such things) into words that accompanied them, in the endless 
dialogues that we carry on with ourselves all the time, or whether the nar-
rating-I has given language to what was originally, then, a wordless event of 
experiencing.
 Gyuri’s ironic understatement functions powerfully to generate pity in 
me too. What has happened to Gyuri is truly atrocious. The Aristotelian 
tragic emotions of pity and fear are appropriate responses—pity for Gyuri 
and fear that a similar fate might in some unforeseen way happen to me. 
Something not entirely dissimilar has happened even today for those who 
have been unjustly imprisoned in Guantánamo Bay or who have been sub-
jected to “extraordinary rendition” and then torture in a foreign jail. Kertész 
has given a name by displacement to the emotion the reader should feel 
when reading Fatelessness, though he has also warned the reader against tak-
ing too much pleasure in that feeling of pity.
 James Phelan, in Living to Tell about It, identifies three main functions 
of narrators: reporting, interpreting, and evaluating. Gyuri as the narrat-
ing-I certainly performs all those functions, but it is not always easy to be 
sure just which Gyuri is doing the performing of these linguistic acts, or 
whose language the reader is encountering. Kertész’s narrating-I in this novel 
appears to be that happy thing, a reliable narrator. He is restricted, however, 
to reporting, interpreting, and evaluating Gyuri’s experiences in the camps 
from Gyuri’s perspective. This exemplifies another of Phelan’s narratological 
terms: “restricted narration.” Kertész’s narrator can only show the way events 
appeared to other characters by means of what they say. Direct access to the 
minds of others is forbidden. This means that both Gyuris may conceiv-
ably be mistaken. The narrating-I may conceivably have forgotten something 
important. The reader has no way to know for sure since no other perspec-
tive is given. We do not have access to any outside confirmation of the testi-
mony the narrating Gyuri proffers.
 There is no way out of this uncertainty within a first-person narration. 
Testimony is a performative enunciation, not a constative one. Any testi-
mony is, like that of a witness in a court case, implicitly prefaced by a per-
formative oath: “I swear this is what I saw with my own eyes and heard with 
my own ears.” The one who hears the testimony, a jury member, for example, 
must believe, without being able to prove, that the witness thinks he or she 
is telling the truth. Even if what the witness says is demonstrably wrong, that 
does not mean she does not think she is right. The possibility of forgetting 
what the camps are like, even by a survivor, is named in the last sentence of 
the novel, in a moving conclusion, to which I shall return.
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 For Gyuri, in any case, I mean that for both the experiencing-I and the 
narrating-I, in their often inextricable entanglement or superimposition, 
there often are “two ways about” anything he experiences. A frequent locu-
tion is something like “from another angle, though,” or “from yet another 
angle, though” (135, 250). The ironic suspension of certain knowledge char-
acteristic of Gyuri’s narration is expressed in these locutions.
The Muselmann and his Witnessing Survivor
I want now to identify an additional important feature of Fatelessness as a 
fictional bearing witness to Auschwitz. Everything I have written so far has 
been preparation, staging, mise-en-scène, for this section of my argument. 
The denouement of Gyuri’s story, its resolution or untying, is his return 
home, his four encounters with uncomprehending people who have not 
been in the camps, his development of his concept of “fatelessness,” and his 
turning away in silence from his “uncles,” when they do not understand, to 
make his way toward his mother. The peripeteia, or turning point, of Fate-
lessness is the moment, earlier in the narrative, when Gyuri returns to life, so 
to speak, after almost becoming a Muselmann. I say “almost” because once 
one becomes veritably a Muselmann, as witnesses testify, return is almost 
impossible and rarely occurs. Gyuri retains his lucid vigilance even in this 
extremity, when he is nearest to death, as, we are told, the true Muselmänner 
did not. This stubborn, unquenchable lucidity and Gyuri’s return from the 
Muselmann condition are two of the quasi-miraculous features of Fateless-
ness, along with all the other “miracles” that allow him to become a survivor, 
against all odds.
 Just what is a Muselmann? It is a name given by prisoners in the camps 
to those other prisoners who, through starvation, overwork, beatings, and 
repeated abuse, both physical and verbal, by the SS guards, became reduced 
to walking corpses, zombies, “mummy-men,” dead–alive nonhuman persons 
who had lost the will to live. Such prisoners may have been called Muselmän-
ner because they swayed their upper bodies rhythmically back and forth 
as they stood in place, or stumbled forward, or crouched on the ground, 
like Muslims at prayer time. Those who came back from this living death, 
however, claim that they made this movement to avoid getting pneumo-
nia. Almost all of the Muselmänner were gassed or simply died of starvation 
or abuse, but a few survived. Giorgio Agamben, at the end of Remnants of 
Auschwitz (166–71), cites some of the moving testimony of those who can 
say, “I was a Muselmann.” Filiksa Piekarska, for example, writes, “I person-
J .  h i l l i S  m i l l e r  37
ally was a Muselmann for a short while. . . . I completely collapsed as far as 
my psychological life was concerned. The collapse took the following form: I 
was overcome by a general apathy; nothing interested me; I no longer reacted 
either to external or internal stimuli; I stopped washing, even when there 
was water; I no longer even felt hungry” (cited in Agamben 166). The other 
survivors of the camps testify that those who were not Muselmänner left the 
Muselmänner strictly alone, as if nothing more could be done to help them. 
They were outside the human community.
 Agamben argues, in his admirable chapter “The Muselmann,” in Rem-
nants of Auschwitz (41–86), that perhaps even worse than the millions of 
murders in the gas chambers was the reduction of so many living human 
beings, before they were actually killed, to the dead–alive, human–inhuman 
state of the Muselmänner: “The Muselmann is not only or not so much a limit 
between life and death; rather, he marks the threshold between the human 
and the inhuman.  .  .  . There is thus a point at which human beings, while 
apparently remaining human beings, cease to be human” (55).
 The Muselmann chapter of Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz is cen-
trally devoted to developing what he calls “Levi’s paradox.” It is a version of 
the paradox I cited from Lyotard at the beginning of this essay. On the one 
hand, Levi asserts categorically that “We survivors are not only an exiguous 
but also an anomalous minority: we are those who by their prevarications or 
abilities or good luck did not touch bottom. Those who did so, those who 
saw the Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute, 
but they are the ‘Muslims,’ the submerged, the complete witnesses, the ones 
whose deposition would have a general significance. They are the rule, we 
are the exception” (The Drowned 83–84).
 “No one,” as Paul Celan says, “bears witness for the witness” (179). No 
one but the Muselmänner can testify to what it was like to be a Muselmann. 
On the other hand, the Muselmänner could not, cannot, speak for them-
selves. Only those who did not fully become Muselmänner and survived 
can bear witness by proxy for these exclusively privileged witnesses. But the 
Muselmänner had nothing to say for themselves any more than did those 
who were gassed and cremated. It is impossible to bear witness for them. 
That is what Agamben means by saying that “the survivors bore witness to 
something it is impossible to bear witness to” (13). Here is Levi’s formulation 
of this in The Drowned and the Saved:
We who were favored by fate tried, with more or less wisdom, to recount 
not only our own fate but also that of the others, indeed of the drowned 
[Levi’s word here for the Muselmänner]; but this was a discourse “on behalf 
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of third parties,” the story of things seen at close hand, not experienced 
personally. The destruction brought to an end, the job completed, was not 
told by anyone, just as no one ever returned to describe his own death. Even 
if they had paper and pen, the drowned would not have testified because 
their death had begun before that of their body. Weeks and months before 
being snuffed out, they had already lost the ability to observe, to remem-
ber, to compare and express themselves. We speak in their stead, by proxy. 
(83–84)
 This speaking by proxy, however, is impossible. It is an absurd project. 
As Agamben says, “And yet to speak here of a proxy makes no sense; the 
drowned have nothing to say, nor do they have instructions or memories to 
be transmitted. They have no ‘story’ . . . , no ‘face,’ and even less do they have 
‘thought.’ . . . Whoever assumes the charge of bearing witness in their name 
knows that he or she must bear witness in the name of the impossibility of 
bearing witness” (34). Agamben’s book ends with the claim that the survivors 
who can say “I was a Muselmann” do not refute Levi’s paradox but utter its 
most extreme and verifying formulation: “I, who speak, was a Muselmann, 
that is, the one who cannot in any sense speak” (165). As Agamben asserts, 
Levi’s paradox “implies two contradictory propositions: 1) ‘the Muselmann is 
the non-human, the one who could never bear witness,’ and 2) ‘the one who 
cannot bear witness is the true witness, the absolute witness’” (150).
 The hero of Fatelessness suspends, or, rather, expresses in a unique way, 
Levi’s paradox by combining in one person both the narrator, the narrating-
I, and the protagonist, the experiencing-I, both the “complete witness,” the 
Muselmann, and the proxy who bears witness for what it is impossible to 
bear witness to. Kertész’s evasion of Levi’s paradox is perhaps one that is only 
possible, for him at least, by way of a particular exploitation of the conven-
tions of fictional representation. Kertész’s genius, I claim, was to understand 
that and to give Fatelessness the form of a first-person novel. Like all first-
person novels, the narrative language of Fatelessness combines two persons, 
the Gyuri who had the experience of the camps and the narrating Gyuri who 
has survived that experience to tell the tale. It is as though Kurtz and Marlow, 
in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, were combined in one person. Or rather, the 
experiencing Gyuri is already doubled into the almost Muselmann and the 
lucid vigilance that is still aware of what is happening to him and that can 
therefore survive into a future remembering. That doubling is then doubled 
again by the narrating-I in the present looking back and reporting on what 
the experiencing Gyuri experienced. What distinguishes Gyuri, as I have 
already emphasized, is his extremely sharp eyes, ears, nose, and touch, his 
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observation of sights, sounds, and tactile sensations, along with his excep-
tional ability to turn all these into succinct, vivid language that carries them 
over to the reader.
 Essential to the meaning of Fatelessness is that Gyuri, in defiance of the 
standard descriptions of the Muselmänner and even against physiological 
probability, retains his remarkable lucidity even when he almost becomes a 
Muselmann. He is able to tell the reader in retrospect just what it felt like to 
be almost a Muselmann. That wakeful vigilance is mirrored, at least for sight 
and sound, and without the ironic narrator’s commentary, by the camera eye 
and the recording microphone in the film version of Fatelessness.
 The Muselmänner first appear in Fatelessness soon after Gyuri arrives at 
Zeitz. His description of them is as vivid and specific as any other testimo-
nies to their existence in the camps that we have. Describing certain of the 
prisoners from Riga, Gyuri shifts from the present tense, a kind of eternal 
present maintained in existence by testimony, to the past tense, in the midst 
of a sentence, and then back to the present tense, at least in the translation. 
He also uses his characteristic ironic understatement, for example, “a little 
disconcerting,” as well as his gift for startling but apt metaphor:
Among them one can see those peculiar beings who at first were a little 
disconcerting. Viewed from a certain distance, they are senilely doddering 
old codgers, and with their heads retracted into their necks, their noses 
sticking out from their faces, the filthy prison duds that they wear hanging 
loosely from their shoulders, even on the hottest summer’s day they put 
one in mind of winter crows with a perpetual chill. As if with each and 
every single stiff, halting step they take one were to ask: is such an effort 
really worth the trouble? (138)
Gyuri’s new Hungarian friend, Bandi Citrom, warns him away from the 
Muselmänner. “You lose any will to live just looking at them,” he says (138). 
In the next chapter, chapter 7, many pages later, Gyuri recounts his own 
transformation almost into a Muselmann and his quasi-miraculous recovery 
from that state. Note that I say “almost.” If he had gone all the way, he would 
not have returned to tell his tale. Gradually reduced to lassitude, weakness, 
and semiconsciousness, he stops washing or in other ways taking care of 
himself. He gets, in short, almost in the state of those Muselmänner he had 
looked at so curiously when he first entered the work camp:
I can report that, after so much striving, so many futile attempts and 
efforts, in time I too found peace, tranquility, and relief. For instance, cer-
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tain things to which I had attributed some vast, practically inconceivable 
significance, I can tell you, lost all importance in my eyes. Thus, if I grew 
tired while standing at Appell, for example, without so much as a look at 
whether it was muddy or there was a puddle, I would simply take a seat, 
plop down, and stay down, until my neighbors forcibly pulled me up. Cold, 
damp, wind, or rain were no longer able to bother me; they did not get 
through to me, I did not even sense them. Even my hunger passed; I con-
tinued to carry to my mouth anything edible I was able to lay my hands on, 
but more out of absentmindedness, mechanically, out of habit, so to say. As 
for work, I no longer even strove to give the appearance of it. If people did 
not like that, at most they would beat me, and even then they could not 
truly do much harm, since for me it just won some time: at the first blow 
I would promptly stretch out on the ground and would feel nothing after 
that, since I would meanwhile drop off to sleep. (171–72)
 Bandi Citrom tells Gyuri he is “letting himself go” and forcibly washes 
him. Bandi can tell from Gyuri’s face, however, when he asks him, “did I 
maybe not want to get home,” that Gyuri is becoming, or has already become, 
a Muselmann. True to the “opinion he had once expressed about Muslims” 
(173) and true to what other survivors say about the way the Muselmänner 
were ignored, given up for lost, Bandi Citrom abandons Gyuri henceforth. 
After Citrom turns him over to the infirmary, they never see one another 
again. The rest of the chapter describes with extreme precision Gyuri’s expe-
riences in various infirmaries and hospitals inside Zeitz and eventually back 
again in Buchenwald.
 A good example of the superimposition of the two experiencing Gyuris 
is a passage in which he describes himself lying outdoors in the rain after 
his return to Buchenwald, waiting to be taken to the hospital. On the one 
hand, he is practically in a Muselmann state: “it seemed I must have lain 
there in that way for some time, and I was getting on just fine, peacefully, 
placidly, incuriously, patiently, where they had set me down” (186). On the 
other hand, Gyuri, even in that extremity, has a clear and precise vision of 
what he can see above him: “the low, gray, impenetrable sky, for instance, or 
to be more precise the leaden, sluggishly moving wintry cloud-cover, which 
concealed it from view” (186, my italics). This sky is shown in the film ver-
sion as a shot of what Gyuri sees as he lies peacefully on the cold, wet ground. 
The passage in the novel goes on to name, in a style that shifts from realistic 
description toward allegorical picture, the way the leaden sky is intermit-
tently “parted by an unexpected rent, with a more brilliant gap arising in it 
here and there for a fleeting moment, and that was like a sudden intimation 
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of a depth out of which a ray was seemingly being cast on me from above” 
(186). That ray seems to Gyuri like “a rapid, searching gaze, an eye of inde-
terminate but unquestionably pale hue—similar to that of the doctor before 
whom I had once passed, back in Auschwitz” (186). The sky’s metaphoric 
gaze reminds Gyuri of the searching gaze of the doctor in the Selektion at 
Auschwitz. That doctor probably knew that Gyuri was lying when he said he 
was sixteen, but he saved him from immediate gassing nevertheless.
 Sure enough, this moment is followed a couple of pages later by Gyuri’s 
arrival in a handcart with other dead–alive Muselmänner inside Buchenwald. 
He gets a whiff of the familiar turnip soup of the camp, weeps a few tears 
from his dried-out eyes, and, in a moment that is especially emotional for 
the reader too, recovers, senselessly, his will to live. This is without doubt 
the turning point of the novel. Gyuri describes it with characteristic irony: 
“Despite all deliberation, sense, insight, and sober reason, I could not fail to 
recognize within myself the furtive and yet—ashamed as it might be, so to 
say, of its irrationality—increasingly insistent voice of some muffled craving 
of sorts: I would like to live a little bit longer in this beautiful concentration 
camp” (189).
 In the topsy-turvy world of those who have been reduced to the condi-
tion of Muselmänner, the natural will to live is unnatural. What would be 
most natural, sensible, and reasonable would be the will to die. Two pages 
earlier, as he and other prisoners lay there in the rain, a camp guard had quiz-
zically asked one of Gyuri’s fellow prisoners, the man whose refrain is still, in 
his extremity, “I p . . . pro . . . protest,” “Was? Du willst noch leben?” (“What? 
You still want to live?”) (187). The return of Gyuri’s will to live is the novel’s 
moment of reversal. It marks the instant of Gyuri’s exit from an almost-
Muselmann state that has always been shared with another Gyuri, the one 
who, even in his extremity, can see his condition and his surroundings with 
sober, ironic clarity, can look up in the rain toward the gaze of the distant 
judging sky, and later on, as the narrating I, can report in precise language 
what he so vividly remembers.
 Gyuri is able to solve Levi’s paradox or at least to live his life in an acute 
demonstration that it is impossible to solve. During all of chapter 7, Gyuri 
is both almost the complete witness and the proxy witness who testifies on 
that witness’s behalf. This is so even though it remains impossible to bear 
witness to the experience of either being gassed or having become one of 
the “drowned,” to have seen the lethal Gorgon’s face that turns the viewer to 
stone (to echo Levi’s figures in The Drowned and the Saved), to have crossed 
the border into the state from which there is no return, the state of the 
Muselmänner.
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 The genius of Fatelessness is the way in which Kertész has been able to 
combine in one person the Muselmann and his proxy witness in a novel that 
bears witness to something to which it is impossible to bear witness. That 
“something” has as one of its components “the conflagration of community.” 
Bearing witness depends on the survival of community along with the legal 
and conventional forms of obligation and togetherness, or Mitsein, that com-
munity entails. No community, no bearing witness. The Nazis deliberately 
destroyed, as best they could, Jewish communities both in the ghettos and 
then in the extermination camps. Nevertheless, Fatelessness and other testi-
monies report the continuation even in the camps of, for example, clandes-
tine groups of Orthodox Jews who held secret services.
 Gyuri experiences, however, the paradox of being treated as an outsider, 
as a Gentile, by Jewish groups in the camps, for example, because he does 
not know Yiddish: “Di bisht nisht kai yid, d’bisht a shaygets” (“You’re not a 
Jew, you’re a Gentile kid”) (139–40). The diversity of languages in the camps 
made difficult the establishment of even fragile communities among the 
prisoners, many of whom had to betray friends for a scrap of bread if they 
were to survive a little longer. When Gyuri returns to Budapest, he finds 
that the community of family and neighbors he had left behind no longer 
exists.
 Fatelessness itself, however, it might be argued, creates the community 
of its readers, those who across several languages and in different national 
locations nevertheless come together in their shared experience of this nov-
el’s testimony to Auschwitz. Unless we forget. I shall return at the end of 
this essay to my sense of this community’s limitations. It is no substitute for 
what we have traditionally meant by a community, that is, people who live 
together in the same place and know one another by name.
The meaning of the Title
The Necessity of a Strictly Chronological Narrative
Gyuri at the end of his unsatisfactory encounter with his “uncles” develops 
what might be called a striking emblem for the temporal series of events that 
make up a human life. Gyuri’s impassioned speech to his uncles about fate 
just makes them violently angry when they understand that he is accusing 
them of being responsible in some measure for what has happened, rather 
than agreeing that they have been passive and innocent victims. Gyuri trans-
poses that to an affirmation of his own responsibility for his fate. Since this 
speech and the coda that follows it are the dénouement of the novel, it must 
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be read with care, micrologically, with close attention to detail. The figure of 
a step-by-step movement through time, with a new decision being required 
at every moment, suggests why Kertész employs a strictly chronological 
method of narration in Fatelessness. It is another example of the way nar-
rative form follows function and contributes essentially to meaning in this 
novel, as in literary texts in general, and as in this chapter.
 Just as those in the lines waiting for the Selektion at Auschwitz move for-
ward step by step toward “the point where it is decided whether it will be gas 
immediately or a reprieve for the time being” (257), so he and all the rest of 
us human beings, Gyuri says to his uncles, move moment by moment, and 
step by step, through life. This comparison is shocking to his “uncles” and 
to his so-called “aunt,” the wife of Uncle Fleischmann. They saw their life 
in Budapest during the Nazi occupation as a series of happenings that just 
“came about.” Gyuri argues that each of those moments was both determined 
by its contingent contexts, in that sense “fated,” and at the same time free, so 
that we are responsible for what we make of whatever situation in which we 
find ourselves. Each moment is detached from the ones before and after, and 
each is the opportunity for endless new possibilities. “There are only given 
situations and new givens inherent in them” (259). “It was not quite true,” 
Gyuri reports himself as having said, “that the thing ‘came about’; we had 
to go along with it too. Only now, and thus after the event, looking back, in 
hindsight, does the way it all ‘came about’ seem over, finished, unalterable, 
finite, so tremendously fast, and so terribly opaque. And if, in addition one 
knows one’s fate in advance, of course” (257). Only by way of the falsifica-
tions of hindsight or of an impossible foresight does one’s life congeal into 
a “fate”: “whether one looks back or ahead, both are flawed perspectives, I 
suggested” (258).
 Life as it is actually lived, from minute to minute, is always open to an 
unpredictable future that might radically change the past: “Every one of 
those minutes might in fact have brought something new. In reality it didn’t, 
naturally, but still, one must acknowledge that it might have; when it comes 
down to it, each and every minute something else might have happened 
other than what actually did happen, at Auschwitz just as much as, let’s sup-
pose, here at home, when we took leave of my father” (258). His father was, 
at the beginning of the novel, ordered to a labor camp, where he died. His 
family, for example, might have hidden him and have helped him escape to 
another country. His uncles are angered at what Gyuri says and ask what they 
could have done on behalf of his father. “Nothing, naturally,” he answers, “or 
rather anything, . . . which would have been just as senseless as doing noth-
ing, yet again and just as naturally” (258).
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 Note the three uses of “naturally” (természetesen in Hungarian) in the 
two citations just made from what Gyuri says to his uncles. As I have shown 
in the longer analysis of Fatelessness in my The Conflagration of Community, 
of which this essay is a revised extract, “naturally” is a frequent word in 
Fatelessness. Természetesen means ”naturally,” but the word takes on an anti-
thetical meaning in Gyuri’s ironic and repeated usage, since he often uses it 
to name something quite unnatural by ordinary measures, such as life in a 
concentration camp. The word appears only a couple of times in the film, 
much less often than it appears in Gyuri’s narration in the novel.
 It is on the basis of a quite specific and quite sophisticated theory of 
human time and freedom that the reader can understand the meaning of 
the novel’s strange title. What Kertész has Gyuri say is perhaps influenced, 
however indirectly, by Sartrean existentialism, but with a twist toward “post-
modern” undecidability, as in what Gyuri says about being neither winner 
nor loser, about cause and effect, and about being both wrong and right. Just 
what does it mean, “fatelessness” (“sorstalanság”)? Gyuri tries to answer this 
question in what he says to his uncles:
Why did they not wish to acknowledge that if there is such a thing as fate, 
then freedom is not possible? If, on the other hand—I swept on, more and 
more astonished myself, steadily warming to the task—if there is such a 
thing as freedom, then there is no fate; that is to say—and I paused, but 
only long enough to catch my breath—that is to say, then we ourselves are 
fate, I realized all at once, but with a flash of clarity I had never experienced 
before.  .  .  .  It was impossible, they must try and understand, impossible 
to take everything away from me, impossible for me to be neither win-
ner nor loser, for me not to be right and for me not to be mistaken that 
I was neither the cause nor the effect of anything; they should try to see, 
I almost pleaded, that I could not swallow that idiotic bitterness, that I 
should merely be innocent. But I could see they did not wish to understand 
anything. . . . (259–61)
 This passage comes just before the end of the novel. It is the nearest the 
reader comes to a conceptual explanation for the either/or; both/and; nei-
ther/nor; maybe this/maybe that, ironic rhetoric that characterizes Gyuri’s 
discourse throughout the novel. It also helps to explain Kertész’s choice of a 
chronological recounting of Gyuri’s life. Anything positive that can be said 
can also be plausibly negated, as in the antinomies of freedom and fate.
 Surely Efraim Sicher oversimplifies, in his otherwise fine book, The Holo-
caust Novel, to say that Gyuri “followed a fate given to him, minute by min-
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ute, day after day, step by step” (48). This could too easily be read as a return 
to the religious explanation offered by Gyuri’s Uncle Lajos. That explanation 
is clearly repudiated by Gyuri’s irony. Uncle Lajos, at the beginning of the 
novel, tells Gyuri, “You too . . . are a part of the shared Jewish fate.” This fate, 
says Uncle Lajos, was one of “unbroken persecution that has lasted for mil-
lennia.” This suffering must be accepted “with fortitude and self-sacrificing 
forbearance,” because “God has meted it out to them for their past sins” (20). 
It is true that Gyuri says at one point in his eloquent but, as he puts it, “a little 
incoherent” speech to his uncles that “I too had lived through a given fate. It 
had not been my own fate, but I had lived through it, and I simply couldn’t 
understand why they couldn’t get it into their heads that I now needed to 
start doing something with that fate, needed to connect it to somewhere or 
something; after all, I could no longer be satisfied with the notion that it had 
all been a mistake, blind fortune, some kind of blunder, let alone that it had 
not even happened” (259). Note that Gyuri says this was not “his fate,” even 
though it had been “given.”
 Gyuri does not want to break off his life in some impossible way and start 
life afresh, as his uncles counsel, but to go forward step by step in continu-
ity with what has happened: “we can never start a new life, only ever carry 
on the old one” (259). This means accepting responsibility for the steps you 
have already taken and going forward on the basis of those. Gyuri’s ultimate 
resolution is expressed in a Blanchotian or Beckettian aporetic formulation: 
“I was already feeling a growing and accumulating readiness to continue my 
uncontinuable life” (262). Gyuri’s attempt to convey to his uncles that they 
were not passive victims but to some degree responsible for what has hap-
pened just makes them violently angry: “‘So it’s us who are the guilty ones, is 
it? Us, the victims!’ I tried explaining to them that it wasn’t a crime; all that 
was needed was to admit it, meekly, simply, merely as a matter of reason, a 
point of honor, if I might put it that way” (260).
 Gyuri’s impassioned demand that his uncles recognize that no one is 
just an innocent victim, that we are all responsible for our fates, even if 
our fate is to be sent to Auschwitz, is met with incomprehension by Gyuri’s 
uncles, expressed in a sentence already cited: “But I could see they did not 
wish to understand anything” (261). The uncles are clearly proxies for you 
and me, dear reader. Do we too not wish to understand anything, or are 
we able to accept Kertész’s belief that we are responsible for our fates, even 
though we cannot rationally comprehend the mixture of freedom and fate 
in our lives?
 An equivocation, one can see, exists in the word “fate,” as Kertész uses 
it and as it is traditionally used. “Fate” can either mean, as in the Homeric 
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epics or in Uncle Lajos’s discourse, a transcendent, divine force that predes-
tines people to live their lives in a certain way, or it can mean no more than 
that in retrospect, one can see that things happened as they did happen, in a 
combination of contingencies and free steps taken one by one, from moment 
to moment. This happens according to the theory of human time Gyuri 
so eloquently expresses. He took steps in response to the options that the 
contingencies he encountered allowed, such as getting arrested and finding 
himself deported to Auschwitz just because he happened to be on a certain 
bus at a certain time. Gyuri seems to be using more this second sense of fate 
than Uncle Lajos’s when he says: “I took the steps, no one else, and I declared 
that I had been true to my given fate throughout” (259). This means, as he 
says on the next page, that “we ourselves are fate.”
 “Fatelessness” in the title of Kertész’s novel refers, in my judgment, to 
Gyuri’s experience that things happen as they do happen, in a mixture of 
randomness and steps taken as free responses, within the limits of the given 
situation, to what happens. We do not have preordained fates. An example is 
the steps Gyuri takes to keep himself alive in the three camps. His survival is 
the result of an astonishing series of quite implausible or even “miraculous” 
events. Why did the doctor believe his lie when he said he was sixteen, not 
fifteen, as he actually was, at the preliminary Selektion at Auschwitz? Why, 
when he was near death from abscesses on his knee and hip at Zeitz, was 
he more or less tenderly cared for at a succession of hospitals rather than 
just allowed to die, since he would be of no more use for work? Why did 
the Pfleger (male nurse), Bohoosh, from the building next to the hospital at 
Buchenwald where Gyuri lies near death, choose to keep Gyuri alive by bring-
ing him bread and tinned sausage for no recompense and at great danger to 
himself? These events, and many others equally crucial to Gyuri’s survival, 
against all odds, just do not make sense. Gyuri makes only highly tentative 
attempts to explain them. In one place, when he has reached comparative 
safety in a hospital bed in the surgical ward in Buchenwald, where he is actu-
ally given fairly good medical attention, he says, “after all, if I took a rational 
view of things, I could see no reason, I was incapable of finding any known 
and, to me, rationally acceptable cause for why, of all places, I happened to 
be here instead of somewhere else” (207). “I have to say,” he comments near 
the end of his account, “that over time one can become accustomed even to 
miracles” (225). That Gyuri survives at all justifies the term “miracle” when 
so many millions, in just his situation, died.
 The human condition, Gyuri’s experience confirms, is one of fatelessness. 
You cannot blame anything on fate, at least in the sense of a benign or malign 
force pulling strings behind the scenes. Gyuri’s ultimate wisdom, perhaps, is 
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that every positive judgment has an equally plausible counterjudgment and 
that, as he says of his day-to-day existence in Zeitz, “The main thing was not 
to neglect oneself; somehow there would always be a way, for it had never yet 
happened that there wasn’t a way somehow. . . . For example, your first device 
is stubbornness” (136, 138). “Stubbornness” (makacsság in Hungarian) is 
the name Gyuri gives to taking such steps as you can take, even when you 
are moving forward in the line toward the moment of the Selektion. “Stub-
bornness” is the best explanation Gyuri can give, for example, of Bohoosh’s 
kindness, since that kindness is a recalcitrant and extremely risky defiance of 
camp rules.
 If there are no atheists in foxholes, there appear to be relatively few true 
believers in God, in Kertész’s view, in concentration camps. The camps 
appear to have tended to take away, to some considerable degree, shared 
religious belief as a form of community togetherness, along with the rest 
of such forms. In the film, Gyuri joins in the prayer for the dead when the 
prisoners stand at attention watching the escaped and recaptured prisoners 
dangle from the gallows, but this does not occur in the novel. The narrator 
in the novel says, rather, “for the first time, I now somewhat regretted that 
I was unable to pray, if only a few sentences, in the language of the Jews” 
(162). Vladek, in Art Spiegelman’s Maus, hears in Auschwitz someone in 
extremity calling on God. He comments to Artie, when telling the story in 
retrospect, “But here God didn’t come. We were all on our own” (189). Fate-
lessness seems to be saying something similar, in its own way. “Apart from 
the last few twitches of the hanged men, nothing moved, nothing wavered 
at these words [the Kaddish]” (162). That may be one reason why, as Sicher 
comments, Kertész “has not been easily accepted in the canon of Hungarian 
literature, where critics have not always welcomed his pessimistic self-irony” 
(51).
 “Pessimistic self-irony” does not quite seem to me an adequate descrip-
tive summing up of Gyuri’s attitude. Fatelessness ends, as does Albert Camus’ 
The Stranger, with an appeal to happiness, clearly echoed by Kertész, that 
seems to me moving and plausible, not pessimistic or self-ironizing. I sup-
pose “self-irony” means “self-deprecating” irony, irony directed at oneself. 
Gyuri’s persistent attitude or tone, surfacing explicitly at the end, is rather 
of irony against, for example, the journalistic clichés that assume the camps 
were unmitigated “hell,” that no one was ever bored or ever happy there. 
Anticipating his future postwar life fulfilling his mother’s hopes for him to 
be “an engineer, a doctor, or something like that” (262), Gyuri says, in a pow-
erfully counterintuitive formulation, that not “fate” but “happiness” will be 
watching over his future, as it has watched over him in the camps:
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No doubt that is how it will be, just as she wished; there is nothing impos-
sible that we do not live through naturally, and keeping a watch on me on 
my journey, like some inescapable trap, I already know there will be hap-
piness. For even there, next to the chimneys, in the intervals between the 
torments, there was something that resembled happiness. Everyone asks 
only about the hardships and the “atrocities,” whereas for me perhaps it is 
that experience which will remain the most memorable. Yes, the next time 
I am asked, I ought to speak about that, the happiness of the concentration 
camps. (262)
 That, however, is not quite the end. Two characteristically qualifying sen-
tences follow, given a separate final paragraph to themselves: “If indeed I am 
asked. And provided I myself don’t forget” (262). Such is the fragility of tes-
timony, based as it is on the vagaries of memory and on being in a situation 
in which one is called on to bear witness.
Coda
I claim to have shown that Kertész’s fictional testimony to the Shoah is made 
possible by the specific narrative devices he brilliantly employs in Fateless-
ness: the ironic discourse of the narrator, the combining of narrator and pro-
tagonist, the narrating-I and the experiencing-I, within the same imaginary 
personage, and the double doubling of the I in the Muselmann episode and 
throughout. Gyuri’s ironic testimony to his experiences in the camps some-
what paradoxically not only distances the events being narrated but also 
allows the reader to see them more sharply and vividly than a sentimental 
or melodramatic telling might have done. The combining in one voice of the 
narrating-I and an already doubled experiencing-I means that the Musel-
mann and the proxy witness who survives the Muselmann can be combined 
in a single, ironic, doubly doubled vision. This provides a fictional solution 
to Levi’s paradox. The strictly chronological narration, finally, corresponds 
to the concept of fatelessness as a series of step-by-step decisions in given 
circumstances.
 My commentary in turn is not so much a bearing witness for the witness 
as it is a facilitating of reading by what might be named a “calling attention” 
to the testimonial work the novel enacts. My chapter, however, also has a 
dimension of performative testimony. It is a declaration of what has hap-
pened to me when reading and rereading the novel. A reading in the sense 
of analytic commentary, if it works, can help open a literary work to other 
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readers. It will thereby perhaps contribute to the creation of a community 
of readers who may, if not know, at least not forget, Auschwitz. I would not, 
however, put too much stress on this idea of “a community of readers.” Such 
a community, if it exists, is fairly abstract, since it is made up of people who, 
for the most part, do not know one another. A “community of readers,” as I 
said earlier, is quite different from a traditional community of people living 
together from generation to generation in the same place and sharing the 
same culture, such as the Jewish communities the Nazis so systematically 
destroyed.
notes
 1. Maurice Blanchot (1907–2003) was one of the most important French critics and 
fiction writers of the twentieth century. One of Blanchot’s characteristic locutions, as many 
of his critics have noted, takes the form of “X without X.” In the case of my third epigraph, 
Blanchot affirms that we have knowledge without knowledge of Auschwitz. My citation is 
taken from a section about the Shoah in a late aphoristic work by Blanchot, L’Écriture du 
désastre (131) (The Writing of the Disaster [82]). Here is the French original: “Nous lisons 
les livres sur Auschwitz. Le vœu de tous, là-bas, le dernier vœu: sachez ce qui s’est passé, 
n’oubliez pas, et en même temps jamais vous ne saurez.” A somewhat different version of 
my essay has been published as “Imre Kertész’s Fatelessness: Fiction as Testimony,” in my 
The Conflagration of Community: Fiction before and after Auschwitz (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2011), 177–227. I am grateful for permission to reuse this essay 
in my book.
 2. See the Works Cited for references to an online edition of Sorstalanság (Kertész, 
accessed spring 2007, no longer available); an online bibliography of works by and about 
Kertész (A Bibliography, accessed spring 2007); an online essay by Susan Eszter on irony in 
Fatelessness (Eszter, accessed spring 2007); and a collection of essays about Kertész’s work 
(Vasvari and Tötösy de Zepetnek, eds.).
 3. I am extremely grateful to Susan Rubin Suleiman, Jakob Lothe, and James 
Phelan for their careful reading of the first version of this essay and for the helpful 
suggestions and corrections they made. Some important work in the abundant and 
growing secondary literature in Holocaust studies has focused on the question of how 
to represent the “unspeakable” Shoah, though usually without my emphasis on the per-
formative aspect of such representation. Examples are Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, By Words 
Alone; Thomas Trezise, “Unspeakable”; and Erin McGlothlin, “Narrative Transgression 
in Edgar Hilsenrath’s Der Nazi und der Friseur.” These essays and Naomi Mandel’s book 
Against the Unspeakable have helped me get some sense of current thinking on ques-
tions of the “unspeakable” and on consequent challenges to representing the Holocaust. 
I am grateful for these references to the anonymous reviewer of this essay for The Ohio 
State University Press. Naomi Mandel, for example, argues persuasively that claiming 
the Holocaust is “unspeakable” may be a copout, a way to avoid talking or writing about 
it at all.
 4. He said this quite emphatically in the generous conversation he held in Berlin on 
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June 29, 2007, with members of the Oslo research group on narratology that sponsored this 
present essay.
 5. Fatelessness’s protagonist’s formal name is György Köves, but his family calls him, 
“Gyuri.” I shall refer to him as Gyuri (pronounced something like “Jury”), since that prob-
ably corresponds best to what we are to imagine was his most commonly used name, per-
haps the name by which he referred to himself. The English subtitles in the film transcribe 
his familiar name as Gyurka, but I shall use the name as it is given in Tim Wilkinson’s 
translation.
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introduction
In the course of the last twenty years the situation for writers who deal with 
the consequences of National Socialism in general, and the Shoah specifi-
cally, has changed considerably. In what follows I shall examine some narra-
tives by three writers from the “successor generation” who, in spite of the fate 
of their families, have chosen to live their lives in Germany as Jewish–Ger-
man writers: Esther Dischereit, Rafael Seligmann, and Maxim Biller. To put 
their work in context, however, I shall begin with some brief remarks about 
some German–Jewish writers from the eyewitness generation who also 
wrote about their experiences decades earlier in ways that met with similar 
resistance from both publishers and readers who habitually brought sharply 
defined attitudes and expectations to bear on anything written about this 
most painful and sensitive of topics. Finally we shall look at a Jewish writer 
from Switzerland, Charles Lewinsky, whose life was of course not affected 
by the Holocaust in the same way as those of his coreligionists in Germany. 
Does his novel, which deals with four generations of a Jewish family, repre-
sent an effort to compensate, in some small way, the Jews for the families 
they had lost and for all the missing life histories attached to them? Is this 
perhaps a work that could only be written outside Germany itself?
 In the writings of Jewish authors living in Germany, the consequences of 
the Shoah are still present as traces, often hidden and yet sometimes erupt-
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ing in unexpected ways. They all focus on problems of identity arising from 
living in Germany, from struggling with their fate as Jews, living as a small 
minority among “ordinary” people and often being confronted with the 
Holocaust and the effects of the genocide. Many descendants feel they are 
still suffering from the morbus Auschwitz—as Grete Weil (1906–99), a Ger-
man–Jewish author who escaped from the Nazis by hiding in Amsterdam, 
called it—the guilt of the survivors: “I suffer from Auschwitz as others suffer 
from TB or cancer. I am just as difficult to put up with as anyone with an ill-
ness.”1 In her narratives she insists that Auschwitz is something that affected 
not only the victims but an entire civilization. On her return to Germany she 
observed that the country was just as broken as she was. Fifty years on, there 
are others who still feel the same way and seek to express their struggle to 
achieve a meaningful life through various modes of writing. Esther Disch-
ereit belongs to the younger generation who have to deal with the difficulties 
of living in Germany with the heritage of their Jewishness after the Shoah; at 
the same time she confesses to being tired of constantly having to satisfy the 
expectation that she should “wear the incarnation of suffering on her face” 
(Joëmis Tisch 68). Others from that generation dislike in turn the earnest-
ness of most representations of the past and the kind of unnatural sternness 
they encounter. The desire to be allowed to use humor in their treatment 
of the Holocaust crops up repeatedly in the works of Rafael Seligmann and 
Maxim Biller. In their attempts to achieve greater normality in the coexis-
tence between Germans and German Jews, they seek to push at the limits 
and even break through the pain barriers that generally circumscribe the 
topic of the Holocaust.
The eyewitness Generation and the 
Problems of Representation and narratability
It would be to mistake the situation to assume that the use of humor is simply 
an affront inflicted on the first generation of survivors by their disrespect-
ful successors. In fact there are literary precedents for this way of dealing 
with the topic of Jewish persecution in the works of some of the survivor 
generation itself, such as Jurek Becker, George Tabori, and Edgar Hilsen-
rath. Hilsenrath, a survivor of a Jewish ghetto in the Ukraine, emigrated 
first to Israel in 1945, then went to the United States in 1951, and returned 
to Germany in 1975. His novel Der Nazi und der Friseur (The Nazi and the 
Barber: A Tale of Vengeance), written in 1968–69, published in the United 
States in 1971, and translated into eighteen languages, was rejected by over 
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sixty publishers in Germany before a small publishing house in Cologne 
finally accepted it for printing in 1977—only to withdraw it subsequently. 
Today it is considered to be one of the most significant works of German 
postwar literature. Hilsenrath’s first novel Nacht (1964, translated as Night 
in 1966) is a brilliant example of how “to express the inexpressible” in abso-
lutely sober language, but it also illustrates the arbitrariness of a book’s fate 
and the inadequacy of a book’s initial reception by critics and readers. Nowa-
days experts regard Nacht as a book that deserves to be as well known as the 
“standard” early literary treatments of the Holocaust. Hilsenrath, who is still 
alive and living in Berlin, now appears at long last to be enjoying a degree of 
recognition.
 The reason for the rejection of Der Nazi und der Friseur by German pub-
lishers lay in Hilsenrath’s use of satire, black humor, and the grotesque when 
treating the topic of the SS and the Jews. The novel reveals the banality of 
fascism at the same time as it perverts guilt and atonement and pokes fun at 
justice. The grotesque (and the provocation it generates) was for Hilsenrath 
the appropriate aesthetic category to characterize the exceptional situation 
and the absolute debasement of human beings in the concentration camps. 
Similar debates about the use of such elements as the grotesque and farce 
sprung up at about the same time in the United States in relation to George 
Tabori’s drama The Cannibals (1965). Reflecting on those controversies, 
Michael Hofmann has emphasized the need for a discussion about the ques-
tion of the adequacy of particular genres or forms in Holocaust literature. 
Hofmann argues, rightly in my view, that elements of farce can contribute 
successfully to the aesthetics and poetics of provocation by accentuating the 
consequences of the rupture of civilization that the Holocaust represents. He 
is also convinced “that the literary methods used . . . convey specific insights 
relating to the overcoming of conventional narrative strategies” (232). For 
most Jewish survivors, however, in the 1960s it was definitely too early to 
use these literary means to deal with the Holocaust in Germany. Even now, 
forty years later, the younger German–Jewish writers mentioned above are 
still meeting resistance from critics who disapprove of any such approach to 
the subject.
 The persistence of these antagonisms—of authenticity versus fictionaliza-
tion, gravity versus grotesque humor—suggests, contrary to what one might 
suppose, that what many readers regard as the acceptable literary means of 
representing the Holocaust seems not to depend simply on historical dis-
tance from the events. Rather, there is a series of elements that combine to 
make the impossible possible at a given point in time or, conversely, to lend 
authenticity to the seemingly inauthentic at some other point when we least 
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expect it. The demand generally placed on the first generation of survivors 
was for authenticity and documentary reliability when recounting personal 
experiences in the concentration camps and in the ghettos. Fictional treat-
ments were not considered to be appropriate to the gravity of the topic. Over 
the years there has been no shortage of attempts to constrict and constrain 
writing after the Holocaust, but many of the survivors themselves did not in 
fact write in accordance with them, and many rejected the verdicts of critics 
and publishers.
 A good example of this kind of recalcitrance is to be found in the work 
of the Austrian–Jewish writer Fred Wander who was born in Vienna in 
1917 and died there in August 2006. Having spent over two years in various 
camps, Wander found that his only thought was to tell those outside what 
had happened once it was all over, but this proved much more difficult than 
he had imagined. Jorge Semprun encountered similar difficulties, whereas 
Primo Levi, a fellow sufferer with whom Wander was familiar and to whom 
he refers repeatedly, began to write about his experiences shortly after his 
return. Semprun and Wander, on the other hand, both had to wait many 
years before finding an adequate form in which to write about the past. The 
releasing factor for Wander’s writing was the painful death of his own eight-
year-old daughter, Kitty, which reminded him of the death of a young boy in 
the camp, an event that clearly had a powerful effect on him but that needed 
the death of Kitty to force its way to the surface again. The novel The Seventh 
Well from 19712 is dedicated to Kitty’s memory. Wander here hides his own 
experiences behind the fate of his comrades in a fictionalized narrative while 
at the same time displaying his learning process about how to narrate such 
painful experiences. Wander has also insisted that narrating was, for him at 
least, the most important survival strategy in the camps. To narrate meant 
to be alive, to communicate with another person, not to be alone. Wander 
quotes Hannah Arendt’s observation that suffering becomes bearable when 
one can at least tell about it (Das gute Leben 341). Narrating about the past or 
even inventing fantastic histories from their former lives helped the prison-
ers to carry on believing in life and maintaining hope in a seemingly hopeless 
situation. That is also the reason why both Wander and Kertész were able 
to describe moments of happiness in the camps, something that was dif-
ficult for many readers of Holocaust literature to accept. Both writers were 
aware of posterity’s categorical expectations about how victims were sup-
posed to write about their experiences: in a nonfictional mode and without 
any “alleviating” means such as humor. Yet in defiance of these expectations 
they both insisted on choosing their own means. Thus their autobiographi-
cal writing involves the interplay of more or less authentic memories with 
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consciously fictional elements. This technique deliberately reflects on the 
constructed nature of the text and on the impossibility of writing about a 
horrifying past without some means of protection for the writer. Thus Wan-
der introduces the medium of a narrator who tells about the sufferings in 
the camp; only by processing things in this way can he even begin to express 
something of his own pain. He does not regard truth as something opposed 
to fiction or necessarily requiring a documentary approach. In his autobi-
ography Das gute Leben (The Good Life), first published in 1996 and later 
rewritten and supplied with the subtitle “Happiness amidst Horror” (2006), 
Wander says little about the time he spent in the concentration camps, argu-
ing that only by fictionalizing them was he able to write about certain areas 
of experience. For his generation authenticity had already become linked to 
“memory’s truth” in the sense referred to by Salman Rushdie and many other 
critics as subjective truth.3
Dealing with Conflicts of identity and Representation
For the members of the successor generation the Shoah has become a past 
historical event. Hartmut Steinecke summarizes his findings on the second 
generation of German–Jewish writers as follows: “For Jewish writers born 
after the Shoah (‘the second generation’), this event no longer occupies the 
central position in their texts. The Shoah is still an important event for them, 
especially its role in contemporary society and in the question of their own 
identity” (246).4
 These writers have to deal with specific private problems personally and 
when meeting the public. Having lost members of their family, they also suf-
fer from a loss of tradition. They feel marginalized by society, and this may 
be the reason why they do not feel any national affiliation. At times they 
have to listen to the reproach that they can rely on an “Auschwitz-bonus” 
(an expression used by Maxim Biller, “Harlem Holocaust” 114) as an aid to 
getting their work published. At the same time they must be wary of being 
sucked in by the Shoah-Business through participation in public events and 
commemorations.5
 Even though they no longer focus on the Shoah as a main subject, it 
remains an important element in their self-perception and their public iden-
tity. Not only are they met with compassion and pity when people hear of 
their family fate, but they are often burdened with the knowledge that their 
parents felt a kind of “survivor’s guilt” that could make them try to hide 
their Jewishness or even make them become invisible. At the same time, 
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their German neighbors and acquaintances could feel uneasy about living 
together with descendants of Holocaust victims without knowing how to 
behave toward them in an unbiased way in everyday life.6 We know that 
Germans scarcely dared to use the word “Jew” for fear of being accused 
of harboring anti-Semitic prejudice. In German literary studies, the term 
sprachliche Vermeidungsstrategien (“linguistic strategies of evasion”) indi-
cates this kind of gap of silence on both sides.7
 There is one more element that distinguishes the eyewitness literature of 
the first generation from the literature of succeeding generations. Whereas 
most of the survivors wanted to contribute to collective memory by com-
municating their experiences, the following generations often have quite 
different motivations for their writing. “Holocaust memory” is something 
imposed on them by their surroundings, above all by their family. They thus 
have to deal with an (often) involuntary attribution of identity as Jews and 
Jewish victims. Their narrative strategies focus on finding their own place 
in society, by either accepting the obligation to commemorate as part of the 
Shoah community, or refusing to do so by trying to establish an independent 
existence and showing their rejection of the prescribed role through vari-
ous forms of opposition. No matter which way they turn, they have to fight 
against inner and outer obstacles when choosing their manner of writing. 
Writing gives them the chance to reveal and to deal with the aftereffects of 
the historical Holocaust, even as the Holocaust itself is slowly disappearing 
beyond the horizon of directly lived experience.
 When narrating family histories or stories told by survivors or friends, 
the successor generation, lacking any direct, personal experience of the 
Shoah, are forced to use the means of fiction. They may deploy genres such 
as the grotesque and farce, or they may play on the whole scale of stereotypes 
and incorporate the most awful prejudices into their texts as Maxim Biller 
and Rafael Seligmann do. If non-Jewish authors had used the same kind of 
literary vocabulary, they would have been placed on trial. In fact, no German 
publisher was willing to print Rubinsteins Versteigerung (The Auctioning of 
Rubinstein), even though Seligmann was already well known as a journalist. 
Eventually he published the book at his own cost.8 Compared to the almost 
universal rejection of Hilsenrath’s book, however, the positive responses of 
the readers to this highly provocative novel indicate that a change of attitude 
has taken place, but what are the long-term consequences of breaking taboos? 
Does it mean that increasing historical distance will remove the inner and 
outer barriers that define the Shoah as an extraordinary matter that needs to 
be dealt with by extraordinary means? I think we will see a wide spectrum 
of different approaches in the future, depending on the authors’ inner and 
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outer relation to the issues they are dealing with. Until now, there seems to 
be one almost impassable frontier, which is to write about life in the camps 
in the voice of a first-person narrator, although even here there have been 
a few exceptions. Binjamin Wilkomirski, alias of the Swiss musician Bruno 
Doessekker, pretended that he had experienced a childhood in the camps, a 
statement that turned out to be false. La vita è bella (1997) (Life Is Beauti-
ful), a film depicting a child who survived in a concentration camp thanks 
to the help of the inmates, was written by the son of a concentration camp 
prisoner, Roberto Benigni, who also plays the part of the father in the film. 
In Germany, Gila Lustiger, daughter of an Auschwitz survivor and historian, 
wrote a novel in 1987 titled Die Bestandsaufnahme (The Inventory). Using a 
first-person narrative perspective, she deployed the means of sarcasm and 
empathy, a choice that met with a good deal of criticism. This shows that 
it will indeed be possible for later generations to write Holocaust narratives 
and films in the first person without having any firsthand knowledge of life 
in the camps, but it also shows how difficult it is to do so in a convincing or 
satisfactory way.
 These problems, and other related ones, are the issues that Esther Disch-
ereit (b. 1952 in Heppenheim), Rafael Seligmann (b. 1948 in Israel), and 
Maxim Biller (b. 1960 in Prague) focus on in their writing. Their social and 
cultural experiences vary, and so do their approaches to the strategies of 
representation. Each of them depicts characters, often represented as first-
person narrators, struggling with the problem of identity when writing about 
the difficulty of being Jewish authors writing in German or German authors 
of Jewish origin who live in Germany.9
esther Dischereit
The Impossible Identity
The first author I will consider in more detail is Esther Dischereit, born in 
1952 in Heppenheim. Her Jewish mother had managed to stay alive during 
the war while remaining in Germany, having survived out of sheer defi-
ance, as she maintained. Dischereit was brought up by her mother and was 
instructed in Jewish religion and customs in a Hebrew School of the Jewish 
Community until her mother died. She trained as a teacher, but in the 1960s 
she became engaged in politics on the extreme left (“Red Cells”) and lost 
her job. Since then she has been active on the Left and worked as a publicist. 
She went to West Berlin and moved to Eastern Germany in 1989. In 1995 
she became a Fellow of the Moses Mendelssohn Center in Potsdam, where 
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she also teaches in the area of European-Jewish Studies. She is known in the 
United States because of her visits to various universities, including Boston, 
Berkeley, Ithaca, and Amherst. She also travels a great deal in Germany, giv-
ing lectures on her topic—living in Germany as a Jewish–German writer—a 
topic that she cannot leave behind.
 “No Exit from This Jewry” is the title of one of Esther Dischereit’s essays 
from 1994, written in English and published in German in 1998. Here she 
exposes the difficulty of accepting that to be a Jew is something normal, 
because everything that belongs to normality for the majority—relatives, tra-
dition, heritage, belief—was destroyed for the Jews in the Shoah. Dischereit 
is a representative of the second generation of German Jews who decided 
to stay in the country but who struggle to live an ordinary life. She focuses 
unremittingly on the problem of identity, using her own acute methods. Her 
main instrument as a writer is language, and because she is writing in Ger-
man, she has a language problem. As many writers have complained, Nazism 
compromised the German language. There are words that simply cannot be 
used any longer according to Dischereit. Words such Rampe (“platform”) or 
Jude (“Jew”) can never be ordinary words again in the way that puppet, boy, 
little, or sweet can (Übungen 19ff.). German thus remains a foreign language 
to her, but so does Hebrew. Writing German as a Jew feels like undressing 
in public, Dischereit says. The label Jew feels as if it contradicts the term 
German; there is a dissonance between them that cannot be resolved. Corre-
spondingly, Jews do not belong to German culture; they never did, Dischereit 
maintains, analyzing statements such as “the Jews have enriched German 
culture.” If they “enriched” German culture, then they never were part of 
it, but something outside. Like Katja Behrens, another female writer, she 
stresses her firm conviction that there never was a Jewish–German symbio-
sis10 and she therefore refers to the “Jewishness” of her stories.
 These are only a few of the many problems Dischereit confronts when 
examining her relationship between “the German” and her deeply problem-
atic identity. She has no hope that she will find a new identity through writ-
ing, because “the mark of Cain, forgotten under the waters of Socialism, is 
still on my skin” (Joëmis Tisch 9). An additional issue is her lack of memories, 
childhood memories, family memories, and narratives transferred within the 
family—elements, as we all know, that help to establish and to stabilize per-
sonal identity. Dischereit feels exposed in both directions, to a German and 
a Jewish identity, but she sees a lack of understanding on both sides:
I declare that I am Jewish and I am not sure whether I am not lying. After 
all, I had not worried for decades about the fact that, or the question of 
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whether, I was one. My daughter declares that she is not a Jew, and knows 
that she too is lying. ‘I am not a diaspora Jew, no, not me. I am a German 
and proud of it,’ says a young friend, and she too is lying. Just as I am per-
haps a “Jew in spite of myself,” which is possible, she has become a ‘German 
in spite of herself.’ (Übungen 48)
In addition, Dischereit observes a certain feeling of rivalry among the Jews in 
Germany toward American, Israeli, and other Jews. They are rivals in Jewish-
ness (Übungen 46), because German Jews presume that American and Israeli 
Jews do not share the same problems with their Jewish identity as they do, 
believing that the others are able simply to take their ethnic distinctness for 
granted. In her eyes, Israeli Jews seem to represent the prototype of this kind 
of Jew: anchored in a national state, they represent a majority and normality 
at the opposite extreme of the combination German–Jewish—a combina-
tion that American Jews in particular tend to regard as incomprehensible or 
almost indecent.11 Dischereit is said to be vulnerable and she admits that this 
is true. She is difficult and cannot change it. She does not like to be compared 
to other Jewish–German writers, such as Barbara Honigmann, even if they 
have much in common: they were both socialized into socialism and com-
munism; they each had parents (Dischereit’s father) who did not practice any 
belief; they each decided to be Jewish at a certain point in their lives. “After 
twenty years of being an Un-Jew I want to become a Jew again” is how Disch-
ereit opens Joëmis Tisch: Eine jüdische Geschichte (Joëmi’s Table: A Jewish 
Story) (9). Her specific situation as a feminist Jewish writer results in many 
invitations to schools, to read from her books and discuss what happened 
during the Second World War. She dislikes the kind of preparation pupils 
get before meeting a Jewish author, as it immediately draws attention away 
from the literary work and toward her most personal feelings as a human 
being. She also dislikes a certain kind of philo-Semitism, the kind of over-
friendly and cautious behavior she experiences, which she finds worse than 
overtly hostile anti-Semitism (Übungen 206.)12 Even if such well-intentioned 
behavior signals good faith and is not meant to hurt, or even if the public has 
learned to show that they are shocked, the way people behave toward a Jew 
says a lot about the fact “that it is not normal to be Jewish and alive” (205). 
Here we find a strong similarity to the problem of being Jewish as presented 
by Lewinsky and Seligmann.
 Dischereit considers herself to be a member of the Erinnerungsgenera-
tion (“the remembering generation”). She reflects on her Jewishness and her 
identity problem in connection with the Shoah as her main experience: a col-
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lectively experienced trauma of the past that is still present in her life, caus-
ing the destruction of all sense. This feeling might be responsible too for her 
lack of a preferred literary genre. She writes essays, poetry, and radio plays. 
The narrative Joëmi’s Table consists of mostly small paragraphs composed in 
non-chronological order, following associations, movements, fragments of 
memories, discussions, political statements, or historical episodes. There is a 
female first-person narrator, Jewish and German, but never quite graspable 
by the reader because she is characterized indirectly and is presented as Han-
nah’s daughter. While the mother is seen from the outside, through the eyes 
of the daughter or narratives overheard, the narrator comments on political 
events in the present and the past; refers to discussions and conversations, 
Jewish jokes, fragments of memories; shows letters; and asks questions and 
makes comments on statements, sometimes in a sarcastic way.
 Dischereit positions herself as a Jewish-feminist writer, using the nar-
rative techniques of the new autobiographical writing that transgresses the 
borders between reality and fiction, identity, and constructions of identity 
by reference to language and gender. Her writing exposes the problem of 
finding a genuine identity. There is the cultural double bind of the German– 
Jewish background, where one part is difficult to accept because of the Shoah, 
but the other part is essential because of the German language. In addition 
to this difficulty, most German–Jewish writers feel disturbed by the continu-
ous confrontation with the modes of identification offered to them by others 
and by social interaction burdened by inhibitions. An illustrative example is 
provided by the following passage from Joëmi’s Table,13 where the narrator is 
addressed by an elderly lady:
I have to confess something to you. I meet you, how should I put it, with 
inhibition. You know, you look like Ruth Deretz. She was in my class in 
those days. And somehow there was something similar about her—she was 
as attractive as you, a big, beautiful girl. You understand, she was then. . . . I 
was born in 1921. . . . Please excuse me. (55)
A person who is met everywhere by this attitude of caution and wariness 
will feel uneasy and unable to communicate in an ordinary way. The Jew-
ish woman has a sense of not being seen as the individual she is, but rather 
of being reduced to the stereotype of a female Jewish victim by the German 
woman who is suffering from a bad conscience about the past. To live as 
a Jew in Germany, Dischereit concludes, requires practice, and there is no 
guarantee that she will succeed.
62 2 :  C h a l l e n g e S  f O r  T h e  S U C C e S S O r  g e n e r a T i O n S
maxim biller and Rafael Seligmann
Maxim Biller, often compared with Philip Roth and strongly inspired by 
American writers,14 has Roth say the following (and clearly endorses his 
words): 
I am an artist, I am not willing to keep quiet about anything just because 
Hitler and Goebbels were once up to mischief. I will laugh about me, 
about the Jews. Every people has a waxworks with heroes, anti-heroes, 
non-heroes, with good ones and bad ones. I feel responsible for the Jewish 
panopticon. I am a Jewish writer and I will not allow the Nazis, after all that 
has happened, to forbid my laughter. I will laugh and feel better afterwards. 
I know how difficult, how impossible this is. I am not so indifferent as to 
forget that six million were murdered during the last war. Damn it: I can-
not help cracking heretical jokes, I want to get rid of my trauma in exactly 
the same way, incidentally, as the children of the perpetrators want to get 
rid of theirs. An irresolvable antagonism. (Hannes Stein, quoted in Braese, 
Deutsche Nachkriegsliteratur 403–4)15
Born in Prague in 1960, Biller emigrated with his parents to Germany in 
1970. He studied literature in Munich and now lives as journalist in Berlin. 
He became well known through the scandal caused by his autobiographical 
novel, Ezra, which had to be withdrawn by the publishing company in 2003 
following a court judgment.
 Up to this point Biller had written stories and novels with quite provoca-
tive titles and no less challenging content, for example, Land der Väter und 
Verräter (Land of the Fathers and Traitors) (stories 1994); Wenn ich einmal 
reich und tot bin (When I’m Rich and Dead) (1990); Moralische Geschichten 
(Moral Tales) (2005), a collection of satirical short stories, or Deutschbuch 
(2001), a collection of sharp, always cheeky and funny phrases about politics 
and public figures, including an essay titled “The Biller Principle.” Here is 
just one example: “I’m happy to talk about Israel. . . . Admittedly, when asked 
the classic asshole question about what we Jews are doing down there among 
the Palestinians, I always reply: ‘All sorts of things I guarantee the inmates of 
German concentration camps could only dream about,’ and immediately put 
an end to the conversation” (Deutschbuch 298).
 Biller is the most extreme of the Jewish writers—he shocks the public by 
using provocative language, breaking taboos, and writing extensively about 
sex. It was possible to write about taboos in Germany only by employing 
black humor and irony, Biller says. He cites all the notorious stereotypes and 
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clichés about Jews, Germans, Arabs, and so forth, which are provocative and 
tiring at the same time, especially when used in all possible combinations 
and without scruples of any kind. What may be very witty when referring 
sarcastically to the media and public figures in a current political context 
becomes problematic when used in a religious context, in connection with 
the Holocaust, or generally without any regard to other people’s feelings.16 In 
his self-portrait, published in 2009 with the title Der gebrauchte Jude (The Jew 
Everyone Needs), he extends his role as a non-conforming troublemaker and 
enfant terrible in the direction of melancholy incorrigibility and whipping 
boy.
 Some of Biller’s publications can hardly be considered good literature 
(although there are critics who hold his literary qualities in high regard), 
but even if we do not apply the criteria of literary quality we have to ask: 
Why does Biller wish to shock his readers? What does he want to achieve? 
Is it (self-) hatred, or the conviction that Jewish literature in Germany has 
to be different from German literature and adopt a non-conciliatory, criti-
cal tone? Biller likes to be thought of as a controversial and dangerous Jew; 
he enjoys his role of enfant terrible in Germany. Together with Dischereit 
and Seligmann, he belongs to that group of intellectuals who characterize 
the cohabitation of the German Jews with the Germans after the Holocaust 
as a “negative symbiosis.” Since he is convinced that there never will be a 
symbiosis, he is searching for a radical, anti-assimilatory way of writing in 
order to accentuate the difference. Karen Remmler, who understands Biller’s 
writing as genealogical in the sense of Foucault, emphasizes the point that 
the genealogy of Jewish stories is always fractured, and that they reveal not 
wholeness but the distorted images of a torn existence that bears traces of 
historical fragmentation (“Maxim Biller” 316). According to this view, Biller 
is less concerned with a search for identity than he is with making it clear 
that identity has become an object of consumption, a product of the cul-
ture industry bent on producing images of Jewishness to satisfy a German 
public. Biller’s intention is to highlight this “marketing strategy” by polariz-
ing differences beyond the customary limits and by deploying the means of 
pornography.17
 Like Biller, Rafael Seligmann has been accused of “dirtying his own nest.” 
He too employs ironic and sarcastic means extensively, but having started 
in an aggressive mode, he appears to be moving toward a more concilia-
tory stance. Seligmann likes to spurn political correctness in the positions 
he takes and to attack openly long-established attitudes that bestow excep-
tional status on Jews, especially in Germany. He was one of the first Jewish 
writers to begin writing about everyday life in post-Shoah Germany. His 
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goal is clear: by provoking his readers, he wants them to discuss how the 
Shoah affects their lives. Nevertheless, he endorses the existence of a hybrid 
German–Jewish identity (Beegle 83–86).
 Seligmann was born in Tel Aviv and followed his parents when they 
decided to go back to Germany when he was ten years old.18 He studied in 
Munich and gained his doctorate with a thesis on Israeli security policy. He 
then became a journalist and an editor of several well-known German news-
papers and magazines, founded the Jewish Magazine in 1985, became profes-
sor of international relations at the University of Munich, and lives now as a 
free-lance journalist and chief editor of the Atlantic Times.
 Seligmann’s first novel, Rubinsteins Versteigerung (The Auctioning of 
Rubinstein), appeared in 1988 (as a self-funded publication). In 1990 he pub-
lished Die jiddische Mamme and in 1996 Der Musterjude (The Model Jew). 
His titles contain pointed references to the Jewish–German double culture, 
the role in the family of the (strong) Jewish mother, and the phenomenon of 
overly compensatory social assimilation as an exemplary citizen.
 Rubinsteins Versteigerung is about Jewish–German feelings of hatred and 
weakness and false reactions (born of uncertainty) on the part of German 
teachers, parents, or friends in everyday situations. The result is confusion 
on all sides about how to deal with one another, a situation the protagonist 
Rubinstein exploits to the full in order to take advantage of the German–Jew-
ish victim role and thereby succeed in his personal and academic ambitions.
 When we look at the narrative, we see that Seligmann uses a special tech-
nique to let the narrator communicate unrestrictedly with the reader, while 
at the same time pretending that the most awful things remain unsaid. A 
conversation between the mother and her twenty-one-year-old son Jona-
than, who is still attending school and in danger of failing his school-leaving 
examination, will give an impression of how people interact with each other 
in this novel, especially when they meet resistance:
“Donkey, the situation is tough.”
 “What have you been up to this time?”
 “Nothing. It’s just that in French my situation is bad. . . . We can still 
stop me getting a five [the lowest mark], but you have to play along. It is 
basically very simple. That Schneeberger woman is obsessed with Nazis. 
She sees Brownshirts where it wouldn’t even occur to us Yids to look.”
 “And why is that good for you?”
 “If you’d just shut up you’ll find out!”
 “Rubinstein, you need to get a grip on yourself! . . . The shouting has 
helped, as usual.” (Rubinstein 89–90)
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He tells his mother that she must talk to his teacher. If the teacher is not will-
ing to give him a better mark, she has to intervene: “You, my dear donkey, 
must make it clear how much our family suffered from the persecutions of 
the Nazis and that my failing would ruin us once more. It is of course rotten 
of us to exploit her no doubt decent feelings so shamelessly, but we aren’t 
harming anyone” (91). But his mother refuses to cooperate, accusing her son 
of being as cold, calculating, and evil as the Nazis. As he tries to calm her 
down before persuading her finally to fight for her child by appealing to her 
instincts as a Jewish mother, he simultaneously reveals to the reader his next 
steps in overcoming his mother’s resistance. Small wonder that no editor 
wanted to publish a book that depicted a youngster engaging in such offen-
sive conversations and thoughts. Through these inner monologues, inter-
woven with the passages of dialogue, Seligmann has his Jewish protagonist 
utter quite unbelievable insults about his parents and those he lives among. 
Thus the narrator indicates Jonathan’s divided mind on the narrative level 
through the doubling of his quite contradictory utterances. Jonathan’s disre-
spectful behavior is perhaps not so much the symptom of a rebelling youth 
who merely wants to provoke as much as it is a cry for help to get out of an 
unbearable identity crisis.
 The central issues Seligmann focuses on in the novel are philo-Semitism, 
Zionism, the cynical way Jewish Germans profit from the Holocaust, the 
widespread reserve toward Jews on the part of the Germans, or simply the 
absence of normal behavior toward Jews. Of course, only the means of fic-
tionalization make it possible for Seligmann to write this autobiographically 
grounded novel in the way he does without ending up in awkward contro-
versies. The ending of the novel has led some critics to believe that the pro-
tagonist finally accepts that it is his fate to live in Germany as a German Jew. 
After his girlfriend decides to leave him because she found out that her father 
had been a SS soldier, something that would always have been an obstacle 
for them and their families, he locks himself in his room in total despair. 
When his father finally breaks through the bedroom door and asks what has 
happened to him, he answers: “Ich bin ein deutscher Jude!” (“I am a German 
Jew!”) (1991, 199). 
 Of course, the situation is conveyed through the prism of irony. This 
extraordinarily outrageous and impertinent man is now like a helpless child. 
I do not believe that we can interpret this sentence as if it were spoken by 
a fortunate young man who has achieved his goals in life. Jonathan is stuck 
with the insight that he has to live with this double identity that will cause 
him trouble in each and every situation, as he just has experienced. Instabil-
ity is his predominant state of mind and a condition that will also follow him 
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in all his social contacts. Only if other people were willing to desist from the 
prejudices that are common in society will German Jews and Germans ever 
have a chance of living more ordinary lives together.
Charles Lewinsky
melnitz: Jews in Switzerland, 1866–1945
Although he deals with similar topics, Charles Lewinsky (b. 1946) can be 
seen as the antithesis of the authors discussed above. He is Swiss and lives 
both in Zürich and in France. He is a writer working for theater, TV, and 
film, and he established his name as a novelist with his family history, Melnitz 
(2006). Lewinsky’s situation is quite different from that of the German Jews 
who lost their families during the era of National Socialism. Swiss Jews were 
safe from persecution, but they all had relatives in the occupied countries 
and they feared for their safety. Thus they too were affected by the fate of 
the Jews living abroad, and they were therefore confronted with the identity 
problem: Who are we compared to the others? That is why Lewinsky under-
took the project he had had in mind for a long time: to write a family history 
of Swiss Jews over five generations. In spite of its length (nearly 800 pages), 
this book enjoyed great success and has already been translated into many 
languages.
 Lewinsky studied the (local) history of Jewish families who had been 
living in the Swiss countryside for centuries. Melnitz is a novel written with 
the intention of giving these Jews something that those who once lived in 
Germany no longer have: a family history and the knowledge of a tradition 
that generates a common feeling of identity and affiliation to the cultural 
community. Lewinsky portrays the everyday life of the Jewish people who 
kept to their traditions and thus lived together with the other people in 
two villages and yet always somehow stood out as different. The story of 
the Swiss Jews begins in 1866 with the fall of the Second Empire and ends 
in 1937 with a strong link to Nazi Germany and the increasing persecu-
tion of German Jews. There is an epilogue concerning the end of the war 
in 1945. The narrator reports the various changes in Swiss society over the 
years; we also read about the gradual adaptation of the Jewish people to 
the ongoing process of secularization. In the nineteenth century the Jews 
remained faithful to their religious particularity. The strain of trying to fit 
into everyday life can easily be felt. The reader is confronted with waves of 
anti-Semitism as well as solidarity and periods of relatively equal treatment 
of the Jews.
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 Lewinsky’s principal achievement consists in the connections he makes 
between contemporary historical events in Europe and the history of the 
family that unfolds in a backwater, away from the complexities of history. 
Thereby he imparts a degree of historical representativeness to the life of an 
extended Jewish family in Europe. From the outset, the none-too-large fam-
ily has a number of international connections, for at the beginning of the 
story a distant relative from France marries into the family, later followed by 
another from Galicia. As they all speak Yiddish, albeit with different accents, 
they all understand one another.
 The narration of the novel is focalized through an authoritative narrator 
who stands outside the story (heterodiegetic narration), which means that 
the reader’s interest is focused totally on the characters and events. While 
Lewinsky thus chooses the most traditional way of narrating a family his-
tory, giving the prehistory of the Shoah, he starts and ends the novel with 
an unusual narrative setting: the return of an old ancestor who embodies 
Lewinsky’s response to the Christian legend of Ahasver, the eternal Jew, con-
demned to wander across the world forever. Old Uncle Melnitz is one of the 
un-dead who returns to the place after every funeral: “Whenever he had 
died, he came back.” He constantly reminds the Jews of their perennial, inevi-
table misfortune, thus representing the suffering individual who stands for 
the suffering of all Jews who know no Christ to bear their pain. The quoted 
sentence runs as a leitmotif through the novel and dominates the epilogue. 
Old Melnitz is given the last word to end the narrative with a brief account 
to the uninformed Swiss Jews of the events between 1937 and 1945, the years 
that were omitted from the narrative proper:
He came back and reported. Narrating made him come alive [my emphasis]. 
New stories, he brought many new stories with him, each so fatally alive 
that the older ones faded away in comparison. .  .  . Stories that you could 
not believe, especially not here in Switzerland, where one had lived on an 
island all those years, on dry ground in the middle of the flood. . . . Mel-
nitz  .  .  .  loved this country in which they would complain about hunger 
simply because there was shortage of chocolate. It was interesting to visit 
Noah’s Ark after her thousand-year journey. (Melnitz 761)
Highlighting several well-known myths that the Swiss had lived with during 
the war years, the narrator represents memory and non-oblivion, tradition, 
and the connection between the living and the dead. At the end, he has the 
overview and tells the truth that people do not want to see or hear. Lewinsky 
uses the means of paradox and irony to express the contradictory fact that 
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an ancient ancestor has to tell the survivors what had happened. At the same 
time, the realistic representation of the historically verified family history 
acquires a mythic and an ethical dimension, as Melnitz’s narration represents 
the chances for a renewal of commemoration after the Shoah. The narra-
tive dialogue between the ancestors and the new generation creates a sense 
of belonging and keeps tradition alive.19 His narrations represent a kind of 
guarantee that the chain of generations will not be broken as long as there is 
someone to tell the others what has happened.20 Conversely, it makes the loss 
caused by the Shoah to the other Jews more palpable. Melnitz is an impor-
tant contribution to the history and identity of the Swiss Jews, as well as a 
significant contribution to the travail de mémoire that began in Switzerland 
at the end of the 1980s.
 In connection with his research into the history of the Jews, and in spite 
of his fear of being marked down as a “professional Jew” and of boring him-
self by repeating the topic, Lewinsky, a nonbelieving Jew, wrote a text as a 
film script titled Ein ganz gewöhnlicher Jude (A Quite Ordinary Jew) (2005) 
which addresses the problem of how to live as a Jew in post-Shoah Ger-
many.21 Born after 1945, the protagonist Goldfarb is constantly confronted 
with the past. He feels he lives a marginalized life as a journalist; he is an 
outsider and what he dislikes most is demonstrative philo-Semitism. All he 
wants to do is to live as an ordinary man in Germany. One day he gets an 
invitation from a headmaster to come to his college and to speak to the stu-
dents about his identity as a “Jewish citizen.” Goldfarb feels it rather as an 
affront (just as Esther Dischereit dislikes this part of her job as a writer, as it 
gives her the feeling of being prostituted, exposed as a rarity [Übungen 205]). 
He would like to reject the invitation out of fear of reaching the conclusion 
that a normal Jew can never again exist in Germany.
 The protagonist conducts an inner monologue, discussing the German–
Jewish relationship in an attempt to collect all the reasons for his refusal to 
see the class. He looks at family pictures, remembering his mother’s paranoia 
and the impact it had on him. He gets furious and highly subjective when 
remembering his adolescence because his whole upbringing consisted of 
warnings against everything that could result in “Risches” (Jewish for “anti-
Semitic reactions”) (Ein ganz 35). The sight of his wife and child hurts too. 
The personal relationship founders on Goldfarb’s problematic identity, and 
he simply cannot get over something his wife said to him: “You have become 
so unbearably Jewish for someone who no longer wants to be one” (57).
 Later Goldfarb starts typing. He continues to write during the whole 
night, finally falling asleep in the early morning. Some hours later he starts 
his class presentation with the words “Also gut!” (97) (“Now then!”), thus 
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indicating that this night’s controversy led him to the conclusion that he must 
accept it is his fate to live with two identities and always to be reminded of 
this by the perplexed questions of those whom he lives among. It seems clear 
that the problem is one with which Lewinsky himself is familiar and that 
writing about the conflict helped him to answer the question of how to live 
with his double identity. Goldfarb’s fear is that there will never again be nor-
mality for such as him, only an everlasting exception: “That we will always be 
Jews in Germany, and never Jewish Germans” (81). This is Goldfarb’s conclu-
sion. It contrasts with Seligmann’s position, although it is difficult to know 
how seriously to take the latter because of the ironic and sarcastic elements 
in his style. An important feature of Lewinsky’s protagonist Goldfarb is the 
fact that writing serves him as the principal means of finding and creating his 
Jewish identity. The process will never be completed by the end of the night; 
rather, it has to be resumed and continued constantly in a debate with the 
past and a present that confronts German-speaking Jews with a quite unique 
challenge.
Conclusion
We have seen that all the authors mentioned have to struggle with their iden-
tity after having decided to live in Germany as Jewish writers. They share 
many likes and dislikes, but their literary means are different and so are their 
convictions. It is difficult to say what kind of impact Biller’s and Seligmann’s 
rejection of taboos will have in the long run. It seems that as writers they 
have to lay claim to the freedom to use precisely the means that they deem 
necessary, regardless of any objections that they are being indecent or inap-
propriate. In this respect they are no different from those writers of the first 
generation who felt compelled to use their artistic freedom to shape their 
material in accordance with their experiences, often in defiance of conven-
tional expectations.
 New generations are open to new perspectives and the prescriptions of 
the first generation survivors will become less influential. Will it make it 
easier to “overcome” the Holocaust, do away with prejudices between people 
when they are articulated openly? Or will the “rifts” be widened by citing the 
stereotypes and thus perpetuating them?22 As the Shoah is losing ground in 
the communicative memory, it will gain more space in collective and cul-
tural memory, but this will depend on how the events are passed on. The 
road passes through cultural storehouses such as literature, art, or museums, 
and lieux de mémoire, where personal memory too gains a more enduring 
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form. The disappearance of the survivors represents a great loss because of 
the absence of direct personal experience, but on the social level there will 
be more possibilities of finding ways that are less restricted by existential 
factors. Like all forms of transmission, the disappearance of personal experi-
ence will make it easier to see the world from a different angle than earlier 
generations did, knowing that memory is a fragile thing. Maurice Halbwachs 
has made two important observations in this connection: First, “the present 
determines the past” (20). Second, Halbwachs speaks of the “social framing” 
of memories, a fact that explains the dissimilar shapes of narrations about 
the same happenings.23 Many taboos that constrained the wartime genera-
tion will vanish when they are gone. They set a standard for the narratives 
about the various experiences of ghettos, camps, and other places of misery, 
narratives that will be questioned by younger historians and writers. What is 
said about the second generation applies even more clearly to the third: the 
grandchildren of the Holocaust victims who question the traditional way of 
remembering the Holocaust and who obviously no longer want their lives to 
be as deeply affected by the past as those of their parents were. They even 
feel free to reveal subjective attitudes free from political correctness, and they 
openly attack habitual attitudes from which the Jews profit because they pro-
vide them with an exceptional status (the “Auschwitz-bonus”).
 On the side of the perpetrators (to use this postwar term) too, the writ-
ings of the succeeding generations deal with the same kind of questions—the 
silence of the parents and the problem of identity after the rupture of civiliza-
tion. To know that a father or a grandfather was responsible for war crimes in 
one way or another is a burden that affects a person deeply. To feel guilty for 
something that happened before one’s birth becomes more and more inad-
equate. And the new generation of writers is willing to look at this problem 
from a different angle as well.
 The fact that a future perspective also will include the civilians on the 
German side among the victims, what for some people is equal to the per-
petrators, shows the ongoing change in the perception of the past. We have 
to face the fact that it will result in a more holistic view of the entire period. 
This does not mean that the Holocaust will lose its exceptional character and 
its importance, but the perspectives will complement each other.24 The his-
torian Reinhart Koselleck regards shared mourning as more important than 
the controversies around the question of comparability. He points out that 
by maintaining the division between victims and perpetrators, one follows 
the line of the Nazis who divided what once was a unity (205). We have to 
ask ourselves how long it shall take until this barrier is broken down and the 
language of memory becomes a common one (Rüsen 58–62).
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 According to Jörn Rüsen, we should also be aware that, contrary to a 
commonly held view, there are no grounds to believe that the greater the his-
torical distance, the greater the objectivity. We live at the threshold between 
contemporary history and history. The loss of direct existential involvement 
can be compensated by careful critical interpretation of the material from 
today’s perspective, a task in which historians and philosophers mainly are 
engaged, or by fictional approaches that open new perspectives through new 
aspects and by asking different questions. But as we all know: thresholds are 
difficult to cross. While writers have to break new ground, readers will be 
acquainted with displaced focuses and unfamiliar topics. As many narratives 
demonstrate, Germany cannot dispose of a common memory because the 
population has to live with a traumatized memory of the war in general and 
the Holocaust in particular.25 Therefore we will find a notable preemphasis 
on the topic of the search for identity on the part of the German–Jewish writ-
ers as well as a relentlessly (self-) critical view of their own mental condition 
within the self-imposed fate of living in Germany.
notes
 1. See Irmela von der Lühe, 322nn6 and 8.
 2. Fred Wander, The Seventh Well (Der siebente Brunnen), 1971, later edited again 
1991, 1997, and 2005.
 3. See also Ansgar Nünning, “‘Memory’s Truth’ und ‘Memory’s Fragile Power’: Rah-
men und Grenzen der individuellen und kulturellen Erinnerung.” 
 4. “Second generation” is used here, as by Harmut Steinecke and others, as a collec-
tive term for the second and the following generations.
 5. Charles Lewinsky refers to this reproach, making his protagonist Goldfarb sarcas-
tically use the cliché “There is no business like Shoah-Business” (Ein ganz, 56).
 6. Many contributions of American critics who deal with German–Jewish writings 
focus on the status of Jewish–German coexistence as represented in their narratives. 
They concentrate on finding advances or setbacks for the future of a cultural symbiosis in 
postwar Germany. Mostly they conclude that there will be nothing more than a negative 
symbiosis. Compare the contributions in Sander L. Gilman and Hartmut Steinecke, eds., 
Deutsch-jüdische Literatur der neunziger Jahre, and Leslie Morris and Jack Zipes, eds., 
Unlikely History. The anthology edited by Hope Herzog et al., Rebirth of a Culture, also 
includes Austria in the survey. Stephan Braese discusses a great variety of cultural aspects 
in his various contributions. His essay “Writing against Reconciliation” gives a survey of, 
among others, Dischereit’s, Biller’s, and Seligmann’s writing and this specific issue.
 7. See Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 7–24. This survey of relevant research reveals 
the difficulties experienced by German literary historians when dealing with the relation-
ship between Germans and Jews represented in German literature after 1945.
 8. See Seligmann’s essay “What Keeps the Jews in Germany Quiet?” in Gilman and 
Remmler, eds., 173–83, in which he tells about his problems to get his books published.
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 9. Anat Feinberg, “Die Splitter auf dem Boden,” gives a short overview over the char-
acteristic as well as controversial standpoints of these authors.
 10. The term is used by Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt, Esther Dischereit, Maxim 
Biller, and Rafael Seligmann. According to Dan Diner, the more adequate description of 
the relation between Germans and Jews after the Shoah is that of a “negative symbiosis.” 
See Diner, “Negative Symbiosis” and “Über Schulddiskurse”; and Melissa Beegle, Rafael 
Seligmann, who elaborates on both terms.
 11. Seligmann’s discusses quite different identity problems of Jews living in Israel than 
Dischereit seems to identify in her texts.
 12. In Mein Judentum, Jurek Becker answers the question of why he is a Jew simply by 
stating, “My parents were Jews.” In the absence of anti-Semitism, he had not felt Jewish for 
a second. “I have no affiliation, no feeling of happiness, I do not know any Jewish tradi-
tions. I do not feel like a Jew, but I am one, so what?” (15). Becker also objected to being 
identified as a Jew and finds it unacceptable that a Catholic or a Protestant can leave his 
church, while a Jew has no such opportunity. He has to bear his identity as a kind of guilt. 
For Becker, the overt politeness and the pitiful reactions when Auschwitz is mentioned are 
enervating and enlarge the feeling of foreignness. It deprives Jews of their normality.
 13. See Norbert Oellers, “Sie holten mich ein, die Toten der Geschichte,” in Gilman 
and Steinecke, eds., 78–82, in which he discusses Dischereit’s enigmatic title and analyzes 
her elaborate poetic technique that leaves much free space for interpretation to the reader.
 14. In an interview with Willing Davidson in The New Yorker, Biller mentions the 
books of Malamud, Heller, Bellow, and Roth as inspirations, and Mordecai Richler as his 
greatest hero. See http://www.newyorker.com/online/2007/07/02/0707020n_onlineonly_
biller. Accessed July 20, 2009.
 15. Seligmann likes to parody public figures and to compare himself with Ameri-
can–Jewish authors like Philip Roth. Stein emphasizes the difference between Ameri-
can Jews and German Jews: while the latter are marginal, the former (minorities in the 
United States, including American Jews) belong to the U.S.–American mainstream even 
as minorities. Stein finds that Seligmann underestimates the difference between the old 
American–Jewish and the new German–Jewish literature. For a critical discussion of the 
relationship see Jefferson Chase on Philip Roth and Rafael Seligmann, 2001.
 16. See Rita Bashaw, “Comic Vision and ‘Negative Symbiosis,’” for an illuminating 
analysis that focuses on the conflict of comic vision and negative symbiosis in two of 
Biller’s texts.
 17. Characterizing Biller’s writing as “counter-memory,” Karen Remmler finds that 
compared to Dischereit, Biller focuses less on identity problems than on exposure, not 
worrying about political correctness. “Maxim Biller,” 311. Biller and Seligmann decon-
struct body and sexuality as images for the continuing social and cultural tensions be-
tween Germans and Jews, while Dischereit uses the female body per se as the expression 
of incorporated mourning. See “Maxim Biller,” 314–15.
 18. The protagonist in The Auctioning of Rubinstein does not hesitate to criticize his 
parents for this decision and to accuse them of weakness and cowardice in an extremely 
impertinent way.
 19. See Bettina Bannasch and Almuth Hammer, “Jüdisches Gedächtnis und Literatur,” 
277–78, who show the importance of the connection between memory, historiography, 
and identity within Jewish tradition while secularization and acculturation exerted a nega-
tive influence on the culture of commemoration.
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 20. Hendrik Werner, in “Und da kam Onkel Melnitz,” draws attention to the fact that 
Melnitz seems to occupy an intermediate position between Benjamin (death living on 
through memory) and Horkheimer (death is dead). Cf. also Fred Wander’s belief in nar-
ration.
 21. In the TV movie directed by Oliver Hirschbiegel, known from the film Der Unter-
gang (Downfall, 2005), the well-known young actor Ben Becker plays the main character, 
Emanuel Goldfarb.
 22. Katja Behrens used this expression in her speech “The Rift and Not the Symbiosis,” 
given at the Weisman Art Museum, Minneapolis, in 2000. A printed version of the speech 
is included in Morris and Zipes, eds., 31–48.
 23. See the discussions by Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume, and Ansgar Nünning, 
“‘Memory’s Truth,” of Halbwachs’s topic in connection with Rushdie’s term.
 24. See articles about the controversies: Jörn Rüsen, “Die Logik der Historisierung,” 
19–60, and Diner, “Über Schulddiskurse und andere Narrative” (both in Gertrud Koch, 
ed., Bruchlinien, 61–84).
 25. Looming large in Holocaust studies, the issue of traumatized memory offers rich 
and varied illustrations of the reciprocal relationship between memory and narrative. One 
indication of the complexity of traumatized memory of the Holocaust is that for the indi-
vidual concerned it can be linked to as well as prompted by memories of all those involved 
in the event, including perpetrator, victim, and bystander. See Raul Hilberg, The Destruc-
tion of the European Jews, 3rd ed., who makes systematic use of this tripartite distinction; 
Arne Johan Vetlesen, Evil and Human Agency, especially 1–13 and 235–57; and the studies 
of Holocaust memory referred to above.
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First, a few words about my title. I have chosen to speak of “recent” literature 
in order to avoid the word “contemporary.” The notion of the contempo-
rary, of sharing the same time (whether the present time or the time of the 
event), remains open to question, and we shall in fact question it later via 
the opposition between the “news value” (actualité) of memory and “memo-
rial renewal” (actualisation).1 It is also important to point out that the word 
“recent” does not necessarily imply that we are concerned here with young 
writers: certain of them may be in their fifties or older. Joseph Bialot, who 
is well known for the score of detective novels he has written, had published 
nothing on his experience of the concentration camps until he produced 
C’est en hiver que les jours rallongent (Days Seem Longer in Winter).2 Given 
that libraries assign this work to the shelf marked “eyewitness accounts,” 
and that the detective novels may be regarded as one of the detours that 
the author, born in Warsaw in 1923, needed to make in order to come to 
terms with his private memory and a whole painful span of his existence, 
there is no doubt that since the end of the 1980s, his project as a writer has 
been overdetermined by a memorial context. It will be apparent here that the 
very notion of “generation” needs to be reviewed and relativized, at least as 
regards an emergence into language that brings together at the same moment 
a number of authors who, as we shall see, were in some cases born forty years 
apart. As for the expression “confronting the past,” I have chosen it because 
it is sufficiently vast and vague to allow one subsequently to differentiate 
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between history and memory as specific modes of relationship to the past, 
both being determined by violence and its consequences. Obviously, it does 
not mean that memory and history are anthropologically determined by 
violence whatever the context in which we think of them, but, in our époque 
and culture, the main meaning and custom of memory and history—that is, 
the hegemonic sense of memory and history, our episteme, as Foucault might 
say—is determined in that way.
 In this respect, the 1970s mark a gradual shift in the meanings attached 
to many of the figures through which collective violence is represented—the 
cultural family, mapped closely onto history, that consists in particular of 
heroes, saviors, victims, traitors, political criminals, collaborators, and so on. 
Following the Second World War and decolonization, the economy of these 
representations in relation to one another can be seen to undergo a striking 
modification. The shift was crystallized and made permanent at the turning 
point of the decade 1980–90 with the breakup of the Communist bloc, but 
it had been set in motion long before. One of the dominant directions of the 
shift was explicitly determined by the memorial questions at the center of 
which the genocide of the Jews casts its somber light. The unique character 
of that event was now explicitly acknowledged, which previously had not 
been the case; from that point on, it has functioned as a horizon of reference, 
and even, in some people’s view, as a paradigm.
 A rereading of collective history then begins to take shape that focuses on 
civilian victims and those forgotten by official history. In the process, these 
become the subject of an increasing number of literary works and films, most 
of which grow out of family scenarios and finally become fully developed 
narrative schemas. Many theoretical and critical studies have been devoted 
to such questions, too, basing themselves primarily on textual corpuses. 
For example, Marianne Hirsch has proposed the concept of “postmemory,” 
Susan Suleiman the expression “the 1.5 generation,” while Dominique Viart, 
with his phrase “the family relation story (récit de filiation)” draws on a vast 
corpus that goes well beyond the Jewish genocide as such. The notion of 
“autofiction”—that is, a work labeled “novel” which nevertheless features the 
actual writer as its main character—constitutes another of these new theo-
retical tools.3
 While situating myself in close proximity to these various reflections, I 
would like to approach the corpus by bringing to light certain of the condi-
tions that, in parallel with the historical events the works in question refer 
to, have helped to make possible the writing of this recent literature. Subse-
quently, I shall discuss the principal tendencies and themes that have become 
prominent over the last fifteen years.
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1. narrative Conditions and Sequences
Within the framework of the approach adopted here, I shall limit myself 
to two questions. The first is the epistemic question of the family, which 
represents a central point of departure for each of the texts I shall examine. 
The second, operating at an epistemological level, strives to grasp the 1980s 
return to autobiography in particular, and to memory in general.
The Model Family and Its Histories
Why is the family located at the center of this memorial configuration? The 
political terrors of the twentieth century were determined by impulses of 
annihilation that impinged not only on individuals but also on their whole 
family, their genealogy, and their group culture. The realization by descen-
dants of what their ancestors lived through has become an integral part of 
the way the very conception of the family is structured. Thus, many of the 
imaginary conceptions by which families define themselves have been recon-
stituted by default around the black hole of terror. Even the groups who are 
least affected are still burdened with suspicions about what their relatives may 
have done, or not done, during the war or the occupation period in order to 
save themselves. In this way, a whole series of possibilities opens up accord-
ing to whether the family is Jewish, whether the father was in the Resistance, 
whether he was a passive civilian or a collaborator. Or even worse. In the spe-
cific German context, evidently the question of collaboration is not relevant. 
There are degrees and differentiations, ranging from those who were simple 
Nazis to those who were more involved in the terror system, all the way up 
to the Nazi, or worse, the SS staff. At the opposite end, we encounter those 
who helped Jews or those who participated actively in one of the Resistance 
movements (Catholic or Protestant or Communist). Would the filiation and 
its imaginary be sufficient to justify memorial writers when they choose to 
enter via the family door? In order to clarify the terms of that question, we 
need to take a brief look backward.
 From the nineteenth century onwards, the family became an object, a 
site, and an agent of social regulation;4 it remains today a primary site of 
subject formation and, as a corollary, one of the most powerful normative 
investments of our culture. In the process, it functions as a relevant indica-
tor, as a sociologist would say, of the state of society, and in this context, of 
the type of relationship that society maintains with its past. This relation-
ship has evolved in a manner similar to the shift of representations referred 
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to above. In the 1960s and 1970s, the family was decried as harmful: it was 
considered responsible for the long-term survival of bourgeois values. Paso-
lini’s Theorem (1968) or Ettore Scola’s Ugly, Dirty and Bad (1976) identify the 
family as a focus of perversions and alienation. In 1971, the family becomes 
a pathogenic, ultraconservative milieu, both as seen through the lens of Ken 
Loach’s camera and in the language of the anti-psychiatry movement: this 
is the moment when David Cooper writes The Death of the Family. Barthes 
denounces “The Father—that Talker” (“Au séminaire”) in the very same year 
that he announces the “death of the author.” Bourgeois norms become the 
object of a widely shared hatred.
 With its cheap realism, the “mode rétro”5 that began in the 1970s may 
have been a harbinger of the reversal that was to take place at the end of the 
1980s, when the family became a positive focus of interest and people turned 
back to it, just as the authors who had previously flaunted the most neutral 
or “blank” mode of writing (écriture blanche) turned to autobiography. If it is 
with this past that present-day writers construct their family narratives, one 
may ask oneself whether that signifies a reinforcement of the family as an 
institution or whether it is not rather a different, non-“revolutionary” way of 
calling it into question, one that uses the past as a form of mediation.
The Rehabilitation of Autobiography
In 1968, Roland Barthes wrote his groundbreaking article with its categori-
cal title “The Death of the Author.” It ends on an irrevocable judgment, pro-
nounced in a prophetic tone: “the birth of the reader must be paid for with 
the death of the Author.” Barthes’s disqualification of the author is formulated 
in the wake of a series of position-taking statements and essays produced by 
the nouveau roman school (of which Nathalie Sarraute’s L’Ère du soupçon 
(The Age of Suspicion, 1956) was a precursor, followed by, among others, the 
essays of Alain Robbe-Grillet (written in a highly polemical tone), as well 
as by Barthes himself (Le Degré zéro de l’écriture [Writing Degree Zero], for 
example), by Julia Kristeva, and, more generally, by intellectuals and academ-
ics affiliated with non-Althusserian structuralism; to these one may also add 
Maurice Blanchot. In the 1980s, however, directly countering this erasure of 
the subject, there comes about a return to autobiography, coinciding with 
the increasingly persistent presence of memorial questions. Many narrative 
works bear witness to a shift in which one can perceive the convergence and 
partial overlapping of the story-telling frameworks of memory, the family, 
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and biography. This trinity gives rise to a new direction that is loaded with 
significance.
 Yet must we therefore conclude that the importance acquired by autobio-
graphical issues and the renewed theoretical interest they elicited represent 
a genuine reversal of the previous situation? If it is true that from the 1950s 
to the 2000s, there is a shift from an uncompromising erasure of the subject 
to self-exhibition, this must rather be understood as the elaboration of new 
authorial configurations that draw their nourishment from the materials of 
memory, and vice versa—configurations arising from the dialectic between, 
on the one hand, the author and what he or she is the focus of (in particular 
at the level of subjectivity) and, on the other, his or her relationship to the 
world and to history. The very writers who were emblematic of self-erasure 
and intransitivity retune their literary awareness to the wavelength of auto-
biography, and thence (since we must avoid harboring the illusion that auto-
biography can ever be the shortest and only authentic route leading from the 
self back to the self) to the question of the subject. Nathalie Sarraute writes 
Enfance (Childhood) in 1983, Marguerite Duras L’Amant (The Lover) in 1984 
and La Douleur (War: A Memoir) in 1985, and Robbe-Grillet Le Miroir qui 
revient (Ghosts in the Mirror) in 1984. And Barthes himself, having already 
published Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes (1975), takes the view in 1980 
that one must henceforth “observe” a possible “return to the author” (La 
Préparation 276). This return to self, which is also an interplay between self 
and autobiography, leaves a margin broad enough to accommodate a power-
ful recharging of the question of genealogy, since autobiography as a genre 
does not fully account for the majority of the texts I have cited that bring 
together the family constellation in all its forms: the father figure, whether as 
a presence in Robbe-Grillet’s Le miroir qui revient or as a painful absence in 
Claude Simon’s L’Acacia (The Acacia) of 1989; the close, affectionate relation-
ship between father and daughter in Sarraute’s Enfance, where the mother 
figure, distant and clumsily egocentric, is desacralized; the mother again 
in Duras’s L’Amant, or as a central structuring presence in Perec’s W ou le 
souvenir d’enfance (W, or the Memory of Childhood), where the father rarely 
appears, or in Roland Barthes, and then again in Roland Barthes’s La Cham-
bre claire (Camera Lucida) (1980). Another way of putting it, however, would 
be that the literary program of self-effacement was incapable of resisting the 
attraction of the force field of memorial questions as they emerged in the 
1980s. In that perspective, what occupies the foreground is the writer’s whole 
relationship to society, his or her way of listening to it, being sensitive to it, 
permeable to it.
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The Lure of the Memorial
The return to autobiography is present in works where memorial expression 
leads the subject to revisit the history of his or her family in the context of 
history in general, thus anticipating quite specifically the tendencies of recent 
literature. Let us consider an example from outside the corpus of writing in 
the French language. In 1976, Christa Wolf ’s novel Kindheitsmuster (A Model 
Childhood) already carries traces of this movement and, one might say, antic-
ipates it. Her project in Kindheitsmuster is characterized by the “crabwalk” 
(Krebsgang)6 long before Günter Grass made the word famous by using it in 
the title of one of his novels (Im Krebsgang 2002):
The closer someone is to us, the more difficult it seems to be to say some-
thing conclusive about them: that’s well known. The child who had crept 
away to hide inside me—has she come out? Or was she so startled that she 
looked for a deeper, more inaccessible hiding place? Has memory done its 
duty? Or has it allowed itself to be used to prove by its fallibility that it is 
impossible to avoid the deadly sin of our times, which is: not to be willing 
to discover one’s own identity?
 And the past, which still had the power to impose its own linguistic 
rules and split the first person into a second and a third—is its authority 
shattered? Will the voices grow quiet?
 I don’t know. (Wolf 530)
Christa Wolf here transmits the uncertainty that ties the past to the present 
via the figures of the parents and the self. In the course of a visit to the town, 
now in Poland, where she spent the first sixteen years of her life before flee-
ing the Soviet troops in 1945, Christa Wolf explores the past of her childhood 
through the mediation of the character little Nelly. The narrative unfolds 
at three levels: 1) the act of remembrance of that period, during which the 
child witnessed events and signs that are retrospectively clarified by mean-
ings she was not able fully to grasp, but that seemed nonetheless evident; 2) 
a visit to the town in the summer of 1971; and 3) a self-conscious reflection 
on memory and the work that writing allows her to carry out to that end. 
The narrative construction thus consists in a to-and-fro movement between 
the present moment of narration and a narrated past interspaced with a criti-
cal reflexivity that preserves the distance between what took place and the 
a posteriori consciousness of an irremediable disaster. Although Perec was 
situated on the symmetrically opposite side (since his parents did not belong 
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to a German “minority” [deutsche Minderheit] who had settled in Poland, 
but were Polish Jewish immigrants who had come to France to live their 
modest lives and were then persecuted by Vichy and the Nazis), the writing 
of W ou le souvenir d’enfance deploys a closely related approach: it aims at a 
reconstitution that, articulated on the two complementary levels of autobi-
ography and fiction, carries within itself the knowledge that it will be impos-
sible to fill the gap in an existence fractured by “l’Histoire avec sa grande 
hache” (“History with a capital H,” where “capital” is also to be understood 
as in “capital punishment”) (13).7 The two approaches may be seen to move 
even closer together when one notes that Perec’s project for this book had 
included a third level,8 as in the three-dimensional structure of Wolf ’s novel, 
on the question of writing itself; although it did not appear as such in the 
final version of the work, its presence is visible throughout the whole text. 
An intermediate narrative level—this time specifically narrative, however—
is likewise to be found in several of the novels of Patrick Modiano, who 
was born, we should recall, just after the war. There again, the expression 
of uncertainty, the “shifty” element, to use one of the author’s own terms, is 
present from his earliest works, La Place de l’Étoile (1968) and Les Boulevards 
de ceinture (Ring Roads) (1971), in connection with his father who, prob-
ably by making shabby compromises, had managed to evade anti-Semitic 
persecution.
2. memorial Permutations
The family, autobiography, and memorial investigation thus constitute the 
conditions for, and the limits within which, recent memorial literature was 
eventually to develop. I should like to present that literature here within 
the frame of two types of discourse: one a discourse of homage or celebra-
tion, the other of suspicion, the latter being the one that achieves by far the 
widest resonance while at the same time accommodating itself within the 
perspective opened up by the authors mentioned previously. In every case, 
the writer becomes the archeologist of his own genealogy; in the process, 
he selects a parental figure as a mediator between himself and history. This 
is perhaps also one of the few critical and heuristic resources still available 
to us today when we seek to confront history. What follows from that is the 
question of the impact of social discourse, the question of the permeability 
of certain of these texts to the memorial doxa that nowadays occupies the 
public sphere.
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Paying Homage
Speaking of the problematics of the notion of filiation, Dominique Viart 
cites the dynastic fictions of Sylvie Germain: Le Livre des nuits (The Book 
of Nights) (1985); Nuit d’ambre (Night of Amber) (1987); and Jours de colère 
(Days of Wrath) (1989). Viart also demonstrates the importance of the dou-
ble paternal and maternal line, the place assigned to ancestors, or the suc-
cession of generations, in Pierre Bergougnoux’s La Maison rose (The Pink 
House) (1987), L’Orphelin (The Orphan) (1992), La Toussaint (All Saints’ 
Day) (1994), and Miette (Crumb) (1995). To these examples one should add 
Jean Rouaud’s series of novels, beginning with Les Champs d’honneur (Fields 
of Glory) (1990),9 which are devoted to the maternal grandfather, then the 
father, then the mother; we shall return to Rouaud’s work later. Even Michel 
Quint’s Effroyables jardins (Strange Gardens) (2000) carries a dedication to 
the memory of the author’s grandfather, “a miner who had fought at Ver-
dun,” and of the author’s father, who “had fought in the Resistance” and was a 
teacher. “Contemporary writers take for granted their own fragility: it is this 
that prevents them, in their capacity as both authors and readers, from turn-
ing themselves into figures of authority,” comments Dominique Viart (131).
 “My father was no hero. For a long time, I would doubtless have preferred 
him to be one. At least so that I could boast about it” (Pachet 9). Pierre Pachet 
here brings out the dilemma of a mode of writing that no longer draws on 
classic models in order to evoke the figure of the father. This does not mean, 
however, that he liquidates “the Father,” as certain writers of the 1970s would 
have done. Pachet belongs to a current of writing in which the father figure 
moves closer to the ordinary man he should always have been. He is not an 
anti-hero. The object is to deconstruct the myth of “my Father the hero” 
without destroying the paternal image. The writer gambles on being able to 
describe what remains while quietly taking apart the symbolic apparatus that 
made the father an inaccessible being, someone to be feared but admired. 
It is easy to associate what Pachet does in this book with Perec’s descrip-
tion, in W ou le souvenir d’enfance, of his father as a man struck down by a 
fatal chance that carried with it neither glory nor cowardice. Alternatively, 
one might recall what Régine Robin says about her father, whose glimpse of 
Lenin on his white horse crossing the river Bug she conflates with Fabrice’s 
encounter with Napoleon at Waterloo (Robin 1–108).10 Similarly, in La Place 
(A Man’s Place), Annie Ernaux speaks about her father with rigorous dignity 
and no trappings: during the Occupation, he is “the hero of the supply-lines” 
(44). Or again, a sober idealization of the father may be constructed around 
a sense of absence and disappearance.11 One wonders whether it is not by 
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bringing the Father down from his pedestal that the author is himself or 
herself able to shift to a different narrative and personal position and thence 
emerge from the illusion of mastering the world through the text.
The Double Bind of Uncertainty, the Double Release of Writing
Certain authors, however, allow what are clearly false notes to slip in. Art 
Spiegelman gives us a portrait of his father, an Auschwitz survivor, that is 
often unappealing. Ruth Klüger, deported with her mother, lets her resent-
ment show: “I don’t think I’ve ever forgiven her. That other person I would 
have become, if only I had been allowed to say a word, if she had not treated 
me purely and simply as her property” (Klüger 63).12 What is one to do with 
the “primeval soup,” she then goes on to ask. The answers are many, but they 
all carry with them suspicion and ambiguity: a real violence that refers to 
the family as a focus for neuroses, as a source of secrets—ones that one may 
perhaps have to spirit away by turning them into enigmas—as an originary 
scene where the place assigned to the ogre (the father or grandfather, or 
sometimes the brother) assumes historic dimensions, as we shall now see.
 The sense of uncertainty that is in play here is expressed in a direct, 
critical form along the double axis of the parental past and of literary tra-
ditions. This angle of approach, which was already apparent in the French 
Romantics, is undoubtedly germane to those who feel that they have inher-
ited a past they would not necessarily have wished for, a past through which 
their parents moved or where they themselves may have been on the scene. 
The arousal of consciousness that is thus set in motion does not only move 
outwards (toward family members, literary traditions); it also involves the 
intimate domain of the subject, inciting it to engage in a self-reflexive dia-
logue. Marc Weitzmann’s Chaos (1997), Lorette Nobécourt’s Horsita (1999), 
and Catherine Cusset’s La Haine de la famille (Family Hatred) (2001) may be 
cited here as examples. All three narrators settle their scores with a very close 
family member who has deceived them or whose behavior carries connota-
tions of falsehood.
 Chaos draws on the biblical model of Abel and Cain as reconfigured by 
modernity and psychoanalysis in order to place on the stage a brother, a 
Holocaust denier who, as the editor of a “New” historical review, apparently 
purloined their grandfather’s manuscript, written during the Resistance. 
The personal history of the narrator’s principal friend, a historian born in 
1947, is itself freighted with his father’s past in the notorious Vichy mili-
tia. In Horsita, it is the father who plays the role of the bad lot as seen by 
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his daughter Hortense, the narrator: she reads the father’s personal diary, 
passed on to her by François (the uncle of her lover Samuel, both of whom 
are Jewish). She discovers that her father was apparently a collaborator who 
had taken part in the looting of Jewish property and who had also joined the 
SS. It turns out, however, that the diary is a fake, invented wholesale by Sam-
uel’s uncle. The structure of the text remains relatively complex, with split 
narratives and flashbacks, the presence of a child as a focalizing character 
and a female narrator who interpolates an episode recounting a visit to San 
Salvador. The use of different typefaces increases the “broken” character of 
the text, thus reflecting the psychological anguish of the narrator who finds 
she has become a prisoner of the inquiry she is conducting into her father’s 
life:
A construction site! that’s what we are, a site for the erection of some kind 
of witches’ sabbath! And in the end it will be language itself that will bury 
us all, I wish I could experience everything so I could tell you everything, 
death included, that bellowing of consciousness as it is burned alive, words 
are executioners, syntax has drilled its way into our skull! (244)
In Chaos, the narrator’s brother makes away with the grandfather’s manu-
script: as a result, “its disappearance blocks all means of access to the family 
heritage” (101–2). What is more, the narrator finds that he has to lie in order 
to cover up for his brother. Likewise, in Alain Nadaud’s La Fonte des glaces 
(The Melting of the Ice) (2000), the grandfather’s dossier, “bought at a sky-
high price” in a hurry, turns out to be “truncated or composed of dubious 
documents. The moment the pages are put back in their right order, the fact 
becomes obvious: none of these archives is an original” (41). In this way, not 
only is the very notion of a written document heavily invested with inauthen-
ticity, thus indirectly shifting the debate to the question of fiction, but the 
narrator is deceived and abused. This theme, in its feminine aspect, is also 
endowed with a sexual sense. Horsita, the imaginary double of the female 
narrator in the novel of that name, has been raped: the abuse thus spreads 
from mind to body, driving the subject as a whole to a point where it faces 
possible destruction. A similar situation occurs in Sylvie Germain’s L’Enfant 
Méduse (The Medusa Child) (1991), which we shall be considering later. As 
it happens, what is in the news in the late 1990s suggests a connection with 
literature here. Thus, for example, many a story, from Christine Angot’s to 
Annie Ernaux’s, was inspired by media coverage of incest and violence to 
minors. With the figure of the brother for Germain, and more generally the 
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figure of the father, the site of authority and power is wholly overthrown and 
obliterated.
 In Catherine Cusset’s La Haine de la famille, which is less parodic than 
Chaos and less experimental in its writing than Horsita, it is the mother 
who, in chapter V (“1943”), appears in the guise of a cheat. She capitalizes 
on the fact that she was apparently “semi”-traumatized by the arrest of her 
own mother—in other words, the grandmother of the female narrator. The 
grandmother herself is treated as a hero, whereas the mother is thoroughly 
ridiculed. In contrast to the female family line (and one should recall that 
the transmission of Jewishness passes through the maternal line), the father 
is “of French stock.” He is derisively presented as “apolitical,” even though he 
worked for the “fascist paper Gringoire.”
 These novels are very much in harmony, as it happens, with the 1990s, 
the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall, and they respond more or less 
explicitly to the reference points of a horizon of expectation dominated by 
the memorial and by the question of the victims. It is in this broader context 
that we must now consider this “recent literature.”
“Social Discourse” and Its Effects
Family questions and secrets over three generations; the genocide of the Jews 
as “memorial news” (actualité mémorielle), with denial as its corollary; the 
written text as fake; a critique of the blurring of the boundary between fic-
tion and reality and a calling into question of literary illusion; even incest 
and crimes within the family—such are the problematic concerns that many 
recent novels share with the current (actuel) horizon of expectation. Satisfy-
ing that expectation generally means causing no upsets and no disappoint-
ments, conjuring up prospects of consolation and redemption, if only by 
showing that life is possible “afterwards.” The observation that literary texts 
are tuned in to the horizon of expectation is corroborated by the fact that 
these writers are highly permeable to what Marc Angenot has called “social 
discourse.”13 They borrow from it both its memorial lexicon and the histori-
cal references that motivate and shape it. One even finds, recurring from one 
text to another, little standard scenarios, narrative micro-models as it were, 
that reinforce the process of historical connotation. Among these are the 
opposition between a “Resistance” and a “collaborationist” past; the looting 
of Jewish goods, which occupied the front pages in the 1990s in the form of 
the scandal of Nazi gold reported to be held in Swiss banks; the stereotypes 
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of the bureaucrat or the pallid snooper in the archives who turns out to be a 
counterfeiter; and so forth.
 There is thus an important distinction to be made when it comes to 
recent works. Texts that are permeable to the mood of the day and the impact 
of fashions exploit the news value (actualité) of memory, whereas those that 
operate by means of memorial renewal (actualisation) translate what took 
place into terms that are compatible with the present time; the object of such 
translation is that the process of transmission should have its effect, yet with-
out giving rise to the belief that a permanent, successful act of mourning is 
possible where crimes have been committed that bordered on the very limit 
of what is human, attempting to destroy it root and branch. The news value 
of memory is a vast cultural phenomenon that always seems to stifle the 
energies of memorial renewal, if only because it is always inclined to chatter, 
whereas genuine transmission requires silences and intervals for reflection.
 Perhaps as a result of the interaction between the public news value (actu-
alité) of memory and an ethics of transmission, the conditions under which 
memorial references are reorganized undergo an evolution. The memorial 
paradigm is flexible, nourished and energized by the tensions between differ-
ent memories,14 which in turn proliferate with the emergence of discourses 
of recognition, demands for justice, and the bringing to light of stretches of 
history repressed by the political authorities. Although in France the mem-
ory of Algeria is present in a number of novels (e.g., Clémence Boulouque’s 
Sujets libres [Free Subjects] of 2005), it is the 1914–18 war that has acquired 
the greatest news value (actualité) in the domain of the novel. Published 
a year before Sébastien Japrisot’s Un long dimanche de fiançailles (A Very 
Long Engagement) (1991), Jean Rouaud’s Les Champs d’honneur (1990) was 
certainly a text that anticipated the relaunch of this theme; a considerable 
number of historical studies on the subject were also published in the 1990s, 
writing the First World War into the archive of the twentieth century as one 
of the greatest crimes of the modern world.
 At times, the exercise of writing attempts to expose a genealogy of crime. 
For example, in Les Champs d’honneur, the horror of the scene where soldiers 
are gassed on the front, north of Ypres, provides a premonition of “the future 
death-camps” (146). Other examples include references to Buchenwald (157) 
or the firebombing of Dresden (173) in the closing pages of the same author’s 
Des Hommes illustres (Of Illustrious Men). François Bon, in Buzon’s Crime, 
also interpolates the following reference, although it is foreign to the plot: 
“The gas was a can thrown at human height, the corpses had been burnt 
by human hands . . .” (46). At other times, the writer’s personality gives way 
to the narcissistic attractions of an easy audience response. “Tomorrow, on 
P h i l i P P e  m e S n a r d  89
Tuesday, she will be eight months old. I know: when she came out, it was 
from me. It was horrifying. A thousand times worse than Auschwitz,” writes 
Christine Angot at the beginning of Léonore, toujours (Leonora, Forever) 
(12). And two-thirds of the way through, one finds this: “Last night I dreamt 
of a German called Angst who had been raped. The Jews had taken him pris-
oner, then tortured him. Since my father, my dreams have become perverted. 
[ . . . ]” (103), and it continues in the same way, following a script that is half 
sadomasochistic, half incestuous. As a more recent example of these effects 
of fashion, one may cite Amélie Nothomb’s Acide sulfurique (Sulphuric Acid) 
(2005), where the system of the concentration camps, with its matricula-
tion numbers and its kapos, constitutes the semantic universe of the novel. 
One may well ask whether history at large, the history of the “great” crimes 
and wars, is not in some sense conscripted here as a decor within which to 
approach the central anthropological question of the suffering body.
 Philippe Claudel, with his Les Âmes grises (Grey Souls) (2003), which won 
the Renaudot Prize, is one of the latest authors so far to have been inspired 
by the Great War. Situated behind the front lines, his novel features the sor-
did murder of a little girl and a police investigation. The author thus displays 
his ability to listen with particular attention to the “sensitive” themes that 
are carried by the media and on which, in the process, the pathos of the 
moment is focused. Sylvie Germain draws on the Christological theme par 
excellence of the suffering that is written on the body, at the interface between 
individual and collective crime, and situates it in the perspective of the dis-
appearance of the body. In her novel L’Enfant méduse (The Medusa Child) 
(1991), the 1939–45 war is present only in the background, but it determines 
the reflection on violence and its transmission that is carried by the story as 
a whole. Lucie Daubigné is a quiet, innocent child up to the day when her 
elder half-brother Ferdinand begins to crucify her. He subjects her to ritual 
rape and reduces her to such a state of moral and physical degradation (she 
turns into a thin, ugly creature, filled with hate) that she shuts herself away 
in her secret shame. It turns out not only that the father of the (half-) brother 
was killed at the front but also that his body was smashed to pieces by a shell. 
“Lieutenant Morrogues’s death could not be doubted, yet his corpse did not 
exist” (85). Brought up by his mother to believe in the sacredness of his strik-
ing resemblance to his father, Ferdinand becomes a “living tomb” (78) to his 
father’s memory and thereby a monster. The irreversible disappearance of 
bodies was given a new meaning by the genocide of the Jews, which from 
then on became established as the cultural prism through which it was pos-
sible to interpret, or reinterpret, every disappearance of a body.
 Sylvie Germain’s many books include a biographical essay on Etty 
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Hillesum15 and, more recently, a story with a Nazi background, Magnus 
(2005). Since the beginning of her career, she has thus been asking the same 
question: can an inheritance that comes out of the void be anything other 
than pathogenic? Can it produce anything other than monsters? It becomes 
clear, then, that one strand (but not all) of the literature of our day is capable 
of taking responsibility for transmission by giving currency to the questions 
that haunt our civilization—or by giving its ghosts the form of a question, 
thus opening up the possibility of comprehension. The issues of radical vio-
lence that are peculiar to the modern world have been so powerfully brought 
into focus in our day by the genocide of the Jews that authors seem irresistibly 
drawn to integrating it into their narrative or even using it as their subject 
matter. This is the case with Philippe Claudel’s Rapport de Brodeck (Brodeck’s 
Report) (2007) and in particular Clémence Boulouque’s Nuit ouverte (Open 
Night) (2007). Among the other factors (both events and discourse) that 
have undoubtedly set in motion these memorial associations, there can be 
no doubt that the Rwanda genocide of 1994 and the ethnic cleansing in the 
former Yugoslavia (1992–95), the Srebrenica massacre, for example, have 
played an important part. The “disappeared” of the Argentinean dictatorship 
should also be taken into account. But they too are often interpreted with a 
reference to the Shoah somewhere in the background.
3. Was my Grandfather a nazi?
The narrative schema we have been considering and the approach that 
underpins it become unavoidable for a considerable number of sons and 
grandsons from the country where it all began, Germany. In that sense, the 
title of the book by Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschuggnall, 
“Opa war kein Nazi” (“Grandpa Wasn’t a Nazi”), exemplifies the impulse that 
one might describe as an awakening of consciousness leading to a desire to 
investigate the past. In this instance, instead of a fictional inquiry conceived 
by a French writer, as with Denis Lachaud’s J’apprends l’allemand (German 
Lessons) of 1998, one encounters an approach in which a tension is estab-
lished between fictional projection and autobiography, as, for example, in In 
den Augen meines Großvaters (In My Grandfather’s Eyes) by Thomas Medi-
cus, a German born in 1953. The author came of age just after the con-
sciousness-raising movement that, in Germany after 1968, incited children 
violently to denounce their fathers’ Nazi past. His grandfather had been the 
only Wehrmacht general to be killed in Italy: “A German Wehrmacht general 
who was fatally wounded in 1944 in a partisan ambush in Tuscany and who 
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bears the Italian family name Crisolli—that configuration, as complex as it 
was accidental, appeared to me, with all of its factual character, as the subject 
for a novel, as a literary challenge” (“‘Comprendre’” 93).
 Various factors were responsible for Thomas Medicus’s decision to 
embark on this adventure, mingling the biographical, autobiographical, and 
fictional genres. In the first place, in 1989, after the fall of the Wall, it became 
easy to travel to Eastern Europe and visit Poland, where his family had set-
tled. Second, the 1990s were of course a period of intense commemorative 
activity. There was the long debate on the Holocaust Monument in Berlin, 
and in particular, the great “Crimes of the Wehrmacht” exhibition that began 
in 1995 and was shown throughout Germany and Austria. This photographic 
exhibition might well be considered as comparable, mutatis mutandis, to the 
broadcasting of the television serial Holocaust in 1978. It sensitized Medicus, 
and many other Germans, to questions that had not been raised until then, 
from that point of view, about the massacres in which the Wehrmacht had 
taken part or which they had supported logistically on the Eastern Front. 
Another biographical factor is the death of Medicus’s father at age forty-nine, 
the same age that his grandfather died: as he reaches this critical year, Medi-
cus is himself gripped by the fear of death. It is against this background that, 
in 2001, his inquiry begins.
 Inquiries flourish on clues and documentary sources. “I decided to do 
some research on Wilhelm Crisolli and solve the enigma of his death. I had 
some papers in my possession” (In den Augen 54). In 1986, when his grand-
mother died, he received an envelope containing fifty-one photographs of 
his grandfather taken in Italy and Denmark. It is not until fifteen years later, 
encouraged by the events we have mentioned above, that Medicus exploits 
the potential of this material. He now begins to ask questions about the pho-
tographs. Ever since the opening sentences of Modiano’s Boulevards de cein-
ture (1971) or Perec’s W ou le souvenir d’enfance (1975), the photograph is 
recognized as one of the major topoi of memorial investigation, whether 
mediated by the literary text, by cinema, or by other art forms. It endorses 
an external narrative point of view that makes it clear that the author knows 
a good deal less than is hidden beneath the surface of reality, thus setting in 
motion—and in that sense justifying—the logic of the inquiry as a whole and 
of its referential grounding.
 The first phase takes Medicus to Poland, where he attempts to capture 
the local atmosphere. Moved by a romantic impulse, he dwells more on the 
landscapes than on the people. In any case, claiming that his book belongs 
to the genre of “travel narrative,” he tells us that he sees himself as belonging 
to “a rich literary tradition” in which the human figure and the landscape 
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form “a kind of mythical unity” (“‘Comprendre’” 88). Then the tone changes, 
and so does the approach. He now conducts his inquiry in Italy. He consults 
the military archives and meets Carlo Gentile, a historian who really exists. 
Where the facts are not sufficient, he entrusts himself to the powers of liter-
ary imagination (literarische Einbildungskraft) (In den Augen 235). On the 
technical level, he uses shifts of point of view in order to construct a plurality 
of perspectives. Thus he imaginatively inhabits the mind of his grandfather 
and proceeds to elaborate a fictional version of Crisolli’s family life. The 
photographs take their place here to mark the phases of the narrative and 
provide support for the quest, while at the same time setting aside within the 
realm of what can be said the unknown quotient of what can be seen. What, 
then, is the project around which this set of procedures is articulated?
 The grandfather is present in the narrator’s life only under the auspices 
of death: this principle is maintained throughout, from his family’s evo-
cations of him up to the scene where his body is transferred to a military 
cemetery. The object, in other words, is to elucidate the grandfather’s death, 
not his life. This is the reason why Medicus is not interested in the Eastern 
Front—at least, that is how he justifies it. The only episode included from 
that period is the description by a female cousin of Crisolli’s refusal to obey 
an order given by one of his superiors, an act of resistance that had acquired 
an almost mythical status (213–14, 222). One is not dealing here, then, with 
an attempt at biographical reconstitution, and still less with a hagiography. 
Medicus insists on his grandfather’s responsibility for a crime (the murder 
of a priest and two women) committed in Italy (193), giving him the benefit 
of no attenuating circumstances. He affirms unequivocally (perhaps a shade 
too unequivocally) that he was a criminal (Täter), citing in support the files 
of the twentieth Luftwaffen-Felddivision.
 This parental figure whom Medicus experienced only via his disappear-
ance provides him with traces, minimal footholds, in the backward, upstream 
journey of his identity as he brings it face-to-face with his genealogy, or 
rather his hypothetical genealogy. In that sense, the fact that his grandfather 
died before he was born frees him from one of the constantly recurring ste-
reotypes of such literature and, as it were, of culture itself: the memory of the 
“kind old grand-dad” who bounces his grandson on his knee and then, on 
further inquiry, turns out to be a wicked ogre (a stereotype of which Lachaud 
has availed himself abundantly). If Medicus does not formulate his relation 
to his grandfather by way of the topos of disclaimed affection, he nonetheless 
recognizes a kind of idealization thwarted by fascination/repulsion (62).
 The real element of the unknown concerns the subject “Medicus” (or 
what he will become after the age of forty-nine). “My grandfather appeared to 
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me as the vanishing point of my biography, towards which ran the converg-
ing lines of what I had done and what I had not done, what I have become 
and what I have not become” (54). Elsewhere, the technical advantage of the 
shifts in point of view also licenses the more ambiguous game—which Medi-
cus plays in the mode of fictional projection, making claims to empathy—of 
taking the place of a murderer.
If I wanted to know as much as possible about Wilhelm Crisolli, there was 
only one approach I would adopt which could not be limited to the collec-
tion of mere facts. As the title of my book indicates, I risked making the 
experiment of discovering how the career officer who was my grandfather 
had observed his world, and what experiences I could read in that gaze of 
his which I found captured in different photographic portraits. (“‘Com-
prendre’” 84)
 One may then wonder whether one is not dealing here with a litera-
ture that achieves expression through the tension between the memorial 
approach and the emergence of a new autobiographical approach that han-
dles life through the mediation of the figure of a dead person who disap-
peared from the scene at the age the author has reached at the moment he 
begins to write. That would invite one to reflect on the place of the dead per-
son—an impossible place—as a focus for the story, as a position to occupy in 
order to open up the possibility of narrative and narrative as possibility. Thus 
the act of narration conjures into reality the possibility of an impossibility 
in order to give itself enough distance—for mediation always means taking 
one’s distance—for its own operations without wanting to turn the text into a 
scene of judgment. Medicus makes it quite clear that he wishes to be neither 
the plaintiff, nor the defendant, nor the judge. “The only role that I dared 
to take on was that of the investigator (Ermittler)” (In den Augen 239). To 
avoid making a judgment in order to understand the criminal, yet without 
pardoning him, is something like the approach Primo Levi proposes in order 
to handle the grey zone of collaboration (24–52). For Medicus, the object is 
to weigh up the probable and the improbable (In den Augen 245).
 At the end of the book, the narrator hears that an Italian is writing a novel 
about a Wehrmacht general. His immediate response is to carry on with his 
enquiry, but then he stops and offers us instead a conclusion that enjoins 
reconciliation with oneself:
To see oneself reflected every day, from one year to the next, perhaps for 
ever, in the eyes of one’s grandfather, appeared to me not to be the most 
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helpful means of finding one’s way out of the labyrinth of damnatio memo-
riae, the erasure of memory. It was important to remember, but also to 
forget. (248)
The questioning and the inquiry are not directed primarily toward the 
discovery of identity; their purpose is to allay the pain of mourning. Such 
mourning would be not so much for the loss of a family member to whom 
the subject was presumably closely attached as for the historical event itself, 
once the subject has taken responsibility for facing up to what took place. In 
that sense, Crisolli could be said to have been a figure of mediation, mak-
ing it possible to assume a position not in history itself, which is no longer 
possible, but face-to-face with the history that the inheritors never wanted.
4. A brief, General Synthesis
Taken as a whole, these works are characterized, on the one hand, by a writ-
ing protocol that combines a complex schema with a narrative logic and, on 
the other, by the interaction of two kinds of temporal relation, which may 
also be described as questions.
 Let us begin with the writing protocol. The schema in question proves 
in fact to be mixed, blending a narrative schema with a family schema. This 
composite structure enables it to serve as a prism through which the narra-
tor, embarking on a quest for his or her own identity, may revisit his family 
history from the perspective of history at large, and vice versa. The writer 
then seeks to elucidate the identity of one of his relations; the father is often 
here a referential construction, one enigmatic aspect of which is linked to an 
experience that took place, in particular, between 1939 and 1945 and, more 
generally, in the course of some major historical event. The narrative logic, 
for its part, gives the schema its dynamic movement and its temporality: it 
is a logic of enquiry. Combining as it does the detective scenario with the 
hermeneutic quest, the enquiry focuses on the question of the crimes com-
mitted and of guilt. In the process, it brings out the influence of the narrative 
structures of the roman noir on literature in general, which in turn makes 
sense of these political crimes by establishing their close connection with 
other crimes, especially those that take place within the framework of the 
family (incest, the massacre of a whole family by one of its members, etc.).
 The interaction of the two temporal questions is situated on an entirely 
different level. It allows an approach that takes as its starting point the ten-
sion between the notions of actualité and actualisation, which are two spe-
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cific modes of relation to the time of the event as referential object. The 
news value (actualité) of memory is a product of operative media-related 
and institutional factors that make memory present in an extreme degree, 
indeed omnipresent, in the total set of discourses that traverse the domain 
of the social and establish themselves as the doxa, to the point where mem-
ory becomes a recurrent frame for our vision of the world (Marc Angenot’s 
notion of “social discourse” is particularly appropriate here). There is a real 
danger that this “presentification” of memory, a specifically cultural phe-
nomenon of which entry into the economic sphere is only one derivative 
form, will reify what happened or turn it into a mere cliché. More precisely, 
the complexity of the event itself is constantly exposed to the risk of being 
sacrificed to facilitate communication or indeed consumption, where “com-
munication” means overdetermination by the constraints of reception. As 
we have seen, there are a considerable number of authors who rehearse these 
effects within their works with a greater or lesser degree of critical distance. 
As for actualisation, it draws on a virtually contrary logic. It consists in the 
labor of translating an experience with the aim of transmitting it. For even if 
the historical character of translations shows that the same text is translated 
differently from one period to another, it remains true that the criterion 
against which the translation is judged must always be the source text and 
not, as is often feared, the context of reception, which is in any case not nec-
essarily the same as the target context. It is on the basis of this set of narrative 
procedures and this tension between two kinds of temporal relation that the 
corpus of memorial literature offers itself for interpretation.
 Yet if one can establish a proximity of this kind between literature and 
the norms of the moment, the actualité of memory, can literature be said to 
retain its critical power? The reply to this question surely holds no surprises, 
since between doubt and certainty, the fictional and the factual, autofiction 
and autobiography, but also between love and hate, mourning and melan-
choly, this memorial literature, which is also a literature of destabilized iden-
tities, can find no definitive answers to the questions it asks. The quest does 
not end in the discovery of an identity, but rather serves to demonstrate, and 
sometimes to harness, the fragility of identity. At the same time, to come 
closer to one’s own identity by revisiting one’s family via history writ large 
is also to gain a footing in the history that is staking its claim in our day 
through a permanent act of remembrance. What really matters for these 
authors, I would argue, is to take up their position in that memory—not 
having participated in the events themselves—and strive to use it as a way of 
gaining some measure of the detachment that emotion will not allow. Per-
haps it is in this tension that one may locate the resistance point of literature 
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to the pressure of memorial actualité. Perhaps it is at that exact point that 
literature in particular and the arts in general insert dialectic into the cultural 
sphere.
notes
 1. [Translator’s note:] The opposition between actualité and actualisation, which 
plays a key role in the argument of this article, cannot be translated into English as it 
stands while preserving the same connotations. The adjectival form actuel means “be-
longing to the present moment,” “current,” “topical”; the noun actualité means “current 
events,” and in the plural, “news” (as in “the television news”). I have attempted to preserve 
something of the opposition here by using the expressions “news value” and “memorial 
renewal”; elsewhere, I have sometimes varied these expressions to suit the context. Wher-
ever actualité, actualisation, or (occasionally) a related word is used, I have added the 
French word in parentheses after the translation so that the reader can track the argument 
through. The opposition is lucidly redefined toward the end of the essay, so there should 
be no doubt about its sense and import.
 2. [Translator’s note:] Translations of titles (provided only for primary sources, not 
for critical works and the like) are in most cases those of published versions. Where I have 
not been able to find a published English translation, I have translated the title myself or 
(as here) used a plausible version from an Internet site. No translation is given for titles 
consisting only of names or of words having the same meaning in English. Translations 
of titles are provided only at the first mention of the work. Where a text is quoted, I have 
provided the page reference for the original version, not the translation. All translations 
of quoted passages are my own.
 3. See Doubrovsky.
 4. See Donzelot; de Singly; Attias-Donfut, Lapierre, and Segalen.
 5. On the “mode rétro” and its relation to memories of the Occupation in France, see 
Rousso, 149–56.
 6. “Earlier drafts began differently: with flight—when the child was almost sixteen—
or with the attempt to describe the work of memory as a crabwalk, as a laborious back-
wards movement” (Wolf 11).
 7. [Translator’s note:] Perec is punning here on the name of the letter “h” in French, 
which is a homonym of the French word for “axe”: thus literally, “History with its capital 
‘H’ / with its great axe.”
 8. See Lejeune 89ff.
 9. Followed by Des Hommes illustres (Of Illustrious Men) (1993), Le Monde à peu 
près (The World, More or Less) (1996), Sur la scène comme au ciel (On Stage as in Heaven) 
(1999).
 10. [Translator’s note:] The reference here is to a scene at the beginning of Stendhal’s 
novel La Chartreuse de Parme (The Charterhouse of Parma).
 11. See Hirsch.
 12. This sentence does not appear in the English edition, which was written (and re-
vised in places) by Klüger herself.
 13. See Angenot 13ff. In defining “social discourse,” Marc Angenot explains that it is 
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a question of the “generic systems,” the “repertoires of topics,” the “sequence rules for ut-
terances that, in a given society, organise the sayable—what can be narrated and asserted 
[the narratable and assertable]—and guarantee the discursive division of labour” (13ff.). 
In the pages that follow, he insists in particular on the “generalized and hegemonic inter-
active features of [social discourse].” If social discourse may easily be seen as analogous 
to ideology, there is nonetheless a difference: the meanings that it carries outstrip both in 
quantity and in organization those circulated by ideology and introduce cultural elements 
that are not subject to ideology’s surveillance.
 14. It is therefore necessary here to make a critical reassessment of what some call 
“competition between victims” (concurrence de victimes), with particular reference to 
Jean-Michel Chaumont’s book (Paris: La Découverte, 1997), which uses the phrase as its 
title. If there may sometimes be rivalry and conflict (terms that do not connote the mar-
ket as “competition” does), these are only epiphenomena of memorial historicity itself, 
which functions by a differentiation of memories one from the other and, in the process, 
by creating an effect of stimulation, promotes mourning and rationalization in a society 
historically marked by violence.
 15. Hillesum was a young Dutch Jew, an intellectual, who was deported to Auschwitz 
in 1943 and subsequently died there. She is well known for her diary, Het verstoorde leven 
(An Interrupted Life).
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how convenient it would be if the Third reich’s citizens had been some-
how evil by nature, demons in somebody’s album of the damned—in other 
words, unlike us. The actual case, of course, is far more terrible.
—william T. vollman, “Seeing eye to eye” 9
In an essay published two decades ago, before he had embarked on his 
authoritative two-volume study Nazi Germany and the Jews, the historian 
Saul Friedländer reflected on the “unease in historical interpretation” regard-
ing the Holocaust and the Final Solution. Despite the enormous amount of 
work that historians had devoted to the subject, he noted, “an opaqueness 
remains at the very core of the historical understanding and interpretation of 
what happened” (“Unease” 103). This opaqueness, this stubborn resistance 
to meaning, manifests itself, Friedländer explained, in two areas in particu-
lar: the psychology of the perpetrators and the possibility of “integrating the 
Holocaust into a global historical interpretation” (104)—that is, of making 
the Holocaust somehow “usable” for an understanding of the present and 
the future.1
 Today, even after Friedländer’s own considerable work, we are no closer 
to a full understanding of the Holocaust—and in particular of the “psychol-
ogy of the perpetrator,” which I take to refer to the tangle of motivations, 
justifications, and self-understandings that allowed thousands of individual 
Germans, either by administrative decision or by action on the ground, to 
engage over several years in genocidal mass murder and industrial extermi-
nation of those whom their government considered “not worthy of life”—
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than we were twenty years ago. That fact may at least in part account for 
why, in recent years, novelists and filmmakers have turned their attention 
to a serious consideration of the “everyday life” of Nazi killers—not Nazis 
portrayed as caricatures (as in Martin Amis’s Time’s Arrow, which James 
Phelan discusses in this volume), nor Nazis as secondary characters in stories 
focused on victims (Amon Goeth in Schindler’s List), but Nazis as the heroes 
of their own stories, the way every human being can be said to be the hero of 
his or her own story. In the case of such figures, whether they are historical 
(like Hitler or Goebbels in Oliver Hirschbiegel’s 2004 film Der Untergang, 
or one of the several Nazi figures whom William T. Vollman focuses on in 
his 2005 novel Europe Central) or else invented, like the main character in 
Jonathan Littell’s Les Bienveillantes (The Kindly Ones), their personal story 
is embedded in the larger, collective history of Germany and Europe in the 
twentieth century. Any insight we may seek about them as individuals is thus 
indissociable from that larger history—from how they themselves viewed 
their role in it and how we view both that history and their role.
 The phenomenal publishing success of Littell’s novel (which the author 
claims totally surprised him) is by now well known. Published in the fall of 
2006 in Paris, this 900-page work by a previously unknown writer who was 
not even French (Littell, born in 1967 in New York, grew up in France, was 
educated at Yale, and spent several years working for NGOs in Chechnya and 
Bosnia before writing the book) won France’s most prestigious literary prize, 
the Prix Goncourt, as well as the Grand Prix of the French Academy, and 
sold more than half a million copies in its first year. It was reviewed every-
where, eliciting wildly divergent opinions from critics and the public: to 
some, it was a masterpiece worthy of Tolstoy or Dostoevsky, while to others 
it was nothing more than voyeuristic, pornographic kitsch that desecrated 
the memory of the Holocaust. Nor could the reviewers be divided into “elite” 
versus “lowbrow” or other clear-cut categories: eminent intellectuals, includ-
ing the historian Pierre Nora, the novelist Jorge Semprun, the psychoanalyst 
and cultural critic Julia Kristeva, expressed admiration for the book; others, 
equally eminent (the filmmaker Claude Lanzmann, the Academician Marc 
Fumaroli, and historians Friedländer and Raoul Hilberg) dismissed it.2 Its 
reception in Germany and Israel was equally stormy, although it appears 
that the negatives were more numerous there than the positives—the book 
was, however, a bestseller in Germany, and an international conference was 
devoted to it alone in Jerusalem in June 2009. In the United States, where 
it did not appear until 2009 due to a delay with the translation, the recep-
tion was mixed (I discuss some of the positive and negative reviews below). 
The New York Times noted, in a separate article, that it seemed unlikely the 
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book would earn back the huge advance paid by its publisher (Rich). Inde-
pendently of the critics and the media, however, Les Bienveillantes is certain 
to continue being discussed in conferences and learned journals, at least 
for a while. Like it or not, it is a “case,” and as such it must elicit serious 
commentary.
 What makes it a case is also well known: this novel, which gives us a 
comprehensive and historically accurate account of the Nazi genocide of the 
Jews, starting in June 1941 on the Eastern front and ending with the January 
1945 death marches from Auschwitz, is narrated exclusively from the point 
of view, and in the voice, of a former SS officer who witnessed it all. Critics 
have pointed out that this ubiquity makes the narrator a kind of Zelig, or 
Forrest Gump, highly implausible by realist criteria. The important question, 
I believe, is not that of verisimilitude but rather: What kind of point of view 
and what kind of voice does Littell’s narrator Maximilien Aue represent, and 
how are we to respond to him as readers? I would like to answer this question 
in a way that will allow me to engage with some of the novel’s most negative 
critics. This approach is through the concept of performance.
 Performance studies has become, over the past two decades, an institu-
tionalized, interdisciplinary field that studies an immense range of phenom-
ena, from theatrical performances of all kinds to sports, cultural rituals, and 
the routines of everyday life. My own use of the concept of performance is 
practical rather than theoretical; my purpose is not to engage with the field 
of performance studies as such, but to think about performance in order to 
illuminate a particular text.3
Performance and the Reader’s Judgment
The meaning of “performance” ranges widely, both in actions and in words. 
The analytic philosopher J. L. Austin, in his foundational work How To Do 
Things with Words, coined the term “performatives” to designate verbal 
utterances that function as concrete acts in the world, and that can be pro-
nounced with their full force only by certain qualified persons: the justice 
of the peace who proclaims “I now pronounce you man and wife,” or the 
political leader who declares war on an enemy country in the name of his 
own. An ordinary individual may also utter performatives—for example, 
by promising to do something that the speaker is actually capable of doing. 
Austin noted that performative utterances can be spoken “infelicitously” or 
“non-seriously,” either because the person uttering them carries no actual 
authority or capacity (a simple citizen cannot truly declare war, and a five-
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year-old cannot truly promise to help you move your piano) or because he or 
she is uttering them in a fictional situation, such as a performance onstage; 
in such cases, the effect of the uttered words on the actual world is imitative, 
metaphorical, or otherwise indirect. Most verbal performances, like most 
other actions, fall somewhere between the two extremes: lacking the full 
force of a declaration of war or marriage, but still engaging the performer in 
some sort of consequential activity in the world. I can perform, by means of 
verbal and other actions, my job in its multiple aspects, or a specific task on a 
given day, or my role as a wife or daughter or mother, with more or less suc-
cess, more or less pleasure (to myself and others), more or less effectiveness. 
I can also perform it with more or less reflection about what I am doing, and 
why, and what its consequences might be. I can even perform it ironically, or 
parodically, as if I were on a stage, watching myself perform for the benefit 
of others, who may or may not be aware of, and may or may not share, my 
ironic self-awareness. If I happen to be an actor, I can perform any one of 
those actions or roles on a theatrical stage, reverting to my “real self ” after 
the play is over. And I can even perform ironically when I am onstage—in 
that case, I as actor and I as character will not totally cohere, and the effect 
will be what Brecht called the alienation effect: I and the audience will com-
municate above the head of the character I am playing, both of us acknowl-
edging the virtuosity of my performance and its distance from verisimilitude 
as well as from “reality.”
 What does all this have to do with Les Bienveillantes? Since this is a novel 
with what is generally called a first-person narrator (a character narrator in 
James Phelan’s terminology, or an autodiegetic narrator in Gérard Genette’s 
classification4), we can think of this fictional character, Max Aue, as per-
forming the task of telling his own story, which consists not only of salient 
actions he has accomplished (successfully or not, pleasurably or not, etc.), 
but also of the thoughts, dreams, or fantasies that may have accompanied 
those actions. To the extent that Aue also tells what he has seen others do 
and say, he performs the task of testifying to events in which he participated 
as an observer rather than as an active agent; and since, in his case, most of 
the events he refers to concern Germany’s role in World War II, with par-
ticular focus on the planning and execution of the genocide of the Jews, Aue’s 
testimony becomes—despite his own fictional status—a historical testimony. 
Even unsympathetic critics have acknowledged that Littell did a tremendous 
amount of historical research in writing this novel and that all of the histori-
cal reporting he puts into Aue’s mouth is accurate. This kind of documentary 
exactitude seems necessary if a novelist is to write responsibly about an event 
that carries as much collective significance as the Holocaust. Indeed, it may 
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be the best criterion for judging the ethical quality of a novel or a fiction film 
that purports to deal with that (or any other) historical atrocity. If a work 
evokes the horrors of the Holocaust arbitrarily, as mere background for a 
story or only for their shock effect, or else commits gross errors in historical 
representation, it disqualifies itself at the start.5
 In terms of narrative performance, Les Bienveillantes presents a com-
plicated structure of levels of speech and communication. Like all autobi-
ographers, be they real or fictional, Max Aue functions as both narrator in 
the present (which in the novel occurs some time in the 1970s), addressing 
himself to “o my human brothers,” his assumed readers; and as a character in 
the past, with most of the past action occurring between 1941 and 1945 but 
with frequent flashbacks to his childhood and youth in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Aue thus performs an intricate autobiographical speech act; but he also per-
forms, as I have said, an act of historical testimony when he reports on events 
of the war that he witnessed or in which he participated. (I will return to this 
unusual combination of fictional status and historical reliability.) Of course, 
behind Aue the narrator there is Littell the author, who communicates with 
what Phelan and other theorists call the authorial audience, or with what 
Wayne Booth and others called the implied reader, the reader as positioned 
by the text—and there is the crux, for the responses of an actual reader may 
not at all correspond to those attributed to this interpretive construct. Leav-
ing that complication aside for the moment, we can think of the author, Lit-
tell, as “performing” the role of Max Aue, casting himself into the character’s 
persona and voice. This becomes especially relevant when we consider Aue’s 
role as historical witness, for obviously it is to the author that we must attri-
bute the historical accuracy of the fictional character’s reporting.
 J. M. Coetzee, in his novel Elizabeth Costello, which is a series of reflec-
tions about authorship and creativity cast in the thoughts and occasionally 
in the voice of a fictional, elderly Australian woman author, has his heroine 
state as she waits “at the gate” after her death (clearly an allusion to Kafka’s 
parable “Before the Law”) that her job in life was to “do imitations, as Aris-
totle would have said” (194). Every author of a fictional narrative can be said 
to “do imitations,” taking on the voice and performance of his characters; 
and this is especially clear in works narrated by a character protagonist.6 
But the author’s performance is more comprehensive than that, for she not 
only invents—or, in the case of historical figures, evokes—and “imperson-
ates” characters in their words, thoughts, and actions; she also makes deci-
sions about the plot, organization, language, style, and length of the novel, 
as well as about the ideas expressed there—in short, about everything that 
constitutes the finished work. The author’s performance, both in the narrow 
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sense involving characters and in the more general sense involving the whole 
work, is directed at the reader (the real reader this time), who is summoned 
to respond to that performance.
 Both author and reader are concerned with ethical as well as aesthetic 
questions, and this is especially true, or urgent, in the case of works that 
deal with issues of collective historical significance. The reader is constantly, 
albeit not necessarily consciously, asking herself as she reads: What does this 
author’s performance overall (including both ethical and aesthetic choices) 
“say” or “do” about issues that matter to me? The author here is less the 
actual person than what Wayne Booth called the “implied author” but what 
might more precisely be called the “constructed or deduced author,” since 
the reader’s response is based first of all on the author she has deduced from 
the work, not on what the actual author-person might say about the work in 
interviews or other external commentary. The reader’s answer to that ques-
tion—and we must recognize that readers may have astonishingly divergent 
answers—will determine the emotional coloration as well as the intellectual 
tenor of his or her response to, and evaluation of, the work.
 Obviously, or tautologically, those readers who express admiration for 
Les Bienveillantes judge Littell’s performance as author to be highly success-
ful; that means, among other things, that they consider his fictional creature 
Max Aue complex, original, compelling—even if, in many respects, he repels 
them or shows himself to be reprehensible, even horrifying. Such readers 
never lose sight of the fact that Aue is a fictional being, a construction of the 
author; and they judge Aue precisely in those terms—not as a “person,” but 
as a character created for this particular literary performance. If I may be 
allowed to quote myself, this is how I put it in an earlier essay:
We have never yet seen a comprehensive account of Nazi atrocities during 
the Second World War that is told entirely from the perspective, and in 
the voice of, a perpetrator. Littell’s Maximilien Aue has qualities that only 
a fictional character can have: he is present, as an observing participant, in 
just about every place where the worst crimes against humanity were com-
mitted; he has access to privileged information available only to the inner 
circle around the SS leader Heinrich Himmler; and most importantly, he 
possesses the intelligence and analytical ability, the emotional detachment 
and temporal distance, as well as a certain moral sensibility, which allow 
him to act as a reliable historical witness. The combination of participant 
status as a perpetrator with historical reliability, and with what I will call 
moral witnessing, which Aue possesses, is a totally new phenomenon in 
fiction.7
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The main focus of my interpretation, and I think of all positive appreciations 
of this novel, concerns Aue’s paradoxical function as a reliable historical wit-
ness—and even, on occasion, a reliable moral witness, when he reflects on 
his actions in a way the reader can adhere to. His role as historical witness is 
paradoxical given his fictional status, but logical if one thinks of the author 
behind the character, who gets the credit for having invented such a figure. 
In fact, as a character, Aue displays a complex combination of traits, for he is 
part of the Nazi system, yet he offers an often devastatingly critical analysis 
of it. I have called this particular combination the “insider/outsider” model 
of witnessing, since Aue is both within the system—indeed, he rises steadily 
in its ranks during the war—yet feels sufficiently distanced from it, ideo-
logically and emotionally, to see it clearly (Suleiman, “Raising Hell”). This 
insider/outsider status becomes even more evident if one compares Aue to 
another important character in the novel, his good friend and quasi-double, 
Thomas, who has no distance whatsoever from the system or its values, even 
though he is sufficiently savvy to exploit the system for his own advance-
ment, like any ambitious climber. Had Littell chosen to make Thomas or a 
character like him the narrator, we would have a very different novel.
 Daniel Mendelsohn, writing in the New York Review of Books, also sees 
Aue as a complex figure:
[Aue] is a well-educated and indeed sensitive person, musical, literate, cul-
tured, who far from being monstrously indifferent to the crimes he sees 
perpetrated and which he is called on to commit himself, spends a good 
deal of time reflecting on the questions of guilt and responsibility that a 
self-aware person could be expected to entertain.
But Michiko Kakutani, in her review in the New York Times (which, given 
Kakutani’s symbolic capital as a critic, is surely partly responsible for the 
book’s cool reception in the United States), sees Aue—and by extension, Lit-
tell’s performance as author—in a far harsher light:
Although Aue contends that he is “a man like other men,” “a man like 
you” and depicts himself as a cultivated intellectual who reads Flaubert 
and Kant, his story is hardly a case study in the banality of evil. [  .  .  .  ] 
Aue is clearly a deranged creature, and his madness turns his story into a 
voyeuristic spectacle—like watching a slasher film with lots of close-ups of 
blood and guts.
 Unable to understand Aue, much less sympathize with him, the reader 
is not goaded . .  . to question his or her own capacity for moral compro-
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mise. Instead Mr. Littell simply gives us a monster talking at monstrous 
length about his monstrous deeds . . .
For Michiko Kakutani, Aue cannot act as a reliable historical witness, let 
alone as a moral witness to the Holocaust, since he is a monster—not human. 
And Aue’s monstrous performance (but one should say performances, for 
Kakutani refers to his narration as well as his actions) signals the failure of 
Littell’s performance. Kakutani’s review shows beautifully how the evaluation 
of the character very quickly morphs into an evaluation of the author. In a 
way, it is Littell himself who here stands accused of voyeurism, perhaps even 
of monstrosity (in his imagination, to be sure).
 This accusation, developed more fully, is also found in the book-length 
indictment of Les Bienveillantes that was published in France six months after 
the novel’s appearance. Titled, parodically, Les Complaisantes (The Compla-
cent Ones) and co-signed by the historian Edouard Husson and the philoso-
pher Michel Terestchenko, this work—whose seriousness and intellectual 
passion cannot be doubted, even if one finds it wrongheaded, as I do—pres-
ents a long list of accusations that boil down to one essential point: in Max 
Aue, Littell has created a character who is inhuman, and he has thereby led 
the reader into an ethical trap, for the reader might find herself identifying 
with Aue despite his inhumanity. Why is Aue inhuman? “Not only because 
he is incestuous and a parricide, but because, through words, he desecrates 
the bodies of the victims.”8 This desecration is achieved, Husson and Terest-
chenko maintain, by Aue’s insistent, voyeuristic fascination with the victims’ 
dead bodies and with scenes of horror. Nor is it only Aue who is fascinated 
by horror. The real problem, according to the authors, is that Littell himself 
manifests that fascination: he does not take sufficient distance from Aue, 
does not “warn” the reader against sharing Aue’s perverse fascination. Here 
they evoke Plato’s allegory of Leontius, in The Republic, which is cited by Aue 
himself after he sees mounds of dead, rotting bodies in the early days of the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union. (As it happens, and against Husson 
and Terestchenko’s insistence that the victims “desecrated” by Aue’s voyeuris-
tic gaze are the Jews murdered by Nazis, these are bodies not of Jews but 
rather of Polish prisoners who were presumably shot by the Soviets during 
their retreat.9) In Plato, Husson and Terestchenko tell us, the story of Leon-
tius—who cannot stop himself from looking at a mound of dead bodies after 
their execution, and who curses his eyes for that weakness—was meant to 
warn us “not to succumb to that perversion of the gaze” (137). But Aue, they 
maintain, and by extension Littell himself, feels no Platonic shame at being 
fascinated by horror.10 As a result, the reader is also led into such fascination: 
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“What is particularly pernicious in Littell’s novel is that, through a Sadean 
atmosphere, it leads the reader to be fascinated by Nazi violence” (76).
 Husson and Terestchenko support their accusations by selective quotes 
from the novel; they never analyze a whole sequence, quoting only “shocking” 
passages in the text wherever they find them. But the aesthetic particularity 
of this novel, especially where scenes that describe Nazi violence against the 
Jews are concerned, is that Aue never merely narrates or observes atrocity, 
with whatever degree of fascination or horror he manifests. He almost always 
follows observation with reflection, either in his present voice as narrator or 
as thoughts attributed to his earlier self at the time of the events (which is 
quite unrealistic, though effective); one must therefore read a whole sequence 
in order to get the full impact of his account. To cite just one example: in 
Aue’s detailed account of the horrendous killings at Babi Yar—where more 
than 30,000 Jewish men, women, and children were murdered by shooting 
in the space of two days—Husson and Terestchenko pick out a particularly 
awful moment when Aue himself is sent into the ditch to finish off prisoners 
who were shot but did not die. (This is the only time in the novel we actually 
see him murdering Jews—I think it is significant that Littell chose to have 
him perform mercy killings, rather than placing him among the shooters 
at the edge of the ditch.) At one point, Aue describes seeing a beautiful and 
dignified-looking young woman who is among the naked prisoners at the 
edge of the ditch, and whom he finds among the corpses at the bottom a 
few minutes later, still breathing despite the bullets she received. She looks at 
him with “large surprised incredulous eyes, the eyes of a wounded bird” [ses 
grands yeux surpris, incrédules, des yeux d’oiseau blessé], an observation that 
Husson and Terestchenko don’t quote; instead, they quote what comes next, 
and even that only partially:
Ce regard [the text says “et ce regard” (“and that look”) separated by a 
comma from “oiseau blessé,”] se planta en moi, me fendit le ventre, et laissa 
s’écouler un flot de sciure de bois, j’étais une vulgaire poupée et ne ressen-
tais rien, et en même temps je voulais de tout mon coeur me pencher et 
lui essuyer la terre et la sueur mêlée sur son front, lui caresser la joue et lui 
dire que ça allait, que tout était pour le mieux, mais à la place je lui tirai 
convulsivement une balle dans la tête, ce qui après tout revenait au même, 
pour elle en tout cas . . . (Les Complaisantes 94; original text with different 
punctuation: B 126)
[That look stuck into me, split open my stomach and let a flood of sawdust 
pour out, I was a rag doll and didn’t feel anything, and at the same time 
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I wanted with all my heart to bend over and brush the dirt and sweat off 
her forehead, caress her cheek and tell her it was going to be all right, that 
everything would be fine, but instead I convulsively shot a bullet into her 
head, which after all came down to the same thing, for her in any case if 
not for me . . . ] (K 130)
Husson and Terestchenko cut off their quotation here, in mid-sentence, with 
the following comment: “Definitely, there would have been every reason to 
return the manuscript to its author as unpublishable.” But, they go on, Pari-
sian intellectual “chic” likes to “continue to proclaim that we are ‘beyond 
good and evil’ despite the genocides of the twentieth century and those that 
threaten our world [today]” (94). In their righteous (if perhaps somewhat 
facile) indignation at modern genocides and moral relativism, the authors 
fail to note what happens in the rest of Littell’s sentence and paragraph, 
which continues as follows:
. . . pour elle en tout cas si ce n’était pour moi, car moi à la pensée de ce 
gâchis humain insensé j’étais envahi d’une rage immense, démesurée, je 
continuais à lui tirer dessus, et sa tête avait éclaté comme un fruit, alors 
mon bras se détacha de moi et partit tout seul dans le ravin, tirant de 
part et d’autre, je lui courais après, lui faisant signe de m’attendre de mon 
autre bras, mais il ne voulait pas, il me narguait et tirait sur les blessés 
tout seul, sans moi, enfin, à bout de souffle je m’arrêtai et me mis à pleu-
rer. (B 126)
[ . . . for her in any case if not for me, since at the thought of this senseless 
human waste I was filled with an immense, boundless rage, I kept shoot-
ing at her and her head exploded like a fruit, then my arm detached itself 
from me and went off all by itself down the ravine, shooting left and right, 
I ran after it, waving at it to wait with my other arm, but it didn’t want to, 
it mocked me and shot at the wounded all by itself, without me; finally, out 
of breath, I stopped and started to cry.] (K 130)
The shape and meaning of this very long sentence, with its jerky rhythm 
and its hallucinatory description of Aue’s own traumatic dissociation as he 
meets the face and look of his wounded victim (his arm detaching itself and 
running amok independently of his control) are entirely overlooked by Hus-
son and Terestchenko in their drive to condemn Aue’s “inhumanity.” If one 
takes the trouble to read this passage without prejudgment, one sees that Aue 
appears here most definitely human: it is one instance in the novel where he 
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significantly fails in his performance as an SS officer, since he breaks down 
and starts to cry. Aue’s failed performance here can be contrasted with the 
actions of his friend Thomas, who never fails to do what is expected of him, 
with no scruples whatsoever. Thomas is the “perfect” SS officer, and the 
divergence between him and Aue underlines the latter’s status as an insider/
outsider who is never fully at home in the system.
 In fact, the paragraph ends with Aue being relieved of his duty in the 
ditch by another officer, who tells him, “C’est bon, Obersturmführer, je vous 
remplace” (B 126) (“That’s enough, Obersturmführer. I’ll take over for you” 
[K 130]). Husson and Terestchenko overlook this ending. And they also 
overlook the fact that in the very next paragraph, Aue reflects on what has 
just happened, in a way that places him squarely in the position of an “out-
sider” analyst even as he continues to say “we”:
Même les boucheries démentielles de la Grande Guerre  .  .  .  paraissaient 
presque propres et justes à côté de ce que nous avions amené au monde. 
Je trouvais cela extraordinaire.  .  .  . Notre système, notre Etat, se moquait 
profondément des pensées de ses serviteurs. Cela lui était indifférent que 
l’on tue les Juifs parce qu’on les haïssait ou parce qu’on voulait faire avancer 
sa carrière ou même, dans certaines limites, parce qu’on y prenait du plai-
sir . . . Cela lui était même indifférent, au fond, que l’on refuse de les tuer, 
aucune sanction ne serait prise, car il savait bien que le réservoir des tueurs 
disponibles était sans fond . . . (B 127)
[Even the insane butcheries of the Great War  .  .  .  seemed almost clean 
and righteous compared to what we had brought into the world. I found 
this extraordinary.  .  .  . Our system, our State couldn’t care less about the 
thoughts of its servants. It was all the same to the State whether you killed 
Jews because you hated them or because you wanted to advance your 
career or even, in some cases, because you took pleasure in it. . . . It did not 
even mind, in the end, if you refused to kill, no disciplinary action would 
be taken, since it was well aware that the pool of available killers was bot-
tomless . . . ] (K 130–31)
This is a clear instance where the reader can appreciate Littell’s performance 
as author behind the character, since it is obvious that these reflections are 
being put into the mouth of the narrator-character by an author who has 
read real-life analysts of the Holocaust whose work came many years after 
the time when Aue claims to have thought these thoughts. The authorial 
audience—or let us just say, the careful reader—understands this, communi-
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cating above Aue’s head with the author. As I wrote elsewhere, commenting 
on this very passage:
This is a reality observed through the later analyses of Hannah Arendt 
on totalitarian systems, or Christopher Browning on the role of “ordinary 
men” in mass murder. And it is made, fictively, by an SS officer who was in 
the ravine shooting people a few hours earlier. Unrealistic, no doubt, but 
very powerful; and pointing not only to historical facts, but to their ethical 
and moral implications. (“When the Perpetrator” 10–11)
 One could say, then, with all due respect, that in their way of handling 
quotations, as exemplified in the passage I have been discussing, the authors 
of Les Complaisantes engage in some unseemly “complacency” themselves. 
They are so intent on indicting Littell (behind his character) for his unethical 
performance that they lose sight of their own responsibility as readers. Hus-
son and Terestchenko constantly hammer the theme of the writer’s ethical 
responsibility, and Littell’s failure to live up to it (in their opinion). But surely 
there is a case to be made for ethical reading as well. As J. Hillis Miller noted 
in his Ethics of Reading, reading too is a performance. It must therefore be 
done responsibly: not cutting off an author in mid-sentence, when the end of 
the sentence radically changes the meaning suggested in the beginning; not 
rushing to judgment before taking account of a whole sequence, if not the 
whole work.11
 This may all be very true. But considering the sharply divergent readers’ 
judgments that have been voiced about Les Bienveillantes makes me wonder 
whether it is ever possible to persuade a reader to change his or her mind 
about a novel once that mind is made up. Even if one demonstrates, as I 
have tried to do, that a critic—who is a particular kind of reader, having to 
defend his or her responses by reasoned argument—has failed to read a cer-
tain passage responsibly or failed to make a convincing case, and even if one 
were to succeed in persuading that very critic to recognize his or her error 
concerning a particular passage in the novel, that would in no way guarantee 
that the latter’s overall judgment of the work would change. All the more so 
when “ordinary,” nonprofessional readers are concerned: to the extent that 
reading is subjective and that a reader’s response to a text is immediate, one 
might even say visceral, before any critical reasoning occurs, there is prob-
ably not much one can do to persuade a reader that he or she is “wrong” to 
love or hate a work. At best, one can try to make the strongest case for one’s 
own reading, addressing it implicitly to a virtual third party or “bystander” 
in the debate.12 In that process, one can cite other readers whom one agrees 
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with, as allies in interpretation. For example, I can cite Daniel Mendelsohn 
once again:
While some will denounce Littell’s cool-eyed authorial sympathy for Aue 
as “obscene”—and by “sympathy” I mean simply his attempt to compre-
hend the character—his project seems infinitely more valuable than the 
reflexive gesture of writing off all those millions of killers as “monsters” or 
“inhuman,” which allows us too easily to draw a solid line between “them” 
and “us.” The first line of the novel takes the form of Aue’s unsettling salu-
tation to his “human brothers”: the purpose of the book, one in which it 
largely succeeds, is to keep alive, however improbably, that troubling sense 
of kinship.
Thus are interpretive communities formed, consisting of like-minded read-
ers of a text. But there will always be other communities, with equally strong 
views, to make the opposite case where certain controversial works are con-
cerned. I would suggest, furthermore, that the kind of performance engaged 
in by Littell in this novel, consisting of an “act of impersonation” (to use 
Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi’s phrase) of a Nazi, carries with it a particular dan-
ger. Quite possibly, a writer or artist cannot imaginatively project himself, 
even with distantiating devices such as irony or paradox, into the mind and 
words of a participant in genocide without running the risk of being identi-
fied—or even, at times, genuinely identifying—with such a character. Sidra 
De Koven Ezrahi, commenting on similar “acts of impersonation” under-
taken by the artists who participated in the controversial exhibit Mirroring 
Evil: Nazi Imagery/Recent Art organized by the Jewish Museum of New York 
in 2002, noted, “What is common to most of this art is a form of appropria-
tion that is always in danger of becoming, or being confused with, collabo-
ration” (19). Although my own reading of Les Bienveillantes credits Littell 
with major critical intentions—if not always toward his character, certainly 
toward the system whose description he puts into the character’s mouth—I 
must recognize that far less sympathetic readings of Littell’s achievement and 
intentions are also possible.
Transgression and Witnessing
An Uneasy Union
My admiration for Littell’s performance in Les Bienveillantes does not come 
without reservations. Like a number of other critics, I am troubled by a 
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jarring discrepancy that the novel does not satisfactorily resolve: on one side, 
there is Aue’s paradoxical and artistically highly successful role as an insider/
outsider who functions as a historical and moral witness to the Holocaust; 
on the other side, there is Aue’s personal story, featuring incest (with his twin 
sister Una, whose name is borrowed from Poe’s “Colloquy of Monos and 
Una” and whose status as an incestuous twin is borrowed from Musil’s The 
Man without Qualities), matricide, homosexuality, and increasingly deliri-
ous sexual fantasizing. The relation of the personal story to the historical 
account is never made clear, or even hinted at, by Littell. The personal story 
is the one pointed to in the novel’s title, which evokes the Greek trilogy of 
the Oresteia. In Aeschylus, the Furies who pursue Orestes after his double 
murder (of his mother and his stepfather) are placated at the end and are 
renamed the “Eumenides,” “The Kindly Ones,” even as Orestes goes scot-
free. In Littell’s novel too, Aue goes unpunished (he escapes from Berlin 
at the end of the war and ends his days as the director of a lace factory in 
northern France), but that is not the part I find most troubling. Rather, it 
is the “disconnect” between Aue’s private excesses and his function as his-
torical witness: if Aue is meant to appear as a reliable historical witness who 
gives detailed accounts of the massacres in Ukraine, the rout of the German 
army at Stalingrad, the machinery of the extermination camps in Poland, 
and the last days of the war in a bombed-out Berlin, how does that role 
square with the fact that he has no memory of the family murders he com-
mitted in the middle of all that? And if he is to appear as a “human brother” 
to the reader, situated both inside and outside the system he describes and 
analyzes, how can we reconcile that representative status with his excessive 
sexual tastes and desires, which are quite far from those of most “normal” 
people? Michiko Kakutani was not wrong to say that he is not a “banal” 
Nazi—but oddly, his “non-banality” as a Nazi, that is, his inability to per-
form his role as perpetrator as evidenced by his breakdown at Babi Yar, for 
example, allows the reader to feel a certain shared humanity with Aue. The 
excesses of his personal history, however, which constitute the other aspect 
of his “non-banality,” emphasize the difficulty that most readers will have in 
considering him as a “human brother.” 
 In terms of narrative theory, we could formulate the problem as one of 
conflicting reliabilities: whereas Aue is a reliable narrator where the historical 
narrative is concerned—not only in the accuracy of his reporting but even in 
many of his judgments, to which the reader adheres—he is stunningly unre-
liable in recounting some major events of his personal story. Thus he never 
relates his murder of his mother and stepfather, and the reader must deduce 
it from an ellipsis in the narrative.13 Nor does he remember his action later, 
and he fails in other ways as well—for example, in understanding (as the 
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reader certainly does) that the twin children he meets at his mother’s house 
are most likely his own offspring from his incestuous relationship with his 
sister.
 I have suggested elsewhere that the Oresteia plot may have to be read 
alongside the historical account (rather than implicated with it), as a par-
allel reflection on the question of guilt and justice that Aue struggles with 
throughout most of the novel (“When the Perpetrator” 18–19). In fact, in a 
striking mise en abyme, Aue himself evokes Greek tragedy and its notions of 
justice, right after a long reflection on the humanity of the “ordinary” Ger-
mans who were enrolled in the machinery of extermination. Having just had 
a conversation, in Sobibor, with one such man, a family man named Döll 
who has been gassing people ever since he was assigned to the euthanasia 
program in Germany in the late 1930s, Aue affirms that, contrary to what 
some commentators have said, the actions of that individual were not inhu-
man but were part of “l’humain et encore de l’humain” (“humanity and more 
humanity”; B 542, K 589). He then goes on to ask whether Döll should be 
held responsible for his actions, for after all, it was by chance that he and not 
some other German was sent to Sobibor. Perhaps it is all of Germany that 
should be called to account for his crimes—unless, Aue muses, one consid-
ers the question not in terms of Judeo-Christian ideas of justice, which take 
into account the intention of one who commits a crime, but rather in terms 
of Greek notions of guilt and punishment, where the action alone matters, 
independently of intention:
Le lien entre volonté et crime est une notion chrétienne. . . . Pour les Grecs, 
peu importe si Héraclès abat ses enfants dans un accès de folie, ou si Oedipe 
tue son père par accident: cele ne change rien, c’est un crime, ils sont cou-
pable; on peut les plaindre, mais on ne peut les absoudre—et cela même si 
souvent leur punition revient aux dieux, et non pas aux hommes. (B 546)
[The link between intention and crime is a Christian notion. For the 
Greeks, it makes no difference that Heracles murders his children in a fit of 
madness, or that Oedipus kills his father by accident. It doesn’t change any-
thing, it’s a crime, they’re guilty. We can pity them, but not absolve them—
even if often their punishment is done by the gods, not by men.] (K 589)14
If we recall that Aue kills his mother and stepfather without having any 
memory of the crime and without ever acknowledging it as his own, then 
this commentary (which occurs in the novel after the double murder) can 
be considered as an oblique reference to his own guilt in Greek terms. The 
burlesque detectives, Weser and Clemens, who pursue Aue with increasing 
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circumstantial evidence of his guilt (his bloodstained clothes were found in 
the bathtub, for example) and whom he manages to elude until the very end, 
would then function as the human attempt at punishment, which fails.15 
But the somewhat ambiguous last line of the novel, “Les Bienveillantes 
avaient retrouvé ma trace” (“The Kindly Ones had picked up my scent”—
B 894, K 975; translation modified) could be read as an indication that the 
“Kindly Ones”—who despite their euphemistic new name are representatives 
of divine retribution—have never actually left him. In Greek terms, Aue is 
guilty—not only of the matricide he does not remember committing, but 
also of the murders he does recall, such as the killing of the beautiful girl in 
Babi Yar. It was a mercy killing, and he accomplished it in a sense despite 
himself; but it was a killing nevertheless.
 In one way, then, we can think of the “excessive” personal story as a dis-
placed (in the psychoanalytic sense) commentary on the question of guilt 
and responsibility—a question that concerns above all the historical narra-
tive of Nazi atrocities, but that is displaced into the realm of individual family 
history, away from the more horrific realm of collective murder. Displace-
ment, as Freud showed about dreams and other psychic phenomena such 
as screen memories, is a defense mechanism to protect the subject against 
truths that would be unbearable if stated directly. Aue, who tells us at the 
start that he does “not regret anything” (“ne regrette rien”— B 12, K 5) about 
his wartime actions, is clearly unable to face his guilt about the Nazi geno-
cide directly. His body responds to the killings he witnesses (witnessing, as 
he himself admits, is a form of participation) with symptoms of rejection—
vomiting, diarrhea, which later turns into constipation—and with insomnia, 
but he never explicitly acknowledges either his guilt or his disgust at the kill-
ings. I am suggesting that on the authorial level, Aue’s whole personal story 
can be seen as a displacement—and here its function is not to evade, but 
rather to reinforce the questions about guilt and responsibility by creating 
a parallel story that transposes the historical crimes into a personal register. 
The intertextual weight of the Oresteia myth would then function as addi-
tional reinforcement.
 Another explanation for the problematic relation between the wartime 
story (“the genre of testimony”) and the private story (“the genre of excess”)—
has been offered by the Israeli scholar Liran Razinsky. Razinsky argues, in an 
unpublished paper, that the “literature of excess,” epitomized in the chapter 
titled “Air” toward the end of the novel—when Aue spends a week alone in 
a Pomeranian castle belonging to his sister and her husband, masturbating 
in every room and engaging in increasingly scatological fantasies—is neces-
sary to the novel’s testimonial project, because it is through his transgressive 
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sexuality that Aue reaches an ethical awareness of “the other.”16 Thus, while 
fantasizing about his sister, he remembers a young woman he saw hanged in 
the Ukraine, fantasizes about her too, and then sobs in helpless rage: “nous 
l’avions pendue comme un boucher égorge un boeuf, sans passion, parce 
qu’il fallait le faire . . . et une telle cruauté n’avait pas de nom, quelle que soit 
sa nécessité, elle ruinait tout, si l’on pouvait faire ça,. . alors on pouvait tout 
faire” (“We had hanged her the way a butcher slaughters an animal, without 
passion, because it had to be done . . . and such a cruelty had no name, even 
though it was necessary, it ruined everything, if one could do that . . . then 
one could do anything”; B 835–36, K 912). Razinsky argues that through an 
excessive jouissance (his own and the ones he fantasizes in his sister and in 
the young woman victim), Aue arrives at an ethical awareness he would not 
have reached otherwise.
 This elegant argument resonates with Susan Sontag’s well-known obser-
vations about the “pornographic imagination” as a conduit to the experience 
of limits that has fascinated avant-garde European literature for over a cen-
tury. Indeed, Littell’s debt to Georges Bataille and other avant-garde theorists 
of transgression has often been noted. Still, this argument does not explain 
the many places in the novel—notably before the “Air” chapter, which occurs 
very late—when Aue acts as a clearheaded analyst of the Nazi system sans 
erotic fantasies; nor does it explain his murderous actions after his supposed 
epiphany in the castle. The only murders he commits before this episode 
are the matricide, of which he has no memory, and the mercy killings in 
the pit at Babi Yar, which make him sick and soon get him transferred out 
of Ukraine. (Later, he also orders the execution of an old Jewish man in the 
Caucasus, but only after the man himself has demanded that he do so—this 
is one of the stranger episodes in the novel.) After the “Air” chapter, how-
ever, in quick succession, he shoots an old man playing Bach’s Art of the 
Fugue in a village church; kills a homosexual acquaintance with whom he 
had had casual sex and who makes another pass at him in public; and kills 
a policeman with a stone, after tweaking Hitler’s nose in a burlesque inci-
dent staged in Hitler’s bunker! Finally, in a real shock to the reader, he kills 
his friend Thomas, allowing for an exchange of identities and his eventual 
escape to France. Thus his most cold-blooded and amoral actions occur after 
the great sobbing scene in the castle, which suggests that if he gained ethi-
cal insight and an awareness of “the other” in that chapter, it didn’t last very 
long. Significantly, in these final pages of the novel, we have no philosophical 
reflections or other internal monologues by Aue: he performs his bizarre or 
criminal deeds with no warning, and he reports them with brutal directness, 
unaccompanied by any explanation or commentary.
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 In fact, as Leland Deladurantaye has noted, the last hundred or so pages 
of the novel, after the “Air” chapter, read quite differently from the rest: in 
contrast to the “meticulously realistic main plot  .  .  .  , brilliantly organized 
and written,” these pages “show signs, if not of fatigue, then of something 
approaching fever.” Deladurantaye sees this as a serious flaw in the novel, a 
weakening in Littell’s authorial performance; but this “feverishness” could 
be interpreted as Aue’s rather than the author’s (as such, it would be part of 
the author’s design), serving to indicate the increasingly nightmarish and 
unreal quality of the last days of the war in Germany. In that case, we could 
see the growing loss of control in the narration as textually mirroring the 
disintegration of Berlin, bombed to smithereens, of the German army and 
bureaucracy, of Aue himself as he becomes another man—and also the dis-
integration of realist narrative, as Aue’s narration becomes more and more 
hallucinatory and grotesque.
notes
 1. Eight years later, in his introduction to the first volume of Nazi Germany and the 
Jews, Friedländer appeared to have revised his views at least on the second of these areas: 
a study of Nazi Germany, he maintained, could in fact yield some enlightenment about 
the present; for together with its “peculiar frenzy of . . . apocalyptic drive against . . . the 
Jew,” Nazi Germany shared in the “murderous potentialities of the world that is also ours.” 
Whence the universal significance of “The Final Solution of the Jewish Question” (Intro-
duction, 6).
 2. For a brief account of the critical reception of the novel in France, see Suleiman, 
“When the Perpetrator Becomes a Reliable Witness of the Holocaust,” 3–4. Saul Friedlän-
der and Raoul Hilberg did not write reviews, but spoke dismissively about the book in 
public and private conversations.
 3. For a wide-ranging panorama of the possibilities of performance studies around 
the time it was stabilizing as an academic field, see the 1998 collective volume edited by 
Peggy Phelan and Jill Lane, The Ends of Performance. Many other works seeking to define 
this enormously varied interdisciplinary field, whose borders are not at all clear, have been 
published since then.
 4. See Phelan, Living to Tell about It, and Genette, Narrative Discourse.
 5. As always, such self-confident generalizations can be contested by reality—in this 
case, by the reality of Quentin Tarantino’s 2009 film Inglourious Basterds, which I found to 
be a highly successful work of art and not ethically irresponsible, even though it ignores 
some of the most basic historical facts about the Holocaust—for example, by having Hitler 
and all his top lieutenants burned to death in a movie theater in Paris circa 1944! Many 
critics do not share my positive view of the film, however, for various reasons, including 
that of historical accuracy.
 6. Phelan, in his book Living to Tell about It, proposes a detailed terminology for 
analyzing the complex relations between author and character, and between author, char-
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acter, and authorial audience. I will not attempt to duplicate his terminology here, which 
he summarizes very usefully in his own essay in this volume. He situates his model not in 
the field of performance but in that of rhetoric (following the precedent of Wayne Booth’s 
classic work The Rhetoric of Fiction).
 7. Suleiman, “When the Perpetrator Becomes a Reliable Witness of the Holocaust,” 5. 
In that essay, I focus specifically on the fictional Aue’s paradoxical role as a reliable histori-
cal witness, without evoking the concept of performance. I have not changed my overall 
interpretation of the novel since that first analysis, but in the present essay I attempt to take 
into account more of Aue’s problematic aspects, as well as engaging with his negative critics.
 8. Husson and Terestchenko, Les Complaisantes, 131. Here and throughout, transla-
tions from the French are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
 9. See Littell, Les Bienveillantes, 97, and The Kindly Ones, 98; hereafter, page numbers 
will be cited in the text, with B for the French version and K for the English translation by 
Charlotte Mandel.
 10. In my reading of Plato’s text, the “moral” of the story of Leontius is not as clear as 
Husson and Terestchenko suggest. The story, told by Socrates to illustrate the three parts 
of the soul, does not necessarily carry the heavy didacticism (about the “perversion of 
the gaze”) attributed to it in Les Complaisantes. It’s true, however, that Plato insists on the 
need to subdue the baser passions, bringing them under the control of reason. Whether 
Littell takes no distance from Aue, and whether Aue is an exclusively “base” character, as 
Husson and Terestchenko assert, are precisely the questions up for discussion. Relevant to 
that discussion is the fact that Littell has Aue himself quoting the Leontius parable from 
The Republic and then commenting, “To tell the truth, the soldiers rarely seemed to feel 
Leontius’s anguish, only his desire [to look], and it was this that was disturbing the hier-
archy, the idea that the men could take pleasure in these actions” (K 98). Husson and Ter-
estchenko ignore the complications—and the distancing—introduced by this and similar 
reflections throughout the novel.
 11. Husson and Terestchenko refer to Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello (though not to the 
episode I mentioned earlier) to support their contention about the writer’s duty to write 
responsibly. They cite with approval a chapter wherein the heroine expresses strong doubts 
about whether writers should engage with certain painful or horrifying subjects, but they 
don’t seem to recall that some of Coetzee’s own works (e.g., Disgrace or Waiting for the 
Barbarians) are strong examples of that very kind of engagement. Not every opinion ex-
pressed by the heroine of Elizabeth Costello is to be taken at face value, or as representing 
Coetzee’s own philosophy.
 12. It can be asked whether this view does not put into question the value of teaching 
literature, since after all, teachers try to persuade their students to share their view of a 
work. I would say that it is easier to persuade students (or any reader) who have not yet 
made up their minds than to change the minds of those who have already formed a strong 
reaction, especially to a work that is perceived as controversial. For a recent, hostile discus-
sion of Les Bienveillantes, see Charlotte Lacoste’s book, based on her doctoral dissertation: 
Séductions du bourreau (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010). The author and I 
participated in a 2009 conference in Paris where we both spoke about Littell’s novel and 
where I was able to note first-hand that mutual persuasion was impossible: neither she nor 
I changed our minds after hearing the other.
 13. The murder occurs between two sentences: “I went upstairs and fell asleep. When 
I woke up the light had changed, it was quite dark” (K 529).
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 14. Littell has expressed the same idea in his own name in interviews; see, for example, 
Georgesco, “Jonathan Littell.”
 15. The names of these grotesque detectives are actually borrowed from volume two 
of Victor Klemperer’s diary, I Will Bear Witness, where they figure as real-life anti-Semitic 
policemen whom Klemperer fears and loathes. This may be a wink to the reader on Littell’s 
part, one of the many intertextual allusions that permeate the novel.
 16. Razinsky, “History, Excess and Testimony in Jonathan Littell’s Les Bienveillantes 
(The Kindly Ones),” unpublished paper, 2008. I understand from Razinsky that he has 
modified his views somewhat subsequently; but I find his argument in this paper interest-
ing, even if I don’t fully agree with it.
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As Susan Rubin Suleiman notes in her essay in this volume, historians and 
artists working on the Holocaust have recently been giving more attention 
to the difficult task of comprehending the psychology of the perpetrators. 
When undertaken by novelists, as Suleiman shows in her insightful analysis 
of Jonathan Littell’s Les Bienveillantes, this effort inevitably raises significant 
ethical and aesthetic issues. How can the novelist plausibly render the psy-
chology of the perpetrator? How does history constrain the fictional repre-
sentation of perpetrators, and how does fiction provide some freedom from 
the constraints of history? What are the ethical and aesthetic consequences 
of narrative techniques that put the reader in the position of sharing the per-
petrator’s perspective, even if the novelist marks that perspective as unreli-
able? These challenging questions are for now best addressed not at the level 
of general theory but rather at the level of theoretically informed interpreta-
tion of individual cases such as we find in Suleiman’s analysis of Littell’s novel 
through the lens of performance. Once scholars have examined a wide range 
of representations from a variety of theoretical perspectives, we will be in 
a better position to draw broader conclusions. Consequently, in this essay, 
I propose to contribute to the same general project as Suleiman’s by using 
principles and concepts of a rhetorical approach to narrative to analyze the 
ethics and aesthetics of one of the earlier attempts to capture the psychology 
of the perpetrator: Martin Amis’s representation of a Nazi doctor in his 1991 
novel Time’s Arrow.
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 Time’s Arrow is an especially intriguing case because Amis foregrounds 
the psychological state of Odilo Unverdorben (the last name is German for 
“uncorrupted” or “innocent”) by emphasizing his dissociation of personal-
ity and using one side of that personality, a figure I shall, following Seymour 
Chatman, call Soul, to narrate the action.1 What’s more, Soul experiences 
time backwards, and thus he recounts Unverdorben’s life from the moment 
just before his death to the moments of his earliest consciousness. In my 
analysis, I will begin with a sketch of my rhetorical approach to narrative, 
then move to consider some general reasons for—and consequences of—
Amis’s technique, and then, for the bulk of the essay, undertake a more spe-
cific examination of its workings. This examination will include a detailed 
account of how Amis manages the relation between reliability and unreli-
ability and how he treats Unverdorben’s behavior at Auschwitz. My goal is to 
demonstrate that Amis’s technique is not just a clever conceit but part and 
parcel of an artistic response to the Holocaust that is at once aesthetically 
innovative and ethically valuable.
A Rhetorical Approach to narrative 
Some Key Concepts
This approach conceives of narrative as a multi-leveled purposeful com-
munication from an implied author to an authorial and ultimately an actual 
audience. This conception leads to my interest in the cognitive, affective, eth-
ical, and aesthetic dimensions of reading (the main levels in the multi-leveled 
communication), dimensions that I analyze through attention to narrative 
judgments and narrative progressions.2 Judgments open up the different lev-
els of communication, and progression governs the arc of the authorial audi-
ence’s experience of these various dimensions from a narrative’s beginning 
through its ending. More specifically, I define narrative as somebody telling 
somebody else on some occasion and for some purposes that something hap-
pened, and I define narrative progression as the synthesis of textual dynam-
ics and readerly dynamics.
 Textual dynamics are the workings of the mechanisms in the story (insta-
bilities between, among, or within characters) or in the discourse (tensions 
of belief, value, or knowledge among authors, narrators, and audiences) 
that generate, sustain, and bring to resolution (however partial) a narrative’s 
movement. Readerly dynamics are (1) the audience’s experiences of differ-
ent kinds of narrative interest and of the different levels of communication 
(cognitive, affective, ethical, and aesthetic) and (2) the trajectory of those 
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experiences over the course of the narrative. I identify three main kinds of 
narrative interest: mimetic, thematic, and synthetic. The mimetic involves 
our interest in the characters and events as what Aristotle called imitations. 
The thematic involves our interest in the characters and events as a means 
to explore ideas or beliefs about the world. The synthetic involves our inter-
est in characters and events as artificial constructions of an authorial design. 
The rhetorical approach does not posit any particular relation among these 
interests as optimal but instead emphasizes that different successful narra-
tives can establish different relations among these three components as they 
pursue their different purposes.
 Narratives with surprise endings provide a good illustration of the 
mutual influence of textual and readerly dynamics and of the reason that I 
regard progression as the synthesis of these two sets of dynamics. In these 
narratives, authors manage the movement of instabilities and tensions so that 
readers will experience the surprise, and readers who follow that movement 
are surprised or not according to the effectiveness of that management.
 Narrative judgments are the bridge between textual dynamics and read-
erly dynamics because they are encoded into narrative texts and decoded by 
readers; in addition, the anticipation of readerly judgments and their conse-
quences influences authorial choices about the textual dynamics. Three types 
of readerly judgment are central to the rhetorical experience of narrative:
 A. Interpretive judgments about the nature of events and other elements 
of the narrative.
 B. Ethical judgments about the moral value of characters and actions.
 C. Aesthetic judgments about the artistic quality of the narrative and of its 
parts.
Rhetorical theory seeks to identify the judgments that readers are guided to 
make, the consequences of those judgments for the ongoing interaction of 
the textual and readerly dynamics, and the ways in which those judgments 
and their interactions point toward the larger purposes of the narrative.
The What and (Some of ) the Why of Amis’s Technique
Apart from its detailed workings, Amis’s technique of backward narration 
has two significant and interrelated general effects: (1) It implicitly com-
ments on the backward logic of National Socialism, the reversal of values that 
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led to the systematic extermination of millions of people. This massive geno-
cide is such a crime against nature, Amis suggests, that it leads to the reversal 
of a fundamental natural process, the forward movement of time. To enter 
the orbit of National Socialism is to enter a world of inverted logic, or in the 
words of Primo Levi, which Amis uses as the title for chapter 5 detailing the 
experience of Auschwitz, a world in which one can say with justice “here 
there is no why” (hier ist kein warum).3 (2) The technique defamiliarizes 
our perceptions and our understandings of every event it describes, from the 
most mundane (shopping in a grocery store, hailing a taxicab) to the most 
horrific (the killings at Auschwitz). It requires us to correct all the reversals of 
order and the concomitant misunderstandings of cause and effect, and as we 
make these corrections, we see things afresh. In this respect, Amis’s project 
entails not only rendering the psychology of the perpetrator but also refresh-
ing his audience’s perceptions of the Holocaust. To be sure, Amis’s technique 
does yield some diminishing returns—once readers get used to inverting 
temporal order, the defamiliarization becomes less pronounced. But such a 
decline also helps to shift our attention from the technique itself to what it is 
representing. In addition, Amis retains the ability to tap into the defamiliar-
izing effects of the technique by varying other elements of it—including the 
situations in which Soul finds himself and his perspective on Odilo (some-
times Soul says “he” and “I,” and sometimes “we” and “us.”). I will return to 
this point when I consider the narration of the events at Auschwitz.
 Even as the narration performs these general functions, Amis specifically 
motivates it through Unverdorben’s experience as a doctor in Auschwitz. As 
Amis explains in the novel’s afterword, he had been “considering the idea of 
telling the story of a man’s life backward in time” (167), but it was only after 
reading Robert Jay Lifton’s study The Nazi Doctors that he was able to execute 
the idea. Indeed, Amis notes that “my novel would not and could not have 
been written without” Lifton’s book (167). Lifton argues that the Nazi doc-
tors managed to function in the camps only through a psychological dou-
bling that allowed them to compartmentalize their behavior in such a way 
that they could both maintain some level of humanity and participate in sys-
tematic genocide. One compartment contained their technical skill and task 
orientation, while another contained the emotional and ethical dimensions 
of their being. The strong compartmentalization allowed them to function, 
but it also induced a significant dissociation of personality.
 Amis’s innovation is to take Lifton’s findings and give them another 
turn of the screw by creating a  protagonist with such an extremely disso-
ciated personality that the side of himself tuned in to emotions and ethics 
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experiences time backwards. More specifically, this narrator is aware that 
he is connected to Unverdorben because he is physically bound to him and 
because he has access to Unverdorben’s feelings and dreams. But he also feels 
separate from Unverdorben because he does not have access to his host’s 
conscious thoughts and does not have any control over his actions. Further-
more, Unverdorben, who is initially called Tod Friendly (friendly death), and 
then John Young and Hamilton de Souza before we discover his given name, 
remains wholly unaware of the narrator’s presence.
 These features of the technique give rise to a progression that moves 
simultaneously along two different but interrelated tracks: the first involves 
the instabilities and tensions surrounding Soul’s quest to make sense of the 
life he is suddenly thrown into, a quest that includes his interest in discov-
ering the ethical nature of his host and such things as the closely guarded 
secret of his host’s life. This first track includes the tensions resulting from 
the global and local unreliability of the backward narration. With respect to 
readerly dynamics, this track orients Amis’s audience in one temporal direc-
tion, that of the reverse chronology. The second track of the progression 
involves the set of instabilities in Unverdorben’s life as it follows the usual 
direction of time’s arrow. With respect to readerly dynamics, following this 
track means not only re-orienting our temporal direction but also properly 
configuring the events of Odilo’s life as he lives it forward. Thus, what func-
tions for Soul as forward movement in time and an advancing understanding 
of Unverdorben’s developing life simultaneously functions for Amis’s audi-
ence as backward movement and backstory. Furthermore, as Soul moves in 
his forward direction, we continually seek to configure the unfolding ele-
ments of backstory into a larger coherent narrative of Unverdorben’s life. 
Following the two tracks simultaneously puts a heavy cognitive load on us, 
one that requires extensive and often complex interpretive judgments, and, 
as we shall see, similarly extensive and complex ethical judgments. Our aes-
thetic judgments will depend to a great extent on whether we find the intense 
cognitive labor of following the progression to be appropriately rewarded.
 Because Soul has access to Unverdorben’s feelings, he is not exactly on 
the outside looking in. Instead it would be more accurate to say that he is 
on the inside looking in, but doing so by looking from the wrong temporal 
direction. Furthermore, as I noted above, within this basic setup, Amis var-
ies the relationship between Soul and Unverdorben. Sometimes Soul treats 
Unverdorben as a wholly other being, but at other times as the larger part 
of himself, and on a few occasions as someone with whom he has just about 
fully merged. In addition, as the discussion so far suggests, Amis constructs 
a doubled experiencing-I: first, Soul as the experiencer who seeks to make 
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sense of Unverdorben and his actions, and, second, Unverdorben as an expe-
riencer containing but also distinct from Soul.
 Describing the what and the why of the technique also entails analyz-
ing the relation between the mimetic and the synthetic components of the 
narrative. At first glance, Amis’s technique, which Brian Richardson would 
regard as an example of “unnatural narration,” suggests that Amis wants 
to plant his stake firmly in the territory of the synthetic. But a closer look 
reveals that in all other respects, Amis follows the conventions of standard 
mimesis. The characters in the storyworld, including Odilo, are bound by 
all the other rules and restrictions on human powers of action, and they all 
have recognizable human psychologies. In addition, the novel’s storyworld 
has a familiar and documentable history and geography that includes the 
Nazi death camp at Auschwitz, and such historical figures as Josef Mengele 
and Eduard Wirths.4 Consequently, our readerly interest in the synthetic 
becomes subordinated to our interest in the mimetic and the thematic. We 
can better understand what Amis does with those interests after a look at the 
detailed workings of Amis’s narration.
The how and (more of ) the Why of the Technique
Addressing the how of the technique entails (1) identifying the logic under-
lying Amis’s decision to divide the narration into eight chapters that coin-
cide with the eight different temporal points from which Soul offers his 
retrospective narration;5 and (2) unpacking the relation between reliable and 
unreliable narration. It’s worth noting that Amis further divides his eight 
installments of Soul’s narration into the three distinct parts of his novel. Part 
I, which consists of chapters 1–3, follows Unverdorben’s life in the eastern 
United States after World War II. The first chapter starts at the moment of his 
death and goes backward approximately six years to recount his time in Well-
port, a suburb of Boston. The second focuses on his work as a doctor in Well-
port and his series of unsatisfying love affairs. The third gives Soul’s account 
of Unverdorben’s time in New York, where he is a successful doctor and an 
active womanizer. Part II consists of Unverdorben’s experiences in Europe 
as an adult. Chapter 4 traces his movements (backward) from the journey 
by boat across the Atlantic to various stops that bring him to the edge of 
the experience of Auschwitz. Chapter 5 focuses on Auschwitz. Chapters 6 
and 7 focus on the highlights of Unverdorben’s pre-Auschwitz life, especially 
his training as a doctor at Schloss Hartheim, the place where the Nazis first 
experimented with different modes of mass extermination, and his marriage 
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to a woman named Herta. Part III consists only of the short, final chapter 8, 
which is split between Unverdorben’s visit to Auschwitz at age thirteen and 
his early experiences at age three.
 We can understand the logic of Amis’s choice to have Soul narrate from 
discrete temporal moments by considering its effect on the first track of the 
progression. As Soul observes Unverdorben early in the narration, he notes 
that Unverdorben frequently feels shame and fear, that he is unable to have 
a relationship with a woman that is both durable and satisfying, and that he 
gets annual letters from “some guy in New York” (16) that report only on 
the weather. In short, the narration by installment allows Amis to introduce 
significant tensions about Unverdorben’s past and to resolve those tensions 
very slowly, even as the resolutions of the tensions—as, for example, when 
we find out that Unverdorben has indeed been a Nazi doctor—increase our 
understanding of the instabilities along the second track of the progression, 
the one concerned with Unverdorben’s life as lived forward. If Amis were to 
adopt the alternative approach of having Soul narrate retrospectively from a 
single point in time, he would need to choose a point near the beginning of 
Unverdorben’s life—perhaps in his adolescence—so that he could give a full 
account of his experiences from the moment of death back to that temporal 
point. But then Soul’s narration would necessarily be informed by the knowl-
edge he had acquired throughout his adult years, including from his experi-
ences in Auschwitz, and that would effectively eliminate the first track of the 
progression and its resulting readerly dynamics. Amis’s choice of narration 
by installment allows him to combine Soul’s retrospection and his gradual 
discoveries, which he nevertheless often misinterprets, in an especially com-
pelling way.
 As I turn to analyze the unreliability of the narration itself, I draw on 
my previous work on the rhetoric and ethics of unreliable narration (see 
Living to Tell about It and “Estranging Unreliability”). In fictional narrative, 
there are at least two tellers: the narrator who communicates to an explicit or 
implied narratee and the author who communicates to his or her authorial 
and actual audience by means of the narrator’s communication to the narra-
tee. Furthermore, narrators perform three main tasks, and these tasks can be 
located along three distinct axes of communication. (1) Narrators report on 
settings, characters, and events (who did what where when) along the axis of 
events and existents. (2) Narrators read or interpret what they report (this 
action had this meaning) along the axis of perception and interpretation. (3) 
They ethically evaluate (or regard) characters and their actions (e.g., Huck 
Finn judging himself as condemned to hell for deciding not to tell Miss Wat-
son where Jim is) along the axis of ethical values. Consequently, narrators 
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can be unreliable in three main ways: they can misreport (by, for example, 
distorting what happened, getting the order of events wrong, or even out-
right lying); they can misread or misinterpret (naïve narrators demonstrate 
their naïveté by misreading); and they can misregard or misevaluate (judg-
ing evil characters to be good, and vice versa). We can add another layer 
of precision to this taxonomy by noting that sometimes a narrator’s report, 
reading, or regarding is reliable as far as it goes, though it clearly does not go 
far enough. This observation yields three other kinds of unreliability: under-
reporting, underreading, and underregarding. 
 By reversing time’s arrow, Amis makes unreliability the default condition 
of the narration, because Soul is reporting events in the wrong order and 
compounding that misreporting with a misreading of the relations between 
cause and effect. Soul of course believes that his reports and readings are on 
target—the unreliability is unintentional on his part—and Amis relies on 
his audience to recognize that Soul has things backwards. Our interpretive 
judgments are further complicated because within this dominant fabric of 
unreliability, Amis inserts what I will call pockets of reliability, and so we 
must frequently negotiate the shifts between the two modes.
 A passage from early in the novel allows us to see the weave of the fab-
ric of unreliability: “A child’s breathless wailing calmed by the firm slap of 
the father’s hand, a dead ant revived by the careless press of a passing sole, 
a wounded finger healed and sealed by the knife’s blade: anything like that 
made me flinch and veer” (26). The passage has an initially—and deliber-
ately—disorienting effect as Soul attributes positive outcomes to small acts of 
violence. And although we can readily invert the order of events and reassign 
cause and effect (the slap causes rather than calms the wailing), Amis also 
gives us pause by concluding the passage with Soul’s response to the violence, 
a response that is more in line with the one we have to our revised under-
standing of his report. Indeed, the last phrase of the passage helps illustrate 
the point that misreporting and misreading may or may not be closely linked 
with misregarding. In this passage, Soul’s flinching at violence is a sign of his 
reliable regarding.
 But now consider Soul’s description of Tod Friendly’s motivation for 
going to church on Sunday, where his backward experience of time leads 
him simultaneously to misreport, misread, and misregard.
The forgiving look you get from everybody on the way in—Tod seems to 
need it, the social reassurance. We sit in lines and worship a corpse. But 
it’s clear what Tod’s really after. Christ, he’s so shameless. He always takes a 
really big bill from the bowl. (15)
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The difference between the two passages is instructive: in the first, Soul is 
directly reporting his own response, and it is not at all surprising that his 
narration is reliable on the axis of values. In the second, Soul is judging the 
experiencing-Unverdorben after having misreported and misread his behav-
ior, and, again, it is not surprising that he misregards Tod as selfish rather 
than generous.
 In addition to distinguishing among kinds of unreliability, we also need 
to distinguish among their affective and ethical effects. While most work on 
unreliability, since Wayne C. Booth coined the term in The Rhetoric of Fiction 
in 1961, has assumed that unreliability creates affective and ethical distance 
between the narrator and the authorial audience, some unreliable narra-
tion actually closes such distance. To capture these different effects, I have 
proposed a distinction between “estranging unreliability,” which increases 
or reinforces distance and “bonding unreliability,” which closes distance. 
The six types of unreliability—misreporting, misreading, and misregarding; 
underreporting, underreading, and underregarding—can each have either 
estranging or bonding effects. Furthermore, I suggest that we think not of 
an either/or binary between estranging and bonding unreliability but rather 
of a spectrum going from extreme estrangement at one end to up close and 
personal bonding at the other end.
 Not surprisingly, Amis often uses Soul’s unreliability for bonding effects 
on the ethical axis. That is, even when he is misregarding, as in his judgments 
of Tod’s motives for going to church, he employs a set of values that the 
authorial audience shares. Or to take another example, consider this passage 
about Soul’s experience in New York City:
This business with the yellow cabs, it surely looks like an unimprovable 
deal. They’re always there when you need one, even in the rain or when 
the theaters are closing. They pay you up front, no questions asked. They 
always know where you’re going. They’re great. No wonder we stand there, 
for hours on end, waving goodbye, or saluting—saluting this fine service. 
The streets are full of people with their arms raised, drenched and weary, 
thanking the yellow cabs. Just one hitch: they’re always taking me places 
where I don’t want to go. (65–66)
Here too Soul misreports and misreads: his inability to recognize the actual 
order of events leads to his misattributing the relations between cause and 
effect. His generous praise for the enterprise indicates that he is also misre-
garding. But all this unreliability makes the passage—and the self who nar-
rates it—endearingly funny. Amis uses Soul’s reversal of time as the basis 
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for what we regard as essentially naïve narration: the narration captures the 
events but is clueless about interpreting them. Soul’s naïveté defamiliarizes 
the whole business of using taxicabs in New York, highlighting its difficul-
ties and annoyances (“we stand for hours on end,” trying to flag one down) 
as well as its compensations (the cabs do take their users where they want to 
go). But most significantly, Soul’s enthusiastic misregarding demonstrates a 
generosity of spirit that is ethically appealing. Consequently, the passage as a 
whole has a bonding effect, one that increases our sympathy for him and his 
quest to have his life make sense.
 Just as important as these passages that are dominated by unreliability 
are those containing what I call pockets of reliability. I use the term “pock-
ets” in order to emphasize the point that these instances of reliability are 
almost always surrounded by the larger fabric of unreliability. Examining 
these pockets along the three axes of communication will take us deeper into 
the how of Amis’s technique.
A. The Axis of Ethics
Along this axis, we find numerous such pockets, often occurring when Soul 
offers ethical judgments that distinguish him from what he understands as 
the ethically deficient Unverdorben. The following passage from chapter 
1 provides the larger context for the one in which Soul comments on his 
responses to small acts of violence.
Surprisingly, Tod is known and mocked and otherwise celebrated for his 
squeamishness. I say surprisingly because I happen to know that Tod isn’t 
squeamish. I’m squeamish. I’m the squeamish one. Oh, Tod can hack it. 
His feeling tone—aweless, distant—is quite secure against the daily round 
in here, the stares of vigil, the smell of altered human flesh. Tod can take all 
this—whereas I’m harrowed by it. From my point of view, work is an eight-
hour panic attack. You can imagine me curled up within, feebly gagging, 
and trying to avert my eyes. . . . I’m taking on the question of violence, this 
most difficult question. Intellectually, I can just about accept that violence 
is salutary, violence is good. But I can find nothing in me that assents to 
its ugliness. (26)
The pocket of reliable regarding can be found in Soul’s underlying ethi-
cal and aesthetic judgment that there’s something wrong with the pain and 
corresponding ugliness of violence. Not surprisingly, that reliable regard-
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ing creates a bonding effect: Amis, his audience, and the narrating self all 
share the same values. But Amis complicates this bonding by juxtaposing 
this reliability with the unreliable report that Tod is not squeamish. If the 
report were reliable, then Tod would not be celebrated among his cowork-
ers for his squeamishness. The consequence of this unreliability reverber-
ates throughout the whole narrative because it complicates our view of the 
relations between Soul and Tod/Unverdorben. We realize that the neatness 
of Soul’s frequent dichotomy between those two selves cannot be sustained, 
since the “other” narrated self actually shares traits and responses that Soul 
does not acknowledge, either because he cannot recognize them or because 
doing so would mean that he cannot claim ethical superiority over Tod/
Unverdorben. But the larger effect is that we come to see that Unverdorben, 
the larger being who contains both the narrating self and the narrated self, is 
neither simply an unfeeling monster nor a sensitive soul who has been cor-
rupted against his will. Instead, we come to see him as someone capable of 
both an ethical and an aesthetic objection to violence and pain and of being 
wholly indifferent to them.
 The ending of the passage reinforces this point. Soul’s view of violence 
as salutary stems immediately—and forgivably—from the reversal of time’s 
arrow, since from that perspective, violent acts seem to heal people. In addi-
tion, his view of violence as ugly stems from an apparently inherent sense 
of the aesthetic. But having now seen that Soul and Tod are not as dis-
tinct as Soul believes, we can also see that Tod shares these attitudes. The 
underlying ethic of the Holocaust, according to Nazi doctrine, was that 
violence against the Jews was salutary and good, and we eventually learn 
that Tod/Unverdorben acted in accord with that belief even though he is 
someone who has an aversion to the ugliness of violence. The larger effect is 
to humanize Tod/Unverdorben and, in that way, to make his behavior more 
horrific.
B. The Axis of Facts and Events
Along this axis, there are two recurring pockets of reliability. (1) While the 
narrating self consistently misreports the order of events, he reliably reports 
the events themselves. Indeed, our ability to recognize his misreporting and 
misreading and our ability to reconstruct the chronological sequence of 
events in Unverdorben’s life depend on this substrate of reliable reporting. In 
addition, this reliable reporting allows Amis to establish brief pockets of reli-
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ability even within passages of strong misreading and misregarding. (2) Soul 
reliably reports on his own inner life as well as on the dreams and feelings 
of Unverdorben. Consider this passage from the end of chapter 3, a point in 
the story during which Unverdorben, then known as John Young, is working 
as a doctor in New York:
Is it a war we are fighting, a war against health, against life and love? My 
condition is a torn condition. Every day, the dispensing of existence. I see 
the face of suffering. Its face is fierce and distant and ancient.
 There’s probably a straightforward explanation for the improbable 
weariness I feel. A perfectly straightforward explanation. It is a mortal wea-
riness. Maybe I’m tired of being human, if human is what I am. I’m tired of 
being human. (93)
The immediate impetus for Soul’s initial question is his misreading of a doc-
tor’s work: with time’s arrow reversed, he sees that medical treatment almost 
always makes people worse—patients who are initially healthy become sick 
or injured. But his report of his incredible weariness is totally reliable, and 
that, in turn, leads us to take seriously his hypothesis that he is tired of being 
human. Since that hypothesis goes beyond the specific condition of being a 
doctor, our taking it seriously also means generalizing that condition. And 
here Amis’s use of the first-person plural pronoun before switching to the 
singular becomes especially significant. The pronoun usage, combined with 
the absence of any “I–he” comparison such as we have seen in the passage 
about squeamishness, signals that Soul’s weariness is shared by Unverdorben, 
even if Soul does not understand why. And when we ask why Unverdorben 
should feel this weariness, we can infer that the answer is to be found in 
something beyond these experiences in New York, that is, experiences from 
Unverdorben’s yet-to-be-narrated past. He has likely seen the face of worse 
suffering and perhaps been more responsible for it. That Soul can now reg-
ister the suffering of others in Unverdorben’s apparent campaign against life 
and love also suggests that at some level Unverdorben registered such suf-
fering in the past. But we also infer that his registering the suffering had no 
consequences for his behavior. The interaction between reliable and unreli-
able narration here aids Amis in his larger nuanced treatment of the ethical 
being of the perpetrator: he portrays Unverdorben as a fellow human, high-
lights the cost of his actions in his dissociation of self, and simultaneously 
suggests that his weariness now pales beside the actual destruction that he 
participated in.
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C. The Axis of Perception and Interpretation
The reversal of time’s arrow means that Soul’s unreliability is greatest on 
this axis, but even here there are two recurring pockets of reliability. The 
first involves Soul’s ability to analyze reliably once he steps backs from his 
assumptions about the direction of time’s arrow. Consider this passage from 
the end of chapter 2. Unverdorben is riding on a train away from one city 
and toward another, and Soul in his usual fashion gets the direction wrong. 
But within that framework of misreading, Amis creates a remarkable pocket 
of reliable reading:
It must be New York. That’s where we’re going: to New York and its stormy 
weather.
 He is traveling toward his secret. Parasite or passenger, I am traveling 
with him. It will be bad. It will be bad, and not intelligible. But I will know 
one thing about it (and at least the certainty brings comfort): I will know 
how bad the secret is. I will know the nature of the offense. Already I know 
this. I know that it is to do with trash and shit, and that it is wrong in time. 
(63)
Because, as we learn on the very next page, his inference about New York 
is correct, the passage initially establishes his reliability as a reader of the 
situation. This reliability leads us in turn to take the other interpretations—
that the secret has to do with trash and shit and that it is wrong in time—as 
equally reliable. But this reliability exists alongside the standard misreporting 
of the distinct separation between the two narrated selves, between the expe-
riencing Soul and the experiencing Unverdorben, a separation that seems 
even less warranted here where the narration has shifted to the present tense. 
Once we focus on that unreliability, we realize that Unverdorben is aware of 
how bad the secret is—and that in traveling away from New York he is vainly 
trying to escape it. Indeed, once we reset time’s arrow this way, we can see 
that the passage is informing us that Unverdorben lives with the conscious-
ness of what Primo Levi referred to as “the nature of the offense” (quoted 
by Amis 168). This passage has even more weight because Amis uses that 
phrase as the alternate title for the book (the title page reads Time’s Arrow or 
The Nature of the Offense).
 The realization that Unverdorben lives with this consciousness, in turn, 
sheds a retrospective light on the second track of the progression to this 
point, that is, the part of Unverdorben’s life that has already been narrated—
his postwar life in America—because it shows that he does not deal with 
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that consciousness very well at all. Although the outer trappings of his life 
are fine, his inner life is ruled by fear and shame and by various unsuccess-
ful efforts to forget, deny, or overcome these emotions, including his endless 
pursuit of sexual conquest and his inability to sustain a serious relationship 
with a woman.
 Once again, then, the overall effect of the passage is to lead us to a series 
of complex ethical judgments that initially have both bonding and estranging 
effects. On the one hand, we can endorse not only Soul’s reliable reading but 
also his willingness to face the secret and learn how bad it is. But on the other 
hand, we infer both that Unverdorben is himself an active agent in what is 
terrible about the secret (indeed, his agency is connected to its being terrible) 
and that he has not managed to deal with his behavior in an ethically produc-
tive way. The best he can do, it seems, is to dissociate.
 The second pocket of reliable narration along the axis of perception and 
interpretation involves Amis giving Soul the intermittent recognition that 
his temporal orientation is backward. For example, during a passage when 
Soul is employing the first-person singular as he describes his doctoring in 
America, he suddenly remarks:
But wait a minute. The baby is crawling, only one or two panting inches 
at a time—but crawling forward. And the mother with the magazine, the 
glossy pages ticking past her face: she’s reading forward. Hey! Christ, how 
long has it been since I. . . . ? Anyhow, it’s soon over, this lucid interval. (82)
 This intermittent recognition functions as a strong reminder that the 
split between the two narrated selves requires a huge effort to maintain and 
is therefore subject to breaking down at just about any point. That Unverdor-
ben is nevertheless able to maintain the split self points, first, to the depth of 
his guilt and shame and, second and more powerfully, to the horrible actions 
that are the source of those feelings.
The narration of unverdorben’s experience at Auschwitz
Amis’s use of Soul’s consistent misreading of the relation of cause and effect 
for bonding effects complicates his task in chapter 5, the central chapter 
of the novel, because it deals with Unverdorben’s experience at Auschwitz. 
Because Soul experiences time backwards, he must (mis)interpret Unver-
dorben’s diligent participation in the extermination of the Jews as his heroic 
efforts toward what Soul calls the “preternatural purpose” of creating a race. 
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Indeed, because of these views, Soul feels that in Auschwitz, life suddenly 
makes more sense than it has before.6 If Amis were to narrate the chapter 
using primarily unreliable narration with bonding effects, he would run the 
risk of undermining his own ethical authority, and, in so doing, seriously 
mar the quality of the novel. But he varies the narration in significant ways: 
sometimes he uses the unreliability for estranging effects, and sometimes 
he employs pockets of reliability to convey his own strongly negative ethical 
judgments. A closer look at both variations shows how his handling of Soul’s 
narration both defamiliarizes our perceptions of the Holocaust and effec-
tively uses aesthetics in the service of ethics.
 Consider how Soul’s naïveté works in this passage:
.  .  .  to prevent needless suffering, the dental work was usually completed 
while the patients were not yet alive. The Kapos would go at it, crudely but 
effectively, with knives and chisels or any tool that came to hand. Most of 
the gold we used, of course, came direct from the Reichsbank. But every 
German present, even the humblest, gave willingly of his own store—I 
more than any other officer save “Uncle Pepi” himself. I knew my gold had 
a sacred efficacy. All those years I amassed it, and polished it with my mind 
for the Jews’ teeth. (121)
Once again we have misreporting, misreading, and misregarding for defamil-
iarizing effects. As Soul praises the generosity of the German executioners, 
Amis underlines their greed and their brutality, especially Unverdorben’s. 
Soul’s host, we recognize, has distinguished himself among the group by 
hoarding more of the victims’ gold fillings than anyone else. Furthermore, 
Amis uses the first-person singular here, thus eliminating much of the dis-
tance between the narrating-Soul and both narrated selves (experiencing-
Soul and experiencing-Unverdorben). Consequently, Amis matches Soul’s 
enthusiasm for this work with Unverdorben’s even as he underlines the sharp 
ethical contrast between their respective reasons for their enthusiasm. In 
addition, the technique reminds us that Soul and Unverdorben are ultimately 
part of the same person. The larger result is to estrange the authorial audi-
ence from Unverdorben by deepening the horror of his actions and under-
lining the depth of his dissociation of personality. This estranging effect is 
frequently repeated throughout chapter 5, where Amis frequently conflates 
Soul and Unverdorben by means of the first-person singular pronoun.
 Amis also uses pockets of reliable reporting to influence our ethical judg-
ments of Unverdorben and of Auschwitz. Consider the second sentence in 
the passage about the extraction of gold fillings from the victims’ teeth: “the 
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Kapos would go at it, crudely but effectively, with knives and chisel or any 
tool that came to hand.” Divorced from Soul’s understanding of sequence, 
and thus, his mistaken understanding that the knives and chisels are tools 
for filling cavities, the sentence is a very reliable report of the perpetrators’ 
behavior, and it functions to enhance the estranging effects of the surround-
ing unreliability.
 Within chapter 5, Amis also uses the pockets of reliability to make a 
remarkable link between ethics and aesthetics, one that extends the link in 
the earlier passage about squeamishness. Consider these two passages that 
occur within just a few pages of each other in the beginning of chapter 5.
Ordure, ordure everywhere. Even on my return through the ward, past 
ulcer and edema, past sleepwalker and sleeptalker, I could feel the hun-
gry suck of it on the soles of my black boots. Outside: everywhere. This 
stuff, this human stuff, at normal times (and in civilized locales) tastefully 
confined to the tubes and tunnels, subterranean, unseen—this stuff had 
burst its banks, surging outward and upward onto the floor, the walls, the 
very ceiling of life. Naturally, I didn’t immediately see the natural logic and 
justice of it. (117)
What tells me that this is right? What tells me that all the rest was wrong? 
Certainly not my aesthetic sense. I would never claim that Auschwitz-
Birkenau-Monowitz was good to look at. Or to listen to, or to smell, or to 
taste, or to touch. There was, among my colleagues there, a general though 
desultory quest for greater elegance. I can understand that word, and all its 
yearning: elegant. Not for its elegance did I come to love the evening sky 
above the Vistula, hellish red with the gathering souls. Creation is easy. 
Also ugly. (119–20)
In the first passage, Amis gives us reliable reporting and juxtaposes it with 
underreading and underregarding. Auschwitz in its last days—albeit the first 
days from Soul’s perspective—has become overtaken with human excre-
ment, a development that we interpret as having a logic and justice entirely 
different from anything that Soul is able to assign. Indeed, in Amis’s audi-
ence, we interpret the aesthetic horror and ugliness of the camp as a sign of 
its ethical horror and ugliness, something that Soul is wholly unable to grasp 
and that Unverdorben is, at this point in his forward experience of time, still 
able to deny. In the second passage, the effects depend on Amis’s juxtapo-
sition of reliable reading with misreading and misregarding. Soul reliably 
represents the aesthetic ugliness of Auschwitz, its assault on all five senses, 
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and the hellish quality of the sky above the crematorium, but his misplaced 
love of that sky underlines for us the horror of the destruction that Unver-
dorben, in his dissociated state, cannot face. Indeed, Soul’s description of the 
sky underlines not only that dissociation but also Amis’s close juxtaposition 
of reliability and unreliability for defamiliarizing effects. We readily endorse 
Soul’s reading of the sky as “hellish red,” but then suddenly must reject his 
phrase “with gathering souls” and replace it with its opposite: “with people 
literally going up in smoke.”
Two Final Pockets of Reliability
Some significant additional effects of our ethical judgments in chapter 5 
result from their influence on the readerly dynamics of two final pockets 
of reliability, one at the very end of chapter 7 and the other in the very last 
lines of the novel. The first pocket provides a partial resolution to one of the 
global tensions of the first track of the progression: Soul’s question about 
Unverdorben’s ethical being. After reflecting on whether Unverdorben could 
use violence (which from Soul’s perspective “mends and heals”) in his devel-
oping relationship with Herta, Soul says,
I have come to the conclusion that Odilo Unverdorben, as a moral being, 
is absolutely unexceptional, liable to do what everybody else does, good or 
bad, with no limit, once under the cover of numbers. He could never be an 
exception; he is dependent on the health of his society, needing the sandy 
smiles of Rolf and Rudolph, of Rüdiger, of Reinhard. (157)
 Amis has ensured the reliability of Soul’s conclusion not only by mak-
ing it a culminating point of the progression but also by giving us evidence 
of how well Unverdorben has fit in at Auschwitz. This reliable conclusion 
in turn functions as Amis’s thematic generalization about the perpetrator. 
Amis has clearly been influenced by Lifton’s contention that the Nazi doctors 
were neither beasts nor demons but human beings who were “neither bril-
liant nor stupid, neither inherently evil nor particularly ethically sensitive” 
(4) and who had to engage in some kind of doubling to participate as they 
did in the genocide. But by using the resources of fictional narrative, and 
especially those of reliable and unreliable narration, Amis’s exploration gives 
us a perspective on the perpetrator that substantially complements Lifton’s. 
Amis defamiliarizes the horror of Auschwitz, enables us to view it, albeit 
indirectly (via Soul rather than Odilo), from the perpetrator’s perspective, 
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and ably guides our judgments so that we recognize the links among Unver-
dorben’s conformity, his dissociation, and his participation in the genocide. 
In this way, Amis also paves the way for us to move from our immersion in 
his fictional world back to our own with a deeper understanding of how the 
Holocaust could have happened—and, indeed, how such an event could hap-
pen again.
 With the final pocket of reliability in the last lines of Soul’s narration, 
Amis gives the narrative one final, defamiliarizing twist. He has shifted to 
the present tense in order to capture the process of Odilo’s becoming ever 
younger.
Look! Beyond, before the slope of pine, the lady archers are gathering with 
their targets and bows. Above, a failing-vision kind of light, with the sky 
fighting down its nausea. When Odilo closes his eyes, I see an arrow fly—
but wrongly. Point first. Oh no, then. . . . We’re away once more, over the 
field. Odilo Unverdorben and his eager heart. And I within, who came at 
the wrong time—either too soon, or after it was all too late. (165, ellipsis 
in original)
 Soul reliably reports that the archers shoot their arrows, but he has a 
moment of unreliable reading, when he interprets their first direction as the 
wrong one. He soon recovers, though, and reliably notes that time’s arrow 
has now reversed direction, propelling him not toward the oblivion of non-
existence but toward experiencing everything he has just told us about in 
the opposite order.7 Unverdorben is not made whole by the reversal of time’s 
arrow, and that fact renders the ending both poignant and horrific. It is poi-
gnant because, as Soul says, he will remain within Unverdorben unable to 
do anything but observe and report as he has done throughout this narra-
tive. He is too soon or too late, depending on where one stands in time, but 
in either case, he is powerless. This new reversal of time’s arrow is horrific, 
because Soul will no longer be able systematically to misread the relation 
between cause and effect in the events of Unverdorben’s life—and because 
Unverdorben will repeat his participation in the atrocity of the Holocaust. 
Furthermore, by reversing time’s arrow once more at the end of the narra-
tive and implying an eventual return to Auschwitz, Amis suggests something 
about the continuing effects of the Holocaust as history marches on, about its 
living on in historical memory, and its lingering effects on all of us who are 
still trying to come to terms with it.
 Looking back on the whole narrative, we can see that Amis, inspired by 
Lifton’s book on Nazi doctors, has found an effective way to confront the 
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ethical and aesthetic challenges of representing the perpetrator. To be sure, his 
approach is oblique—through Soul, not Odilo himself—and that approach 
involves significant trade-offs. We can bond with Soul in a way that we could 
not with Odilo, but that very bonding reinforces a certain distance from 
Odilo. That distance, in turn, heightens our negative ethical judgments of 
Odilo, but it also means that Amis will only partially get inside the psychol-
ogy of the perpetrator. Consequently, as I hope this rhetorical analysis has 
shown, Amis is able to use what appears as a gimmick—the backwards nar-
ration—as a key building block in what becomes for his audience a rich ethi-
cal and aesthetic experience, even as we remain aware that this experience 
is ultimately just one partial glimpse into the complexity of the perpetrators.
notes
 1. Chatman’s essay does an excellent job of analyzing the basic mechanism of the 
backwards narration and discussing its relation to similar techniques. Vice offers another 
impressive analysis of Amis’s technique, one that effectively responds to the charge that 
Amis is more interested in his narrative technique than in the subject matter of the Ho-
locaust. McGlothlin (“Theorizing the Perpetrator”) develops an instructive comparison 
between Time’s Arrow and another representation of a perpetrator, Bernhard Schlink’s Der 
Leser. Other insightful work on Amis’s novel has been done by Diedrick, Harris, Finney, 
Easterbrook, and McCarthy, but none of these critics focuses on the ethics and aesthetics 
of its technique to the extent that I do here.
 2. For a fuller exposition and demonstration of this rhetorical approach, see my Liv-
ing to Tell about It and Experiencing Fiction.
 3. Levi’s phrase has become a useful shorthand for referring to the inverted logic of 
the camps, but here is the context in which it occurs:
Driven by thirst, I eyed a fine icicle outside the window, within hand’s reach. 
I opened the window and broke off the icicle but at once a large, heavy guard 
prowling outside brutally snatched it away from me. ‘Warum?’ I asked in my 
poor German. ‘Hier ist kein warum’ (there is no why here), he replied, pushing 
me inside with a shove.
  The explanation is repugnant but simple: in this place everything is forbidden, 
not for hidden reasons, but because the camp has been created for that purpose. 
(35)
 4. Like Mengele, Wirths was a Nazi doctor at Auschwitz. Lifton, who devotes a 
chapter to Wirths in The Nazi Doctors, succinctly summarizes his role: he “established 
the camp’s system of selections and medicalized killing and supervised the overall process 
during the two years in which most of the mass murder was accomplished” (384).
 5. The retrospection is intermingled with narration from the time of the telling and 
occasionally with simultaneous present-tense narration such as at the end of section 2, 
when acting and telling coincide: “I am on a train now, heading south at evening” (62).
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 6. See Vice for an excellent discussion of Amis’s re-appropriation of parts of Lifton’s 
study in his representation of Auschwitz.
 7 . I am indebted to Brian Finney for calling my attention to Amis’s move here. 
Finney describes its effect this way: “the narrative condemns [its readers] to share with the 
narrator an endless oscillation between past and present, incorporating the past into our 
sense of modernity” (111).
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p a r T  I I
intersections/border Crossings

In Tolstoy’s novel War and Peace the captured Pierre is brought in to be 
interrogated by the French General Davoust. The General is aggressive, 
accuses his captive of being a spy, and when Pierre gives his name asks: 
“What proof have I that you are not lying?”
“Monseigneur!” exclaimed Pierre in a tone that betrayed not offence but 
entreaty.
 Davoust lifted his eyes and gazed searchingly at him. For some seconds 
they looked at one another, and that look saved Pierre. It went beyond the 
circumstances of war and the court-room, and established human relations 
between the two men. Both of them in that one instant were dimly aware of 
an infinite number of things, and they realized that they were both children 
of humanity, that they were brothers.
 When Davoust had first half raised his head from his memorandum, 
where men’s lives and doings were indicated by numbers, Pierre had been 
only a case, and Davoust could have had him shot without burdening 
his conscience with an evil deed; but now he saw in him a human being. 
(1140–41)
For anyone familiar with accounts of the terrible events of the Nazi Holo-
caust this passage is likely to inspire conflicting responses. The sentiment 
that the pen is mightier than the sword is an ancient one, yet Tolstoy’s per-
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ception that modernity vastly increases its purchase is prophetic. His vision 
of a murderer whose countless victims are never confronted in person but 
whose “lives and doings” are indicated only by numbers points straight 
towards the genocidal acts of Eichmann and his fellow bureaucrats, who 
killed millions who were literally “just numbers” to them. At the same time, 
Tolstoy’s confidence that face-to-face contact between individuals will ren-
der killing difficult or impossible may well seem misplaced to a modern 
reader. Emmanuel Lévinas—who had firsthand experience of the horrors of 
Nazism—was able to maintain a Tolstoyan belief in his 1953 essay “Freedom 
and Command” that the
absolute nakedness of a face, the absolutely defenseless face, without cov-
ering, clothing or mask, is what opposes my power over it, my violence, 
and opposes it in an absolute way, with an opposition which is opposition 
in itself. The being that expresses itself, that faces me, says no to me by 
his very expression. This no is not merely formal, but it is not the no of a 
hostile force or a threat; it is the impossibility of killing him who presents 
that face . . . (21)
Most of us, however, are more likely to believe that if there is one lesson 
that can be learned from the Holocaust, it is that, as a line from Geoffrey 
Hill’s poem “Ovid in the Third Reich” expresses it, “Innocence is no earthly 
weapon.”
 Testimony is, of its very nature, if not face-to-face then certainly a mat-
ter of personal witness, and using accounts by and about single individuals 
to depict aspects of the Holocaust is very far from uncontentious. Such a 
focus, it has been argued, risks obscuring the mass, industrialized nature of 
the murders, and it may also encourage us to attribute utterly inappropriate 
powers of self-determination and choice to victims. Accounts of individuals 
risk transforming the exception (survival) into the representative example. 
More disturbingly, any attempt to make the experience of a single survivor 
somehow representative of the fate of thousands—or millions—may unin-
tentionally reduce victims to a uniformity that is worryingly reminiscent of 
the Nazi assertion that all racial Untermensch are essentially the same. It is 
a useful thought-exercise to imagine how we ourselves would feel were we 
to know that our own life and fate were to be preserved only through the 
memory of the life and fate of a friend or contemporary who would some-
how “represent” us.
 Against this it can be argued that a refusal to portray any of the victims 
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of the Nazis as individuals also dehumanizes them: photographs of bodies 
being bulldozed into mass graves do nothing to display the humanity of the 
murdered. We cannot dispense with the accounts of the historian for whom 
most of the millions of victims are inevitably “indicated by numbers.” But to 
convey the humanity of victims and the full extent of the guilt of perpetra-
tors and bystanders, accounts by and about individuals are irreplaceable. 
To appropriate a distinction made by Roland Barthes, we can say that if the 
wide sweep of the historian gives us the “studium,” the personal account of 
the individual provides us with the “punctum.” In his essay “The Grey Zone” 
(in The Drowned and the Saved), Primo Levi refers to the Holocaust account 
that has probably been read more than any other, noting that “a single Anne 
Frank excites more emotion than the myriads who suffered as she did but 
whose image has remained in the shadows.” And he adds: “if we had to and 
were able to suffer the sufferings of everyone, we could not live” (39).
 However, perhaps the strongest ground for insisting on the importance 
of narratives that focus on encounters between individuals is that survivors 
themselves repeatedly include such accounts in their own writings. Here, for 
example, is a brief passage from the memoir of a Norwegian Auschwitz sur-
vivor, Herman Sachnowitz, in which he remembers his first meeting with a 
fellow-inmate named Felix Pavlowsky.
I had noticed him as we were singing—he was lying on his stomach in one 
of the upper bunks, relaxing. He was a good-looking man with a strong, 
firm-looking face. When he got up and jumped down to the floor I noticed 
he was a little bent over. His eyes were blue and friendly. His age was diffi-
cult to determine, since his head was shaved. The chevron on his chest was 
red. But what distinguished him most from the rest of the inmates—and 
what riveted my attention in a special way—was his smile. It was a wry 
and sad little smile that had so much in it, I was not sure how to interpret 
it right. Was it pity, or compassion? Was it cordiality, or deep wisdom? It 
seemed to me that the smile emanated from a person that really under-
stood how we felt. (67)
As I will argue below, the smile and a curiosity about others are markers of 
humanity that recur time and time again in survivor accounts. In its mirac-
ulous compression this passage tells us volumes about Sachnowitz, Pav-
lowsky, and what was sometimes preserved in the camps and discovered by 
victims through personal encounters. But what of encounters that involve 
perpetrators?
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1. Victims and Perpetrators
Charlotte Delbo’s extraordinary nonfictional trilogy Auschwitz and After—
extraordinary both in terms of what it recounts and in terms of Delbo’s 
creative mixing of narrative and poetic genres to convey her multifaceted 
experiences and musings over them—provides ample proof that in Auschwitz 
confronting one’s persecutor directly guaranteed no such shared moment 
of perceived humanity. “The Farewell”—a short, self-contained account in 
the first part of the trilogy—recounts Delbo’s observation of a female guard 
named Drexler who was supervising the loading of women into a truck tak-
ing them to the gas chamber.
The Drexler woman observes the departure. Her fists on her hips, she 
supervises, like a foreman who oversees a job and is satisfied.
 The women in the truck do not shout. Pressed tightly together they 
try to release their arms from their torsos. It is incomprehensible that one 
would still try to work an arm free, that one could wish to lean on some-
thing.
 One of the women thrusts her chest far over the side panel. Straight. 
Stiff. Her eyes shine. She looks on Drexler with hate, scorn, a scorn that 
should kill. She did not shout with the others, her face is ravaged only by 
illness.
 The truck starts up. Drexler follows it with her eyes.
 As the truck pulls away, she waves a farewell and laughs. She is laugh-
ing. And for a long time she keeps on waving good-bye. (51)
The passage confirms what the history of our time has corroborated innu-
merable times already: human beings observe and even interact with those 
they are mistreating or murdering without displaying pity or remorse. They 
may even, as here, appear to enjoy the suffering they are inflicting. Sixty-
seven years after Delbo observed Drexler’s behavior, a thirty-two-year-old 
Norwegian named Anders Behring Breivik detonated a massive bomb out-
side a Norwegian government building, killing eight people. He then trav-
eled to an island outside Oslo named Utøya, where the Labour Party youth 
organization was holding a summer camp. There he proceeded to shoot par-
ticipants, killing an additional sixty-nine individuals, most of whom were 
teenagers or young adults, and the youngest of whom was a girl of four-
teen. Many of those who survived reported that as he killed he smiled and 
laughed. Writing these words in Trondheim a week after this atrocity, I find 
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that the implicit question in Delbo’s account has an added force for me. Why 
is Drexler laughing? 
 The narrator of Anne Michaels’s novel Fugitive Pieces suggests one 
answer. 
If the Nazis required that humiliation precede extermination, then they 
admitted exactly what they worked so hard to avoid admitting: the human-
ity of the victim. To humiliate is to accept that your victim feels and thinks, 
that he not only feels pain, but knows that he’s being degraded. And 
because the torturer knew in an instant of recognition that his victim was 
not a “figuren” but a man, and knew at that moment he must continue 
his task, he suddenly understood the Nazi mechanism. Just as the stone-
carrier knew his only chance of survival was to fulfil his task as if he didn’t 
know its futility, so the torturer decided to do his job as if he didn’t know 
the lie. The photos capture again and again this chilling moment of choice: 
the laughter of the damned. When the soldier realized that only death has 
the power to turn “man” into “figuren,” his difficulty was solved. And so 
the rage and sadism increased: his fury at the victim for suddenly turning 
human; his desire to destroy that humanness so intense his brutality had 
no limit. (166)
Michaels’s analysis suggests, paradoxically, that the most extreme cruel-
ties of the Nazis were not the result of a failure to recognize the humanity 
of their victims but, on the contrary, the result of just such a recognition. 
A Tolstoyan recognition of the humanity of your potential victim may, if 
Michaels is right, lead to a grotesque frustration that erupts in acts of cru-
elty designed to remove the victim’s humanity in the only way remaining: by 
killing him or her. The analysis carries with it the paradoxical implication 
that in certain circumstances it may be safer for the victim to be perceived 
as not human.
 Primo Levi’s If This Is a Man contains a chapter titled “Chemical Exam-
ination” in which Levi describes another person-to-person encounter 
between perpetrator and victim (himself). A prisoner in Auschwitz, Levi is 
attempting to prolong and even to save his life by obtaining work in a labora-
tory. He has reported that he is a chemist and is taken to be interviewed by 
a Doktor Pannwitz to see if his skills can be used by the Germans. Perhaps 
because the account (unusually) depicts a confrontation between two indi-
viduals alone in a room, the account is uncannily reminiscent of the previ-
ously quoted scene in War and Peace.
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Pannwitz is tall, thin, blond; he has eyes, hair and nose as all Germans 
ought to have them, and sits formidably behind a complicated writing-
table. I, Häftling 174517, stand in his office, which is a real office, shining, 
clean and ordered, and I feel that I would leave a dirty stain on whatever 
I touched.
 When he finished writing, he raised his eyes and looked at me.
 From that day I have thought about Doktor Pannwitz many times and 
in many ways. I have asked myself how he really functioned as a man; how 
he filled his time, outside of the Polymerization and the Indo-Germanic 
conscience; above all when I was once more a free man, I wanted to meet 
him again, not from a spirit of revenge, but merely from a personal curios-
ity about the human soul.
 Because that look was not one between two men; and if I had known 
how completely to explain the nature of that look, which came as if across 
the glass window of an aquarium between two beings who live in different 
worlds, I would also have explained the essence of the great insanity of the 
third Germany.
 One felt in that moment, in an immediate manner, what we all thought 
and said of the Germans. The brain which governed those blue eyes and 
those manicured hands said: “This something in front of me belongs to a 
species which it is obviously opportune to suppress. In this particular case, 
one has to first make sure that it does not contain some utilizable element.” 
And in my head, like seeds in an empty pumpkin: “Blue eyes and fair hair 
are essentially wicked. No communication possible. I am a specialist in 
mine chemistry. I am a specialist in organic syntheses. I am a specialist . . .” 
(111–12, ellipsis in original)
Here there is no confident reassurance that direct eye contact between two 
men can penetrate the distorting and corrupting interference of nation, 
creed, and culture, no mutual perception of each other’s humanity. Not only 
is Pannwitz portrayed as perceiving Levi as a species that is not human (Levi 
is “it,” not “he”), but reading Levi’s account we are encouraged to wonder 
whether Pannwitz can himself be reckoned within the ranks of humanity. In 
spite of Levi’s curiosity about him “as a man” and as a possessor of a “human 
soul,” his failure to perceive Levi’s humanity undermines his own claim to be 
a member of the human race. As Levi has it: “that look was not one between 
two men.” If Anne Michaels is right, this may have saved Levi’s life.
 The scene as presented constitutes a direct challenge to Tolstoyan opti-
mism and to the confident liberal-humanist meliorism to which it has con-
tributed. The scene implies that we possess no “essential humanity” but 
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instead develop whatever humanity we posses through engagement with 
the cultural, historical, and political realities into which we are thrust. In 
other words, there is no extra-social self that can be miraculously exposed 
by means of an exchanged gaze with another. There is only the self that we 
develop through action in the world and interaction with others: that self is 
what we are, even if we may be compelled to conceal it from others on occa-
sions. While War and Peace is a work of fiction, If This Is a Man is an auto-
biographical account of Primo Levi’s time in Auschwitz. Tolstoy’s narrator is 
thus able to tell the reader about things of which neither of his characters is 
more than “dimly aware.” When we read that Pierre and Davoust “realized 
that they were both children of humanity, that they were brothers,” the form 
of the narrative allows for the possibility that this realization is not a fully 
conscious or verbalized one—there is a sense in which the passage invites 
the reader to assume that the narrator is providing words for sensations that 
are indistinctly apprehended rather than understood by the two. (We cannot 
in a brief moment of time put “an infinite number of things” into words.) A 
fictional narrator can know things of his or her characters that human beings 
can never know for sure about their fellows.
 Levi’s narrative technique is, necessarily, very different from Tolstoy’s 
but it is no less subtle and complex. It plays with the relation between the 
experiencing-I and the narrating-I, the gap between the Levi who can sign 
his own death warrant by the wrong word or gesture and the Levi in his 
secure postwar world looking safely and mockingly back in time at the 
(now) absurdly limited Pannwitz. Note, for example, how the changes in the 
form of the verb in the first three paragraphs (“is tall,” “he finished,” “I have 
thought”) denote and evoke significant shifts of perspective on the events 
described.
 Pannwitz’s dehumanizing vision of Häftling-Levi is countered by narrat-
ing-Levi’s derisive portrayal of the somehow not-fully-human Pannwitz. We 
thus get a very clear sense of the scene as composed of three participants: 
Häftling-Levi, Pannwitz, and narrating-Levi. As I read the passage I have a 
clear visual-spatial sense of the powerful Pannwitz looming large over the 
terrified prisoner-Levi, while above and behind him looms the unremarked 
author-Levi, with a cool, mocking, but also appalled smile on his face. I see 
him smiling because there clearly is a strain of very somber humor in this 
passage—witness the first quoted paragraph. And if Anne Michaels associ-
ates the laughing of the perpetrators with their frustrated recognition of 
their victims’ humanity, so too the humor in this passage can be explained 
only by narrating-Levi’s recognition of some element of twisted human-
like qualities in Pannwitz. But if recognizing the humanity of their victims 
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prompts cruelty and murder on the part of the perpetrators, the humor that 
bespeaks a recognition of something human in Pannwitz leads not to “a 
spirit of revenge” in Levi but to curiosity. In “The Quiet City,” one of the 
essays in Moments of Reprieve, Primo Levi makes it clear that his curiosity 
about Pannwitz was not an isolated experience: “It might be surprising that 
in the Camps one of the most frequent states of mind was curiosity. And yet, 
besides being frightened, humiliated and desperate, we were curious: hun-
gry for bread and also to understand” (99). Levi’s curiosity about Pannwitz 
infects the reader so completely that as we follow Levi’s account of the meet-
ing between his younger self and the German, we almost forget “Häftling-
Levi.” If our human sympathies are all with the victim, it is the perpetrator 
who inspires and then monopolizes our curiosity. Indeed, to a very large 
extent “understanding the Holocaust” has to be a matter of attempting to 
understand the perpetrators: the sufferings of victims demand our respect 
and our witness, but they cannot explain the human actions that have pro-
duced these sufferings.
 Some sense of the complex narrative orchestration of the passage is nec-
essary to engage with other details in it. “I, Häftling 174517, stand in his 
office, which is a real office, shining, clean and ordered.” What is the force of 
that “which is a real office”? What else could it be? Does not this communi-
cate to us that sense of the surrealistic in the meeting? The office is “real” in 
the sense that it is indistinguishable from offices in the normal world outside 
(and after) Auschwitz, offices in which bosses do not send their employees to 
the gas chamber. For Levi, too, its “real-ness” strikes him so forcibly doubt-
less because of its contrast to the horror he has become used to in the camp. 
For the reader, though, this mixture of the familiar and the quotidian with 
the unfamiliar and the obscene helps to link the hideous reality of the Holo-
caust with our day-to-day experiences, just as the familiar furniture of our 
waking life can exist within our worst nightmares. The hardest challenge to 
us in this passage is to accept that some of the furniture of Auschwitz was and 
is just like the furniture of our own familiar world, that Auschwitz was both 
a world apart and our world.
 Levi’s alternation between his two historically distinct selves is not with-
out its risks. There is a danger in thus narrating the experiences of the suf-
fering victim from the perspective of the survivor. In another of Charlotte 
Delbo’s short sequences—“Morning”—we can, I think, see an alternative way 
of negotiating this danger.
I am standing amid my comrades and I think to myself that if I ever 
return and will want to explain the inexplicable, I shall say: “I was saying 
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to myself: you must stay standing through roll call. You must get through 
one more day. It is because you got through today that you will return one 
day, if you ever return.” This is not so. Actually I did not say anything to 
myself. I thought of nothing. The will to resist was doubtlessly buried in 
some deep, hidden spring which is now broken, I will never know. And if 
the women who died had required those who returned to account for what 
had taken place, they would be unable to do so. I thought of nothing. I felt 
nothing. I was a skeleton of cold, with cold blowing through all the crevices 
in between a skeleton’s ribs. (64)
In technical terms, what we see here is a hypothetical alternative response 
to her suffering, presented so that it is first read not as hypothetical but as 
actual. The suffering Delbo is initially characterized as heroic, as one capable 
of hanging on to hope, not stripped of the capacity to desire survival, not 
too reduced to have lost the will to resist. Why does Delbo dangle this opti-
mistic—almost sentimental—fiction in front of the reader, only to snatch 
it away? First, I think, to underscore the danger that her present self will 
rewrite the past and will inject qualities into her camp-self that were not 
there; and, second, in order to remind us of the stereotypes and clichés that 
we must strip away if we are to come close to the unheroic reality of what the 
Nazis reduced their victims to. However, these two suggestions may make 
the backtracking in the sequence more considered, more artful, than it is 
or was. It is tempting to read the first quoted sentence as having been writ-
ten in good faith, with the qualification that follows it the result of brutally 
honest self-revision on Delbo’s part. And having that possibility in mind 
serves to alert the reader to the enormous difficulty faced by the survivor 
who attempts after the event to narrate his or her experience as a victim.
 Levi uses a different method to prevent the reader from confusing his 
victim-self, whose head is like an empty pumpkin containing a few seeds, 
with his survivor-self, a self that is relaxed, and curious about Pannwitz in 
ways that had to be unavailable to him at the time. If I suggested earlier that 
Pannwitz’s inability to see Levi as a human being is symmetrically matched 
by the narrating-Levi’s inability to grant full humanity to Pannwitz, there 
is also a crucial element of asymetricality. Had Pannwitz sent Levi to the 
gas chamber, it would doubtless have been, as Tolstoy remarks of Davoust 
prior to his meeting Pierre’s eyes, “without a thought.” Levi, however, a free 
man back in Italy and a witness to the destruction of all that Pannwitz stood 
and worked for, does not dismiss him from his thought. “From that day I 
have thought about Doktor Pannwitz many times and in many ways.” Levi 
wants to understand Pannwitz in the way that Tolstoy understands Pierre 
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and Davoust—but he cannot. This seeking for such knowledge, however, 
this curiosity about another person confirms Levi’s humanity. In marked 
contrast, Pannwitz’s total lack of interest in anything about Levi beyond his 
skills as a chemist puts his own incomplete humanity on display. Not only 
does Levi think about Pannwitz, but he also requires us to think about him 
too. And by contrasting his own curiosity about Pannwitz with Pannwitz’s 
total lack of interest in himself, Levi manages to exhibit in his narrative what 
it is that makes him fully human and Pannwitz less than this. Levi’s account, 
in other words, contains instructions to us on how to avoid becoming like 
Pannwitz. Among them: be curious about others. Indeed, to return briefly to 
my opening quotation from Herman Sachnowitz’s memoir, we can say that 
Sachnowitz’s curiosity about Pavlowsky as they interact depicts their shared 
humanity as something that is generated and sustained through a process of 
active mutual exploration.
 In his memoir Hanged at Auschwitz, French Jew Sim Kessel tells a story 
that contains a number of quite extraordinary events. At the same time, the 
very fact that Kessel survived only by virtue of such extraordinary strokes 
of chance and luck demonstrates the point that survivor memoirs can by 
their very nature be misleadingly unrepresentative. Kessel was twice rescued 
from an apparently inevitable death because his past as a professional boxer 
enabled him to appeal to sympathy from two of his captors who had also 
been boxers. The first time he is minutes away from death, standing naked in 
a group of prisoners destined for the gas chamber, waiting for more victims 
to make up the numbers so that the gassings are economic. A group of SS 
men ride up on motorcycles, and one of them positions himself near Kessel. 
Looking at his face, Kessel recognizes “the marks of a boxer: broken nose, 
ridges over the eyes, cauliflower ears.”
I simply blurted out in German:
 “Boxer?”
 “Boxer? Ja!”
 He didn’t wait for me to explain, he understood. I too had a broken 
nose. An enormous bond existed between the two of us, despite the poles-
apart difference in our positions. A few feet away, naked scarecrows stared 
at us and forgot for a moment their imminent deaths.
 He questioned me.
 “Where’d you fight?”
 “Pacra, Central, Delbor, Japy, and once at the Vel d’Hiver.”
 Focal points of boxing, universally known. Something like a smile 
flickered briefly over his flattened face, revealing a row of metal-capped 
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teeth. He hesitated for a moment, looked around, and made a quick deci-
sion.
 “Get on!” he bellowed.
 Apparently he was in charge of the S.S. detachment; I suppose he didn’t 
stand to lose a thing. Anyway, the miracle had happened. (117–18)
Kessel gets, naked, on to the motorcycle and is driven to safety. The fantastic 
nature of his personal survival does not end here. Condemned to death at a 
later point in his imprisonment in Auschwitz, he is sentenced to be publically 
hanged. But during the hanging the rope breaks. Because the Nazis cannot 
admit publicly that anything has gone wrong, he is taken away and scheduled 
for execution the next day. But again he has an ex-boxer as a guard, and again 
the man allows him to escape and assume a new identity.
 The passage quoted recounts extraordinary events, but is not the most 
extraordinary aspect of this brief scene Kessel’s report that “[a]n enormous 
bond existed between the two of us”? There is a minor irony, of course, in 
the fact that this bond is founded on a common involvement in that most 
brutal of sports, boxing. This bond is established with hardly any words, 
primarily on the basis of the physical scars left by a career as a boxer, and 
it is acknowledged by the German almost without apparent cerebration by 
(again!) “something like a smile” that flickers “briefly over his flattened face.” 
Kessel is not at all sentimental about this moment. He certainly does not 
present the reader with a Tolstoyan moment of mutually perceived, common 
humanity. He goes on to remind his reader that this was a man who had 
been instrumental in the murder of very large numbers of innocent victims, 
that he doubtless went on to murder thousands more (including those other 
naked victims waiting with Kessel), and that his action in saving Kessel was 
in the nature of a whim, much like a man who decides not to step on a worm. 
What this man did was almost unimaginably evil, and this one act of cynical 
and possibly sentimental mercy is but a single drop in an ocean of wicked-
ness. If the other victims waiting with Kessel could write their accounts, they 
would not be like the account we are able to read. It is only some time later 
in his account when Kessel reminds us of these victims that we realize that 
his narrative has carried us along, celebrating his escape and forgetting the 
murders.
 Having said all this, the account still contains, from the perspective of 
the Nazi perpetrators, an element of Tolstoyan subversiveness. It suggests 
that some sort of recognition of, if not a shared humanity then a shared 
something, could break out in the most unlikely situations. The almost-smile 
betokens again something approaching a recognition of the victim’s human-
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ity. For once it is not followed by a renewed attempt to destroy what it has 
unwillingly witnessed.
2. Victim and Collaborator-Victim
Tadeusz Borowski’s chilling short story “This Way for the Gas, Ladies and 
Gentlemen” was first published in Polish in 1948. Although Borowski’s sto-
ries, collected in English in a book with the same title, are presented as fic-
tion, they build on Borowski’s experiences as a non-Jewish political prisoner 
in Auschwitz, where he had a number of relatively (but only relatively) privi-
leged jobs. Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi has commented that in some cases “the 
testimonial imperative so controls the artistic impulse that the boundary 
between the memoir literature and the fiction (the histoire as history and as 
story) seems hardly distinguishable” (23). Borowski’s stories surely represent 
one such case. Like Primo Levi, Borowski took his own life (ironically by 
gassing himself) after the war, in 1951. He was not yet thirty. In his intro-
duction to This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen, Jan Kott comments, 
“The most terrifying thing in Borowski’s stories is the icy detachment of 
the author” (24). Reading the stories, one can see what Kott means, but his 
characterization strikes me as not quite right, and I will try to explain why.
 The following sequence comes from the title story in This Way for the 
Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen. The story is set at the point of disembarkment 
for victims arriving at Auschwitz by train. The first-person narrator of the 
story—like Borowski himself—has a job sorting and storing the possessions 
stripped from the new arrivals, who are to be sent either straight to the gas 
chamber or on to slave labor, starvation, and death by maltreatment or gas-
sing. From the mass of those arriving the narrator’s attention is suddenly 
directed to a single individual.
She descends lightly from the train, hops on to the gravel, looks around 
inquiringly, as if somewhat surprised. Her soft, blonde hair has fallen on 
her shoulders in a torrent, she throws it back impatiently. With a natural 
gesture she runs her hands down her blouse, casually straightens her skirt. 
She stands like this for an instant, gazing at the crowd, then turns and 
with a gliding look examines our faces, as though searching for someone. 
Unknowingly, I continue to stare at her, until our eyes meet.
 “Listen, tell me, where are they taking us?”
 I look at her without saying a word. Here, standing before me, is a girl, 
a girl with enchanting blonde hair, with beautiful breasts, wearing a little 
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cotton blouse, a girl with a wise, mature look in her eyes. Here she stands, 
gazing straight into my face, waiting. And over there is the gas chamber: 
communal death, disgusting and ugly. And over in the other direction 
is the concentration camp: the shaved head, the heavy Soviet trousers in 
sweltering heat, the sickening, stale odour of dirty, damp female bodies, the 
animal hunger, the inhuman labour, and later the same gas chamber, only 
an even more hideous, more terrible death . . .
 Why did she bring it? I think to myself, noticing a lovely gold watch on 
her delicate wrist. They’ll take it away from her anyway.
 “Listen, tell me,” she repeats.
 I remain silent. Her lips tighten.
 “I know,” she says with a shade of proud contempt in her voice, tossing 
her head. She walks off resolutely in the direction of the trucks. Someone 
tries to stop her; she boldly pushes him aside and runs up the steps. In the 
distance I can only catch a glimpse of her blonde hair flying in the breeze. 
(44, ellipsis in original)
As with the passage describing Primo Levi’s encounter with Doktor Pan-
nwitz, this extract is disturbing in ways that are not easy to isolate.
 Borowski understands that to portray the obscenity of murder, we must 
be confronted with what death deletes—life in all its fullness. The passage 
stuns us not by depicting a person being tormented and killed, but simply by 
depicting a person—a person who will be killed. As Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi 
puts it, “Borowski’s characters are human, and even as they collaborate, even 
as they adopt an attitude of indifference or even cynicism in order to get 
through the day’s work, they cannot banish the images of human suffering 
that lodge in their memory” (56). And if Pannwitz’s inability to perceive 
Levi’s humanity makes him less than human, Borowski’s narrator’s shamed 
perception of the young woman’s life and humanity reminds him and us of 
his and of his author’s membership of the human race. The portrayal of the 
fully human woman forces us to confront what will be or has been destroyed 
by her murder. She is presented as physically attractive, but more impor-
tant she is presented as fully alive. She is light on her feet, active, enquiring, 
impatient, natural—and she asserts her quality as a living human being by—
again—her curiosity, by seeking contact with other living human beings.
 Moreover, as her “gliding look” examines “our faces,” the reader is forced 
into the narrator’s subject-position and required to experience as his or 
her own a refusal to answer her question honestly and fully. The passage 
prompts the question: in the narrator’s position, in Auschwitz, what would 
we have done? Would we have been heroic enough to provide the answer 
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that might have threatened our own vulnerable security in a “safe” job? In 
this sense the woman’s gaze challenges both the narrator and the reader. 
She confronts us as a human being and requires us to respond in like man-
ner. Who among us can be sure that, unlike Borowski’s narrator, we would 
have had the courage to grant the woman a full, open, and honest human 
response?
 Like Tolstoy and Levi, Borowski depicts an encounter that focuses on 
direct eye-to-eye contact between two individuals. And in the life, indepen-
dence, and bravery of the young woman the narrator perceives the loss of 
significant parts of his own humanity. She meets him openly and honestly, 
asks him a question as an equal, and is denied an honest and open answer. 
His failure to rise to her challenge to be a human being provokes her “shade 
of proud contempt” for his suppressed humanity, and it stands as a marker 
for a personhood that the Nazis, as Anne Michaels points out, both denied 
in and attempted to remove from their victims. As we read the passage, her 
contempt becomes first the narrator’s self-contempt and then, through our 
identification with the narrator, ours too. In the face of the narrator’s inaction 
and tacit compliance, she “walks off resolutely” and “boldly” pushes aside 
someone who tries to stop her.
 In a passage discussing his curiosity about “the lords of evil,” Primo Levi 
suggests that “the essential inadequacy of documentary evidence” to satisfy 
this curiosity means that the depths of a human being are more likely to be 
given to us by the poet or dramatist than by the historian or psychologist 
(Moments of Reprieve 99–100). Not all commentators have felt that imagina-
tive literature can extend our understanding of the Holocaust. In an essay 
titled “Aharon Appelfeld and the Problem of Holocaust Fiction,” for example, 
Bernard Harrison cites Berel Lang’s argument that “certain features essential 
to imaginative fiction make it incapable of dealing effectively with the his-
torical realities of the Holocaust.”
Lang notes, to begin with, that imaginative fiction lives by the represen-
tation and analysis of individual consciousness in all its diversity. It is 
equally essential to our understanding of the Holocaust, Lang suggests, 
to see that, by its nature, it denied the diversity of consciousness. That 
denial is, for Lang, a function of the dispersal of causality. The fate which 
overtook European Jewry was neither the consequence of, nor capable of 
being averted by, any act or volition on the part of its victims; equally, it 
was in the nature of Nazism that it worked to submerge the individual wills 
and personalities of its adherents and tools in the workings of a vast and 
impersonal bureaucracy of death. So far, then, as Holocaust fiction follows 
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the general rule of all fiction in representing to its readers characters whose 
choices determine events, it falsifies its subject matter. (80)
If we direct such criticisms back toward the passage from Borowski’s story, 
how much force do they have?
 The passage does not, it is true, depict an individual able to determine 
her own destiny. But it does show us an individual attempting so to do. That 
the narrator knows, and we know, that this attempt must fail does not render 
this depiction false or misleading. Moreover, while the Nazi project of geno-
cide attempted to deny “the diversity of consciousness” in its chosen victims, 
this is not to say that it always succeeded. Who are we to deny the right of 
each individual victim to his or her most personal and private experiences 
in the face of oppression and murder? We know, it is true, that the Nazis did 
succeed in denying most of the objects of their murderous plan the ability to 
make any choice that could determine events, but it would be insulting to the 
dead to presume to know what choices they attempted or what unique indi-
vidual sufferings they went through and reflected upon. In the above-quoted 
passage from Borowski, there is no optimistic attempt to portray the young 
woman as one who may fall through the Nazi net. There is no SS man on a 
motorcycle there to save her, and the narrator spells out to us what awaits 
her—what awaited her nonfictional fellows. Moreover, even in the presenta-
tion of the narrator himself we do not quite witness a man who has no will 
apart from that of obeying the orders of his oppressors. The very fact of his 
shame, of his ability to register the young woman’s contempt, reveals that, in 
contrast to Doktor Pannwitz, he has not been totally stripped of his person-
hood. This surely is something quite different from “icy detachment.”
3. Survivors and Perpetrators
Eva Schloss’s account of her arrest, deportation, and incarceration in Ausch-
witz ends with an account of a meeting, after liberation, with a man in the 
striped uniform of a prisoner who tells her and her fellows that he is an 
escaped prisoner. They are suspicious of him but feed him and send him in 
the direction of the Russian forces. The next day they witness him with his 
hands tied behind his back, being roughly treated by his Russian captors. 
When they protest this treatment, the exasperated Russians reveal his SS tat-
too. “Oddly enough we weren’t pleased in any way, we were extremely upset. 
We should have been immune to any kind of suffering but we were not. It 
sickened us to imagine what was going to happen to him. It was a strange 
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emotional reaction” (157). The reaction is indeed “strange”—to us as much 
as to the author. Most important: our disquiet is unstable and volatile; it 
does not settle down into an ordered meaning, but remains to disturb us as 
we search for a reconciliation between these forces that we cannot find. It is 
again a reaction that evokes curiosity and requires discussion.
 At the risk of a banal pointing out of the obvious, what comes across so 
strongly in this particular encounter is the fact that the liberated prisoners, 
who have had their humanity denied and assaulted in the most extreme 
form, find it immediately at hand when faced by the need of another human 
being—even if in this case the human being in question must be ranked 
among the least deserving of humane consideration. Does this account 
allow us to accord Tolstoy’s optimistic belief in the possibility of establish-
ing human contact between the empowered and the disempowered some 
credence? What about the readers of this account, we who have experi-
enced none of the horrors or cruelties of the Holocaust? Can we share any of 
Schloss’s sympathy for this man? Does the narrative manipulate the reader 
into a morally uncomfortable or even untenable position?
 To feel that the account does Schloss and her fellow victims immense 
credit does not entail that the SS man is in any way worthy of their sympathy 
or fellow-feeling. Even so, it offers us no easy solutions: it forces the reader 
to consider that a human sympathy for the victim cannot necessarily be 
switched off even when the victim was, a few days earlier, one of the perpe-
trators. We may feel—as I do—that those who have not been victims have no 
right even to consider the possibility of pity for those who were perpetrators. 
But Schloss’s account reminds us that to be human is to be unable to switch 
our pity on and off at the behest of our moral judgments. The passage makes 
us uncomfortable, but it does not manipulate us. In “The Trip,” another short 
sequence in her memoir, Charlotte Delbo provides an account of a journey 
from Birkenau to Ravensbrück during which some fellow passengers were SS 
soldiers. Like Primo Levi, she is again curious about her oppressors.
Traveling along the tracks next to ours, a convoy of tanks and cannons 
passed us, eastward-bound. Our SS rise and explain, “Panzer divisions. On 
their way to Russia.”
 I was dying to approach them, start a conversation, find out, as little 
as it was bound to be, what’s an SS. Why and how does one become an SS? 
The others go along with that. I go. They turn out to be Slovenes, forcibly 
enrolled in the SS. They say they know nothing about Auschwitz—all those 
smokestacks . . . Otherwise . . . They offer us cigarettes, light them for us. 
When we stop they go to the railway canteen, return with ersatz coffee 
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distributed by Red Cross nurses to the soldiers. We had never seen a look 
of pity or a human expression in the eyes of an SS. Do they strip off the 
assassin on departing from Auschwitz? (179, ellipses in original)
Delbo ends “The Trip” by reproducing without comment a newspaper 
account of the American William L. Calley’s “deep distress” on learning that 
a little Vietnamese girl for whom he had cared had escaped. Calley, at that 
time, was awaiting trial for having killed 109 Vietnamese civilians. The news-
paper account sets Delbo’s questions in a certain relief, but it does not answer 
them.
 Herman Kahan’s memoir The Fire and the Light contains a comparable 
anecdote. Kahan was brought up in a small Orthodox Jewish community in 
Romania and was a childhood friend of Elie Wiesel. When American troops 
liberated the Ebensee camp to which Kahan had been forced-marched from 
Auschwitz, he was naked in a truck loaded with bodies. Only because an 
American soldier saw some faint movement was he taken for treatment and 
saved. Having recuperated, he and three other survivors encounter a very 
frightened German soldier whom they drag into a house, strip, and again 
discover an SS tattoo. “With his hands folded, he pleaded and cried, ‘Mensch, 
ich habe eine Frau und Kinder.’” Kahan then takes command of the situation 
and allows the man to escape.
At first I did not want my friends to know that I had allowed an SS thug 
to escape. When they realized that this was the case, they were enraged. 
For a while it looked as though they would kill me instead of the German. 
They hit me and roughed me up, screaming at the top of their lungs that I 
was a traitor and a damned coward. In the midst of it all, I kept thinking, 
“Did I have the right to do this? He was one of the executioners.” I tried 
to defend myself but they would have none of my explanations. I agreed 
with them: an SS guard deserved death. They finally stopped, but I do not 
know if they ever forgave me. For some reason, my impulsive act became 
a turning point in my life. The obsessive thoughts, “Will I ever be a human 
being again? Will I ever be rid of my hatred?” began to lose their urgency. 
My depression began to ease, if only slightly, for the first time.
 At least I was not party to a murder. The world had had enough mur-
ders. (128–29)
If as readers we approve of Kahan’s actions and of his much later assessment 
of them, how do we stand with regard to those survivors who did capture 
and kill SS guards? (Tadeusz Borowski’s chilling three-page story “Silence” 
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depicts such an event, contrasting the naïve innocence of the “young Ameri-
can officer” who appeals to the liberated prisoners not to take the law into 
their own hands but to deliver SS men to formal justice, with the determina-
tion of the men who, once the officer has left them, pull out their gagged and 
concealed prisoner and trample him to death.) How, we cannot help asking, 
could the SS man appeal to the four Jews as “Mensch” when the Nazis for 
decades had been insisting that they were not human, not “Mensch” at all? 
Must one get rid of hatred to regain a humanity that has been stolen from 
one? Are Kahan’s companions right to be outraged by his action? When the 
SS man addresses Kahan and his companions as “Mensch,” he admits that he 
knows and has always known that the Nazi view of the Jews is a lie. There is, 
too, a clear sense in Kahan’s account that his desire to be rid of his hatred is 
not one that focuses just on the interests of the SS man, but one that is also 
concerned with the re-establishment of his own full humanity.
4. Conclusion
The central conceit in Wilfred Owen’s poem “Strange Meeting,” written in 
the final year of the Great War, is that of a meeting in Hell between a sol-
dier and the man he killed the day before. The killed man’s account, and his 
smile, assert and confirm their shared humanity, a commonality that renders 
absurd their murderous confrontation as members of opposing armies. In 
the passage I quote from Tolstoy, it is the man holding the power of life and 
death who perceives the humanity of his potential victim and thus allows 
both individuals to confront their shared humanity. Accounts of the Holo-
caust written by perpetrators have not, so far as I know, bequeathed us any 
comparable descriptions by the murderers of moments when, either during 
or after their genocidal acts, they recognized the humanity of the people they 
killed. In general, the perpetrators remain as much an enigma to us as they 
did to Primo Levi, who thought about Doktor Pannwitz “many times and in 
many ways” but who still wished to meet him again to satisfy his curiosity 
about him. Such a meeting was not to take place: as Levi reports in a list of 
answers to questions asked by his readers, when the Red Army was about 
to reach the Buna factory, Pannwitz “conducted himself like a bully and a 
coward,” “ordered his civilian collaborators to resist to the bitter end, forbade 
them to climb aboard the train leaving for the zones behind the Front, but 
jumped on himself at the last moment.” His escape won him little time: as 
Levi reports, he died in 1946 of a brain tumor (If This Is a Man 394). But had 
such a strange meeting ever taken place, it is surely unlikely that Levi’s curi-
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osity would have been satisfied. The curiosity remains, however, as a token 
of that humanity which, against enormous odds, he retained.
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Speaking by Proxy
Can the story of the victims who perished in the Holocaust be adequately 
told? Clearly, those who perished cannot tell their own stories. But accord-
ing to Primo Levi, the question has a particular significance in connection 
with the Muselmänner, those victims of the Holocaust who were destroyed 
as human beings before they died biologically. “Even if they had paper and 
pen, the submerged would not have testified because their death had begun 
before that of their body. Weeks and months before being snuffed out, they 
had already lost the ability to observe, to remember, compare and express 
themselves” (The Drowned and the Saved 64). The story of the way they 
ended their lives could only be told by others: “We who were favoured by 
fate tried, with more or less wisdom, to recount not only our fate, but also 
that of the others, the submerged; but this was a discourse on ‘behalf of 
third parties,’ the story of things seen from close by, not experienced per-
sonally” (64); the victims speak “by proxy” (64).
Parameters of evaluation and the Case of 
Kathe, Always Lived in Norway
Responding to this situation, some work on the Holocaust has generated 
a hierarchy of representations and parameters of evaluation according to 
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which the privileged account is the one closest to the story we cannot have: 
that of the victim speaking about his or her experience at the time and in 
the very place of the extermination. In Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi’s words: “The 
voices that have been heard are measured, then, by degrees of access, by the 
privileged status of the witness or the act of witnessing and by relative claims 
to authenticity and artistic licence” (53). Thus, accounts that are nearer to the 
gas chamber, as measured along the three main variables of time, place, and 
person, are deemed to be more authoritative than those produced further 
away from it. In turn, this principle of authority by proximity privileges doc-
umentary forms of representation over imaginative ones, a point that seems 
to hit fictional accounts particularly hard: whatever authority they have will 
not be grasped by applying this principle.
 Scholars such as Ezrahi and Geoffrey Hartman, however, have persua-
sively argued against this principle by rejecting its premise that there is a 
single standard against which to judge efforts to engage with the experience 
of the Holocaust.1 Hartman succinctly expresses the alternative view, which 
I take as my point of departure. “To ‘transmit the dreadful experience’ [as 
Aharon Appelfeld puts it]2 we need all our memory institutions: history writ-
ing as well as testimony, testimony as well as art” (155).
 In this chapter I will analyze a biography of a Holocaust victim that might 
throw light on the importance of not using testimony by victims or witnesses 
as the measuring rod for all Holocaust narratives. This biography, Espen 
Søbye’s Kathe, Always Lived in Norway, is by no means unique in taking an 
unknown victim of the Holocaust as its biographee,3 but thus far it is virtu-
ally unknown to the wider international readership of Holocaust literature. 
Eight years after its publication in Norwegian in 2003, however, it has already 
established itself as a seminal work on the Norwegian participation in the 
Holocaust. A source-based biography written approximately sixty years 
after the deportation and death of Kathe Lasnik by a non-Jewish Norwegian 
author with no personal connections to the Holocaust, Kathe, Always Lived 
in Norway can make no claims to the nearness to the events similar to that 
of testimonies. In her criticism of the principle of authority by proximity, 
Ezrahi emphasizes the way in which distance invites imaginative (and espe-
cially fictional) modes of telling into the exploration of the significance of the 
Holocaust (60–64). However, Søbye’s biography quite consciously does not 
venture into imaginative modes of writing, and I shall argue that his decision 
to not fill in the many gaps in Kathe Lasnik’s story is crucial to the ethical 
and aesthetic power of his narrative.4 Before I turn to analyze the biography, 
I need to place it in the broader context of thought on the Holocaust and 
memory.
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War against memory
In The Drowned and the Saved, Primo Levi presents the difficulties of 
remembering the Holocaust in terms that may help us get a better grasp of 
what is at stake in our effort to do just that. He suggests that “the entire his-
tory of the brief ‘millennial Reich’ can be reread as a war against memory, an 
Orwellian falsification of memory, falsification of reality, negation of reality” 
(18). As I understand Levi, the term “war against memory” points partly to 
the malicious intention of the Nazi regime to obliterate from human memory 
what happened in the camps, expressed most directly in the destruction of 
evidence that could prove what had happened: crematoria that were used to 
burn dead bodies were also used to burn the files and lists that could prove 
the facts. Himmler, in a famous statement, explicitly stated that the Holo-
caust was “a page of glory in our history which has never been written and 
which will never be written” (quoted in Stark 192).
 By juxtaposing the term “war against memory” with the term “negation 
of reality,” Levi highlights another aspect of the Holocaust: the very nature 
of the event itself seems to make it resistant to being remembered. The event 
seems to weaken the capacity of most parties involved to relate to this par-
ticular part of the past, and this weakness underlies a more general logic of 
oblivion that has impeded later attempts to come to terms with it. The vari-
ous aspects of this logic of oblivion are well known to anyone familiar with 
the huge literature on the Holocaust, but let me just give a reminder of a few 
of them. First, there is the unwillingness of the perpetrators to face up to their 
participation in the atrocities: forgetting that it happened may seem the only 
way to live with the past. Second, there is the “traumatic impact” (Stark 197) 
of the Holocaust, the survivors finding it hard to articulate in words what 
happened without being crushed by those very words, and in some cases 
finding it just as hard to trust their own memories. “Everything that hap-
pened was so gigantic, so inconceivable, that the witness even seemed like a 
fabricator to himself ” (Appelfeld, quoted in Hartman 124). And clearly the 
survivors who did break the silence were not helped by a frequent attitude of 
their audiences: sheer lack of interest. This attitude was actually anticipated 
in the prisoners’ collective dreams that Levi famously recounts and calls “the 
ever-repeated scene of the unlistened-to story” (If This Is a Man 66). This 
lack of interest is perhaps best understood as another effect of the enormity 
of the Holocaust. Both the numbers killed and the harm done to each one as 
an individual contribute to weaken our capacity to face up to and stand by 
the facts, even for those of us who have no direct involvement in the events.
 One way of taking Levi’s remark about the war on memory in The Drowned 
and the Saved is that he invites us to consider efforts to remember what hap-
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pened in the concentration camps as acts, more specifically as acts of resis-
tance or counter-acts in this war against memory, and consequently as ways 
of protecting both reality and our sense of it. However, this emphasis on pro-
tecting (our sense of) reality should not be taken to imply that the sole function 
of such counter-acts is to make available information about the past. Memory 
and memory institutions are not merely repositories of information; if they 
were, art would count as a memory institution only insofar as it provided 
facts, which it may or may not do, but providing facts is seldom all art does. 
More generally, different acts of remembering may differ in function, one sin-
gle act may have more than one function, and in many cases the function(s) 
of a particular act of remembering cannot be determined independently of 
its context of utterance and its concern(s). The proximity to or distance from 
the Holocaust—in terms of time, space, and person—is one aspect of its con-
text, and as such it may influence deeply both the form and the purpose of the 
act of remembering in question, but, again, it is only one aspect.
 Seeing Holocaust narratives as acts of resistance in the war against 
memory helpfully foregrounds the distinction between the conditions of 
remembering the victims of the Holocaust and the significance of doing so. 
The obstacles to remembering the Holocaust may increase as the distance 
between the act of remembering and the remembered event increases. How-
ever, this distance does not necessarily diminish the significance—especially 
the ethical significance—of the act of remembrance. Quite the contrary: one 
may hold that those of us who have no personal memories of the Holocaust 
have a duty to remember its victims that one hesitates to ascribe to survivors. 
(What expressions this duty should take will certainly vary with where we 
stand in relation to the victims.)
 If this line of reasoning holds, parameters of evaluation based solely on 
the principle of authority by proximity turn out to be counterproductive, to 
put it mildly. Rather than ranking the various accounts in relation to their 
nearness to the source, we should ask what significance, ethical or otherwise, 
we may attribute to each one of the acts of remembering that we encounter. 
I turn now to consider the ethical and aesthetic significance of Søbye’s biog-
raphy of Kathe Lasnik.
A biography emerging from Statistics
The most surprising fact about Kathe, Always Lived in Norway is perhaps that 
it came to be written at all, that this ordinary girl has been subject to a biog-
raphy sixty years after she, on November 26, 1942, was brought to the har-
bor in Oslo and taken onboard MS Donau together with 531 other Jews on 
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a journey that ended in Auschwitz-Birkenau on December 1 that year. Who 
is the author, and how did this girl who died at fifteen come to his notice?
 Espen Søbye is a philosopher by training who for many years worked 
in Statistics Norway, the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics. In the late 
1990s, while still employed by Statistics Norway, he was approached by a col-
league on behalf of a historian at Bronx University, William Seltzer. Seltzer 
was doing research into what role statistics had played when Jews were identi-
fied, located, and arrested during World War II, and he wanted Søbye to com-
ment upon the portion of his paper dealing with Norway. Søbye discovered 
that the Norwegian historiography of the war had little to offer on this issue: 
it had hardly been dealt with at all, and he decided to do the research himself.
 Going through the bundle of forms that all the Norwegian Jews were 
asked to fill out in 1942, “Questionnaire for Jews in Norway,” 1,419 forms 
altogether, one particular form catches his attention, that of a fifteen-year-
old girl, Kathe Rita Lasnik. On the question “How long have you lived in 
Norway?” she had responded, in her young girl’s handwriting: “Always lived 
in Norway.” Looking for more information about her long after his research 
project was finished, Søbye finds her name on a commemoration relief at her 
school, Fagerborg, a relief dedicated to those who “gave their life for Norway 
during the war 1940–1945.”5 Her name is also on the memorial of the alto-
gether 620 Jewish Holocaust victims from the Oslo area in the Jewish cem-
etery at Helsfyr. Finally, he reads a short notice about her in the Norwegian 
state’s four-volume work, Our Fallen, which officially commemorates the 
Norwegian war victims. He finds few other traces of her.
 Søbye decides to ask to see her file in the National Archive in which con-
fiscated assets of the deported Jews were kept. The file, however, turns out 
to be empty. Nothing whatsoever is kept in the box: not a small collection of 
books, no toys, no birth certificate, nothing at all. Reflecting on the sadness 
of a person’s being remembered only for the way she died (“I thought it was 
terrible that she was remembered only as a victim” [6]), Søbye decides to find 
out everything possible about Kathe Lasnik and to tell her story. The narra-
tive Kathe, Always Lived in Norway is the outcome of this decision. Regarded 
as a counter-act in the war against memory, it is a narrative deeply marked 
by its point of departure: the author’s concern with statistics (picking Kathe 
out from a vast number of victims of the Holocaust) and the lack of readily 
available information about her.
interacting Story Lines
To see how this point of departure matters to the narrative regarded as a 
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counter-act in the war against memory, we need a more detailed picture 
of its structure. There are three significant story lines in this narrative, the 
interaction of which is crucial to its overall effect. The core of the narrative 
is certainly the account of the short life and abrupt death of Kathe Lasnik 
herself, lodged in quite a bit of family history and a general account of the 
situation of the Jews in Oslo in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
This story line, which for convenience I will call the Kathe Lasnik Line, also 
recounts the growth in anti-Semitism in Norway during the 1930s and is 
brought to a close with the deportation and death of the whole family except 
two sisters who managed to escape to Sweden. The closure of this story line 
marks the opening of the second, the one telling how the Jews were treated 
by the Norwegian state during and after the war. This story line, which I will 
call the Norwegian Response Line, starts with an account of the way in which 
the deportation was prepared for and carried out, with a special emphasis on 
the deportation of Kathe Lasnik and her family. The high point of this line 
of action is the treason trial just after the war against Knut Rød, the head of 
the police in Oslo who was in charge of the police operation that led to the 
arrest of the Norwegian Jews.
 The third line of action focuses not on the biographee and the series of 
events that led to her death, but rather on the researcher himself and his 
struggle with his material. It fleshes out the series of events that led to the 
biography’s being written, but above all it revolves around the author’s dif-
ficulties with finding sources on which to base his story. (This line of action 
makes Kathe, Always Lived in Norway similar to the narratives Irene Kacan-
des discusses in her essay in this volume.) This third line, which I will call 
the Research Line, is placed first in the discourse, but in the chronology of 
the fabula it is temporally removed from the two others, starting almost 
sixty years after the closure of the Kathe Lasnik Line and the opening of the 
Norwegian Response Line. What precisely is its function? Is it just another 
expression of the widespread, epistemologically grounded, skeptical attitude 
toward the genre of biography? Is its function to give the self-reflexive author 
room for thoughts about the impossibility of writing the life story of some 
other person while he is doing just that?
undermining the moral high Ground
The Interaction of the Research and the Norwegian Response
Story Lines
As we shall see, the Research Line has several functions, and one of them is 
to interact with the two other story lines so as to establish what I take to be 
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the two main areas of concern in the work. One of these concerns is closely 
linked to the result of Søbye’s historiographic inquiry that led to the biogra-
phy’s being written: Why has the fate of the Jews played such a minor part 
in Norwegian historians’ concern with the war? The answer is suggested 
in the Norwegian Response Line but requires some contextualization to be 
grasped. Because Norway was an occupied country, both the historiography 
and the more popular historical memory of the Norwegian experience in 
World War II have revolved around the conflict between collaborators and 
resisters. Who belongs to what group may not always be obvious, but the 
overall picture has been pretty clear: resistance to the occupants is the moral 
high ground, collaboration with the Nazis a matter of treason.
 By making Knut Rød—the head of the state police force in Oslo and in 
charge of rounding up the Jews in Norway—the central figure of the Nor-
wegian Response Line, Søbye complicates this picture considerably. Rød was 
acquitted in the treason trial after the war because he was presumed to have 
given practical support to the Norwegian Resistance movement. The fact 
that he had played a major role in the deportation of the Jews was described 
as a relatively minor offense compared to the actions he had taken to save 
ethnic Norwegian lives. Men with high positions in the Resistance testified 
in his favor. After examining  the outcome of the treason case, the various 
arguments which Rød, his defense council, and some witnesses brought to 
his defense, Søbye more than suggests that both the court and the Resistance 
revealed an attitude to the Jews that was not as far removed from that which 
motivated the Holocaust as one would like to think. He quotes the court soci-
ologist Knut Sveri to this effect: “In my view it raises the most uncomfortable 
thought that the court did not view Norwegian Jews as equal to other Nor-
wegians” (153).
 Through his analysis of the acquittal of Knut Rød, Søbye brings to light 
a feature of the Norwegian postwar consciousness that is both painful and 
embarrassing. As a nation and as a people, we Norwegians have had our own 
quite specific motivation for letting the fate of the Norwegian Jews during 
World War II fade into oblivion. The Norwegian contribution to the Holo-
caust does not fit the general moral map that has governed our picture of the 
war and our participation in it. This racist undercurrent in the Norwegian 
collective consciousness is brought to the foreground in Søbye’s work by the 
interaction between the story lines. The Norwegian Response Line enables 
the reader to understand the significance of the lack of information about the 
role of statistics in the deportation of the Norwegian Jews that is central to 
the Research Line: we recognize the connection between how the Jews were 
treated during the war, how the people responsible for the deportation were 
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treated immediately after the war, and the popular and historiographic lack 
of attention to the fate of the Norwegian Jews during the postwar decades.
 In other words, Søbye structures the biography so that it brings to the 
surface not only the Norwegian collective indifference to the fate of the Jews 
but also a sense of shame and guilt for this indifference. The self-reflex-
ive Research Line, in which the lack of available information, sources, and 
research is thematized, is crucial to establishing this critical perspective on 
the historiography and collective memory of World War II in Norway. Being 
a non-Jewish Norwegian, the biographer is able to give voice to this moral 
consciousness, and the fact that the biography is written at the distance of 
many decades from the event itself gives urgency to the telling of the story. 
It comes across as a belated but necessary confrontation with Norway’s par-
ticular reasons for ignoring the fate of the Norwegian Jews.
Remembering the Victim as an individual
The Interaction of the Research and the Kathe Lasnik Story Lines
Being vital for the biography’s capacity to reveal the shortcomings of the 
Norwegian war historiography, the narrative’s point of departure in statistics 
plays a crucial role also in relation to another of its aspects: its ambition to 
remember Kathe Lasnik not only as a victim but as a person, as an individual. 
In my view, this is the most important aspect of this particular biography 
read as a counter-act in the war against memory. Consequently, the Kathe 
Lasnik Story Line is the central component of the narrative, though, as we 
shall see, its force depends on its interactions with the Research Line. By sin-
gling out one victim from a statistical database containing information about 
1,419 Norwegian Jews, and ultimately one victim among six million Jews, the 
work confronts a general difficulty in our response to the Holocaust victims. 
On the one hand, the unbelievably high number of victims seems to stand 
in the way of our taking on board the fact that each one of them is an indi-
vidual. Each one of the victims, each name on the commemoration reliefs, 
seems to “drown” among the many. On the other hand, the significance of 
the high numbers cannot be grasped unless we insist on trying to encompass 
in our mind that each one of them is a particular human being. Thus, if we 
wish to hear what the statistics tell us, we have to make an effort to remember 
each one of the victims as the particular human being he or she is.
 I will return to some of the difficulties involved in the idea of remem-
bering the perished victim as this particular human being and the response 
to these difficulties in Kathe, Always Lived in Norway. Let me just note that 
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the importance of grasping the victims as individuals becomes all the more 
pressing in light of the efforts of the Nazis not only to kill them, but to obliter-
ate them as individuals, as human beings who are to be remembered: giving 
them numbers instead of names, robbing them of all personal belongings, 
and otherwise dehumanizing them. The testimony of survivors is so valuable 
in large part because it works against this obliteration of their individuality. 
This point is eloquently expressed by Hartman who in turn quotes Aharon 
Appelfeld: “Testimony [ . . . ] considered not just as a product but also as a 
humanizing and transactive process, [ . . . ] works on the past to rescue [in 
the words of Appelfeld] the ‘individual, with his own face and proper name’ 
from the place of terror where that face and name were taken away” (Hart-
man 155). Hartman has in mind the recorded testimonies at Yale, and he 
emphasizes the importance of the voice in these recordings: “Though speech 
may stumble, get ahead of itself, temporarily lose its way, it is a voice as well 
as memory that is recovered from the moments of silence and powerlessness” 
(155). Being able to speak in one’s own voice is here envisaged as an over-
coming of powerlessness, the testimony embodying the victim’s capacity to 
mark his or her own status as an individual.
 If the testimonies of the survivors are regarded as a sign of the partial 
failure of the Nazi regime to obliterate the victims as human beings who can 
tell their own story, it is important to bear in mind that the perished victims 
remain human beings who are entitled to being recognized and remembered 
as such. As noted before, Primo Levi in The Drowned and the Saved makes 
the point that the Muselmänner had lost their capacity to express themselves 
as individuals before they died, and this may make it harder for us to remem-
ber them as individuals. But their status as human beings to be remembered 
is not affected by their loss of capacity for self-expression, and the difficulties 
of remembering the Holocaust victims as individuals in no way reduce the 
force of the injunction to do so. On the contrary, insofar as these difficulties 
spring from the perpetrators’ intentions to obliterate the victims as individu-
als, the ethical importance of the effort to remember them as such may be 
regarded as all the more pressing.
 Kathe, Always Lived in Norway can be understood as emerging directly 
from this tension between the difficulties of remembering and the injunction 
to do so: Søbye’s urge to explore Kathe Lasnik’s life, to find out everything 
he possibly can about her, is fueled by the empty file. It is as if the subject of 
the biography withdraws from the author at the outset of his project, and the 
ensuing book is his response to this withdrawal.
 As it turns out, the empty file is emblematic of the obstacles the project 
will meet. Søbye discovers that hardly any of his oral sources have much to 
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say. Kathe Lasnik’s school mates, her friends and nearest neighbors are all 
incapable of providing much information about her. “Why was it so difficult 
to remember Kathe Lasnik? The act of remembrance was difficult for her 
friends too. Had the Holocaust also eliminated other memories? It seemed 
that way” (12). It was as if “the weight of what happened” (Hartman 27) had 
worked directly on their capacity to remember. This effect of the event on the 
ability to remember proves an obstacle also in Søbye’s meeting with her two 
sisters, Jenny Bermann and Elise Bassist, whom he traces to the United States 
and to Israel, respectively. They turn out to be rather unhelpful as sources, 
not because of a lack of goodwill, but because talking about her turned out 
to be too painful. “Kathe Lasnik’s two sisters answered my questions, but it 
was difficult to probe. I could feel the pain of once again having to recall the 
memory of the little sister and the time they had spent together. I had not 
been prepared for this—that my efforts to find out as much as possible about 
Kathe Lasnik would be hindered by the pain of remembrance” (10).
The effect of Adding nothing
Thus the hope of being able to obtain the information needed to tell Kathe 
Lasnik’s life story is time and again frustrated by the dynamics of oblivion 
inherent in the Holocaust. What are the consequences of this lack of sources 
on which to build a biography for Søbye’s project? Does he fail in his attempt 
to remember Kathe Lasnik as an individual? Is the value of his attempt 
limited to providing insight into the difficulty of doing so? In my view the 
answer to both questions is no, and the clue to this answer lies in Søbye’s 
attitude to and handling of the meager sources in this narrative. His general 
method is to respond to the difficulties of finding informative sources by 
sticking very closely to those that he finds, to glean as much as he can from 
them, and to stop there. He knows very little, and he adds virtually nothing. 
He does hypothesize a little every now and then on the basis of the sources, 
but in a careful, inconclusive manner, with very little propositional force 
invested in his words.
 One effect of this method is his dependence on official statistics and 
publicly available data. These sources allow him to give a rather compre-
hensive account of the wider social and geographical world in which Kathe 
Lasnik lived. We learn about the wave of immigration that brought Kathe 
Lasnik’s parents to Norway from Vilnius in Russia in 1908, the general living 
conditions of Jews in Oslo, their struggle to make a living, the quite sharp 
anti-Semitism they experienced, the legislative and economic conditions of a 
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metal sheet worker rising from apprenticeship to owning his own shop, and 
the trades Kathe Lasnik’s sisters were involved in. We also get a fairly com-
prehensive picture of the various social milieus Kathe Lasnik experienced 
during her childhood, as she moved into new neighborhoods and attended 
new schools. We get a broad and detailed picture of the world she lived in, we 
get a rich circumstantial backdrop, which in itself is not irrelevant, but what 
we do not get is an account of her various responses to these circumstances. 
We get to know her social world, but important aspects of how she acted in 
this world, how she interacted with it, are for the most part missing.
 There are, however, exceptions to this pattern. A few episodes, the nar-
ration of which depends on oral sources, show her awareness of her “other-
ness.” Most telling, perhaps, is her awkwardness when being placed in the 
same class as Celia Century, a Jewish girl from a more intellectual and self-
conscious family. Celia Century was proud of her Jewishness and able to turn 
her otherness into a strength. Although the two of them were placed in the 
same class so that each would have a classmate with the same background, 
the move turned out to be fundamentally unhelpful for both. Celia Century’s 
self-assertive behavior exposes Kathe Lasnik’s otherness in a way she has 
tried to avoid, whereas Kathe Lasnik’s strategy of making as little point about 
her otherness as possible marks Celia Century out for the other children as 
particularly difficult and unnecessarily self-assertive. In consequence, Celia 
Century turns aggressively against Kathe Lasnik in the schoolyard, but a 
classmate comes to her rescue.
 This is an episode that clearly individualizes Kathe Lasnik, and it brings 
us as readers closer to her as a person by revealing how she in her attitude and 
actions longed for being one among the many, how she sought inclusion and 
integration, and how she feared exclusion. This picture is strengthened by 
other episodes, such as this one: “One winter afternoon in 1939, Kathe Las-
nik took off on skis together with Fride Prytz and Ingrid Prytz, the daughters 
of the priest from the fourth floor. Suddenly Kathe Lasnik stopped and asked: 
‘Do you want to play with me?’ The mere question surprised the sisters. They 
played with everybody, but understood that the girl from the ground floor 
was not used to taking this for granted” (70). There are also episodes without 
the emphasis on her insecurity, simply portraying her as integrated and (we 
assume) happy: “Turid Ekestrand, who lived at no. 6 Schultz’ gate, accompa-
nied Kathe Lasnik home every day from teacher Heyerdahl Larsen’s flat to 
do homework together. Since her father was active in the fight against the 
Wehrmacht, Turid Ekestrand had gone with her mother and siblings to a 
house the family owned on Ringerike. She had brought her schoolbooks with 
her so that she could do her homework, but the house burnt down together 
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with her books. For that reason Turid Ekestrand did not have schoolbooks 
when she arrived back in the city at the beginning of May, but she followed 
Kathe Lasnik home anyway. They sat together in the girls’ room and Dora 
Lasnik came with biscuits and even a sugar trifle cake for the diligent stu-
dents” (76–77). On other occasions, the cultural difference between Kathe 
Lasnik and her fellow pupils has an impact on their relationship: “While the 
rest of the children attended classes on instruction in the Lutheran Protestant 
religion, Kathe Lasnik left class. Karin Swärd always wondered where Kathe 
Lasnik went and how she spent her time while the class had instruction in 
the Lutheran Protestant religion. Did she wait around in the hallway or did 
she walk about in the schoolyard? She had a strong urge to ask [Kathe], 
but could not force herself to do it” (62). On the whole we learn very little 
about how her Jewish customs interfered with the routines of her Protestant 
surroundings. One schoolmate, however, “remembered that Kathe Lasnik 
had eaten fish pudding every Saturday. This was her way of honouring the 
Jewish day of rest” (64). In such passages we see both how valuable the oral 
sources are to give us a sense of Kathe Lasnik as this particular person and 
how insufficient they are to give a fuller picture of her. They give important 
glimpses into her life and responses, but on the whole her schoolmates don’t 
remember enough, or they have not been close enough to her to allow a more 
comprehensive picture of her to emerge. We never feel familiar with her in 
the way that we do with the subjects of conventional biographies.
 The tempting way to tell the story of a person about whom so little is 
known, about whom the sources are so few and so silent or nearly silent, is 
to individualize her by fictionalizing her, by giving her thoughts and feel-
ings, ups and downs, blessings and curses we take to belong to any individual 
human being. Søbye resists the temptation and, in fact, goes in the opposite 
direction. He respects the limitations of his sources: the distance between the 
sources and the biographee is reflected in the narrative. He tells a story with 
many gaps, and he leaves those gaps open; the gaps are part of what we are 
invited to see and acknowledge.
 The result is a biography with a strangely vacuous central character. 
What is the point of this strategy? What is an adequate response on the part 
of the reader? My suggestion is that we take the respect for Kathe Lasnik as 
an individual to be expressed in just that distance that the narrative maps out 
between us, the readers, and her. The implicit claim seems to be that to equip 
her with an inner life that has no basis in the sources, to pretend that we can 
know her intimately, is in fact to fail to respect and acknowledge her as an 
individual, as a person with her own set of thoughts, feelings, and responses. 
Søbye’s respect for Kathe Lasnik as this particular person with a name and a 
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face is expressed in the acknowledgment that she cannot be brought within 
our reach: in an important sense she remains unknowable to us.
Documentation and narration
Søbye’s attitude to his sources also affects the narrative discourse in a way that 
brings out more succinctly what is attempted and achieved in this biography. 
Let me explain what I mean by illuminating another important feature of the 
way in which the different story lines interact. The opening chapter, “The 
Empty File,” is dedicated to the Research Story Line. In the second chapter 
the Kathe Lasnik Story Line takes center stage. But because the sources are 
so meager and lacking in information about her, the telling of her story takes 
place in a constant dialogue with the sources, a strategy that means that the 
Research Line and the Kathe Lasnik Line overlap more or less constantly.
 This feature of the narrative creates an intense interaction between docu-
mentation and narration. This technique comes to a peak in the role that the 
questionnaire for Jews living in Norway plays in the narrative. It is central 
to all three of the lines of action: it is crucial to the Research Line in that it 
sets the whole process of investigating Kathe’s life in motion; crucial to the 
Kathe Lasnik Line in the sense that the filling in of the form was part of the 
procedure that eventually led to her deportation and death; and crucial to 
the Norwegian Response Line insofar as it is vital to the rounding up of the 
Norwegian Jews and as it becomes emblematic of the racism the Norwegian 
Jews were subject to.
 The document holds a special place in the work for other reasons as well. 
One is that it contains one of the very few utterances in the book that with 
certainty can be traced back to Kathe Lasnik herself, the phrase “Always lived 
in Norway.” Søbye reflects on why she wrote just this answer. Clearly it was 
redundant; it gave a piece of information that could be inferred from her 
answers to questions already answered. “She must have answered ‘Always 
lived in Norway’ because she thought this might help protect her. ‘Always 
lived in Norway’ was a prayer, ‘I am one of you, you are not going to hurt me, 
are you?’” (5). Indeed, there are other possible interpretations, such as “You 
take me for an outsider—but I belong here,” or something along this line: 
“There is no other place to which I belong, so don’t send me away.” However 
we interpret the utterance, it gets an expressive power we normally do not 
ascribe to documents, because we know these words are hers, and because of 
the contrast between her response and the use to which the information in 
the document was put.
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 Kathe Lasnik’s answer in the questionnaire also features in the title of 
the book. The full title is not a direct quote from the questionnaire, but 
Søbye’s melding of two of her responses. The comma is the only part of 
the phrase that belongs solely to Søbye. This authorial sequencing of her 
words allows us to hear the author’s voice containing within itself the voice 
of Kathe. The title is an example of Bakhtin’s concept of double-voiced dis-
course, one that with reference to Dorrit Cohn’s term “psycho-narration” we 
might call “docu-narration,” a kind of narration in which we characteristi-
cally hear both the mind of the person filling in the form and the narrator’s 
voice.6
 Being double-voiced in this way, and pointing to the story told as much 
as to the document forming the basis of this biography, the title gives us the 
prime example of the author’s attitude to and handling of the sources in this 
narrative: he uses the interaction of the documentation and the narration to 
bring us as close to this person as the sources permit. The reproduction of 
the form itself, showing the crucial sentence “Alltid vært i Norge” [Always 
lived in Norway] in Kathe Lasnik’s own handwriting, strengthens our sense 
of her being this particular person, but it also reinforces our sense that she is 
somehow unknowable to us: perhaps we never get closer to her as a person 
than we do when confronted by this particular document.
 This interaction between documentation and narration carries over so 
as to integrate several of the other paratextual elements directly in the main 
narrative. The notes appear as part of the Research Line of the narrative and 
so do The Epilogue (in which the sources are accounted for) and the rest of 
the documents reproduced in the book.7 Some of these documents fill out 
the picture of the general circumstances of Kathe Lasnik’s life, while many 
of them, most significantly the black-and-white photos of her (alone, one 
of them being on the cover of the book, or together with family, friends, or 
schoolmates) contribute to the reader’s sense of her individuality. Again the 
interaction between the Research Line and the Kathe Lasnik Line colors how 
we see these paratextual elements: we see them both as contributing to the 
picture of the life of the young girl and as sources for the struggling author, 
a way for Søbye to integrate the struggle to tell the story into the telling. But 
Søbye does not make his struggles a focal point of interest: the narrative 
never turns into a mystery story in which the author becomes the detective 
trying to solve the puzzle, nor does it turn into a by-now-familiar, postmod-
ern, self-conscious meditation on the general problems of grasping the elu-
sive “other.” Rather than diverting the reader’s attention from the main story 
about Kathe Lasnik, the perpetual presence of the Research Line is geared 
toward making us all the more aware of the nature of Kathe Lasnik’s fate and 
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to help us acknowledge, as an important feature of this fate, the unbridgeable 
gap between us and her.
The Significance of Remembering kathe Lasnik
It is by handling his sources in this particular way that Søbye shapes his 
resistance to the oblivion that the Holocaust prescribed for Kathe Lasnik. He 
develops an aesthetics and an ethics of remembering the individual in which 
what we cannot know about this person looms almost as large as what we do 
know. Her remaining in an important sense unknown and unknowable to 
us is part of how this biography teaches us to see her and acknowledge her 
existence as an individual. In this way the biography seems to point beyond 
the initial project: to save this one individual victim from the statistics that 
threaten to drown her as an individual. Her remaining largely unknown to us 
by the end of the reading in fact seems to reinforce the connection between 
the biography and the statistical material it emerged from. We are brought to 
reflect on the distinction between two different forms the acknowledgment 
of the perished victim as an individual may take: it may take the form of writ-
ing a narrative that grasps, or seeks to grasp the life story of this particular 
individual, or it may take the form of an acknowledgment that there is such 
a story to be told, whether or not we know it.
 One effect of the author’s respect for the limits of the possibility of know-
ing Kathe is that her biography throws light on our relation to all those whose 
fate she shared, all those who in the statistics remain one among the millions 
of people who perished in the Holocaust. All of them are human beings with 
a history that we mostly do not know. In fact, for the vast majority of victims 
of the Holocaust we have far less to go on than in the case of Kathe Lasnik, 
and less than we have in the case of the victims named on reliefs and memo-
rials: we cannot even identify an individual whose story we do not know. To 
acknowledge the reality of these human beings is the only resistance we can 
muster against the willful obliteration of their memory, and the only way in 
which we can mark the impossibility of obliterating them as individuals.
 We can come at this important ethical point by reflecting further on the 
material that Søbye had to work with. From the sources available to Søbye 
and made available to us, both in the text and in the paratexts, we can make 
the qualified guess that Kathe Lasnik was a completely ordinary person. Not 
only was she too young to have left many marks on the world around her; 
she also comes across as someone who had no ambition to do so. There was 
nothing outstanding about her to that point in her life; she was not particu-
larly talented, beautiful, or striking in any other respect. Most likely she was 
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just a nice, shy girl, neither particularly popular nor strongly disliked. As the 
confrontation with Celia Century shows: she was different, but unable—at 
that age, at least—to turn her difference into an asset. In social contexts in 
which she detected the danger of exposure, she sought invisibility.
 Ironically, in view of the legacy of remarkable young Jewish women in 
the Holocaust literature, Kathe Lasnik almost stands out as the different one. 
She is not Anne Frank. Nor is she Ruth Maier, the young Austrian woman 
who came to Norway as a refugee before the war, and who was deported to 
Auschwitz on MS Donau on November 26, 1942, together with Kathe Lasnik. 
When Maier’s diaries finally were published in 2007,8 revealing an astonish-
ing talent for writing and thinking, she was immediately named “the Norwe-
gian Anne Frank,” and one wonders what would have become of her had she 
been allowed to live.
 Kathe Lasnik does not belong to this group of promising Jewish women 
whose early and brutal death represents a great loss also to the wider culture. 
On the other hand, Søbye’s biography reminds us of something that may not 
stand out so clearly in connection with Anne Frank and Ruth Maier: the 
importance or significance of her being a person is not in any way connected 
with her importance or significance as a person. There is no horrible loss 
connected with Kathe Lasnik’s death over and beyond the loss of her. In other 
words, what ultimately gives the injunction to remember her, this particular 
person, its force is what she shares with all the other victims of the Holo-
caust, and indeed with any one of us. In virtue of Kathe Lasnik’s character 
and Espen Søbye’s shrewd narrative strategy, Kathe, Always Lived in Norway 
combines a craving for respect for the particularity of this one human being 
with a strong conception of the common humanity—the term “common” 
here pointing to both the ordinary and the shared—of which any racism is a 
denial, and of which the anti-Semitism that culminated in the Holocaust is a 
particularly brutal and evil denial.9
notes
 1. In addition to being an obstacle to understanding the significance of the broad 
variety of non-testimonial accounts of the Holocaust, this line of thought leads, as Ezrahi 
(“Questions of Authenticity”) convincingly demonstrates, to absurd conclusions for our 
judgment of testimonies. A poem written in the concentration camp is in principle worth 
more than the poet’s revision of it some time after the war (cf. Ezrahi 54–55). We should 
be able to acknowledge the special significance it may have for us that a certain text was 
written in the camps, under the very special circumstances that prevailed there, without 
turning that proximity to the camps into the only relevant criterion by which we evaluate 
and compare Holocaust representations.
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 2.  Hartman quotes from Appelfeld’s  Beyond Despair: Three Lectures and a Conversa-
tion with Philip Roth, 22 
 3. Other examples of biographies that reconstruct the life of a victim unknown to 
the author are Erick Hackl, Abschied von Sidonie (Farewell Sidonia), and Patrick Modiano, 
Dora Bruder. 
 4. At this point it is markedly different from, for example, Modiano’s Dora Bruder, in 
which the author’s imaginative engagement in what might have happened to his biogra-
phee, and indeed also his partial identification with her, play a significant role.
 5. My translation. A picture of the relief is reproduced in Søbye’s book.
 6. Or perhaps the term “docu-presentation” is more apt, as the sequence occurs in a 
presentational paratext rather than in the narration as such. However, given the tendency 
in this text to let the Research Line of the narrative encompass the paratexts, it may not be 
so far-fetched after all to regard it as part of the narration.
 7. Søbye has in conversation explained that the narrative first was written without 
the Research Line. He thought it was a shame that Kathe Lasnik’s sisters were relegated to 
the footnotes as sources, and the Research Line grew from this wish to let the sisters play 
a part in the narrative itself. As the Research Line developed, it produced a narrative that 
subsumes and transforms those original endnotes.
 8. Jan Erik Vold: Ruth Maiers dagbok: En jødisk flyktning i Norge (The Diary of Ruth 
Maier: A Jewish Fugitive in Norway), 2007.
 9. I am grateful to Rolf Gaasland, James Phelan, and Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan for 
discussions and comments on an earlier version of this essay. I am particularly grateful to 
David Cockburn for detailed comments on an earlier version and for discussions over the 
years on what a human being is.
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Basic premises of this volume are that soon there will be no eyewitnesses 
alive who can testify to the complicated and tragic series of events we group 
under the single words “Holocaust” or “Shoah” and, further, that something 
will be different because all eyewitnesses will be gone. A group of individuals 
who have been concerned about this issue for a long time are the offspring 
of those survivors. While I do not occupy this identity position, I am fasci-
nated by the appearance, starting in approximately the 1990s, of a small but 
noteworthy number of personal texts produced by those who count them-
selves as familially connected to the Shoah. Building on the subtitle from 
one example of such writing, Lisa Appignanesi’s Losing the Dead, I propose 
that we might call these texts “Holocaust family memoir.” The phrase aptly 
describes Appignanesi’s book and several others written by children of sur-
vivors because, as in Webster’s definition of “memoir,” this writing can be 
characterized as “narrative composed from personal experience” (def. 2a) 
and because such books also draw on the personal experiences of family 
members of their authors.
 Holocaust family memoirs may on the surface seem quite different. In 
addition to Appignanesi’s wistful elegy Losing the Dead, my corpus includes 
Art Spiegelman’s self-conscious comix treatment of the Holocaust, Maus, 
panels of which started appearing in 1973 and a “complete” version of which 
was published as a two-volume set in 1991; Anne Karpf ’s biting critique The 
War After; Helen Epstein’s scholarly report Where She Came From; Helen 
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Fremont’s pained detective work After Long Silence; George Gerzon and 
Helen Gerzon Goransson’s plodding chronicle The Hand of Fate; Michael 
Skakun’s gripping adventure story On Burning Ground; Barbara Honig-
mann’s understated mystery Ein Kapitel aus meinem Leben (A Chapter from 
My Life); and Bernice Eisenstein’s clichéd psychological portrait in mixed 
cartoon-prose form I Was a Child of Holocaust Survivors.1 These texts vary 
considerably with regard to their aesthetic value; what they share, however, 
is generational inflection. That is to say, their authors write about the Holo-
caust in relation to its effects on multiple generations of one family; kinship 
in this subculture often brings with it an especially acute sense of obligation 
to one’s progenitors. To put it yet another way, the memoirs in my corpus 
include the story of what happened to family members in the Shoah and the 
story of getting that story.
 That dual structure prompts the specific investigation I want to conduct 
here: how such texts perform their relation to the factual, historical world. For 
it is the search for knowledge about history, if personal history, and commit-
ment to sharing the history known and discovered that drives these endeav-
ors in the first place. A further motivation for investigating these texts is that 
their double focus is often misapprehended; I diagnose it as one source of 
criticism of so-called second-generation texts, of which my memoirs must be 
considered one type.2 Charges of “identity theft” (Franklin) and of claiming 
someone else’s memories as one’s own (Weissman 16–17) can only be made, 
I will argue, when a reader fails to appreciate that anchoring these authors’ 
parents’ stories in “real” history is partially accomplished by foregrounding 
how that history made itself felt in the authors’ own lived experiences. For 
this reason, in addition to propagating the subgenre of “Holocaust family 
memoir,” I will also propose the concept of “autobiography once removed” 
as a useful framework for encountering the texts in my corpus.
 It is perhaps because of silences in my own family about what the pre-
vious generations had suffered in Greece during the Second World War 
that my thoughts while reading Holocaust family memoirs have been won-
drous and admiring, not critical.3 How did those children learn so much 
about what had happened to their parents in the first place? What differ-
ence does knowledge seem to make? How is it connected to writing itself? 
How is knowledge textualized and authenticated? I took a first step toward 
answering these questions by investigating two aspects of these memoirs: 
their paratexts, Gérard Genette’s term for all those elements surrounding 
the text proper, for instance, the book’s covers, its titles and subtitles, generic 
designations, dedications, prefaces and afterwords, blurbs, and so forth;4 and 
the text itself, in its connection to what Dorrit Cohn has proposed we call 
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the “referential level” or “data base,” that is to say, “the more or less reliably 
documented evidence of past events out of which the historian fashions his 
story” (112).5 Offered as memoirs, the texts in my corpus fall under Philippe 
Lejeune’s “autobiographical pact,” by which readers understand writers to be 
asserting the identity of the work’s author, narrator, and protagonist (4–5). 
Lejeune’s theories overlap with Cohn’s when he asserts that both autobiogra-
phy and biography are “referential texts,” which like “scientific or historical 
discourse  .  .  . claim to provide information about a ‘reality’ exterior to the 
text, and so to submit to a test of verification” (22, Lejeune’s emphasis). In 
what he then designates as the “referential pacts” that life stories make with 
their readers—in differentiation to the specific version of text–reader pacts 
in scientific and historical discourse—Lejeune points out that “it is a supple-
mentary proof of honesty to restrict it to the possible (the truth such as it 
appears to me, inasmuch as I can know it, etc., making allowances for lapses 
of memory, errors, involuntary distortions, etc.), and to indicate explicitly 
the field to which this oath applies (the truth about such and such an aspect 
of my life, not committing myself in any way about some other aspect)” (22, 
Lejeune’s emphasis).
 Several preliminary comments might be made about the “data base” and 
the related “referential pacts” of the works in my corpus. First, despite claims 
of some Holocaust deniers, the destruction of European Jewry is one if not 
the most documented series of events in the history of the world. However, 
the record-keeping-obsessed Nazis also put enormous effort into erasing 
their own criminal trail, especially once it was clear that they were not going 
to win the war (see Stark 192). Thus, documenting certain aspects of the 
Holocaust has been notoriously difficult. A second and related point is that 
many Holocaust family memoirs try to trace lives that were preserved pre-
cisely through targeted individuals’ success in hiding or erasing signs of their 
(Jewish) existence. Not only generally chaotic circumstances or perpetrators’ 
desire to save themselves from postwar retribution, then, but also survival 
strategies deployed by the subjects of these texts during the persecution may 
have been responsible for destroying documents that the offspring of the 
victims will later search for in vain. It is this reality about the Holocaust that 
inspired me to borrow Lisa Appignanesi’s phrase for my essay title: “‘when 
facts are scarce’” (224). With “facts” scarce, eyewitness testimony, that is, what 
the parents recount about their lives, plays a much larger role in these texts 
than it might in, say, historical biography. Eyewitness testimony is highly vul-
nerable to introduced information (see, for instance, Loftus 87), and yet it is, 
for many aspects of the Nazi Judeocide, the only “evidence” available. Third, 
the authors of the texts in my corpus certainly cannot be viewed—and usually 
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do not view themselves—as neutral researchers or reporters. Their identities 
both as “individuals who were not there” and as “family members” make it 
particularly likely that the referential pacts they enter into with their readers 
will be highly inflected by stated or implicit caveats like Lejeune’s: “the truth 
such as it appears to me,” “inasmuch as I can know it,” “making allowances 
for lapses of memory, errors, involuntary distortions, etc.” (22). I intend my 
term “autobiography once removed” to signal not only generational distance 
but also, because of that distance, a likelihood of numerous such allowances 
and lapses. With documents so scarce and eyewitness testimony so qualified, 
how do these texts convince their readers of their veracity?
hOlOCaUST family memoirs rely heavily on the paratext for staking their 
claim to “a ‘reality’ exterior to the text,” to quote Lejeune’s phrase again. 
Strategies I will mention here include their subtitles, generic labels on the 
back cover, comments on the book flaps and copyright pages, comments on 
sources, documentary apparatus such as maps, and the inclusion of blurbs, 
testimonials to the testimony, if you will.
 While the titles of books in my corpus—like the titles of most books—
mainly try to reference the content in a dramatic, mysterious, or otherwise 
intriguing way, their subtitles often function to foreground the generational 
structure, as in the aforementioned “A Family Memoir” of Appignanesi’s Los-
ing the Dead. Helen Epstein explains her project in Where She Came From 
most explicitly through her subtitle: “A Daughter’s Search for Her Mother’s 
History.” Michael Skakun subtitles On Burning Ground “A Son’s Memoir,” a 
label that almost exclusively bears the burden of communicating the gen-
erational structure since the father’s wartime experiences comprise the bulk 
of the book (15–221). This proportion is similar in The Hand of Fate, in 
which the filial role is mainly one of amanuensis and editor, information 
that I solicited from Helen Gerzon Goransson in an interview but that can 
also be detected from information on the title page of The Hand of Fate: 
“Memoirs of George Gerzon as Told by Him to his Daughter, Helen (Ger-
zon) Goransson” (see, too, a similar statement on the copyright page). Anne 
Karpf ’s subtitle, “Living with the Holocaust,” foregrounds personal experi-
ence, though the gerund also produces ambiguity as it could and probably 
does refer to both the parental and filial generations. Karpf ’s is the only edi-
tion that includes a generic label that sometimes appears on the back cover of 
books at the top or bottom: NON-FICTION is stated in bolded capital letters. 
Despite author-artist Spiegelman’s virulent insistence that Maus is nonfiction 
(see the discussion in Hirsch 24 and 274n14), that word appears nowhere in 
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the paratext of the 1991 two-volume edition. The prose on the cover flaps, 
however, elaborately foregrounds the factual basis of the volumes, making 
clear that the Art in the book shares an identity with the Art who penned it, 
for instance. The Library of Congress categories on the copyright pages ref-
erence the Holocaust and Poland in the same way that a history book on the 
subject would and furthermore include the label “biography.” The Library of 
Congress information in Bernice Eisenstein’s book similarly references her, 
the place where her life unfolded (Toronto), biography, and the Holocaust.
 In addition to a generic label in the form of a subtitle or a designation 
somewhere on the exterior or copyright page pronouncing the book as a ref-
erential text, the works in my corpus use several other parts of the paratext 
to stake their claim to recounting factual material. In Helen Fremont’s and 
Michael Skakun’s memoirs, an explicit statement intones—oddly in much 
the same style as we have become used to seeing disclaimers at the end of 
films, that is, to their not being about real persons or events—that they are 
about real persons and events. The “Author’s Note” on Fremont’s copyright 
page asserts: “This is a work of nonfiction,” and then continues, “I have 
changed the names, locations, and identifying characteristics of a number of 
individuals in order to protect their privacy. In some instances, I have imag-
ined details in an effort to convey the emotional truths of my family’s experi-
ences” (unnumbered). Skakun’s claim appears on the copyright page itself as 
a “Note to Readers” and explains in similar fashion: “Everything contained in 
this narrative is factual. The author has taken a small degree of license with 
such details as weather, occasional dialogue, and only minor particulars that 
do not detract from the veracity of this story” (unnumbered). I will return to 
the issue of “imagining” in my conclusion.
 Sometimes Holocaust family memoirs include the kind of documentary 
apparatus we expect to see in scholarly histories or biographies, but not nec-
essarily in memoir or autobiography. For example, Skakun includes a “Note 
on Spelling” that discusses “the variant spellings of names of Eastern Euro-
pean cities and towns” as “a product of the region’s tumultuous history and 
frequent border changes” (unnumbered). Karpf places a glossary directly 
before the opening of her text proper (xiv–xvi) and defines there words of 
German, Yiddish, Hebrew, and English that refer to aspects of the Holo-
caust such as “Selektion” and “Shoah,” or of Jewish culture or religion such 
as “matzo” and “shiva,” that she considered potential stumbling blocks for 
the non-Jewish Britons she assumed would comprise the bulk of her audi-
ence. Karpf ’s text also contains endnotes with complete references for her 
sources. Epstein does not use notes but does include a selected bibliography. 
Directly before the text proper commences, she places a sober, simplified 
184 8 :  “ w h e n  f a C T S  a r e  S C a r C e ”
map of “Central Europe around 1870” (2). Spiegelman allots maps a promi-
nent place on the back covers of both volumes of Maus. Drawn by the artist 
in the style of the book (though in color, not black and white), the maps show 
critical places in which Maus’s story will unfold—Poland and Rego Park, NY 
(volume I), and Auschwitz-Birkenau and the Catskills (volume II). The simi-
lar graphics reinforce the connection between this paratextual element and 
the text; even if subconsciously, the reader should use the maps’ relation to 
real locations to posit the text’s relation to history.
 I propose that some of the dedications of these books can be thought of 
as serving to emphasize their authors’ commitment to history, too. Michael 
Skakun dedicates his memoir, for instance, in a manner that foregrounds 
specific historical information and that brings the father’s and son’s personal 
connection to the Holocaust to readers’ attention before they have begun the 
book proper:
FOR MY FATHER
and in memory of
Chaim Chaikel Skakun, my grandfather,
who died during the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in June 1940,
and
Chaja Elovich Skakun, my grandmother,
murdered together with thousands of other Navaredkers on  
December 8, 1941.
(unnumbered)
Spiegelman deploys the dedication to further his work’s connection to his-
tory particularly effectively by including a photographic portrait in the sec-
ond volume of Maus. The photo labeled “For Richieu” conveys to readers 
through the style of the clothing and hair not only the young age of his 
brother at the time the picture was taken, but also the fact that this child lived 
long ago (unnumbered). Readers of Maus I will already know, of course, 
about Richieu’s tragic death, poisoned by his caretaker when she fears her 
and her charges’ imminent deportation to Auschwitz (109). Richieu’s photo 
at the beginning of Maus II serves as a jarring reminder of that death and of 
the connection of Spiegelman’s two volumes to real lives.
 Finally, under paratextual strategies announcing these books’ relation-
ship to the world of history and fact, I would like to mention promotional 
blurbs that appear on front and back covers and sometimes in the initial 
pages of the volumes as well. More than just convincing readers that these 
books are worth reading because they are “good,” many blurbs of the Holo-
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caust family memoirs in my corpus anchor the books’ referential level. Con-
firming the information on the cover and title page, the blurbs frequently 
refer to the books’ generic status. For instance, two of the blurbs on the back 
cover of my edition of Maus I identify its genre in a way that makes apparent 
its connection to history; to cite just one of these: Jules Feiffer pronounces 
Maus not only “a remarkable work  .  .  . brilliant, just brilliant,” but also “at 
one and the same time a novel, a documentary, a memoir, and a comic book” 
(Spiegelman, Maus I, back cover, my emphasis). A quotation on the back of 
The Hand of Fate seems to be included for the purpose of highlighting the 
role of the daughter-writer, a role noted earlier as fairly invisible in the text 
itself. The paperback edition of Helen Fremont’s After Long Silence contains 
twenty blurbs on the front and back covers as well as on three initial pages, 
almost all of which include the word “memoir.”
 Beyond the specific content of their judgments, the very identity and 
authority of the blurb writers occasionally vouchsafe the veracity of these fam-
ily memoirs. The publishers of Skakun’s On Burning Ground include across 
the top of the cover of the paperback edition in large bold type an endorse-
ment by Elie Wiesel: “What a life! This is a story that must be told.” Wiesel’s 
name appears in similarly large bolded letters at exactly the center top of the 
cover. It is not simply that Elie Wiesel is a famous person and his name one 
that many readers will recognize that prompts the inclusion of such a quote. 
Wiesel’s endorsement would be additionally effective as an authenticating 
strategy because he has long campaigned for the importance of personal 
testimony and against “the literature of the Holocaust,” going so far as to say 
that “there is no such thing” [as Holocaust fiction] (7). Aware of this stance of 
Wiesel, we can assume that if Skakun’s story “must be told,” it is nonfictional. 
Similarly, when publishers decided to use blurbs by Eva Hoffman and by 
Helen Epstein on Appignanesi’s and Fremont’s memoirs, respectively—even 
though they are not as well known as, say, Feiffer or Wiesel—they did so at 
least in part because of Hoffman’s and Epstein’s demonstrated interest in the 
fates of children of survivors through their journalistic and book writing. I 
surmise that the publishers counted on at least some readers picking up the 
memoirs because they had been vetted by such experts as belonging to this 
sphere.
alThOUgh authors might be involved in making particular decisions about 
the paratext, editors and publishers usually play an active role in shaping 
this part of any book as it can so directly affect marketing and sales. The 
strategies I now want to consider were presumably more fully determined 
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by the authors since they concern the text proper, specifically the way these 
writers authorize themselves as individuals who know a lot about their par-
ents’ experiences during the Nazi persecution. I will try to shed light on 
this subject by focusing first on the sources of authors’ knowledge about 
their parents’ pasts and second on the ways in which those sources are ref-
erenced in the texts. Such ways include “global” procedures, by which the 
memoir writers authorize the entire discourse; “local” procedures, by which 
they reference the source for a specific narrated event or statement made in 
the discourse; and “regional” strategies, by which they authorize episodes or 
intermediate amounts of discourse. It is not practicable to keep the sources 
themselves and their appearances in the text strictly separated, and as I list 
concrete examples of the way the author documents her or his sources below, 
my readers will already begin to see how and when they are textualized.
 The authors of Holocaust family memoirs learn about their parents’ pasts 
in varied ways; in Cohn’s terms, the nature of the data base that the refer-
ential level denotes is quite diverse. Considering all the texts in my corpus, 
I would place oral communication with the parents at the top of this list. 
Parental stories may have been heard or overheard repeatedly in childhood, 
as they were by Lisa Appignanesi and Michael Skakun. They may have been 
solicited explicitly by the offspring in adulthood, for instance, by Helen Fre-
mont, to reveal parents’ hidden pasts and confirm children’s suspicions about 
those pasts. In many instances, the authors had been told some stories while 
children and had learned others—or other versions of the same—later in 
their lives, as appears to have been the case with Bernice Eisenstein, Helen 
Gerzon Goransson, Barbara Honigmann, Anne Karpf, and Art Spiegelman. 
Most readers will easily remember such scenes of adult offspring soliciting 
new or more detailed information from the survivor generation as they are 
depicted frequently throughout the two volumes of Maus. Information about 
parental pasts may also be acquired by the offspring through oral stories 
from other eyewitnesses to the original events, as when—to give a specific 
example from Spiegelman—Mala, Vladek’s second wife, extends Vladek’s 
account of the registering of Jews in the stadium at Sosnowiec (Maus I, 92). 
Lisa Appignanesi describes hearing stories from an entire network of Holo-
caust survivors on a regular basis during her childhood (18–22). As an adult, 
she also interviewed her older brother—a member of what Susan R. Sulei-
man has termed the 1.5 generation, “too young to have had an adult under-
standing of what was happening to them but old enough to have been there 
during the Nazi persecution of Jews” (372). Staszek may not have had “an 
adult understanding,” and yet his memories of his childhood turn out to sig-
nificantly aid his younger sister Lisa in decoding a few events that occurred 
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toward the end of the war and during its immediate aftermath, events that 
their parents were reticent to discuss (Appignanesi 182–92). As for other 
types of eyewitnesses or eyewitnessing, Helen Epstein succeeds in locating 
and interviewing several friends and relatives of her parents. She could also 
take advantage of formally recorded testimony; before writing Where She 
Came From, Epstein had taken down an oral testimony from her mother for 
an oral history library in New York (314). Toward the beginning of Losing 
the Dead, Appignanesi recounts watching a video testimony her mother had 
given to a research team at McGill University (82–83).
 Photographs and documents may be mobilized not only in the para-
text (like the portrait of his deceased brother Richieu that Art Spiegelman 
uses as part of the dedication in Maus II) but also in the text proper to help 
tell the story—for instance, that of Art and his mother in the “Prisoner on 
the Hell Planet” section of Maus I (100)—and/or to explain how the author 
learned something. The thirty-two different images at the center of Epstein’s 
Where She Came From, for instance, range from family photographs to 
reproductions of advertisements for family businesses to archival photos 
from wartime Prague and Theresienstadt that do not depict family mem-
bers (unnumbered). Through these last, Epstein presumably learned about 
experiences which she assumes family members did endure but for which 
she could not locate personal evidence. Barbara Honigmann details the con-
tents of numerous documents she has seen and incorporates into her text 
proper letters written by her mother, for instance, one from her mother to 
a biographer of Kim Philby’s begging him not to mention her name in his 
work (113), and another to her writer-daughter Barbara entreating her to 
refuse interview requests on the subject of her mother’s relationship to Philby 
(136–37). Authors learn more about their parents’ pasts by explicitly search-
ing elsewhere for documentary evidence beyond that located in the parental 
home; how such searches are conducted and what they turn up is reported by 
several authors, most notably by Appignanesi and Epstein. Sometimes docu-
ments are procured by mail, as those solicited by Helen Fremont and her 
sister (e.g., from Yad Vashem, 29); and sometimes they are sought in person 
when the adult child decides to travel to the European locations in which 
their parents’ dramas unfolded. Such trips of “return” figure prominently in 
the family memoirs of Appignanesi and Karpf (to Poland), Epstein (to Aus-
tria and the Czech Republic), and Fremont (to the Ukraine). Conducting 
research by examining family documents already in their possession or by 
seeking out additional documents, eyewitnesses, and missing information by 
mail or in Europe is supplemented by authors’ perusal of formal histories and 
of memoirs by persons who survived similar persecutions or who traversed 
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some of the same spaces as the parents; Epstein assesses some memoirs listed 
in her selected bibliography as “most pertinent to my mother’s story” (314; 
see, too, Eisenstein, e.g., 84–85).
 While the family memoir writers point to the primary sources, they also 
authorize themselves in their texts as persons qualified to relate their parents’ 
pasts. The passages in which they do so confirm my previous demonstration 
of the paratexts as foregrounding the memoirs as referential texts, that is, as 
having a relation to fact and history. The paratexts, we might say, offer the 
general message that the books are based in sources, and passages within 
the texts usually make that claim more explicitly by pointing to (a) specific 
source(s) and telling the story of how authors found the source and/or what 
they learned from it.
 Similar to the paratext, some of these textualizations of working with 
the data base are “global,” by which I mean that one act of citing a source 
presumably authorizes the entire discourse. In Michael Skakun’s On Burning 
Ground, a short prologue of only four pages explains that the son heard from 
his father directly and repeatedly about his father’s experiences trying to sur-
vive Nazi persecution: “It was every Friday at the Sabbath table that Father’s 
narrative gifts flourished” (4); “He conveyed [his story of terror that defied 
all logic] with such emotional conviction that it became the substance of my 
life, until it achieved an immediacy as palpable as my own skin” (5). Having 
laid out from whom he had received this information and how thoroughly 
he knew it, Skakun-the-son begins to narrate Skakun-the-father’s past in a 
fairly strictly chronological fashion, referring to the protagonist throughout 
as “Father.” The son-narrator-author never mentions again how he acquired 
detailed knowledge of his father’s survival, though he eventually reappears 
in the narrative at the book’s conclusion to take up the issue of how he has 
wrestled with the burden of his father’s impossible wartime choices (232–35). 
In other words, Skakun authorizes himself only once as teller of his father’s 
tale on the basis of being the recipient of eyewitness testimony. Readers are 
left to deduce that all information included in the text derives from this 
source, which actually may not be the case (recall his proviso on the copy-
right page). The facts that Skakun begins with this authorization, that the 
narrative details follow, and that the narration centers on one character who 
is referred to as “Father” may strengthen readers’ willingness to accept that 
the author-narrator-son could know the many things they read in On Burn-
ing Ground.
 Other passages in the memoirs I’m considering read more like excerpts 
from history books in that they are not focused on personal experience, 
making it necessary for authors to establish how the information there can 
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plausibly be known by them. When Anne Karpf raises the topic of her dis-
comfort with the level of gratitude her parents displayed toward Britain—“I 
was touched but also always a little embarrassed  .  .  .” (16)—she is covered 
by Lejeune’s “autobiographical pact,” since she is speaking about herself. But 
when she continues with a three-chapter discursus on British Jews, wartime 
British policy toward Jews, and life as an immigrant Jew in postwar Britain, 
or, as she describes it, when she places her “family’s experiences into his-
torical context” (167), she anchors the specific bits of information relayed 
there through standard referential practice for academic writing: notes—in 
fact, more than four hundred of them (318–40) for only eighty pages of text 
(165–245). In contrast to Skakun’s unique indication of his single eyewitness 
source, Karpf points to her sources over and over again at the point where 
each one is relevant to her discourse; I consider this a “local” authenticating 
strategy.
 To be sure, Karpf ’s text is the only one in my corpus that utilizes formal 
documentation procedures. However, other authors also frequently docu-
ment locally how they know what they include in their texts by citing a 
source as it is relevant. The issue here is not so much a judgment that some 
sources legitimate better than others as it is the observation of authors’ deci-
sions about when, how, and how often to point to sources. I have already 
mentioned Spiegelman’s repeated inclusion of the scene of his father giving 
testimony to him; similar strategies are found in other memoirs. For exam-
ple, preceding the sections with notes, Anne Karpf not only tells the reader 
that she interviewed her parents but then also reproduces for the reader 
extended if edited quotations from those interviews, passages that look and 
read like transcripts in their layout and person of narration. Such passages 
completely disambiguate the origin of information and the subsequent first-
person pronoun by including the eyewitness’s name: “Josef Karpf: My father 
came from a large family of thirteen . . .” (18).
 Though they may point to sources more subjective than the historical 
and academic studies to which Karpf ’s notes mainly refer us, or though 
they may look more familiar to us than the transcript style just quoted, even 
phrases such as “My father told me . . .” or “She said” or typographical marks 
such as quotation marks should be recognized as local authenticating strat-
egies. They point to the source for the writers’ knowledge—in these cases, 
to eyewitness testimony they have received. I would go so far as to say that 
such phrases function to communicate the preciousness of that knowledge 
received, the solicitation of which is often difficult in survivor families. Vir-
tually all texts in my corpus stage difficult solicitations of information. One 
in Barbara Honigmann’s memoir foregrounds these challenges by relating 
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that when her mother was eighty years old, she finally decided to tell her 
daughter certain things about her past, only to then begin and stop, repeat-
edly claiming she didn’t remember (112ff.).
 Of course, to anchor each single piece of information in its source, par-
ticularly when so much comes from the same source, would be tedious for 
the writer and the reader.6 Therefore, some writers mention the source only 
once in a section to authorize what presumably applies to all the informa-
tion related there. The actual reference to the source might occur at the start, 
in the middle, or at the end of such a section. Neither limited to one fact 
nor extended to everything in the text, this strategy might best be labeled 
“regional.” Helen Epstein’s Where She Came From utilizes regional authenti-
cations particularly often. For instance, in a larger stretch of text describing 
the “first wholesale exclusion of Jews from Czech cultural life” (209)—some-
thing Epstein might have learned in history books, though she does not 
document locally as having done so—she narrates her mother Franci’s and 
Franci’s cousin Kitty’s responses to this exclusion, including reflections on 
their physical appearance, and specifically their noses:
Kitty’s was small, straight, and unremarkable but Franci’s was long and 
slightly hooked at the end: the sterotype of a “Jewish” nose. Its length and 
shape became the focus of all her frustration with the Nazi restrictions. “I 
thought if my nose were different,” my mother later told me, “I could go 
to the movies.” During that strange prewar summer, my mother talked her 
boyfriend, her parents, and one of Prague’s few plastic surgeons into help-
ing her obtain a nose job. (210)
The first statements are rather factual and the information related there might 
have been garnered by studying photographs. The next sentence, however, 
as the assessment of another person’s feelings—“the focus of all her frustra-
tion”—mystifies. We wonder how Helen could know such a private matter 
until we get to the verbatim quotation which the daughter authenticates by 
anchoring it as an oral communication from her mother: “my mother later 
told me.” Having read this, one can then consider the whole passage as autho-
rized by eyewitness testimony: such a personal assessment about such a pri-
vate emotion did indeed stem from the person who was doing the assessing, 
and it was shared by that person, the mother, with the daughter, who eventu-
ally wrote the passage. Epstein authorizes similarly other pieces of informa-
tion by referring to things Franci had written: “‘Marie had undergone a subtle 
change,’ my mother would later write” (216). Here, both the italics and the 
phrase “my mother would later write” serve to authenticate by pointing to 
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this specific information as having a specific source. On many occasions in 
Epstein’s book, however, neither a local nor a regional indication of sources 
appears, and the reader might then need to assume that some thoughts and 
feelings or even statements about Franci’s whereabouts or actions do derive 
from the mother, because they are globally authorized by Epstein’s inclusion 
of her mother’s autobiographical writings in the selected bibliography at the 
end of the text (315) or because they know Epstein talked at length with her 
mother about the past, including in a formal act of testifying.
 The problem, of course, with multiple strategies of authentication, par-
ticularly given that some of them authorize indeterminate amounts of dis-
course and discourse to which they are not directly adjacent, is that the 
reader cannot always know the source for a particular event, dialogue, or 
thought. A reader’s unsureness can be exacerbated by some authors’ (global) 
announcements that they have “taken a small degree of license with such 
details as weather, occasional dialogue, and other minor particulars that 
do not detract from the veracity of this story” (Skakun, copyright page; see 
also Fremont unnumbered) or when they point (regionally) to “how fantasy 
works when facts are scarce” (Appignanesi 224, my emphasis), to now quote 
the full phrase from which my title stems. The door is left open to charges of 
fabricating something that does affect the veracity of the story, because none 
of these authors alert their readers (locally) to every instance of engaging 
their imaginations to fill in missing information, as none authorizes (locally) 
every fact for which they have indeed consulted a data base.
alThOUgh Fremont is probably the author in my corpus who learned the 
least amount directly from her parents, her poetic account of reconstructing 
her parents’ past can serve to summarize the general process behind family 
memoirs and to bring together the main points of this essay:
Over the next several months I gradually pieced together the story of my 
family: from my mother, anecdotes stripped of context, shrouded in mys-
tery; from libraries, museums, and other survivors, I was able to fill in and 
add color to my mother’s outline. And so the story began to take shape 
with information from several sources, stacked high like an enormous 
building, overlapping layers of history and family, fact and omission. (61)
As readers who have entered into an autobiographical pact with Fremont, 
that is, who assume that the author, narrator and protagonist share an iden-
tity and that the topic is the individual’s own existence (Lejeune 4–5), we 
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need not challenge her statement about her research project, and she need 
not authenticate it beyond writing in the first person, since she is relating 
something she herself did: “I gradually pieced together . . .” To consider now 
one of many counterexamples, when Fremont claims that her father’s mis-
shapen left arm “is a souvenir from the camps, a token of his time there, a lit-
tle gift from the Gulag” (225), the statement no longer concerns the author’s 
feelings, actions, or something she could have witnessed herself. Readers 
may rightly wonder: how does she know? Or to return to Cohn’s terminol-
ogy: through what data base has she come to know about her father’s arm, 
and how does her text acknowledge her use of that data base?
 Surely eyewitness testimony is the most likely source for this kind of 
information. After all, unlike a birth, arrest, deportation, or death, an acci-
dent or personal attack was not an occurrence to have created a paper trail 
during the Nazi assault on European Jewry or in the Soviet prison camp sys-
tem where this particular event transpired. That’s not just a guess, of course. 
Having read the book, I know that when she was a child, Fremont had dis-
covered an old newspaper article that reported that her father’s arm had 
been broken in a Soviet camp by prisoners trying to steal his clothes from 
him (226); Fremont had then immediately queried her mother who con-
firmed that this was true (226); years later her father himself told her about 
being jumped by other prisoners (228). In other words, Fremont the narrator 
reveals that she learned of this particular episode in multiple ways, through 
a written account and two oral communications, one from an eyewitness, 
the protagonist of this episode, her father, and one from an intimate of the 
eyewitness, her mother.
 The question remains: Why does the reader accept this as a true story 
from the past? The author refers to them, vouches for them, by putting them 
into first-person statements in her book. To quote now instead of to para-
phrase: “I found an article  .  .  .” (225); “I went to my mother with the arti-
cle . . .” (226); “When I was in college in 1975, my father told me more about 
his arm” (228). Notice how even the oral interaction with the eyewitness 
is subsumed into a sentence about the self: “When I was in college .  .  . my 
father told me . . .” In such instances—and there are so many in my corpus 
that I could not possibly cite them all here—we should notice that informa-
tion is authorized not by foregrounding the actual source but by narrating 
the author’s experience of encountering the source. This strategy makes sense 
given the generational structure of these texts and their multiple plots, time 
frames, and goals: as mentioned at the beginning of this essay, most authors 
concentrate on their parents’ pasts and include information about their own 
childhoods and their searches to learn more about their parents. I return 
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here, too, to the generic point. We might conceptualize at least passages like 
Fremont’s on her father’s arm as “autobiography once removed” rather than 
as strictly biography or history. These texts are narrated in the first person 
and located in a book with the offspring’s name on the cover, and thus the 
veracity of the content of these statements falls under the autobiographical 
pact. To put it otherwise, once attributed to the self, the knowledge need not 
be authorized in an additional way, and in fact in myriad instances authors 
of my family memoirs do not authorize such information in any other way.
 We can use my generic idea of “autobiography once removed” to shed 
light on an ethical point, that is, on accusations that the second generation 
believes that its “‘experiences’ of the Holocaust are just as valid as those 
of the survivors” (Franklin 31) or misreadings of Hirsch’s concept of post-
memory as claiming that children of survivors “have memories of living 
these experiences” (Weissman 17). These charges are preposterous in their 
generalizing and, in any case, constitute a mischaracterization of the family 
memoirs I have been examining. These books’ numerous and sometimes 
overlapping authenticating strategies in the paratext and text proper demon-
strate that authors do assert and do partially account for a relation between 
their works and verifiable history. They mobilize various strategies for doing 
so. Furthermore, these authors are sometimes writing as autobiographers 
and sometimes as biographers. However, as I hope my discussion above and 
the “once removed” part of my term demonstrate, occupying both roles facil-
itates authors’ slippage between authenticating strategies readers might con-
sider as more appropriate to one genre or the other. As in the (re)framing of 
information we observed in Helen Fremont’s account of learning the history 
of her father’s mangled arm, the knowledge about the parent may stay in the 
form of autobiography even as it reports something that mainly concerns the 
survivor-parent. Family memoirs shift easily and frequently between what 
happened to the parent and how “I” learned the information. Naturally, an 
individual reader may be more interested in learning about surviving the 
Nazi Judeocide than about surviving growing up in a household with a survi-
vor. My point here would be that for many if not all of my authors these two 
things are connected: surviving in such a household involves (eventually) 
learning more about what happened in the past. These memoirs and their 
authenticating strategies thematize this tangled connection.
 I want to conclude by claiming an ethical and practical role for well-
written books about the story of getting the story. For one thing, such narra-
tives can inspire and have inspired other individuals to undertake searches 
that may then be personally beneficial to them. Why, as a society, should we 
count that as nothing? Perhaps even more importantly, and certainly to the 
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point of this entire volume, soon such books may be the only new sources for 
making the acquaintance of survivors in something close to the fullness of 
their personalities and the contradictions and fragilities of their lives. Family 
memoirs will be one of few sources for making clearer to us aspects of the 
Nazi persecution that are likely to seem more fantastical with the passage of 
time. The stories that someone like Helen Epstein can tell about her mother’s 
internalization of Nazi racial ideas and the extremes to which she therefore 
went to try to pass as Aryan according to those ideas are different stories 
from the ones we are likely to receive through an oral interview with the par-
ent conducted by a stranger or even, I would suggest, in a memoir written by 
the parent. Helen Fremont runs to ask her mother about the article on her 
father because she is shocked to think of her father as a victim and because 
she read there that someone tried to take his clothes away from him: “It 
didn’t occur to me that they wanted his clothes for themselves, for warmth. 
This was beyond my imagination as I sat in my parents’ warm home, well-
clothed. I could not picture anyone (much less my father) that cold” (226, my 
emphasis).
 To frame the story in terms of herself and her own incredulity at the pos-
sibility of one human being feeling so frozen that s/he would not only steal 
but maim another human being is not to steal the parents’ identity, nor is it to 
claim that the second generation’s experiences are “just as valid.” It is, rather, 
to reenact a scene of the tremendous task for those who were not there—that 
will soon be all of us—of engaging precisely our imaginations to come to 
knowledge of what the persecuted experienced and how they felt about it. If 
we still have hopes of learning lessons from the Shoah, these memoirs offer 
valuable examples of trying to bridge a chasm through research and fantasy 
that will only loom larger “after testimony.”
notes
 1. Some texts that resemble my family memoirs include Sarah Kofman’s philosophi-
cal essay Paroles suffoquées for its inclusion of a critical document about her father’s death 
(the deportation lists). As her memoir Rue Ordener, Rue Labat makes clear, though, Kof-
man is herself a survivor and her father a murdered victim. Lost in Translation focuses 
on Eva Hoffman’s own experiences as an immigrant, not as the child of survivors that 
she in fact is. She writes from this identity position briefly and movingly in After Such 
Knowledge, but this text is much more of a sociological analysis than a narrative. Mari-
anne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer’s Ghosts of Home could be considered also as a mixed genre, 
with some more analytical and some more narrative elements; the book’s blurb labels it, 
among other things: a “communal memoir.” Carl Friedman’s Tralievader [Nightfather] 
takes up many of the issues of my family memoirs and is written from the first-person 
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perspective of the daughter of survivors, but its author clearly labels it “fiction.” Daniel 
Mendelsohn’s The Lost resembles perhaps most closely other texts in my corpus; I ulti-
mately decided not to include it here since Mendelsohn’s nuclear family was safely living 
in the United States throughout the Holocaust, and he investigates the fates of individu-
als he had never known. It should count as one of Stark’s “postmemorial” books, though 
(Stark 202).
 2. Hypotheses about the psychological effect of the Holocaust on survivors’ offspring 
began essentially at the same time that the concept of “survivor syndrome” was proposed, 
that is in the 1950s and 60s (see Solkoff; and Bergmann and Jucovy). Interest in so-called 
second-generation literature began several decades later and has primarily concerned 
itself with fictional texts about the Holocaust and its legacies (see Berger and Berger; 
McGlothlin; and Sicher). The most important theoretical development came from Mari-
anne Hirsch and her proposal of the term “postmemory” to identify “an intersubjective 
transgenerational space of remembrance, linked to cultural or collective trauma which is 
not strictly based on identity or on familial connection” (Hirsch and Kacandes 14; also 
Hirsch). Distinguishing memoirs from fictional writing has begun only quite recently 
(e.g., Kacandes 243–44).
 3. Inspired by Holocaust family memoirs, I eventually wrote about those silences and 
how I learned more about what lay behind them (Kacandes).
 4. The specific examples I give here of “paratext” Genette actually lists under the 
subcategory of “peritext,” which he distinguishes from “epitext”—writings related to the 
text such as reviews, journals, or correspondence about it; for Genette peritext and epitext 
constitute the paratext. In a recent meeting of the International Society for the Study of 
Narrative (Birmingham, June 2009), however, it was agreed that in practice, most narra-
tologists do not distinguish between the two subtypes and that Genette’s umbrella term is 
the one in circulation.
 5. Thus Vladek Spiegelman’s account of the function of the Auschwitz-Birkenau 
death machinery in the second volume of Maus can be checked against the Nazis’ own ar-
chitectural plans (see Dwork and Pelt), against clandestine photos (see Didi-Huberman), 
or against other eyewitness testimony (see Gradowski, Lengyel, Levi). In contrast, the lay-
out of Trachimbrod cannot be verified anywhere, as it “exists” only in Jonathan Safran Fo-
er’s novel Everything Is Illuminated. The shtetl’s streets, therefore, have a textual rather than 
a referential existence. To be sure, fictional texts can include reference to places and events 
whose existence can be verified in the available historical record. Rachel Seiffert’s poignant 
novel The Dark Room, for instance, depicts prewar, wartime, and postwar Germany and 
Eastern Europe, including mentions of real persons, places, and events. However, because 
of the paratextual apparatus, the message given to us by the work about its genre (e.g., its 
designation as “fiction” on the copyright page), readers’ horizon of expectation does not 
include querying each element in Seiffert’s novel, even if some of the details it utilizes are 
“true,” in the sense of “verifiable in documents or archives.”
 6. That is, unless one is as talented a writer as W. G. Sebald, who foregrounds the 
issue of transmission of knowledge by repeatedly anchoring the discourse in phrases that 
specify who said what to whom: “sagte Vera zu mir, sagte Austerlitz . . .” [Vera said to me, 
said Austerlitz] (250). Sebald did not give a generic label to his work Austerlitz, but no 
researcher has yet disproved that he meant it as a novel. The frequency with which the 
narrator and characters point to oral transmission comes across to the readers, I would 
suggest, as one of Austerlitz’s literary features; the inquits sound like poetic refrains.
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edek resumed his digging. he dug and he dug. half of the outhouse’s foun-
dation now seemed to be exposed. edek got down on his knees, and dug a 
hole at the base of the foundations. Suddenly he stiffened.
 “i think i did find something.” everyone crowded in. . . .
 he reached under the foundation and dug around with his fingers. he 
was lying stretched out on the ground. 
 “i got it,” edek said breathlessly. he pulled out a small object, and 
began removing the dirt from its surface. The old man and woman tried get 
closer.
 “what has he got? what has he got?” the old woman said. . . .
 edek got up. he had cleaned up the object. ruth could see it. it was a 
small, rusty, flat tin. “i did find it,” edek said, and smiled. 
—brett, Too Many Men 514
incongruous objects
At the end of Lily Brett’s 1999 novel, Too Many Men, Edek and his Austra-
lian-born daughter Ruth return one more time to Kamedulska Street in Lódz 
where Edek had grown up as a small boy and young man in the 1920s and 
30s. They had already been there several times and, each time, had discov-
ered additional objects that provided clues to Edek’s and his family’s past. 
Ruth had gone there by herself to buy, for inordinate sums of money, her 
grandmother’s tea service and other personal items that the old couple liv-
ing in the apartment that had been Edek’s brought out for her in a slow and 
emotionally torturous process of extortion. But after traveling on from Lódz 
to Kraków and then to Auschwitz, where Edek and his wife Rooshka had 
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survived the war, Edek insisted on returning to Lódz and to Kamedulska 
Street once more to retrieve an additional item of immense personal value. 
“Did they find gold?” the neighbors kept asking, but the old couple had 
already searched every inch of ground and had come up empty. To his great 
joy, Edek does find the precious object buried in the ground: it is “a small, 
rusty, flat tin” (514).
 It isn’t until later, at their hotel, that Edek opens the small tin. Ruth
could feel the dread in her mouth, in her throat, in her lungs, and in her 
stomach. .  .  . The tin held only one thing. Edek removed the object from 
the tin. It was a photograph. A small photograph. . . . It was a photograph 
of her mother. . . . Rooshka was holding a small baby. The small baby was 
Ruth. . . .
 “It does look like you,” Edek said. “But it is not you.” Ruth felt sick (518)
Edek then proceeds to tell Ruth a story concerning her parents that she had 
never heard before. After liberation, Edek and Rooshka had found each 
other again and had had a baby boy in the German DP camp Feldafing. 
The baby had been born with a heart problem that required a kind of care 
that these stateless Auschwitz survivors were not in a position to provide. 
At the advice of their doctor, they made the excruciating decision to give 
him up to a wealthy German couple for adoption. Before giving him away, 
Edek had taken a photograph of the baby. Rooshka, however, “‘was angry. 
She did say that if we are going to give him away, he will be out of our lives, 
so why should we pretend with a photograph that he is part of us. . . . Mum 
did tell me to throw away the photograph. But I did not want to throw it 
away’” (524). Edek gave the photo to his cousin Herschel who was going 
back to Kamedulska Street, which, he believed, “‘was still more his home 
than the barracks.’” Herschel took the photo with him and, discovering that 
this could, in fact, never again be his home, buried it in the yard under the 
outhouse before returning to the DP camp.
 Too Many Men belongs to a genre of Holocaust narrative that has been 
increasingly prevalent in recent years: the narrative of return, in which a 
Holocaust survivor, accompanied by an adult child, returns to his or her 
former home in Eastern Europe, or children of survivors return to find their 
parents’ former homes, to “walk where they once walked.” Memoirs by these 
children of survivors dominate this narrative genre, but Too Many Men pro-
vides a rich fictional example and the chance to discuss the characteristics of 
return plots that are generally punctuated by images and objects that mediate 
acts of return.1
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 Narratives of return are quest plots holding out, and forever frustrating, 
the promise of revelation and recovery; thus Edek’s discovery of the metal 
tin and the baby’s photograph offers a rare epiphanic instant in this genre. 
And yet, characteristically perhaps, this moment of disclosure and satisfac-
tion serves only to raise another set of questions that defer any possibility 
of narrative closure. Why, when Edek’s baby was born after liberation, in 
Germany, was his photo taken back to Lódz, to Kamedulska Street, to be 
buried there? And why does Edek spend such enormous sums of money 
and effort to go back to his former home one more time to search for and 
to retrieve the photograph? Why, if the photo is so important to him, does 
he not dig for it on his first visit? Why, in fact, does he wait? Narratives 
of return, like Too Many Men, abound in implausible plot details such as 
these. What, actually, does Ruth find out about her parents and about herself 
when her father succeeds in unearthing the photo of her lost brother? What 
can these moments of narrative fracture and incongruity tell us about the 
needs and impulses that engender return in different generations and about 
the scenarios of intergenerational transmission performed in and by acts of 
return?2
 In this essay, I read Brett’s novel alongside two other works that clarify 
the incongruities, the implausibilities and impossibilities, and the fractured 
shapes characterizing the impulse to return and the narrative and visual 
enactments of return: Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani’s 1969 novella 
Return to Haifa, a work that deals not with the Holocaust but with the Nakba, 
and the Eurydice Series of Bracha Lichtenberg-Ettinger, an Israeli visual art-
ist who is the daughter of Holocaust survivors. These three works enable us 
to look, in particular, at the role that objects (photographs, domestic inte-
riors, household objects, items of clothing) play in return stories, marking 
their sites of implausibility and incommensurability. Objects, lost and again 
found, structure plots of return: they can embody memory and thus trigger 
affect shared across generations. But as heavily symbolic and over-deter-
mined sites of contestation, they can also mediate the political, economic, 
and juridical claims of dispossession and recovery that often motivate return 
stories.
 Read together, these three works stage the impulse to return as a frac-
tured encounter between generations, between cultures, and between mutu-
ally imbricated histories. From Australia, New York, and Israel to Poland 
and back, from the West Bank to Haifa, from a layered present to a com-
plicated past, return is desired as much as it is impossible. In focusing on 
the figure of the lost child, however, these works expose the deepest layers 
of the contradictory psychology of return and the depths of dispossession 
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that reach beyond specific historical circumstances. How can different his-
tories that expose children to danger and abandonment be thought together, 
without flattening or blurring the differences between them? Perhaps in a 
feminist, connective reading that moves between global and intimate con-
cerns by attending precisely to the intimate details, the connective tissues 
and membranes, that animate each case even while enabling the discovery 
of shared motivations and shared tropes. Such a feminist reading, as I see it, 
pays attention to the political dimensions of the familial and domestic and to 
the gender and power dynamics of contested histories. It foregrounds affect 
and embodiment and a concern for justice and acts of repair. It is connective 
rather than comparative in that it eschews any implications that catastrophic 
histories are comparable, and it thus avoids the competition over suffering 
that comparative approaches can, at their worst, engender. 
 In Kanafani’s text, a Palestinian couple drives from Ramallah to the house 
in Haifa that they were forced to leave in 1948. It is June 1967, twenty years 
later, and Said S. and Safiya join many of their neighbors and friends curi-
ous to revisit the homes they had left behind and that they were allowed to 
visit after the Israeli annexation of the West Bank and the opening of the 
borders. As they approach Haifa, Said S. “felt sorrow mounting from inside 
him . . . No, the memory did not come back to him little by little, but filled 
the whole inside of his head, as the walls of stone collapsed and piled on top 
of each other. Things and events came suddenly, beginning to disintegrate 
and filling his body” (99). Return to place literally loosens the defensive 
walls against the sorrow of loss that refugees build up over decades and that 
they pass down to their children. Just as Ruth responds to the photograph 
in Too Many Men, so Said S. and Safiya respond viscerally, with trembling, 
tears, sweat, and overpowering physical feelings of torment. As the couple 
approaches their former house, the streets they cross, the smells of the land-
scape, the topography of the city—all trigger bodily responses that are not 
exactly memories, but reenactments and re-incarnations of the events of the 
day in 1948 when they left their home. The past overpowers the present, 
“suddenly, cutting like a knife” (102), and we are with Said S. in 1948 as he 
desperately attempts to get back to his wife through the bullets and confu-
sion on the city streets; we also see her haste to get to him and her inability 
to fight her way back through the flood of refugees to the house where her 
baby Khaldun remains asleep in his crib, tragically left behind. Later that 
day, offshore, as the boats take them away from Haifa, “they were incapable 
of feeling anything” (107). The loss is so overwhelming that for twenty years, 
Khaldun’s name is rarely pronounced in their house, and then only in a whis-
per. Their two younger children do not know about their lost brother. And 
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even as they drive toward Haifa together in 1967, neither Said S. nor Safiya, 
who talk about everything else during the journey, “had uttered a syllable 
about the matter that had brought them there” (100). On the surface, the trip 
is about seeing their house again—as they say, “just to see it” (108).
 Both of these fictional works represent refugees’ and exiles’ re-encounter 
with the material textures of their daily lives in the past.3 “Habit,” Paul Con-
nerton writes in his book How Societies Remember, “is a knowledge and a 
remembering in the hands and in the body, and in the cultivation of habit it 
is our body which ‘understands’” (95). In returning to the spaces and objects 
of the past, displaced people can remember the embodied practices and the 
incorporated knowledge that they associate with home. When Said S. slows 
his car “before reaching the turn which he knew to be hidden at the foot of 
the turn” (Kanafani 11), when he “looked at all the little things which he 
knew would frighten him or make him lose his balance: the bell, the copper 
door knocker, the pencil scribblings on the wall, the electricity box, the four 
steps broken in the middle, the fine curved railing which your hand slipped 
along,” he reanimates deep habits and sense memories. Ordinary objects 
mediate the memory of returnees through the particular embodied practices 
that they re-elicit. And these embodied practices can also revive the affect of 
the past, overlaid with the shadows of loss and dispossession.
 Said and Safiyah notice every detail of the house, comparing and con-
trasting the present with the past “like someone who had just awoken from a 
long period of unconsciousness” (112). Much remained exactly the same: the 
picture of Jerusalem on one wall, the small Persian carpet on the other. The 
glass vase on the table had been replaced with a wooden one, but the peacock 
feathers inside it were still the same, though of the seven feathers that had 
been there, only five remained. Both wanted to know what happened to the 
other two.
 Somehow, those two missing feathers become signifiers of the incom-
mensurability of return—a measure of the time that had passed and the life 
lived by other people and other bodies in the same space and among the 
same objects. Emerging from this bodily re-immersion in his former home, 
Said S. begins to realize that, for years, other feet have shuffled down the long 
hallway, and others have eaten at his table: “How very strange! Three pairs 
of eyes all looking at the same things . . . and how differently everyone sees 
them!” (113). In Kanafani’s novella, the third pair of eyes belong to Miriam, 
the wife of the deceased Evrat Kushen, both of them Holocaust survivors 
who had been given the house by the Jewish Agency only a few days after 
Said S. and Safiya left it.4 “[A]nd with the house, he was given a child, five 
months old!” (120), Miriam tells Said S. and Safiya as they sit in the living 
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room that all three of them consider their own. Miriam also tells them how 
she had been ready to return to the Italian DP camp to which they had been 
sent after the war because of the disturbing scene she had witnessed during 
those days in 1948: Jewish soldiers throwing a dead Arab child, covered with 
blood, into a truck “like a piece of wood.” When they adopted the baby, Evrat 
Kushen hoped that his wife would be able to heal from the shock of that 
vision.
 As Said S. and Safiya discuss whether to wait for the return of Khaldun 
who had been raised by his Jewish parents as Dov, or whether to leave imme-
diately, accepting the fact that their son had irrevocably been taken from 
them, they surprisingly equate their child with the house that had been, and 
was now no longer, theirs. Both house and child are invested with agency 
and power—to accept or to deny their former owners/parents. As Said tells 
Safiya, “‘Don’t you have those same awful feelings which came over me while 
I was driving the car through the streets of Haifa? I felt that I knew it and that 
it had denied me. The same feelings came over me when I was in the house 
here. This is our house. Can you imagine that? Can you imagine that it would 
deny us?’” (123). What could figure the enormity of their dispossession as 
powerfully as the loss of a child, or a child’s refusal to recognize his parents? 
When Khaldun/Dov finally appears on the scene, he is wearing an Israeli 
uniform.
 Although, in Kanafani’s novella, the lost child structures the story of 
return, the novella’s plot does not fully motivate the loss of Khaldun: we 
are told that Safiya tried, desperately, to return to the house to fetch her 
baby—but how, we cannot help wondering, could she have left him there in 
the first place? This narrative implausibility is compounded by other textual 
incongruities, most notably Dov’s revelation that “they” (his parents) only 
told him “three or four years ago” (131) that he was not their biological son, 
even though he said earlier that “my father was killed in Sinai eleven years 
ago” (129).5 Is this a mistake on Kanafani’s part or an indication of the son’s 
very belated acceptance of his adoption? These implausible elements of the 
story and the questions they raise produce moments of fracture in which dif-
ferent plot possibilities are overlaid on one another with no possible resolu-
tion. They can be motivated only on the level of fantasy and symbol—as the 
measures of a failed maternity and paternity in a time of historical extrem-
ity and as emblems of the radical dispossession that is the result of Israeli 
occupation.
 For Said S. and Safiya, as for Edek and Rooshka in Too Many Men, the 
lost child remains a shameful and well-kept secret, haunting and layering 
the present. When Edek regrets giving his baby up for adoption and worries 
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that he had made the wrong decision, Ruth attempts to alleviate her father’s 
guilt by insisting, “You did nothing wrong” (Brett 526). Here, also, extreme 
historical circumstances fracture family life and disable parental nurturance. 
Just as Said S. and Safiya need to return to their former home and to re-
encounter the objects that trigger bodily memories and with them the emo-
tions of inconsolable loss they had so long suppressed, so Edek needs to find 
the photograph of his baby son if he is to tell the story to his daughter. More 
than her grandmother’s tea service that Ruth buys from the old couple at an 
exorbitant price, more than her grandfather’s overcoat and the photographs 
that are in one of its pockets, the photo of the lost child figures the expul-
sion from home and the impossibility of return. In the narrative, we need to 
wait for its revelatory power; we need to witness the progressive discovery 
that Edek and, with him, Ruth undergo. Suspense, partial disclosures, and 
delayed revelations structure the plot: several scenes of digging have to pre-
cede the unearthing of the small tin can. In both texts, the loss of the child, 
associated with guilt and shame, is deeply suppressed. It can be brought into 
the open and confronted only gradually, by crossing immense temporal and 
spatial divides.
 For Edek, the photograph becomes the medium of a narrative shared 
across generations. Ruth wonders why her parents had never told her about 
her baby brother and insists that this is her story as much as it is her mother’s 
and father’s: “It was impossible to grow up unaffected. The things that hap-
pened to you and to Mum became part of my life. Not the original expe-
riences, but the effects of the experiences’” (527). It is these effects that 
motivate Ruth’s journey to Poland, her need to imagine her parents’ lives, 
her tireless search for every object and every detail of their past. They moti-
vate her repeated returns to Kamedulska Street and her need to go there with 
her father. And, through a process of unconscious transmission of affect, 
they motivate a recurrent nightmare that plagues Ruth throughout her trip 
to Poland, before she ever sees the photo or learns about her lost brother: 
“She had had one of her recurring nightmares. The worst one, the one in 
which she was a mother. The children were almost always babies. . . . In these 
dreams she lost her babies or starved them. She misplaced them. Left them 
on trains or buses.  .  .  . The abandonment in her dreams was never inten-
tional. She simply forgot that she had given birth to and brought home a 
baby. When in her dreams she realized what she had done, she was morti-
fied” (113). How does the act of returning to place and how do the objects 
found there inflect the process of affective transmission that so profoundly 
shapes the postmemory of children of exiles and refugees?
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Returning bodies
In her latest book on memory, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit (The 
Long Shadow of the Past), the German critic Aleida Assmann reflects on 
the role of objects and places as triggers of bodily or sense memory.6 Invok-
ing the German reflexive formulation of “ich erinnere mich” (“je me sou-
viens”) she distinguishes what she calls the verbal and declarative, active 
ich-Gedächtnis (I-memory) from the more passive mich-Gedächtnis (Me-
memory) appealing to the body and the senses rather than to language or 
reason.7 Assmann’s mich-Gedächtnis is the site of involuntary memory that is 
often activated and mediated by the encounter with objects and places from 
the past. Scholars of memory sites, such as James Young and Andreas Huys-
sen, have been skeptical of what they deem a romantic notion that endows 
objects and places with aura or with memory. In response, Assmann speci-
fies that although objects and places do not themselves carry qualities of past 
lives, they do hold whatever we ourselves project onto them or invest them 
with. When we leave them behind, we bring something of that investment 
along, but part of it also remains there, embedded in the object or the place 
itself. Assmann uses the metaphor of the classical Greek legal concept of the 
symbolon to conceptualize this. To draw up a legal contract, a symbolic object 
was broken in half, and one of those halves was given to each of the parties 
involved. When the two parties brought the two halves together at a future 
time, and they fit, then their identity and the legal force of the contract could 
be ratified. Return journeys can have the effect of such a reconnection of sev-
ered parts, and, if this indeed happens, they can release latent, repressed, or 
dissociated memories—memories that, metaphorically speaking, remained 
behind, as it were, concealed within the object. And in so doing, they can 
cause them to surface and become re-embodied. Objects and places, there-
fore, Assmann argues, can function as triggers of remembrance that connect 
us, bodily and thus also emotionally, with the object world we inhabit (122). 
In her formulation, the mich-Gedächtnis functions as a system of potential 
resonances, of chords that, in the right circumstances—during journeys of 
return, for example—can be made to reverberate.
 But can the metaphor of the symbolon cover cases of massive historic 
fractures, such as the ones introduced by the Shoah and the Nakba? Would 
not contracts lose their legal force in such cases, so much so that the pieces 
would no longer be expected to fit together again? Worn away not only by 
time but also by a traumatic history of displacement, forgetting, and erasure, 
places change and objects are used by other, perhaps hostile, owners, and 
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over time they come to merely approximate the spaces and objects that were 
left behind. Cups and plates chip, peacock feathers disappear, wooden vases 
replace glass ones, and keys to houses, obsessively kept in exile, no longer 
open doors. “Home” becomes a place of no return.
 And yet, embodied journeys of return, corporeal encounters with place, 
do have the capacity to create sparks of connection that activate remem-
brance and thus reactivate the trauma of loss. In the register of the more 
passive mich-Gedächtnis, or of the “repertoire,” they may not release full 
accounts of the past, but they can bring back its gestures and its affects. Per-
haps the sparks created when the two parts of a severed power line touch 
ever so briefly constitute a more apt image for this than the ancient symbolon 
cut in half. The intense bodily responses to the visits of return that we see in 
both of these novels testify to the power of these sparks of reconnection that 
increase expectation and thus also intensify frustration.
 The powerful bodily memory engendered in return is compounded in 
these narratives by the trope of the lost child that clarifies the enormity of 
the stakes involved. In contrast to Brett and Kanafani, W. G. Sebald’s Auster-
litz, which contains another paradigmatic narrative of return, reverses the 
generations by staging the return of the lost amnesiac child in search of his 
parents and his own past self. Here too, bodily symptoms signal found sites 
and engender moments of reconnection, often without cognitive recogni-
tion: “I could tell, by the prickling of my scalp . . .” Austerlitz says of a scene 
that was “brought back out of my past” (151). “[I]t was as if I had already 
been this way before and memories were revealing themselves to me not by 
means of any mental effort but through my senses” (150). When he is handed 
the photo of the little page boy and is told “this is you, Jacquot” (183), Aus-
terlitz is “speechless and uncomprehending, incapable of any lucid thought” 
(184). “I could not imagine who or what I was” (185), he repeats. In the face 
of expulsion and expropriation—especially childhood expulsion—home and 
identity are in themselves implausible, and objects remain alienating and 
strange.
Generations and Surrogations
The impossibility and implausibility of return is intensified if descendants 
who were never there earlier return to the sites of trauma. Can they even 
attempt to put the pieces together, to create the spark? Or is the point of con-
nection, including the physical contact with objects, lost with the survivor 
generation? What if several generations pass? What if traces are deliberately 
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erased and forgetting is imposed on those who are abducted or expelled, as 
Saidiya Hartman asks in her moving memoir of “return” to the slave routes 
of Ghana, tellingly titled Lose Your Mother? Her narrative, like other second- 
and subsequent-generation stories of return, attempts to reclaim memory 
and connection to the objects and places of the past, even while making 
evident the irreparability of the breach. Narrative incongruity in fictional 
accounts may well serve the purpose of signaling the fractures and implau-
sibilities underlying both home and return in the autobiographical and fic-
tional accounts of postmemorial generations that have inherited the loss. 
And images, objects, and places function as sites where these implausibilities 
manifest themselves.
 In Too Many Men, Ruth says to Edek that “so much of what happened in 
your life became part of my life” (Brett 526). Along with stories, behaviors, 
and symptoms, parents do transmit aspects of their relationship to places 
and objects from the past to their children. Ruth had wanted to visit Poland 
the first time “just to see that her mother and father came from somewhere. 
To see the bricks and the mortar. The second time was an attempt to be less 
overwhelmed than she was the first time. To try and not to cry all day and 
night. . . . And now she was here to walk on this earth with her father” (5). 
He identifies places and objects, gives her information, but also, together, 
they are able to relive the most difficult and painful moments of his past—to 
transmit and to receive the sparks of reconnection. These are often provoca-
tive and disturbing, as when Said S. and Safiya confront Dov with the real-
ity of his double identity, or when Ruth cannot evade the running mental 
dialogue with Rudolf Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz whose voice, 
implausibly again, addresses and argues with her as soon as she arrives in 
Poland, from the dead, or, as he presents it, from “Zweites Himmel Lager” 
[Second Heaven Camp], as part of his own rehabilitation program.
 This need on the part of the child born after the war, and after the moment 
of expulsion and expropriation, to visit the places from which her parents 
were evicted provides another explanation for cousin Herschel’s return and 
burial of the baby’s photograph in Lodz in Too Many Men. It comes from 
a yearning to find a world before the loss has occurred, before the Rudolf 
Hoesses dominate the scene—from a need for an irrecoverable lost inno-
cence that descendants of survivors imagine and project.
 With the small tin and the photo inside it, Edek is unearthing more than 
his own repressed feelings of loss. He is demonstrating to Ruth her own sur-
rogate role: she is not the first child to “return” “home” to Lódz; the baby had 
already come back before she did, albeit in the guise of a photo. As Joseph 
Roach argues in Cities of the Dead, cultural memory of loss works through a 
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genealogical network of relations we might think of as surrogation: memory 
is repetition but always with some change, reincarnation but with a differ-
ence. Those of us living in the present do not take the place of the dead 
but live among or alongside them. In encountering the baby’s photo, Ruth 
comes to understand her role as surrogate. The lost brother’s photo is liter-
ally dug up from under the foundation of the house. His image, like and also 
unlike her, emerges as the fantasmatic figure shared by all children of survi-
vors who tend to think of themselves as “memorial candles”—stand-ins for 
another lost child, who becomes responsible for perpetuating remembrance, 
for combating forgetting, for speaking in two overlapping voices.8
 The structure of surrogation functions even more literally in Kanafani’s 
text. The children Said and Safiya have after losing Khaldun are called Khalid 
and Khalida. These children do not know about their brother. And yet, on 
some level they may have learned that in the familial economy of loss, they 
are taking his place. At the end of the novel, Said emotionally authorizes 
Khalid to take up arms for Palestine, to win back the home from which they 
were evicted. Mythically, brother will fight against brother.
 Reading these two texts connectively, however, shows how differently 
memory can function in the different contexts in which journeys of return 
take place. When Edek returns to Kamedulska Street, the old couple residing 
there worries that he plans to reclaim his property. Nothing could be further 
from his intentions: Edek and Ruth are there to find the past not the pres-
ent. Even though Edek enjoys the food of his youth and feels at home in his 
language, he is uninterested in Poland and cannot wait to leave it. Ruth could 
not imagine living there: her project is one of mourning and psychic repair, 
not recuperation of the past. Bringing her grandmother’s tea service to New 
York promises to reconnect some of the disparate parts of her life, to find 
continuity with a severed past—not to bring it into the present. But Hoess’s 
constant whisper, overlaid onto her musings about her parents’ and grand-
parents’ world of before, shows her how much the past and also the future are 
dominated and overshadowed by the incontrovertible fact of the genocide. 
No revelation or recovery can heal the breach.
 In Kanafani’s text, we see an entirely different economy at work. “‘You 
can stay for a while in our house,’” Said S. says to Miriam and to Dov as he 
leaves. It is his house and he imagines that his son Khalid will help recover 
it. Khalid had wanted to join the fedayeen, to become a guerilla and sacrifice 
his life for the struggle, but his father and mother had been opposed. Now, 
driving back to Ramallah, Said hopes that his son has left while they were 
away. Memory serves a future of armed struggle and resistance here, not one 
of mourning or melancholy. And return serves the cause of legal and moral 
m a r i a n n e  h i r S C h  209
claims of recovery in a context in which the conflict continues and resolution 
cannot yet be envisioned.
 But the fantasmatic structure of surrogation functions in a more disturb-
ing and open-ended fashion as well. In both texts, the lost child’s survival is, 
for a while at least, submerged in ambiguity. Said S. and Safiya do not know 
whether they will find Khaldun when they return to Haifa. Ruth harbors 
fantasies of searching for and finding her lost brother, and in fact the novel, 
implausibly again, holds out that possibility: a German woman Ruth meets 
on her trip tells her about a young Christian German man named Gerhard 
who looks exactly like her and who, though German, identifies profoundly 
with Jews. At the end of the novel, Ruth, in a fantasy of recovering her lost 
brother, sets out to search for Gerhard. Could the lost child, then, function 
in these texts alongside the logic of the uncanny—as the embodiment of 
childhood innocence and hope irrevocably lost with war and dispossession? 
In this schema, surrogation would work backward toward a primordial past, 
rather than forward into the future, and Edek, as well as Said S., would be 
finding not their sons but their own childhood selves—lost, unprotected, 
neglected, forgotten, and repressed, but returning, perpetually and uncan-
nily, to haunt a tainted present and to hold out the vision of an alternative 
ethical and affective future.
Visual Returns
I turn now to a third body of works that exhibit a visual aesthetics of return 
characterized by fracture, overlay, and superimposition. The works by Bra-
cha Lichtenberg-Ettinger, a second-generation Lacanian psychoanalyst and 
feminist visual artist, allow us to measure the political and psychic implica-
tions of the repetitions and irresolutions of return.
 In her Eurydice Series, produced between 1990 and 2001, Ettinger goes 
back to a street in Lódz at a moment “before” the Shoah. A 1937 street pho-
tograph of Ettinger’s parents from the Polish city of Lódz (see figure 1) has 
become an obsessive image that recurs throughout her visual work in many 
iterations. In the image, her young, smiling parents are energetically walking 
down a street in their town, exuding comfort and safety. They are happy to 
look and be looked at, to display and perform their sense of belonging in this 
city and its urban spaces. In a label on her website, the artist informs view-
ers that, unlike her parents, the friend walking on the street with them was 
later killed by the Nazis. The image of her young parents taken before her 
own birth appears in Ettinger’s Euridyce Series superimposed onto another 
Figure 1
Street photo lódz, 1937.
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image, a washed-out photograph of her own childhood face (see figure 2). 
The child’s smile is covered, almost erased, by the mother’s smiling figure. 
The prewar stroll through the city, the couple walking toward a future they 
could not yet imagine, bleeds into the face of the child who grew up in a 
distant place, dominated by stories and histories that preceded her birth. 
Here, in overlay fashion, are the past and the present, two worlds that the 
postwar child longs to bridge: the world her parents once knew—where the 
Holocaust had not yet happened—and her own world, “after Auschwitz.” 
In projecting her own face onto and into the spaces of the past, Ettinger 
absorbs some of the embodied practices of that past moment, enacting a 
kind of return journey in photographic mode. This journey is characterized 
by similar structures of superimposition and overlay as Brett’s and Kanafani’s 
fictions. Past and present coexist in layered fashion, and their interaction is 
dominated by objects that provoke deep bodily memory and the affects it 
triggers.
 Thus, in Ettinger’s composite images, the Lódz street photo of her par-
ents and the image of her childhood face are often juxtaposed, overlaid, or 
blended with yet a third image—a disturbing, well-known photograph of a 
group of naked Jewish women, some holding children, herded to their exe-
cution by Einsatzgruppen in Poland. This image, no doubt taken by one of 
the Nazi photographers who accompanied the Einsatzgruppen, serves as the 
basis for Ettinger’s Eurydice Series. This is not a space to which one would 
want to return; it is the antithesis of “home.”
 For this artwork, Ettinger made reproductions of various details of the 
Einsatzgruppen photo, which she then ran through a photocopier, enlarged, 
cut into strips, mounted on walls, and tinted with India ink and purple paint 
to a point where all details are washed out or made virtually invisible (see 
figure 3). The juxtapositions of the Lódz and Einsatzgruppen photos—one 
taken by a prewar street photographer, a fellow citizen, the other snapped and 
shaped by the annihilating Nazi gaze conflating the camera with the gun—
illustrate the child’s deep fear of parental impotence in a time of extremity 
that dominates all the texts under discussion. They illustrate the underside of 
return, the fear that violence will be repeated, that, as in Eurydice’s backward 
look, return will prove to be deadly. As objects emerging from the past, the 
superimposed images contain and activate those fears, and Ettinger mobi-
lizes them in her superimpositions.
 The women walking toward their death, holding their babies, suffer the 
ultimate failure of parental care: they cannot protect their children, or them-
selves, from annihilation. They are witnesses and victims of the ultimate 
breach of a social contract in which adults are supposed to protect infants 
Figure 2
bracha lichtenberg-ettinger, “mamalangue—borderline conditions and pathological narcissism,” no. 5.
Figure 3
bracha lichtenberg-ettinger, eurydice, no. 5.
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rather than murder them. In these composite images (see figure 4), the art-
ist, as child, becomes the surrogate of the dead baby; the infant held by the 
mother in the picture becomes, by implication, her own phantom sibling or 
her fragile child self.
 In the Eurydice images, the photos from “before” cannot be separated 
from the photos taken “during” and “after” the destruction. As a child born 
after the war—a child who might easily never have been born at all had her 
parents’ fates taken a slightly different turn—Ettinger is unable to return to 
the spaces from “before” without the superimposed, layered, screen image 
of the atrocity “during.” The prewar photo from the family album—from 
the seemingly protected intimate and embodied space of the family and its 
repertoires—cannot be insulated from the collective, anonymous images in 
the killing fields, and the child born after the war is inevitably haunted by 
the phantom sibling. The two kinds of images, and the three temporalities, 
are inextricably linked. In this way, Ettinger’s juxtapositions forge a power-
ful, anti-nostalgic idiom for the postmemorial subject. Return, even meta-
phoric return, cannot jump over the breach of expulsion, expropriation, and 
murder.
 In foregrounding and recasting Eurydice into the maternal figure who 
lost her child, Ettinger, moreover, is reframing the father/son and father/
daughter perspectives presented in Kanafani’s and Brett’s novels. Ettinger’s 
Eurydice is the maternal figure who returns from Hades having witnessed 
the loss of her child. In her powerful reading of the Eurydice Series, Griselda 
Pollock sees Eurydice as the woman precariously alive “between two deaths”: 
for the women in the ravine, this is the brief moment between being shot by 
the camera and by the gun. Eurydice’s story is no doubt the prototypical nar-
rative of impossible return. For Pollock, however, Ettinger, the daughter art-
ist, is reframing the Orphic gaze of no return in favor of an aesthetic of what 
Ettinger calls “wit(h)ness” and “co-affectivity.”9 In subjecting her original 
images to technologies of mechanical reproduction, in degrading, recycling, 
reproducing, and painting over them, Ettinger underscores the distance and 
anonymity of the camera gaze. But, at the same time, she allows all of these 
images to invade, inhabit, and haunt her, and she therefore inscribes them 
with her own very invested act of looking, exposing in the images her own 
needs and desires—her own fears and nightmares. In Pollock’s reading, the 
purple paint is a physical touch that marks the images with “the color of 
grief ” (175).
 But more still is at stake in a few of the images from this series that 
include yet one more level of superimposition. The grid in the image in fig-
ure 5 is of a World War I map of Palestine, and of aerial views of Palestinian 
Figure 4
bracha lichtenberg-ettinger, eurydice, no. 37.
Figure 5
bracha lichtenberg-ettinger, eurydice, no. 2.
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spaces taken by German warplanes during World War I when Palestine was 
occupied by the British. Ettinger, born in Israel after World War II, has inher-
ited other traces of loss—traces of Palestinian spaces that she maps onto the 
spaces of Polish streets before World War II.
 These competing spaces and temporalities become part of a multilayered 
psychic grid, unconsciously transmitted, merging geography and history and 
challenging any clear chronology or topography of return. The views are 
aerial shots taken by military airplanes. In including them in her own family 
image, Ettinger dramatizes, in a closer and more intimate manner, the irrec-
oncilable stakes of memory and return. The spectral unconscious optics that 
emerge in her composite images blend the spaces of the individual journey 
of return with a larger global awareness of contested space and competing 
geopolitical interests.10 Hers is an enlarged map that incorporates the losses 
of the Shoah into a broader intertwined psychology and geography of irre-
coverable loss. The illegibility of her works, moreover, and the multiple gen-
erations they have undergone in the process of copying and reproduction, 
signal the loss of materiality that the objects and images have suffered in the 
multiple expulsions which they survived in faded and sometimes unrecog-
nizable form.
Sequellae
Ettinger’s layered compositions use the image of the fractured family and 
the lost or murdered child in the service of a political reading in which the 
structure of surrogation produces a layered memory that can recall and call 
attention to multiple losses across unbridgeable divides. The figure of the 
lost child and the textual implausibilities it engenders complicate and subvert 
the temporal and emotional trajectories of return narratives. A spectral fig-
ure that cannot be neatly integrated into the plot, it haunts the return story 
sprouting into series, subplots, projections, overlays, and sequels.
 Just as the return plot of Too Many Men is punctured by the voice and 
implausible sub-plot of Rudolf Hoess, the primary plot of Return to Haifa is 
also interrupted by a long subplot. Said S. tells Safiya about a neighbor, Faris 
al Labda, who went back to his old home in Jaffa to find the picture of his 
martyred brother Badr still hanging in the house they had left. The picture 
inspires the brother who finds it, and the Israeli Arab family who has been 
living in the house, to take up arms for Palestine.
 Both texts have also sprouted sequels. Brett’s sequel to Too Many Men, the 
2006 You’ve Gotta Have Balls, renamed Uncomfortably Close in the paperback 
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edition, takes Ruth and her father back to New York. Kanafani, killed in an 
Israeli reprisal raid in 1972, could not, of course, write a sequel to Return 
to Haifa, but several adaptations and sequels have appeared in Israel, pro-
ducing overlay reinterpretations of the original. These Israeli rewritings and 
stage adaptations use Kanafani’s text in the service of fantasies of peace and 
reconciliation, covering over the breaches and angers that shape the original. 
Most notable is Iraqi–Israeli novelist Sami Michael’s 2005 novel Doves in 
Trafalgar—a work that did not initially acknowledge its debt to Kanafani and 
that features the two mothers in the narrative. Michael’s novel ends with the 
son Zeev’s dream of “a federation between two nations . . . with two flags and 
one common currency.”11 The 2008 theater production of Return to Haifa 
adapted by Boaz Gaon and staged on the occasion of Israel’s sixtieth anniver-
sary “wanted to offer an opening for something else to happen.” Gaon claims 
to find in the novella “a moment of grace where perhaps they could become 
one family” (Harrison).
 In contrast to these recent rewritings, I have read return stories precisely 
for the implausibilities and incongruities, the fractures that foreclose resolu-
tion and reconciliation. Ettinger’s series conform to this structure of irreso-
lution. The Eurydice Series returns to the same images and the same themes 
obsessively, again and again. But this is not an art of endless melancholy and 
perpetual return. I prefer to see the different images in the series, the recur-
ring dreams and nightmares, the multiple plots and subplots in the novels, 
as versions or approximations—drafts of a narrative in process, subject to re-
vision. It is an open-ended narrative that embraces the need for return and 
for repair, even as it accepts its implausibility.
notes
This chapter will also appear in my own book The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and 
Visual Culture after the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012) and in The 
Global and the Intimate, ed. Geraldine Pratt and Victoria Rosner (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012). I am very grateful to Bracha Lichtenberg-Ettinger for permission 
to reproduce her artwork. Thanks also go to a number of colleagues for their helpful sug-
gestions on the draft manuscript: Lila Abu-Lughod, Carol Bardenstein, Sidra DeKoven 
Ezrahi, Saidiya Hartman, Jean Howard, Martha Howell, Dorothy Ko, Jakob Lothe, Nancy 
K. Miller, James Phelan, Victoria Rosner, Susan Rubin Suleiman, Carol Sanger, and Leo 
Spitzer.
 1. On the contemporary phenomenon of return and its recent prevalence, see Hirsch 
and Miller.
 2. On implausibility, see Miller.
 3. See Hirsch and Spitzer, “The Tile Stove” and Ghosts of Home, for a related analysis 
of the embodied qualities of return journeys.
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 4. Miriam is one of the first Jewish–Israeli characters in Palestinian literature, and a 
remarkably sympathetic one.
 5. I am grateful to Amira Hass for pointing this incongruity out to me.
 6. See especially 119–37.
 7. Assmann’s distinction is comparable to Diana Taylor’s recent theorization of a 
distinction between the “archive” and what she terms “the repertoire”—that set of stored 
behaviors and embodied practices that exceed the conventional structures of the cultural 
archive. But while Taylor specifically writes about cultural memory, Assmann’s distinction 
here is centered on individual embodied recall.
 8. The phantom sibling, or “memorial candle,” is a ubiquitous and determining fig-
ure in narratives of massive trauma and loss. See, especially, Richieu in Art Spiegelman’s 
1986 Maus, but also, more recently, the figure of Simon in Phillippe Grimbert’s novel and 
Claude Miller’s 2008 film based on it, A Secret. On the notion of “memorial candle” see 
Wardi. See also Hirsch, Family Frames. On “replacement children,” see Schwab.
 9. See especially Pollock; and Lichtenberg-Ettinger, 1997, 2001.
 10. On unconscious optics see Benjamin; and Hirsch. 
 11. See Karpel for a full account. Michael’s novel has not been translated into English.
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One essential reason why the German–British author W. G. Sebald’s prose 
works are not only peculiarly unclassifiable but also unusually compelling is 
the way in which their textual surface is interrupted by uncaptioned black-
and-white photographs and other visual images. This essay will explore how 
Sebald responds to the historical events of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust by using such visual images as integral parts of his narratives. I will 
focus on two of his books, Luftkrieg und Literatur,1 a collection of essays first 
published in German in 1999, and Austerlitz, the strange novel that appeared 
in 2001. I will discuss two visual images presented in the first essay of the 
former book and then proceed to comment on three images that appear 
toward the end of the latter. In each case, I link the visual images to the nar-
rative discourse in which they are situated and of which, I argue, they form 
an integral and important part. The critical aim of my discussion is to show 
how the interplay of verbal text and visual image serves not only to obliquely 
present Sebald’s abiding preoccupation with the war and the Holocaust but 
also to urge the reader to reflect on the temporal reach of these historical 
events, not least the significant absences they generated in individual lives.2
 Before turning to Sebald, I want to make four observations on the aes-
thetic and ethical effects of visual images presented in verbal narrative.3 
These brief comments on a complex issue are related to, and inspired by, 
the discussion that follows. My obvious yet important first point is that once 
a visual image is included in a verbal text, we are confronted not just with 
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what we can term two different media but also with a constellation of, and 
opposition between, two aesthetic and communicative registers. Simply put, 
the reader also becomes a viewer, and the fact that we are looking at a photo 
when reading a verbal narrative does something to the way we read both the 
verbal text next to the photo and the whole narrative. As Silke Horstkotte 
notes in an essay titled “Photo-Text Topographies,” a photo-text topography 
indicates “a spatial dimension which the photos introduce into the linearity 
of verbal narrative” (50). In a narrative like Austerlitz this spatial dimension 
is added to, or superimposed on, that of the verbal narrative itself. Litera-
ture, and not least fictional literature, has a topography of its own—a spatial 
dimension at once linked and opposed to the temporal one.4 The topography 
of a photo-text, or what J. W. T. Mitchell calls “imagetext” (83), is thus a com-
bination of two topographies, one verbal and one visual, and our construc-
tion of the former (an integral and essential part of the reading of fiction) 
may be supported or complicated by our understanding of the latter. Thus 
the relation of the topographies can vary across a wide spectrum with total 
reinforcement at one end and complete conflict at the other.
 Second, since we conventionally relate a photograph to our experience 
of the external, physical world, the encounter with a photo when reading a 
verbal narrative, and especially a fictional one, raises the issue of authenticity. 
Broadly, two dimensions are activated here. If one purpose of the narrative is 
to say something about historical reality (historical events, characters, pro-
cesses), a photograph can support that purpose. But if, not least in a fictional 
narrative, the author wants to exploit the ambiguity of the photograph, he or 
she can make it part of “an elaborate play with interdiscursive (intertextual, 
intermedial, and intericonic) allusions” (Horstkotte 50), thus problematiz-
ing the notion of authenticity. Interestingly, the two dimensions need not 
necessarily exclude each other; rather, they may coexist in curiously alogical 
fashion. One illustrative example of this kind of combination, which presents 
the reader (and viewer) with a considerable interpretive challenge, is that of 
the photographs of Vita Sackville-West included in the first edition of one 
of the major fictional biographies of the twentieth century, Virginia Woolf ’s 
Orlando (1928).
 Third, since, as indicated already, the presentation and layering of space 
in incorporated photos and other visual images can relate in different ways to 
the topography and storyworld evoked in the verbal narrative, issues of nar-
rative are highlighted. I identify two such issues, both of which are possessed 
of aesthetic as well as ethical aspects. The first aspect is located at the inter-
section of narrative, reading, and viewing. If we are confronted with a visual 
image when reading a verbal narrative, our reading of the verbal text is tem-
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porarily suspended as we look at the image and wonder about its relevance 
and significance. Seen thus, there is a sense in which the visual image has the 
potential to disrupt the previous narrative progression but also the potential 
to enrich it. And yet the image, the textual picture we are looking at, can itself 
include narrative features—features that may be convergent with, accentu-
ated by, or opposed to the surrounding verbal narrative. Such an imbrication 
of visual and verbal elements becomes particularly noticeable if, as in the 
case of Sebald, the textual pictures are uncaptioned, thus in a way making 
the verbal text an extended caption and, conversely, turning the pictures into 
an oblique commentary on the verbal text. This dimension of the first aspect 
blends into the second: who or what are the narrative agent(s) responsible for 
the visual images? If we use the verbal narrative as our interpretive starting 
point, is the relationship between the author and the narrator different as far 
as the textual pictures are concerned?
 Fourth, while most visual images are imbued with an aesthetic aspect, the 
ethical dimension may be more implicit and may to a larger extent depend 
on the reader’s interpretive activity. Unsurprisingly, as far as the Holocaust is 
concerned it is a matter of considerable debate how photographs and other 
visual images of this historical event can, and should, be presented. As Anette 
H. Storeide notes in her contribution to this volume, “an unwritten rule has 
been that the images should not be shown at the expense of the victims and 
not satisfy the audience’s need or greed for sensations and shocking images.” 
This issue is interestingly linked to both of the narratives that I now proceed 
to discuss. One reason why the question is important is that it highlights the 
narrative dimension of photographs of this kind: when a viewer is looking 
at a photo from, say, Auschwitz, his or her more or less accurate or compre-
hensive narrative of Auschwitz is activated; moreover, he or she is forcefully 
reminded of the close, in this case even insistent, interplay of visual image, 
narrative, and historical as well as personal memory.5
 Born in a hamlet in the Bavarian Alps in 1944, Sebald was literally as 
well as metaphorically a child of the Second World War. After the German 
capitulation in May 1945 his father, a soldier in the Wehrmacht (the Ger-
man army), was detained in a prison camp in France for two years. When 
he finally returned to his family in 1947, Sebald’s father, who hardly ever 
spoke about his war experiences, was not recognized by his three-year-old 
son. Whether the difficult relationship with his father was one reason why 
Sebald later decided to leave Germany we do not know. After having stud-
ied German and comparative literature at the University of Freiburg and in 
French-speaking Switzerland, Sebald emigrated to Britain in 1966. After that 
he spent most of his time in Norwich, writing and teaching at the University 
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of East Anglia and becoming the first director of The British Centre for Lit-
erary Translation. His writings stretch from his MA thesis on Carl Stern-
berg and Alfred Döblin, via essays on German and Austrian literature, to 
the more personal essays and the book of poetry titled Nach der Natur.6 In 
the 1990s Sebald’s writing moved closer to fiction, and Austerlitz has often, 
though never by Sebald himself, been referred to as a novel. Tragically, since 
he was killed in a traffic accident in 2001, this major work was to become 
his last book. Both generally and with a view to Austerlitz in particular, the 
passage from Luftkrieg und Literatur that I will consider in this essay marks 
an important stage in Sebald’s development as a writer.
 Even though Luftkrieg und Literatur assumes documentary form, it is not 
generically simple. The two first chapters consist of lectures Sebald delivered 
in Zürich in the autumn of 1994. Two related purposes of these lectures 
were, first, to argue that postwar German literature had failed to address the 
massive destruction of German cities and the killing of German citizens in 
the last years of the war, and, second, to provide a belated account of, and 
reflection on, this vexed issue. While, unsurprisingly, the language of these 
lectures is predominantly argumentative, in the third chapter the discourse’s 
narrative dimension is strengthened. Here Sebald reflects on the reactions 
to his Zürich lectures. The shift to a more narrative mode is accompanied 
by, and partly the result of, the inclusion—or perhaps rather intrusion—of 
elements of autobiography. Few passages in Sebald are more painfully auto-
biographical than the long second paragraph of chapter 3. Here aspects of 
narrative, memory, and photographic image are suggestively combined, thus 
producing rich thematic effects.
 At the beginning of this paragraph, which is at the center of my critical 
attention and blends into my first quoted passage, Sebald makes an unusu-
ally explicit statement on the effect that visual images of the war can have on 
him. “When I see photographs or documentary films dating from the war,” 
he notes, “I feel as if I were its child, so to speak, as if those horrors I did not 
experience cast a shadow over me, and one from which I shall never entirely 
emerge” (71). He then goes on to link this observation to a book published 
in 1963 on the history of a small hamlet in Bavaria, the region where he grew 
up. As we can see in figure 1,7 the page that Sebald reproduces from this book 
shows two photos: an idyllic landscape and a small, laughing girl. The page 
includes two caption-like comments placed next to the photos. Sebald pres-
ents, in English translation, the first of these comments: “The war took much 
from us, but our beautiful native landscape was left untouched, as flourish-
ing as ever.” For Sebald, however, the photos are blended with “images of 
Figure 1
Page 77 of Luftkrieg und Literatur
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destruction—and oddly enough, it is the latter, not the now entirely unreal 
idylls of my early childhood, that make me feel rather as if I were coming 
home.” (71)
 Considered as an integral part of Luftkrieg und Literatur, this textual 
picture is important for two related reasons. The first reason is suggested 
by the formal and semantic elements of the picture itself. We note the rhe-
torically effective way in which the two captions not only comment on the 
photos but are also commented on by the verbal discourse into which they 
are incorporated. This comment also applies to the second caption, that is, 
the one positioned to the left of the laughing girl, “And gradually we move 
on—accompanied by the laughter of our children—into a hopeful future” 
(my translation from the German). If separated from the surrounding nar-
rative and considered as captions only, these two sentences reveal an atti-
tude that is naïvely optimistic and willfully vague about “the war.” When 
read as part of Sebald’s discourse, however, the words accompanying the 
pictures—even more than the photographic images themselves—become 
ironically ambiguous. I identify two facets of this ambiguity, which is the-
matically productive and considerably strengthens the picture’s narrative 
dimension. First, the noun “the war”/“der Krieg” may refer not just to the 
Second World War but also to the first. Although this link may be rather 
weak, it is supported by the second facet: the picture of the little girl strik-
ingly calls to mind the way in which girls and young women were presented 
by Nazi propaganda in the 1930s. Significantly, this association on the part 
of the reader, and perhaps also Sebald, becomes possible only as a result of 
the visual image—neither the caption nor Sebald’s verbal discourse refers to 
the prewar period. The photo of the laughing girl accentuates the irony of 
Sebald’s observation, while at the same time furthering the discourse’s nar-
rative and thematic complexity. The textual reference to “images of destruc-
tion” (which are not presented or reproduced visually) colors our reading of 
both the visual image of the beautiful landscape and of the laughing girl. As 
readers who also become viewers, we see these visual images and simultane-
ously imagine war’s destruction.
 The second reason why this picture is important is that it provides the 
starting point for, as well as an elegant transition to, the concluding part of 
the paragraph and its incorporated photograph. The English translation of 
the passage accompanying the photo reads thus:
I know now that at the time, when I was lying in my bassinet on the bal-
cony of the Seefeld house and looking up at the pale blue sky, there was a 
pall of smoke in the air all over Europe, over the rearguard actions in east 
J a k O b  l O T h e  227
and west, over the ruins of the German cities, over the camps where untold 
numbers of people were burnt, people from Berlin and Frankfurt, from 
Wuppertal and Vienna, from Würzburg and Kissingen, from Hilversum 
and The Hague, Naumur and Thionville, Lyon and Bordeaux, Kraków and 
Łódź, Szeged and Sarajevo, Salonika and Rhodes, Ferrara and Venice—
there was scarcely a place in Europe from which no one had been deported 
to his death in those years. I have seen memorial tablets even in the most 
remote villages on the island of Corsica reading “Morte à Auschwitz” or 
“Tué par les Allemands, Flossenburg 1944.” I saw something else in Corsica 
too—if I may be permitted a digression: I saw the picture from my parents’ 
bedroom in the church of Morosaglia, a half-decayed edifice with a dusty, 
pseudo-Baroque interior. It was a bluish oleograph in the Nazarene style, 
showing Christ before his Passion seated deep in thought in the moonlit, 
nocturnal Garden of Gethsemane. The selfsame picture had hung over 
my parents’ conjugal bed for many years, and then at some point it disap-
peared, probably when they bought new bedroom furniture. And now here 
it was again, or at least one exactly like it, in the village church of Moro-
saglia, General Paoli’s birthplace, leaning against the plinth of an altar in 
a dark corner of one of the side aisles. My parents told me that just before 
their wedding in 1936 they had bought their picture in Bamberg, where my 
father was transport sergeant in the cavalry regiment in which the young 
Stauffenberg had begun his military career ten years earlier. Such is the 
dark backward and abysm of time. Everything lies all jumbled up in it, and 
when you look down you feel dizzy and afraid. (71–74)
 Relating this passage and its textual picture to our concern with narrative 
and memory, we can start by noting how the narrator’s, and Sebald’s, associa-
tive train of thought gradually brings him closer to the key words “deported 
to his death.” In Sebald’s original German, the concluding part of the sen-
tence (following all the place names) reads: “—kaum ein Ort in Europa, aus 
dem in diesen Jahren niemand deportiert worden wäre in den Tod” (78) (“—
there was scarcely a place in Europe from which no one had been deported 
to his death in those years”).8 The subjunctive in the passive construction 
“deportiert worden wäre” is doubly significant: while the passive reminds us 
that they were deported by somebody, that is, the Nazis, the subjunctive form 
wäre refers to “niemand”/nobody, thus indicating that in spite of the narra-
tor’s wish, deportations actually occurred in all of these places. The double 
negation affirms a historical truth.
 The association of names prompted by the first picture brings the narra-
tor into touch with the second one, which then takes over as the narrative’s 
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primary point of reference. I do not find it necessary to distinguish between 
the narrator and Sebald here. What is important, however, is to note how 
suggestively, almost imperceptibly, three constituent elements of the narra-
tor’s experiential self are blended. James Phelan has usefully drawn atten-
tion to the ways in which, in much autobiographical narrative, the “I” “will 
sometimes speak from the perspective of her former self, thereby making 
the communication shift from the direct to the indirect” (1). In this passage, 
the narrator is speaking from two perspectives of his former self: while at the 
beginning the “I” is looking up at the “pale blue sky” (71) from the balcony 
of his parents’ home in Bavaria, the “memorial tablets” (73) which he refers 
to are clearly seen not only in a “remote” place but also at a much later stage 
of his life. Moreover, since Sebald’s own perspective as narrator at the time of 
writing is not totally eliminated, it is added to, or perhaps rather infiltrated 
by, the other two.
 The documentary feature of this variant of first-person account serves 
to delineate its narrative purpose. It also strengthens the narrative’s autobio-
graphical dimension, which has two distinctive features in this paragraph. 
On the one hand, the narrator is induced by the idyllic scene from the Bavar-
ian countryside to think of the many places from which people, in large part 
Jews, were deported to Nazi concentration and extermination camps. On 
the other hand, or rather as a digression (Abschweifung) from his train of 
thought, the narrator takes the reader into his parents’ bedroom. I am not 
claiming that looking at this picture (see figure 2) makes us feel voyeuristic. 
But I am suggesting that the addition of this second autobiographical facet 
brings the reader embarrassingly and almost painfully close to Sebald’s dif-
ficult relationship and lasting preoccupation with his parents, his Bavarian 
home, his past, and the Holocaust.
 It is characteristic of Sebald’s narrative art that the transition from the 
first to the second autobiographical facet is provoked by his associative inter-
linking of two physical objects seen in the same place, that is, Corsica: first 
the “memorial tablets” and then the oleograph in the church of Morosaglia 
which he identifies as “the picture from my parents’ bedroom” (73). To these 
two elements of space are added the geographical names of Auschwitz and 
Flossenburg, yet in Sebald’s discourse all of these places are immediately 
temporalized. The memorial tablets are related both to the time of his visit 
and to 1944; the painting of Christ in Gethsemane is related not just to his 
parents’ bedroom but also to the time when he (the narrator/Sebald) was a 
child, perhaps sleeping in the same room. Thus the atrocities of the Holo-
caust force themselves into the author’s most private sphere. This narrative 
association of historical events and personal memory is strengthened by the 
Figure 2
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reference to Bamberg, where Sebald’s parents had bought the picture in 1936. 
Sebald’s father was a transport officer in Bamberg at the time, and exactly 
here “the young Stauffenberg had begun his military career ten years ear-
lier” (74). This information is historically correct: Claus Schenk Graf von 
Stauffenberg, born 1907, entered the so-called Reiterregiment in Bamberg in 
1926. Stauffenberg later played a key role in the attempt to assassinate Hitler 
in 1944; when this attempt failed, he was caught and executed.
 It would be misleading, however, to claim that it is the connection 
between Sebald’s father and Stauffenberg that leads the narrator to make the 
observation on time and history at the end of the passage. Although inspired 
by it, this generalized comment is generated by the narrative’s implications 
and thematic thrust. The picture inserted into the middle of the paragraph 
simultaneously prompts and silently accompanies the narrator’s observation, 
serving as an obscure visual illustration of it. Considered as a photograph, 
the picture is not a good one; it seems amateurishly contrived and there is 
no way we as readers can decide whether it is authentic or not. That is not 
the main issue here, however. What is essential from my critical perspective 
is the picture’s narrative and thematic function in this particular paragraph, 
and as an integral part of Luftkrieg und Literatur. Seen in this light, it is argu-
ably very significant. Since the photo shows a bedroom with a painting on 
the wall, the visual medium of painting is added to that of photography; and 
the defining features of both these variants of visual representation simul-
taneously enrich and complicate our reading of the verbal text. As the pho-
tograph shows both a bedroom and a painting, two elements of space are 
presented as one. Yet there is a tension between them. Accentuated by the 
different forms of visual media (photograph and painting), this tension is 
generated in large part by the contrast between the temporal positioning of 
the bedroom in the late 1940s and the image of Christ in Gethsemane almost 
2,000 years earlier. This constellation of two spatial images held together 
in one spatial frame considerably strengthens the photograph’s temporal 
dimension, while also accentuating the religious (Catholic) dimension of 
Sebald’s childhood milieu. It is significant that, as described by the narrator, 
Christ is not only alone but “seated deep in thought.” It is as though the nar-
rator is identifying, and even accentuating, a distinctly melancholic aspect 
of the painting—an aspect imbued with a sense of loneliness and powerless-
ness. Thus the content of the visual image contributes to the dizziness and 
fear associated with looking at the past. Markus Weber has suggested that, 
for Sebald, pictures do not document reality but rather indicate the narrator’s 
searching movement. Weber’s term Suchbewegung (68) is suggestive, and his 
point would seem to be supported by this picture. The movement is not just 
into the past, since the “abysm of time” also brings the past closer. There is a 
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strong sense in which the visual image documents reality not only as remem-
bered by the narrator but also as experienced by him at the time of seeing the 
picture in the church in Morosaglia. What he sees in the church is not the 
photo but the painting in it; thus he is reminded of his childhood by looking 
at a work of art—an object that is made, created, rather than mechanically 
reproduced. And yet the painting is of course reproduced here, in the photo, 
thus adding one more complication.
 Turning to Austerlitz, a perhaps obvious yet important first point to make 
is that since this long narrative is closer to the novel than to autobiogra-
phy, the effects of its insistent linking of verbal discourse and visual image 
both resemble and differ from those noted in Luftkrieg und Literatur. As in 
the latter book, the verbal discourse of Austerlitz is punctuated by visual 
images, which are here not just photographic but also graphic and filmic. I 
will discuss the way in which three different textual pictures—a map, a fro-
zen video image, and the photo of a railway station—influence and shape our 
understanding of the three passages of verbal discourse into which they are 
inserted and from which neither author nor reader—or, inside the fictional 
universe of Austerlitz, neither narrator nor character or narratee—is able to 
dissociate them.
 One important reason why the visual images in Austerlitz both resemble 
and differ from those in Luftkrieg und Literatur is generic. I have described 
the chapter from the latter book as a blend of essay, commentary, and autobi-
ography. Even though we must be wary of collapsing these generic categories 
into one, they all purport to refer to, and thus represent, aspects of the real 
world—such as Sebald’s reflections on the reactions to his Zürich lectures or 
the account, albeit selective, of aspects of his childhood in Bavaria. The essen-
tial point to make here is that in this discourse the embedded photographs 
confirm, rather than complicate, its nonfictional character. I am making this 
point in spite of the fact that the photo of the bedroom of Sebald’s parents 
may be “constructed,” and thus in one sense fictional. One of photography’s 
defining features, and also one of the strongest conventions associated with 
this medium, is its capacity to visually represent a segment of physical reality 
at a given point in time. Seen thus, photography is a marker of nonfictional-
ity, and not just in Luftkrieg und Literatur but also in Austerlitz. In the latter 
text, however, the relationship between visual image and verbal discourse is 
more complex, also in the sense of being more problematic and presenting 
the reader with considerable interpretive challenges. The reason is that in 
contrast to Luftkrieg und Literatur, the verbal discourse of Austerlitz is pos-
sessed of several signposts of fictionality. Even though there is no theoretical 
consensus as to whether any combination of linguistic usages or narrative 
and literary devices can unambiguously indicate fictionality, David Gorman 
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is right to note, in his helpful entry on “Theories of Fiction” in the Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, that the combination of such signposts at 
least makes a text more likely to be fictional. Two signposts of fictionality in 
this novel (I will call it a novel, though it is a strange and highly original one) 
are extensive use of dialogue and what Gorman calls “distinguishability” of 
narrator from author.
 As my reading of the three visual images in Austerlitz turns on the way in 
which they are embedded in a verbal discourse, I need to briefly indicate how 
the narrative is established and sustained. The main character of Austerlitz 
has grown up ignorant of his past, and many years after the Second World 
War he is forced to explore what happened to him and his parents, both of 
whom were Jews and in all probability victims of the Holocaust.
 This is how the novel begins: “In the second half of the 1960s I travelled 
repeatedly from England to Belgium, partly for study purposes, partly for 
other reasons which were never entirely clear to me, staying sometimes for 
just one or two days, sometimes for several weeks” (1). On a first reading, 
we may think that the first-person narrator, the “I” who travels “repeatedly 
from England to Belgium,” is identical with Austerlitz. Yet although, as it 
turns out, there is a peculiarly strong resemblance between the first-person 
narrator and the novel’s main character—who also becomes eventually a 
main narrator—this beginning is actually a frame narrative whose function 
is to establish a narrative situation in which the two can meet and in which 
Austerlitz can talk.
 Sebald’s use of a frame narrator can be linked to a tradition of such nar-
rators in literary fiction. With a view to the narrative and thematic fabric of 
Austerlitz, the gains of employing a frame narrator are considerable, and they 
strikingly resemble the effects of Joseph Conrad’s use of a frame narrator in 
Heart of Darkness. Conrad’s famous novella from 1899 is one of the strongest 
intertexts in Austerlitz. In both narratives, the main narrator is introduced by 
a frame narrator, who then becomes a keenly interested listener or narratee. 
Moreover, in Austerlitz as in Heart of Darkness, the frame narrator’s relative 
conventionality renders him more reliable, thus making it easier for us to 
believe Austerlitz’s story, which the frame narrator reports to us as readers. 
This narrative strategy creates a tentacular effect: we are drawn into the nar-
rative in a manner comparable to the way in which the frame narrator is irre-
sistibly attracted to Austerlitz’s account. And one of the elements that attract 
him, and the reader, is Austerlitz’s pictures. In Story and Situation, Ross 
Chambers draws attention to the manner in which, at a deep and frequently 
unthematized level, the narrator’s motivation to narrate is complemented by 
the narratee’s readiness to listen, and he notes that for both parties, possibili-
ties of gain as well as risks of loss are involved (51). The narrative situations 
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in Austerlitz offer ample illustrations of this important point. For example, 
by telling fragments of his story Austerlitz risks confirming his sense of loss 
and estrangement, yet his narration may enable him to negotiate that loss. 
By listening to the story, the narratee risks losing, or being drawn out of, a 
comfortable position of ignorance; yet the fact that he not only listens to but 
also retells what Austerlitz has told him suggests a learning process, and thus 
the possibility of gaining essential knowledge.
 Even though both the frame narrator and Austerlitz are presented as fic-
tional characters, the pictures Austerlitz takes—and at least some of which, 
the reader assumes, are presented in the book—seem to refer to the same 
physical reality as those included in Luftkrieg und Literatur. And yet we read 
them differently, since the pictures in Austerlitz simultaneously oppose and 
are colored by the fictional verbal discourse in which they are embedded, 
and from which Sebald makes it exceedingly difficult to disentangle them. 
During one of their first conversations in the railway station in Antwerp, 
“Austerlitz took a camera out of his rucksack, an old Ensign with telescopic 
bellows, and took several pictures of the mirrors, which were now quite dark, 
but so far I have been unable to find them among the many hundreds of 
pictures, most of them unsorted, that he entrusted to me soon after we met 
again in the winter of 1996” (7). If Austerlitz’s narrative is relayed to the 
reader via the frame narrator, so, it seems, are his pictures.
 In an insightful comment on Heart of Darkness, Tzvetan Todorov has 
said of Marlow’s narration that it spirals toward a thematic core or center, 
which, however, turns out to be empty (167, 169). There is a sense in which 
this description applies to Austerlitz’s narration too, and the three textual 
images to be discussed support the notion of gravitating toward a nightmar-
ish vacuity. A Czech Jew, Austerlitz escaped from the Nazis in the summer of 
1939, on a Kindertransport to Britain. Austerlitz’s father, Maximilian, fled to 
France, while his mother, Agáta, remained in Czechoslovakia together with 
Věra, a non-Jewish friend of the family. As Austerlitz’s search for his parents 
now, many years later, takes him “further and further east and further and 
further back in time” (262–63), his conversations with Věra, with whom he 
resumes contact, make him believe that his mother was interned in Terezín 
(the German name is Theresienstadt) in late 1942 (281) and then “sent east in 
September 1944” (287).9 Accordingly, Austerlitz, with typical thoroughness, 
studies an 800-page book “which H. G. Adler, a name previously unknown 
to me, had written between 1945 and 1947 in the most difficult of circum-
stances, partly in Prague and partly in London, on the subject of the setting 
up, development and internal organization of the Theresienstadt ghetto . . .” 
(327). In the German edition of Austerlitz, this sentence is divided into two 
by this textual picture, shown in figure 3.
Figure 3
Pages 336–37 of Austerlitz
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 An illustrative example of Sebald’s technique of integrating visual images 
into his verbal discourse, this map invites three comments. First, although 
not a photograph, this textual picture has a topographical dimension in 
that it indicates—and makes Austerlitz, the frame narrator, and the reader 
visualize—an element of space, a place complete with streets, houses, and a 
surrounding border. However, as our knowledge that this place was a con-
centration camp during the Second World War blends into our impression of 
its topographical shape, it is temporalized and linked to our own history. Sec-
ond, as if preempting such a reading of the map, Austerlitz makes an attempt 
to qualify or counter it by stating that “because in its almost futuristic defor-
mation of social life the ghetto system had something incomprehensible and 
unreal about it . . .” (331). This is as close as the verbal discourse in Austerlitz 
comes to being a caption, or caption-like. Third, like most maps, this one too 
has names written on it. Names, as we well know, have to be read; and two 
general names in particular become semantically loaded in the context of the 
proper names to which they are linked and of the verbal narrative in which 
they are situated: “(BHF)” [railway station] and “KREMATORIUM.” “BHF” 
signifies both Austerlitz’s restless train journeys across Europe and those 
of countless Jews being deported to the extermination camps; “KREMATO-
RIUM” is repeated in the main text when the frame narrator reports that the 
“incinerators of the crematorium, kept going day and night in cycles of forty 
minutes at a time, were stretched to the utmost limits of their capacity, said 
Austerlitz” (337).
 The protagonist and main narrator Austerlitz makes this comment in 
the middle of the novel’s longest sentence, which stretches from page 331 to 
page 342. Through this long, convoluted sentence, Austerlitz’s first-person 
narrative—relayed to the reader via the frame narrator—makes a sustained 
attempt to move beyond the sterile surface of the map, groping for a different 
kind of sign that could possibly affirm, for him, the existence of his mother 
in the camp. At the very end of the ten-page sentence, Austerlitz suddenly 
mentions that, according to Adler, the Nazis made a film at Theresienstadt, 
a film Adler never saw “and thought it was now lost without trace” (342). 
However, Austerlitz eventually manages to obtain “a cassette copy of the film 
of Theresienstadt for which I had been searching” (343). Watching the film, 
he cannot see his mother, Agáta, anywhere. But then he gets the idea of hav-
ing a slow-motion copy made. Watching this artificially extended version, 
he notices the face of a young woman in the backdrop. The visual image is 
accompanied by this passage:
Around her neck, said Austerlitz, she is wearing a three-stringed and del-
icately draped necklace which scarcely stands out from her dark, high-
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necked dress, and there is, I think, a white flower in her hair. She looks, 
so I tell myself as I watch, just as I imagined the singer Agáta from my 
faint memories and the few other clues to her appearance that I now have, 
and I gaze again and again at that face, which seems to me both strange 
and familiar, said Austerlitz, I run the tape back repeatedly, looking at the 
time indicator in the top left-hand corner of the screen, where the figures 
covering part of her forehead show the minutes and seconds, from 10:53 
to 10:57, while the hundredths of a second flash by so fast that you cannot 
read and capture them. (350–51)
 As it turns out, this woman is probably not Agáta, since Věra cannot 
recognize her. Nor does Austerlitz himself seem to be certain of her iden-
tity, as words such as “imagined” and “faint memories” indicate. The failure 
of identification is revealing. My main concern, though, is the presentation 
and effect of the image. Unusually for Austerlitz, the textual image inserted 
into this passage is filmic. This means that, in concert with this medium’s 
conditions of production (that is, making a film), what we are looking at 
here is just one frame out of the 24 frames per second that our eyes need to 
be exposed to in order to experience an optical illusion of movement. The 
temporal dimension of the filmic image is insistent in a way that that of a 
photograph is not, and here it is visually presented in the form of the num-
bers indicating the day, month, and year of the recording of the tape, as well 
as the time (close to eleven minutes) played and seen so far.
 And yet what we are looking at is a frozen image, an image that insists 
on moving and yet stands still, suspended in time and space. It is as though 
Austerlitz, or Sebald, or the frame narrator, is attempting to stabilize or tem-
porarily halt a fleeting, moving image by freezing it in time—first by having 
the slow-motion copy made and then by making the still copy. Avi Kempin-
ski finds that by running “the tape back repeatedly,” Austerlitz evokes Roland 
Barthes’s notion of the “defeat of Time” (96) in historical photographs; Aus-
terlitz seems to experience a punctum whose uncoded intensity and “power 
of expansion” (Barthes 45) lead him to believe that the woman in the photo 
may be his mother.10 Kempinski is correct to note that “despite this attempt 
to resuscitate the mother-image through the ‘defeat of time,’ this faint image 
ultimately betrays a face, but not the mother’s” (466). The two faces in the 
image seem to be approaching the viewer from an unknown place some-
where in the past, and the lack of textual commentary on the man in the 
foreground of the still seems conspicuous. He appears to be unknown, yet he 
may irresistibly remind Austerlitz of his lost father. Although there is some-
thing ghostlike about the appearance of the two faces, they do add a human 
dimension to the map of Theresienstadt, the place where these two human 
Figure 4
Page 358 of Austerlitz
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beings were at the time of the shooting of the film. The image contributes to, 
and further extends, Austerlitz’s attempt to understand at least something of 
the terrible conditions under which the inmates of the camp lived. As Mari-
anne Hirsch has shown in Family Frames, the appearance of faces, human 
beings, in a photograph prompts a form of narrativization of it—not least if it 
is one of a family member. In this textual picture, narrativization is accentu-
ated partly by the way in which time and space play equally important roles 
in film, partly by the imprint of temporal markers (numbers) on the frozen 
image.
 We have noted that although the visual images in Austerlitz, in common 
with those in Luftkrieg und Literatur, seem to refer to physical reality, we read 
them differently because of the fictional verbal discourse into which they are 
integrated. One of the ways in which Sebald makes it difficult to disentangle 
this frozen filmic image from the fiction in which it is embedded is that Aus-
terlitz thinks he can recognize his mother, Agáta, in a historical film made 
at Theresienstadt by the Nazis.11 As it would seem impossible for a fictional 
character such as Austerlitz to recognize his mother in a documentary film 
about people in the real world, there is a sense in which the historical film is 
fictionalized—even though it links Austerlitz to historical reality. Moreover, 
fictionalization is also very much part of the film itself: as a Nazi propaganda 
film it presents a picture of Theresienstadt that is entirely false. Before mak-
ing the film, the Nazi authorities fixed up the camp and arranged cultural 
activities to give the appearance of a happy community; after the filming 
ended, the camp slipped back into its cruel routine. In the fictional world 
of the novel, Austerlitz thinks that Agáta was “sent east in September 1944” 
(287); in historical reality, both before and after shooting the film at There-
sienstadt, the Nazis deported a large number of the camp’s inmates to Ausch-
witz. Accentuating the novel’s ethical dimension, Sebald’s incorporation of 
the documentary into the fiction of Austerlitz testifies to a powerful concern 
on his part not just with the relations between history and fiction but also 
with the relations between truth and falsity: the documentary has a historical 
existence but its purpose was not to fictionalize but to lie, whereas Sebald’s 
narrative is fictional but its purpose is to capture truths that the documen-
tary either denies or neglects. Indeed, the Nazi film does not really merit the 
term “documentary,” even if, as Sebald demonstrates, documentary evidence 
of some sort may be obtained from it through an oppositional reading.
 Just after the presentation of this image, Austerlitz tells his narratee, who 
has been listening patiently for a long while, that “he was now about to go to 
Paris to search for traces of his father’s last movements” (354). If the visual 
image of the woman from Theresienstadt is as close as Austerlitz thinks he is 
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able to come to his mother, the last one I want to discuss is a forceful visual 
representation of his search for his father (see figure 5).
 Linked to this visual image is the following paragraph:
Curiously enough, said Austerlitz, a few hours after our last meeting, when 
he had come back from the Bibliothèque Nationale and changed trains at 
the Gare d’Austerlitz, he had felt a premonition that he was coming closer 
to his father. . . . an idea came to him of his father’s leaving Paris from this 
station, close as it was to his flat in the rue Barrault, soon after the Germans 
entered the city. I imagined, said Austerlitz, that I saw him leaning out of 
the window of his compartment as the train left, and I saw the white clouds 
of smoke rising from the locomotive as it began to move ponderously away. 
(404–6)
Reading these lines and looking at this textual picture, the reader has a sense 
of the narrative coming full circle, for one of the first images of Austerlitz is 
also one of a railway station. Moreover, the name of the railway station at 
Antwerp, Salle des pas perdu (Hall of Lost Steps), can equally be linked to the 
Gare d’Austerlitz, whose name is blended with one significant aspect of the 
protagonist’s name. As the frame narrator tells us that Austerlitz takes several 
photographs in the Salle des pas perdu, he may have taken this one too.
 Significantly, there are no people in this photo—just a large hall and two 
trains, one on each side of the hall. We assume that it is a photo of the Gare 
d’Austerlitz, but we cannot be sure, and probably are not meant to be. This 
kind of ambiguity is thematically productive: the image induces us to think, 
first, of Austerlitz imagining his father traveling out, aus, escaping from the 
Nazis in 1940 and yet, we suspect, ending up in a concentration camp a few 
years later. Second, the image also invites us to think of this railway station 
as one of many sites of deportation. The German words Zug and Bahn/Eisen-
bahn are semantically loaded for Sebald, as are the various references to trains 
and railways throughout Austerlitz. On the one hand, they signal voluntary 
travel and possible escape (as in the case of Austerlitz himself); on the other 
hand, they are inextricably linked to the transport of Jews to the concentra-
tion and extermination camps. Giving a visual anchorage to one of the novel’s 
most important leitmotifs, this last image is suggestively linked to the one 
from Theresienstadt just discussed. While the first one gives us an image of 
two humans with textual commentary about Austerlitz’s effort to identify the 
woman as his mother, the second gives us an image without any humans but 
with commentary about Austerlitz’s imagining his father leaning out of the 
window of a train leaving the station. The first juxtaposition of image and text 
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leads to the conclusion that the woman is not his mother, while the second 
emphasizes the gap between what is known and what is imagined. In differ-
ent ways the combinations of visual image and verbal text underline the same 
larger point about the absence in Austerlitz’s knowledge—and in his life.
 Concluding, I link my observations on these three textual pictures in Aus-
terlitz to those made on the three photographs from Luftkrieg und Literatur. 
Even though these images would appear to support Mieke Bal’s notion of 
making “discourse a partner, rather than dominant opponent, of visuality” 
(288), we must not forget that, as we have seen, the visual images’ narrative 
and thematic functions vary considerably. Broadly speaking, the relationship 
between visual image and verbal discourse is less obvious, and more indirect, 
if this discourse is fictional. And yet the map of Theresienstadt, the frozen 
filmic image of two of the camp’s inmates, and the photo of Gare d’Austerlitz 
serve to anchor the constructed story of the fictional character Austerlitz in 
historical reality. Aided by his fictional narrator, Sebald manages to make 
some contact with aspects of his past, the war, and the Holocaust that would 
otherwise have remained out of reach.
 All the visual images discussed here, and not least the last one from Luft-
krieg und Literatur, contribute significantly to the two texts’ multidimen-
sionality of narrative and thematic purpose not only by altering the verbal 
meaning but, more importantly, by extending and enriching that meaning. 
Since the photograph of the bedroom of the narrator’s parents is placed in 
the narrative of Sebald’s familial history, and since that history is available to 
him essentially through associative, narrativized memory, the temporal and 
spatial variants of distance observable in the photo simultaneously reflect and 
intensify the narrator’s sense of being permanently removed from something 
or somebody he cannot possibly retrieve but still needs to go on searching 
for. The visual images in Austerlitz, and the passages of which they become 
integral parts, reveal narrative fiction’s unique capacity to make a strong, gen-
eralized statement about human action—ranging from mass murder on the 
one hand to the importance of not forgetting those murders on the other.
 In Luftkrieg und Literatur as in Austerlitz, the visual images confirm and 
intensify the narratives’ ethical dimension. In the novel’s fictional discourse, 
the ethical facet is closely linked to, and developed through, Austerlitz as 
character narrator. Austerlitz keeps searching for his parents because he feels 
he has a moral obligation to do so and because he has an existential need to 
search for his own past. The novel’s ethical thrust is perhaps even stronger 
for the frame narrator, who feels compelled to listen to Austerlitz as a kind of 
moral duty of learning and also of witnessing by passing on Austerlitz’s story 
to the reader. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub put emphasis on the impor-
J a k O b  l O T h e  243
tant role of the listener in testimony (57–59)—in an important way, the frame 
narrator and via him the reader are placed into that role here. Thus the novel 
has two main narrators, since Sebald makes the entire narrative depend on 
a frame narrator who is German and who as a German born at the end of 
the war comes distressingly close to awful crimes he did not commit.12 While 
Austerlitz is drawn toward the victims of the Holocaust, the frame narrator 
seems unable to reassuringly distance himself from the perpetrators respon-
sible for the crime.13 The photograph of the empty railway station—be it the 
Gare d’Austerlitz or an anonymous site of deportation or both—is a forceful 
visual reminder of the novel’s ethical dimension, effectively relayed to the 
reader via the frame narrator as Austerlitz’s narratee. In our example of non-
fictional, autobiographical discourse the ethical dimension becomes particu-
larly noticeable in the narrator’s associative linking, in the village in Corsica, 
of the “memorial tablets” of Holocaust victims and “the picture from my par-
ents’ bedroom” (73). It is significant that, in common with most autobiogra-
phies or fragments of autobiography, this narration is in the first person. As a 
first-person narrator is involved in the plot, it becomes more difficult for him 
or her to remain at a comfortable distance from that plot. Although Sebald 
was born during the war, this narrative association suggests that in a distress-
ing sense his father’s service in the Wehrmacht brings him, the first-person 
narrator Sebald, problematically close to wartime actions making possible, 
and including, the Holocaust. The reference to Stauffenberg, whose moral 
decision to attempt to assassinate Hitler cost him his life, further strength-
ens the passage’s ethical dimension. So does the painting in the photograph: 
Jesus, immobile and in a moment of doubt, is also facing an ethical dilemma 
at this difficult stage of the narrative of His Passion. Although this kind of 
affinity should not be exaggerated, it suggests, in combination with the other 
aspects we have noted, Sebald’s narrative method of linking together appar-
ently disparate elements of space and time.
notes
 1. The title of the German original is preferable to the English one, On the Natural 
History of Destruction. However, quotations from this book as well as Austerlitz are from 
the English translations by Anthea Bell.
 2. Three helpful collections of essays on Sebald are Görner, The Anatomist of Melan-
choly; Long and Whitehead, W. G. Sebald; and Patt, Searching for Sebald. Two important 
monographs are McCulloh, Understanding W. G. Sebald; and Long, W. G. Sebald. In addi-
tion to the contributions to Patt’s volume, four essays dealing specifically with the issue of 
visual images and narrative in Sebald are Shaffer, “W. G. Sebald’s Photographic Narrative”; 
244 1 0 :  n a r r a T i v e ,  m e m O r y ,  a n d  v i S U a l  i m a g e
Duttlinger, “Traumatic Experience”; Kilbourn, ”Architecture and Cinema”; and Horstkotte, 
“Photo-Text Topographies.” 
 3. I use the terms “visual image” and “textual picture” synonymously to indicate pho-
tographs and photocopied matter (e.g., an illustration or a map) presented in, and thus 
made a part of, a verbal text. Even though such images are generically and aesthetically 
very different from the images formed in, and by, verbal language, the interpretive activity 
prompted by the reading of Sebald can establish points of contact between the two main 
variants.
 4. In Topographies J. Hillis Miller gives a detailed account of the complexity of the 
term; see especially 3–5. I make more comments on the spatial aspect of narrative fiction 
in my “Space, Time, Narrative.”
 5. Two helpful books on narrative and memory are King, Memory, Narrative, Identity; 
and Rossington and Whitehead, Theories of Memory.
 6. The English translation by Michael Hamburger, After Nature, appeared in 2001.
 7. Since the positioning of the photos is inaccurate in the English editions of Luftkrieg 
und Literatur and Austerlitz compared to the original German ones, illustrations of pages 
with photographs or other images inserted into the body of the text are taken from the 
German editions. Quotations from the passages associated with the images, however, are 
from the English translations by Anthea Bell.
 8. Although Anthea Bell’s translation is generally good, it needs to be pointed out that 
Sebald’s niemand (nobody) refers not just to people deported to “his death” but also “her 
death.” Large numbers of women were deported from locations across Europe, and their 
chance of surviving a camp like Auschwitz was even smaller than that of the men.
 9. A specific and historical camp, Theresienstadt is at the same time representative of 
the concentration and extermination camps constructed and run by Nazi Germany. Of all 
the camps, Auschwitz has come to symbolically represent the Holocaust, and it is hardly 
coincidental that the first three and last three letters of the names Austerlitz and Auschwitz 
are identical. See my “Narrative, Genre, Memory,” 117.
 10. While in Camera Lucida the concept of studium refers to the cultural, linguistic, 
and relatively conventional interpretation of a photograph, punctum denotes the wound-
ing, intensified, subjective, and personally touching detail that establishes a more direct 
relationship with the object or person within the photo. See Barthes, 26–27.
 11. The film’s original title is Der Führer schenkt den Juden eine Stadt (The Führer Gives 
a City to the Jews), written and directed by the Jewish actor Kurt Gerron. Forcing Gerron 
to make the film, the Nazi authorities promised him his life. Filming started on August 16, 
1944, and was completed on September 11 of that year. After that, Gerron was deported 
to Auschwitz, and he was gassed in Birkenau on October 28, 1944. See The Holocaust 
Education & Archive Research Team, http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/toc.html. 
Surviving footage of the film, a portion of which can be seen on YouTube, is about twenty 
minutes long. The YouTube excerpt includes the filmic image of the man and woman pre-
sented on page 351 of the novel and discussed in this essay. See http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Hp_KaenGnDM.
 12. Although the frame narrator lives in England, he tells the reader, “I returned 
to Germany at the end of 1975, intending to settle permanently in my native country, 
to which I felt I had become a stranger after nine years of absence” (45). The number 
“18.5.44” (415), which the frame narrator mentions on the novel’s last page, is Sebald’s 
birth date.
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 13. If, as Charles L. Griswold observes in Forgiveness, “forgiveness requires reciprocity 
between injurer and injured” (xvi), the conversations between the frame narrator and Aus-
terlitz reveal, as I argue in a different essay (“Forgiveness, History,  Narrative,”), elements 
of such reciprocity, which simultaneously highlight the need for forgiveness and demon-
strate the problems or limitations of forgiveness. In the narrative dynamics of Austerlitz 
these elements are blended with, and thus in one sense qualified by, friendship, trust, and 
a melancholic sensation of the past’s pervasive present.
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introduction
The documentary Auschwitz: The Nazis and ‘the Final Solution’ was aired on 
the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. 
The main topics of the series are, first, the planning and building of the con-
centration and extermination camp Auschwitz and, second, the perpetrators’ 
motives; the latter is part of an attempt to explain why Auschwitz was built 
and made into “the site of the largest mass murder in history,” a statement 
often quoted throughout the series. 
 The creative director of the history programs at the BBC, Laurence Rees, 
wrote and produced this six-part documentary, a coproduction of the British 
BBC and the American KCET, an independent public television station. The 
American title of the documentary is Auschwitz: Inside the Nazi State. Rees 
is also the author of the accompanying book Auschwitz: The Nazis and ‘the 
Final Solution.’ A BBC survey presented as part of the press release before the 
airing of the documentary in 2005 stated that a large part of the British pop-
ulation knew little or nothing about Auschwitz and the Second World War 
(BBC Press Office). Thus, one expressed intention behind the documentary 
was to transmit knowledge of the Nazi mass murder to a broader and also 
younger audience.
 The series is based on up-to-date research. The opening of the former 
Soviet archives, where among other aspects the complete building plans of 
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Auschwitz were discovered, has given historians new and important sources 
for research on the Second World War. This new knowledge is reflected in 
the series. A team of experts on the Holocaust, including the well-known his-
torian Ian Kershaw, provided support and advice during production. As part 
of the documentary’s pedagogical aspect, Learning Resources were published 
on the Internet (http://www.pbs.org/auschwitz/).
 The historical facts presented in the documentary were well known to 
historians when the series was broadcast in 2005. It can be viewed as a sum-
mary of the current research and knowledge of the Nazi persecution and 
mass extermination, with focus on the events in Auschwitz, available sixty 
years after the end of the Nazi era. Promoted as the “definitive screen his-
tory of the evolution of Auschwitz” in which “the reality of life in the camp is 
exposed in unflinching detail” (according to the text on the back cover of the 
DVD), the documentary contributed to making the latest historical research 
available to a wider public with no or limited academic interest in historical 
research on the Second World War. As the series was aired, it became very 
popular in several European countries. Although it may come as a surprise 
that a documentary on a historical subject would attract that much attention, 
the public’s interest in the Second World War and the Nazi regime has hardly 
faded, and the year 2005 also marked the sixtieth anniversary of the end of 
the Nazi dictatorship. This essay will argue that the narrative strategies used 
by Rees to construct this narrative of Auschwitz—especially the implementa-
tion of dramatized scenes and the intensive emotional and dramatic aspect, 
which will be a main focus of the essay—may have contributed significantly 
to the documentary’s widespread success and made the history of Auschwitz 
and the Holocaust “available” to new generations of viewers. The application 
of these key narrative strategies, which are important pop-cultural features, 
may have promoted the emotional involvement and interest of a wider audi-
ence. Although Rees’s series proved successful, however, its effect was not 
comparable to that of the American TV series Holocaust (1978)—a hugely 
popular series that also introduced “the Holocaust” as a common term for 
the Nazi genocide. Furthermore, the two series differ significantly in the 
adaptation of historical reality (I will elaborate on this point later). While 
the American TV series does not present reenacted scenes, Laurence Rees’s 
series is presented as a documentary, but at the same time it contains a wide 
implementation of reenacted scenes and even credits a drama director. Thus, 
a major critical concern of this essay is the use and consequence of imple-
menting reenactments in documentaries.
 The possibility of establishing a narrative of a traumatic experience such 
as the Nazi mass murder has been widely discussed. Appropriating Jürgen 
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Habermas’s definition of the term “Holocaust” (Habermas, in Feuchert 5ff.), 
the thesis of the unspeakability of the Holocaust dominated philosophical 
and literary perspectives for many years. However, since the 1980s there 
has been a growing focus on memory, and the perspective of research on 
memory has turned from which memories are depicted to how memories are 
constructed. One of the main foci in research on testimonies of survivors in 
the last years concerns more how the memories are narrated and represented 
as text than which memories of persecution and imprisonment the survivors 
present. One of the initiators of this perspectival shift, Lawrence L. Langer, 
calls it the second phase of reaction to the Holocaust (“Die Zeit der Erinner-
ung” 53). The phase of questioning the representation is followed by a phase 
of analyzing the representation.
 Responding to this new trend of research, this essay focuses on what nar-
rative is presented of Auschwitz and how this narrative is presented. I thus 
use the inclusive definition of narrative given by Jens Brockmeier and Rom 
Harré, who consider narrative as an “ensemble of linguistic, psychological, 
and social structures, transmitted cultural-historically, constrained by an 
individual’s level of mastery and by his/her mixture of communicative tech-
niques and linguistic skills” (41). I transfer this definition to filmic represen-
tation in which not only the verbal (spoken and written) discourse about the 
history of Auschwitz has to be considered, but also the complex combina-
tions of images and sound (including music). I use this extended definition 
of narrative to emphasize that the historical, political, and cultural context of 
a narrative cannot be separated from the narrative itself. Each narrative is a 
social construction dependent upon the context of its narration, and Rees’s 
narrative of Auschwitz not only contains knowledge on the historical events 
in and concerning Auschwitz, but is also constructed under certain political 
and cultural conditions sixty years after the liberation of the camp and the 
capitulation of Nazi Germany. These aspects, and not only the facts about 
Auschwitz, also need to be considered in an analysis of Rees’s narrative.
 Considering the series as an attempt to establish a narrative of Ausch-
witz sixty years after the end of the Nazi era, I will examine the combina-
tion of the images (photos, film, original recordings, dramatized scenes), 
music, interviews (with both surviving victims and perpetrators), and the 
speaking voices (both of the main narrator and of the interviewed persons). 
I will consider the filmic construction of the narrative by analyzing the nar-
rative strategies, focusing mainly on the combination of documentary strate-
gies and dramatization. Important questions include: Why does the director 
implement dramatizations in this attempted documentary? What effects do 
such strategies have in and on a documentary? Moreover, which situations 
250 1 1 :  W H I C H  n a r r a T i v e  O f  a U S C h w i T z ?
are being dramatized and which are not? The extensive use of dramatization 
in this series blurs the limit between documentary and historical drama. 
Main points argued in this essay are that the series therefore in many aspects 
can be interpreted as a “docudrama” and that its conception as a drama of 
this kind may have contributed significantly to its widespread international 
success.
The narrative of Auschwitz according to Laurence Rees
Rees’s narrative contains six parts, each running approximately fifty min-
utes. The six parts are titled 1) “Surprising Beginnings,” 2) “Orders and Ini-
tiatives,” 3) “Factories of Death,” 4) “Corruption,” 5) “Frenzied Killing,” and 
6) “Liberation and Revenge.” The narrative represents a temporal chrono-
logical construction mainly from April 1940 in Poland until approximately 
the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961. The beginning is defined with the 
preliminary considerations of establishment of the camp. The end is less 
definite because it refers to various aspects of the postwar period and to 
what happened to some of the survivors without specifying the time of 
event. Recent retrospective reflections are incorporated into the narrative 
through the interviewees. In addition to this main focus, recent footage 
of Auschwitz and other sites and places—as well as recent interviews with 
perpetrators, victims, and others involved—represent a different time level 
as well as an aspect of topicality. The narrative switches in time mainly for 
two reasons: the pictures from “then” (both original and reenacted) and 
the interviewees. As we shall see, they are “telling and commenting” on the 
story in retrospect.
 The first episode, “Surprising Beginnings,” presents the development of 
Auschwitz from April 1940 until the decision to build Birkenau in the winter 
of 1940–41. This part starts with the establishment of Auschwitz I through 
the decision to use existing barracks earlier used by the Polish army as a site 
of imprisonment for prisoners of war (POWs) and Polish political prison-
ers. Early in the program, the interest of the German company IG Farben, 
a chemical industry conglomerate, is presented in a dramatized scene that 
shows people visiting the site as part of an intended industrial expansion. 
The voice-over narrator issues a “warning”: the situation will get worse. It 
is clearly stated that the establishment of IG Farben and the war against the 
USSR resulted in a radicalization of the Nazi policies against the Jews and 
other victims. This part of the first episode also tells of the exploration of 
different ways of murdering prisoners, which led to the application of the gas 
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Zyklon B for mass killings. Although these historical facts may be expected 
to be part of “common knowledge,” the first episode is constructed around 
the presentation of basic information and the indication of later develop-
ments (“it gets worse”; “this came to be the site of the greatest mass murder”). 
Although dealing with what can be considered as well-known historical facts 
and events, the documentary’s attempts to trigger suspense through warn-
ings, remarks, and hints of the advancing catastrophe are comparable to 
strategies routinely implemented in popular drama.
 The second part, “Orders and Initiatives,” describes the development of 
the camp Birkenau from 1941 until the Wannsee Conference on January 20, 
1942. This part shows that the combination of orders from above and initia-
tives from below led to the development of Auschwitz as a site of industrial 
genocide. The focus remains on what proved to be the preamble to indus-
trial mass murder in Auschwitz–Birkenau: the ghetto of Łódź, Chełmno, and 
mass killings in Eastern Europe, as well as experiments on Soviet POWs in 
Auschwitz I. Part 2 ends by concluding that the phase of testing and experi-
ments with gas ended in the early weeks of 1942. Now permanent buildings 
for gassing were constructed in Birkenau, and Jews from all Europe were to 
be brought there to be gassed. Parts 1 and 2 of the series thus describe the 
preparations leading toward the industrial genocide, and hence toward the 
so-called narrative peak.
 “Factories of Death,” part 3, presents the widespread Nazi persecution of 
the Jews, leading to arrests and deportations even from remote parts of the 
occupied territories such as the British Channel Islands, the island of Cor-
sica in the Mediterranean, and the city of Tromsø in Northern Norway. This 
third part of the documentary presents the camps of Bełżec, Sobibór, and 
Treblinka as they operated in 1942. On the one hand, these camps are seen as 
preparing the ground for Auschwitz; on the other hand, they are said to come 
even closer to the “final solution” than Auschwitz because they were pure 
killing factories where 99 percent of the prisoners died within two hours of 
arrival.
 The fourth part, “Corruption,” focuses on the “crucial phase of Auschwitz 
in 1943” as the camp developed into the “site of the largest mass murder in 
history”—a remark repeated several times throughout the series. Thus the 
emphasis is put on the result, the mass murder, rather than on the perpetra-
tors or the victims. The year 1943 is described as the “bloom year for the 
Nazis,” presenting a grotesque contrast to the camp inmates’ horrific condi-
tions. The development of sub-camps and the exploitation of the prisoners 
as slave labor in the armament industry are mentioned, but the main focus 
remains on the corruption in the camp, the Canada command (where the 
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belongings of the victims were sorted and stored), and the thefts among the 
SS guards and the soldiers.
 Part 5, “Frenzied Killing,” presents the year 1944 as a period of massive 
extermination in Birkenau. This part marks the “peak” of the narrative: the 
industrial genocide, which has been announced several times in the preced-
ing parts. Thus, the first four parts of the documentary illustrate the stages 
of the dynamic process of Birkenau’s development toward becoming the site 
of “the greatest mass murder.” In 1944 the construction of four large crema-
toria with gas chambers was completed, as well as the railway line leading 
directly into the camp. The result was that the mass murder could be carried 
out more effectively. Part 5 shows the year 1944 as marked by both the peak 
of the murders in Birkenau and the breakdown and chaos in the camp.
 The sixth and last part of Rees’s narrative, “Liberation and Revenge,” 
presents the evacuation of Birkenau and the Soviet liberation of the camp on 
January 27, 1945, also applying archival footage. Main topics of the last part 
include the fighting in Berlin, the liberation of Bergen-Belsen (incorporat-
ing some of the original footage), the punishment of the perpetrators (e.g., 
Rudolf Höss), and survivors returning to their prewar homes.
Significant Aspects of Rees’s narrative
When one is analyzing Rees’s narrative of Auschwitz, it is important to con-
sider both what is told and what is not told. One important achievement 
of Rees’s narrative presentation is the correction of the stereotypical, popu-
lar, and static image of Birkenau through a sustained focus on the phases 
of genocide and the process that led to the genocide and transmitting this 
important point to a broader public. Placing Auschwitz I–III in the context 
of other camps, and illustrating the dynamic process of the Holocaust, the 
series thus provides a more nuanced view than stereotypical presentations, 
which tend to highlight the singularity of Auschwitz as the center of mass 
murder.
 Rees’s presentation of Birkenau as one of the last camps with massive 
killing capacity has been interpreted as a correction of myth, but this knowl-
edge has been an essential part of the “historians’ narrative” of Auschwitz 
and the Holocaust for several years (e.g., as presented in Raul Hilberg’s The 
Destruction of the European Jews). However, Rees’s documentary series may 
have added this aspect to the “public or popular narrative” of the Holocaust, 
which has been dominated by a narrow-minded focus on Auschwitz as the 
singular, the unique, place of mass murder.
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 The enormous number of Nazi camps, especially in Eastern Europe, and 
the heterogeneity of the victims are two important aspects of the Holocaust 
that are often ignored. An asset of Rees’s documentary is its mediation of 
knowledge of death camps other than Auschwitz, and also of victims other 
than the Jews, because the Nazi genocide is often stereotypically reduced to 
the gassing of Jews in Auschwitz. For example, the fate of the European Gyp-
sies is often forgotten in the public narrative of Auschwitz, and it is to Rees’s 
credit that he does not do so but instead pays close attention to the Porrajmos 
(the Nazi genocide of the Gypsies). An important part of the fifth installment 
presents the Gypsies killed in Birkenau: 20,000 out of 23,000 Gypsies brought 
to Birkenau were murdered. They “suffered more proportionally than any 
group apart from the Jews,” the documentary states. The Gypsy camp was 
destroyed in the course of one night in the night of August 2, 1944, when all 
remaining inmates were killed in crematorium V.
 Part 2, for example, highlights topics that are controversial and parts of 
so-called grey zones in a moral narrative of right and wrong, of good and 
evil. These include the Jewish leadership forced to cooperate with the Nazis 
in running the ghetto of Łódź as well as the leader Rumkowski’s abuse of 
power, including deporting people who opposed him and sexually abus-
ing female inmates. In this way the series makes us aware of difficult topics 
and questions that have often been repressed. Although these aspects hardly 
present new facts, to a large extent they have been taboo outside historical 
research.
 The series also does important work in showing the problems that sur-
vivors faced when returning to their prewar homes in Eastern European 
countries, such as their frequent failure to regain their property and, incred-
ibly, meeting widespread anti-Semitism. The persistent hatred against the 
Jews is presented as a problem especially for survivors in Eastern Europe. 
One may query, though, whether this was only a problem in Eastern Europe: 
it has been well documented that many returning prisoners faced the same 
problems in countries such as Norway, France, and the Netherlands. For 
example, not until the last ten years has there been any attempt to recognize 
the Norwegian responsibility for the deportation and extermination of the 
Norwegian Jews—only 34 out of 771 deportees survived—and not until 1997 
did the Norwegian government pay compensation for confiscated Jewish 
property during the time of Nazi occupation (1940–45). Providing a strik-
ing contrast to the problems of many survivors, the documentary tells of the 
good life of many Nazi perpetrators in postwar Germany, for example, the 
interviewed Oskar Gröning who was an SS guard in Auschwitz. The Nurem-
berg Trial of Major War Criminals found the SS to have been a criminal orga-
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nization. Like many other members of the SS, however, Gröning, although 
identified, was never punished for his actions. Focusing on events such as 
the Eichmann trial, this part of the series rightly stresses that most perpetra-
tors, around 90 percent, were never put on trial. Surprising, though, is the 
focus on Rudolf Höss, who is presented in the series as the main persecutor, 
whereas Adolf Hitler and the other leading Nazis remain in the background. 
Nor does the series elaborate on the postwar reintegration of Nazis. In actual 
fact, most Nazis could continue their professional positions and personal 
lives after the downfall of the Third Reich without encountering great dif-
ficulties because of their Nazi past (Storeide 96ff.). In 1949 and 1954 West 
Germany adopted two acts: 1) the so-called amnesty laws, which promoted 
and reinforced the reintegration into society of a number of “minor offend-
ers” and people with a Nazi past; and 2) the so-called 131 Act of 1951 that 
enabled many employees in the judiciary and public administration to con-
tinue their jobs despite their connections with the Nazi regime.
 The word “beginnings” in the title of part 1 of Rees’s narrative suggests 
the establishment, initial experiments, and planning of Birkenau—the prep-
aration of what was to become the largest industrial genocide the world 
has seen. But was it really surprising? The radicalism of Nazi ideology and 
actions against people considered “unworthy of life” was more than clear in 
1940: the Nazi persecution of their political opponents started immediately 
after they gained power in January 1933; concentration camps had existed 
for seven years; the racial laws that established the legal basis for discrimina-
tion against and persecution of Jews were adopted in Nuremberg in 1935; 
and the killings of so-called disabled persons had been going on for a long 
time. Yet “surprising” may also refer to the fact that Auschwitz originally was 
established as a camp for Polish prisoners, and not for Jews, whereas Ausch-
witz today is most “famous” for being the site of the “largest mass murder 
of the European Jews.” However, establishing an important link between the 
Nazi mass murder program and the later mass murder with gas, part 1 also 
presents the beginning of the testing of gas for purposes of murder in barrack 
B11 in Auschwitz.
 When a narrative of Auschwitz is constructed, it is also important to con-
sider what is not included. A major weakness of Rees’s narrative is that it fails 
to appreciate the significant role of German industry in the Holocaust. The 
presentation of economic aspects of the Auschwitz camp complex focuses on 
the corruption and the thefts in the camp (part 4). The fourth part, which 
presents the year 1943, also concentrates on sexual abuse of female prison-
ers, on Mengele’s experiments performed on twins, and on the countries 
that did not cooperate in the deportation of Jews: Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, 
and especially Denmark. A major flaw of the narrative is that it does not 
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clearly show that the years 1943–44 were marked by a widespread coop-
eration between German industry, especially the armament industry, and 
many camps where prisoners were exploited as slave laborers. During these 
two years, the net of sub-camps and satellite camps where prisoners had to 
work as slaves expanded fast. Even though the role that IG Farben played in 
establishing Auschwitz is stated in part 1, the company’s responsibility for 
the construction of this site of mass murder is to a large extent ignored in 
Rees’s narrative of Auschwitz. The industry’s contribution and the existence 
of Monowitz, a camp that operated in close relation with Birkenau, are hardly 
mentioned. The camp Monowitz is referred to only once, and then only in 
connection with the Allied bombing. Yet this camp was in charge of a large 
number of sub-camps where prisoners were abused as forced laborers; many 
of them died because of the inhuman working conditions. Rees’s failure to 
recognize the great impact that German industry exerted on the develop-
ment of Auschwitz and other concentration camps may induce the viewer 
to consider Rees’s narrative as an acquittal of industry—industry that gained 
substantial benefits from the exploitation of inmates as slave labor and from 
extensive economic and industrial cooperation with the Nazi regime (Orth 
48ff.; Zimmermann 730ff.). Since Rees’s narrative completely ignores the 
camps as sites of slave labor, it fails to bring out the close connection between 
the economic aspects and the mass murder that took place in the numerous 
Nazi camps. It also fails to question what German civilians knew of the ongo-
ing political and racial persecution and genocide and the role that so-called 
ordinary people played in the Holocaust. The German interviewees are for-
mer soldiers and members of the SS; to give a broader presentation of the 
“German perspective,” Rees might also have interviewed German civilians 
such as housewives and children.
The Filmic Construction of a narrative of Auschwitz
Important narrative aspects of Rees’s documentary are the use of contrasts, 
various narrative voices, and the implementation of dramatization and reen-
actments—strategies that may promote the emotional involvement and 
interest of a broader audience.
The Use of Contrasts
The application of contrasts represents an important strategy of narration in 
this documentary. The use of contrasts may promote the emotional involve-
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ment of the audience and reinforce the impression of brutality and suffering. 
The main contrast lies between the lives of the perpetrators and those of the 
victims, that is, between life itself and the threat against and extermination of 
life. One significant effect of Rees’s use of this kind of contrast is to highlight 
the perpetrators’ brutality and careless attitude to the victims, including their 
pain and the terrible conditions they lived under. There is an enormous gap 
between the comfort of Höss and his family and the appalling conditions of 
the prisoners, between Höss’s apparently happy and peaceful family life and 
the experiments with gas, and between the singing at the perpetrators’ par-
ties and the cruelty of the camps. Furthermore, the stories told reinforce the 
crucial contrast between the Nazis’ conspicuous lack of empathy and the suf-
fering among the prisoners. This contrast is highlighted by using quotations 
from Rudolf Höss’s autobiographical report (which conveys his ignorance of 
the fact that his actions actually were crimes and that he committed crimes 
against humanity) as “comments” on the victims’ suffering, which is pre-
sented by either reenacted or original footage or interviews.
 In some passages the documentary constructs contrasts by making sur-
viving victims tell stories in which the brutality, dehumanization, fear, and 
suffering are opposed to the ignorance and neglect—and in many cases con-
tinuing anti-Semitism—of former perpetrators. One illustrative example is 
the presentation of mass executions of more than 10,000 Ukrainian Jews in 
August 1941 (part 1). In this scene there is a strong opposition between the 
surviving victim Vanyl Valdeman and the perpetrator Hans Friedrich. The 
interview with the former SS guard Friedrich, who took part in such mass 
shootings, makes abundantly clear that he is still an anti-Semite who even 
talks openly about his hatred against Jews. The image shifts from the inter-
viewee Friedrich to reenacted images of soldiers, scenes in which shots can 
be heard, followed by images of cartridge cases falling down. One reason 
why focalization remains on the SS guards may be that most original foot-
age approximates the perpetrators’ perspective as they are dealing with their 
victims. Here, however, the viewer can see the perpetrators in action. The 
reenacted footage then shifts to original footage of naked people before the 
execution squad and naked bodies in mass graves.
 Telling about his participation in the execution, Friedrich states that he 
did not feel anything—he just focused on secure hits. When the female inter-
viewer (whose voice we hear) asks him directly about his feelings, he repeats 
that he did not feel anything at all because of his lifelong hatred against the 
Jews. In his childhood, his family was cheated by some Jews, he says, and that 
is why he hates them. He confirms that the people he shot did not have any-
thing to do with those who cheated his family. But they were Jews, and that is 
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why he did not feel anything, he concludes. As a contrast to this perpetrator’s 
lack of regret, the Jewish survivor Valdeman tells about his and his mother’s 
escape from the ghetto and their rescue by local villagers and about the exter-
mination of the Jews in Eastern Europe. The contrast between the victim and 
the perpetrator, combined with the brutality of the images and the survivor’s 
story of the victims’ suffering, may serve to enhance the viewer’s emotional 
engagement. Similar constructed sequences are observable throughout.
 The series implements interviewees from both sides, both victims and 
perpetrators. For many years it was a crucial point whether the perpetra-
tors’ stories could be told in this way, without being contradicted. In Rees’s 
documentary the perpetrators are given the chance to tell their story without 
obstacles and, as I have shown with reference to Friedrich, may state their 
lack of regret. But the archival footage and the victims’ testimonies provide 
an effective contrast to the stories and attitudes of the perpetrators, high-
lighting them as grotesque.
 In some cases the documentary contrasts the “then” of the Second World 
War and the “now” of the filmmaker and viewer. It contains scenes in which 
the horrible stories of what occurred in the camps represent a glaring con-
trast to the beautiful landscapes of the sites pictured today. This construc-
tion method is, for example, implemented in the presentation of the death 
camp Chełmno (part 2): A female survivor tells about the ghetto of Łódź, at 
the same time original footage is presented. Then there is a shift to reenact-
ments of the Nazis’ planning of Chełmno; the planning of this extermination 
camp was the result of the overcrowding of the ghetto in Łódź and the need 
for more space. Rees presents a reenacted scene in which Herbert Lange, an 
SS officer who had been involved in the murder of disabled people in East 
Prussia and had participated in using gas vans for killings, is being driven 
in his car to his “new mission”; Lange talks about the tasks that await him. 
Then the narrator’s voice takes over, stating that the purpose of Chełmno was 
to exterminate Jews in order to create more space in Łódź and concluding 
that Chełmno was not the only such place at this time. Providing a thought-
provoking contrast to this chilling story, the footage changes to images of 
the peaceful and beautiful scenery as it looks today. Stressing the inordinate 
brutality of the events, this shift in footage may reinforce the audience’s emo-
tional engagement in the story. Thus, the recently recorded footage does not 
signal recovery, although the landscape obviously has recovered and the sites 
of the atrocities are no longer visible. Rather, it creates a feeling of a peaceful 
community whose life was abruptly ruined by the Nazis, thus accentuating 
the contrast between an innocent nature and the danger of fanatic culture. 
This strategy calls Claude Lanzmann’s masterpiece Shoah strikingly to mind, 
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although Lanzmann distanced himself from any implementation of drama-
tization in his documentary work.
 Another narrative strategy of the documentary concerns oppositions 
between the images shown and the narrating voice, either that of the main 
narrator or that of one of the interviewees. This method is used, for example, 
at the beginning of part 3. The images show Paris, the Eiffel tower, German 
soldiers eating grapes, and people promenading. While a joyful French song 
is being played, the main narrator tells about the deportation of the French 
Jews; as he does so, the image changes to a recent picture of Paris by night. 
Then the perspective changes again as a female survivor is describing her 
own arrest in Paris. While her story is told, the image shown on the screen 
changes from Paris today to a dramatized scene of French policemen run-
ning upstairs to an apartment to arrest someone. The woman’s brother also 
serves as a narrator in this story. The topic is the arrest of Jews in France. The 
narrative strategy is a blend of stories told by survivors, original footage from 
the French camp Drancy, and reenacted scenes of arrests made by the French 
police. Contrasting with this deportation story, images show the happy life 
of German soldiers in Paris during the war and stereotypical, well-known 
images of Paris by night. A similar strategy is implemented in the story of 
the war in the Channel Islands (part 3). Presenting a holiday paradise, the 
footage establishes a stark contrast to the narrator’s and the witnesses’ stories 
about the registration and the deportation of local Jews in Guernsey.
 The music applied, not only in these sequences but also throughout the 
series, may further and support the audience’s emotional engagement, not 
only through its recurrent theme, but also by means of modulations of light 
and heavy chords, reminding the viewer of marching soldiers. The music 
seems to be implemented in ways that support Rees’s elaborate use of con-
trasts. For instance, while the visual images of Paris at the beginning of part 3 
are made more joyful by the accompanying happy music on the soundtrack, 
the story told elaborates on the tragic story of the deportation of Jews from 
France.
The Narrating Voices
Rees’s documentary contains a variety of narrating voices. I have mentioned 
Rees’s use of an unidentified narrator. Performing a key role in the docu-
mentary, this narrator has different functions. First, he serves as introducer, 
inviting the viewer into and guiding him or her through the documentary. 
Thus this narrator, whose narrative characteristics largely fit those of voice-
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over, fills in the gaps between the images (both original and reenacted). Sec-
ond, he comments on pictures we see and on stories we are being told (also 
by interviewees). Finally, he serves as the expert stating facts and statistics.
 The interviewees have different roles too. When interviewed, the surviv-
ing perpetrators and victims are pictured sitting in a chair, shown from the 
waist-up and looking straight into the camera. In this way, they are, first, 
telling their stories when communicating “directly” with the viewer. Second, 
since their narratives are linked to the original or reenacted footage, the sur-
vivors serve as commentators on the images we see. This aspect of the inter-
viewees’ narrative role is often contrastive because their stories are those of 
brutality and suffering while the footage shown may be peaceful images of 
the beautiful present-day landscapes today (cf. the discussion above of the 
filmic presentation of Chełmno). Third, the interviewees comment on their 
own stories or other events.
 In some of the dramatized scenes the actors playing the historical charac-
ters speak as if history repeats itself in front of the eyes of the public. These 
dialogues and fragments of speech are partly based on historical documents 
such as reports and letters, partly constructed from what we know was the 
result of, for example, a meeting. The latter variant means that a fictional ele-
ment has been added to the attempted documentary, because although the 
result of a meeting may be known, the discussions, gestures, and so forth, 
almost invariably remain in the dark. This does not mean that the presented 
stories are untrue, but it shows that elements of imagination are implemented 
in the documentary. Fiction (from the Latin noun fictio and the verb fingere, 
“to invent or construct”) is traditionally defined as any narrative invented by 
the author. Clearly, Rees did not invent the narrative of Auschwitz—it refers 
to historical facts and events. To a certain extent and in certain situations, 
however, fictional elements are implemented in Rees’s reenactments. They 
are no doubt based on facts, but because of the limited knowledge and lack 
of information of some situations, meetings, discussions, and so on, certain 
aspects have been invented and therefore represent fictional elements of the 
documentary, although they are constructed as close to the historical reality 
as possible.
 The readings from Höss’s autobiographical report by an unknown voice 
are also part of the narrating voices. In Rees’s documentary, Höss’s report 
functions as a transmitter of facts, especially about Auschwitz and the events 
that occurred there. This kind of function is linked to, and supported by, 
the value and reliability of the information, which many historians attribute 
to the genre of memoir. In this particular case, however, it is questionable 
whether an autobiographical report can be identified as the truth or as a 
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reliable source of what actually happened, for the documentary also uses the 
report as evidence of Höss’ guilt as a perpetrator and as a contrast to stories 
told by victims. Considered as a contrastive narrative, the report represents 
an insensible and non-regretful speech given by one of the main perpetra-
tors, who in Rees’s narrative functions as the main perpetrator of all the 
Nazis responsible for the Holocaust.
Beginning and End
The beginning and ending represent crucial aspects of any narrative. Rees’s 
documentary opens with a long shot of Birkenau today, showing a huge, 
almost empty landscape. Some barracks are still intact, some ruins remain, 
and it is green and quiet. This opening shot slowly blends into a dramatized 
computer-reconstructed image of how the camp looked when it was in oper-
ation during the Second World War. A narrative voice announces that “this is 
the story of the evolution of Auschwitz and the motives of the perpetrators.” 
The word “evolution” is somewhat unexpected given that it has various con-
notations, including that of “natural development,” whereas the development 
of Auschwitz was intentional and pursued by human beings, which is also 
one of the main points of Rees’s narrative. The camera’s focalization is com-
parable to the eye of the viewer. It takes the viewer down to the gas chamber, 
and the screen goes dark, as if the viewer is captured in the darkness of the 
chamber. This technique—which is similar to that of other scenes in which 
the camera’s perspective approximates that of the viewer, thus serving as the 
public’s eye—may create an emotional engagement and enhance the impact 
on the audience.
 At the end of the last part of the series, there is a similar shot of the site 
of Birkenau today. The narrator announces that of the 1.3 million people 
sent to Auschwitz–Birkenau, 1.1 million were killed. Recent footage of the 
remaining railway tracks, the wood, the barracks, and the main entrance 
with its watchtower pass the screen while the narrator’s voice elaborates on 
the numbers of the different groups of victims. Dan Diner has argued that 
there can be no narrative of the Holocaust, only statistics (“Gestaute Zeit” 
126; “Vorworth des Herausgebers” 9). As if to bear out this point, the main 
narrator of Rees’s narrative sums up the tragic statistics of Auschwitz. Then 
archival footage of Jews on the way to the gas chamber is presented, and a 
female survivor’s voice identifies her aunt with four children in the foot-
age. In this way, the horror and immense dimension of Auschwitz and the 
Nazi genocide are personalized and taken into the context and narrative 
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of a family. The statistics contain someone’s aunts, uncles, brothers, sisters, 
mothers, fathers, and children. The narrative ends by focusing on Birkenau. 
The image changes again, presenting recent footage of the destroyed crema-
toria of Birkenau. Through computer graphics, this image changes to one 
computer-reconstructed image of a crematorium with a gas chamber recon-
structed as one of the crematoria put into operation in 1944. Rees’s narrative 
of Auschwitz closes with the narrator’s voice stating that the ruins remain 
as a “reminder of what human beings are capable of ”—Auschwitz was the 
result of an intended construction process and of the Nazis’ firm determina-
tion to exterminate millions of human beings.
Visual Aspects and the Use of Reenactments
The visual aspects of Rees’s documentary include, first, archival footage as 
expected of a documentary, a convention that Claude Lanzmann, among 
others, famously worked against in Shoah. Rees’s documentary features a col-
lection of original recordings, both pictures and film, made by perpetrators, 
victims, and the Allied forces. Second, the documentary presents a surpris-
ingly large number of dramatized scenes. The filmmakers seem to have been 
seeking to fill in the gaps in the narrative by incorporating reenactments of 
the “missing” sequences.
 Holocaust documentaries have conventionally limited the representa-
tion to original recordings, material, and interviews with participants. They 
have strictly avoided dramatizations and fictionalizations often interpreted 
as strategies typical of the fiction film in opposition to documentary film. 
Since, as indicated already, Rees’s documentary makes extensive use of reen-
actments, important questions in my further analysis are: Why does Rees 
implement dramatizations in this attempted documentary and what effects 
do they have? Furthermore, which situations are being dramatized and 
which are not—what principle of selection is operative here?
 An important aspect of the discussions of the Holocaust is whether and 
how this genocide can be represented. The so-called image ban or aniconism 
(Bilderverbot) implies that every imagination necessarily becomes a banali-
zation and a twisting of the historical event (Oster and Uka 251ff.). Elie 
Wiesel and Claude Lanzmann are both prominent representatives of those 
who have connected the image ban on cinematic presentations with the 
aniconism of the Old Testament, and thus added restrictions on how the 
Holocaust can be represented as film. Wiesel has opposed any kind of fic-
tionalization and dramatizations of the Holocaust (314). And Lanzmann 
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clearly turned against the use of both original photography and film foot-
age and dramatized sequences when he made Shoah, a film also made as 
a response to the American television series Holocaust (1978). Lanzmann 
criticized the latter for its fictionalization that turned the Holocaust into a 
soap opera and represented a violation of the aniconism of the Holocaust 
(Reichel 295, 299). Shoah differs from most documentaries on the Second 
World War by its renunciation of both archival footage and reenactments. 
Concentrating on interviews with surviving victims, bystanders, and per-
petrators, it consists solely of present footage of the sites the witnesses talk 
about.
 Important questions concern which photos and images of the Holocaust 
can be presented and how the detailed descriptions of the Holocaust are 
deemed acceptable. An unwritten rule has been that the images should not 
be shown at the expense of the victims and should not satisfy the audience’s 
need or greed for sensations and shocking images. After the publication of 
Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners, there has been a radi-
calization of detailed presentations of violence, abuse, and murder (Kran-
kenhagen 202). Containing a large number of close-up realistic depictions 
of torture, suffering, and killing, Goldhagen’s study attracted considerable 
attention when it was published in 1996. The interest in his book may have 
promoted a change in the perception of the image ban or aniconism of the 
Holocaust.
  A documentary deals with historical events, facts, and nonfiction. Even 
though the term “documentary” is often used synonymously with the terms 
“document” and “documentation” (Sørenssen 14–17), however, it is crucial 
to remember that a documentary is a construction of scenes, focalization, 
time, and narration that separates it from what actually occurred. Since a 
documentary is a selection and construction of a narrative of the reality 
it seeks to present, it is an interpretation of historical reality. The events to 
be presented are part of a past that cannot be reached but instead must be 
constructed from the present, relying on the “ruins of memory” (Langer, 
“Holocaust Testimonies” 1991) and on remaining documentation. Inevitably, 
gaps exist between the past and what we can possibly know about it. Such 
gaps between historical events and present knowledge of these events can be 
reduced by using a main narrator and by interviewing persons involved.
 Rees’s documentary is distinguished precisely by the use of dramatiza-
tions as a way to overcome the narrative gaps. The reenactments enable 
Rees to visually present situations and events that have not been preserved 
through original recordings and documents. At the same time, the reenact-
ments blur the line between fiction and nonfiction, thus incorporating a 
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fictional element into the attempted documentary, as I have mentioned 
already. Rees constructs his narrative on extensive historical research, but 
events that we do not have full knowledge of are reconstructed through reen-
actments. This does not make Rees’s narrative a fiction because it deals with 
real historical events that are reconstructed as accurately as possible. How-
ever, since the dramatized scenes require imaginative representation where 
historical knowledge is missing, fictional elements are inevitably imple-
mented in the documentary.
 The dramatized scenes are reconstructed in a manner that makes them 
appear as realistic as possible. As stated by Rees himself, the reenactments 
are based on research on, for example, the shape of the rooms; they are also 
indebted to primary source documents such as minutes or protocols from 
meetings; letters; diaries; and trial testimonies by or interviews with par-
ticipants (Gallagher 2004). For example, the reenacted meeting before the 
invasion of the Soviet Union (part 1) is based on the original minutes of the 
meeting. Yet there will always be a gap between the past historical event and 
the filmic reconstruction of an event, no matter how accurate the film aims 
to be; thus fictional elements have to be added. One difficulty concerning 
the reenactments in Rees’s documentary is that since the reenacted parts are 
often filmed in black and white, in many cases it can be difficult for a viewer 
without some relevant historical knowledge to decide whether the footage is 
original or dramatized.
 The dramatized sequences present events, meetings, and situations, but 
they do not show prisoners in gas chambers or in similar situations of abuse 
and suffering. In the case of the reenacted scene of the mass shootings of 
Ukrainian Jews already discussed, the reenactment concerns the SS guards 
lining up and the dropping of the cartridge cases. These images were perhaps 
chosen because a reenactment of the victims being shot may have been seen 
as a violation of the aniconism of the Holocaust and as disrespect toward 
the victims. Instead, Rees has implemented original footage of people before 
an execution and of naked bodies in a mass grave. Yet although aniconism 
is often neglected, Rees obviously imposes limits on representation when it 
comes to the reenacted parts, especially those concerning the victims of the 
Holocaust.
 As a counterpart to Rees’s documentary and hence to aniconism, I want 
to briefly comment on another BBC documentary. Written by Andrew 
Bampfield and directed by Richard Dale et al., D-Day 6.6.1944 (2004) goes 
even further than Rees both in the implementation of reenacted scenes and 
in the dramatization of scenes where people are suffering and/or dying—for 
example, in the presentation of the Allied forces’ landing on Omaha Beach 
264 1 1 :  W H I C H  n a r r a T i v e  O f  a U S C h w i T z ?
on June 6, 1944, and the liberation of the city of Caen. Both events are pre-
sented by the use of original footage and reenacted scenes. Some of the reen-
acted scenes are very detailed in showing pain and suffering and injuries and 
damage. Furthermore, in this documentary the stories of the interviewed 
survivors, Allied soldiers and Germans alike, are partly reenacted, and the 
interviews of the survivors serve in many cases as comments or elaborations 
on the reenactments. As the reenacted scenes in D-Day 6.6.1944 are shot 
in color and unambiguously reenacted, there is hardly a risk of a mix-up 
between the film’s original and dramatized footage. For this reason, Dale’s 
D-Day 6.6.1944 is more easily associated with the genre of docudrama than 
is Rees’s narrative.
 In addition to reenactments, Rees uses specially commissioned computer 
images to fill in the information gaps of his documentary. These narrative 
techniques are used to present the gas chambers: the scenes are constructed 
through an extended focalization in which the camera serves as the eye of the 
public, taking them into the door of a reconstructed crematorium building, 
down the stairs, and into the waiting room, making them look around the 
room, enter the gas chamber, turn around to the door which is closed—and 
then it gets dark. This scene is repeated with a few changes throughout the 
series, marking, for example, the end of part 2. The gassing was an “event 
without witnesses” (Laub 80) where the “real witnesses” were murdered 
(Agamben 31–33; Levi 83–84). However, by using computer graphics, Rees’s 
filmically constructed narrative shows us the inside of the gas chambers, thus 
attempting to fill in the gaps in the narrative of Auschwitz.
 The repetitively displayed images of the gas chambers from inside can be 
viewed as violations of the aniconism of the Holocaust and as a presentation 
of images of the “event without witnesses,” even though the actual gassings 
are not dramatized. These reconstructed scenes of the gas chambers may 
function as important emotional triggers for the audience, also prompting 
the question of how far one should go in applying strategies of emotionaliza-
tion in order to attract the audience’s attention. Although it is important to 
evoke interest and involvement to further and enhance the viewer’s empathy 
with the victims, sensational and shocking effects should never be promoted 
for their own sake. As I have shown, Rees clearly imposes ethical limits of 
representation on his film, although on several occasions he neglects ani-
conism in general.
 The strategy of reenactment blurs the limit between fiction and nonfic-
tion and separates Rees’s documentary from documentation, also removing 
it from the transmission of the “pure document” as attempted, for example, 
in Lanzmann’s Shoah. Different as they are, both films are interestingly linked 
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to Steven Spielberg’s historical drama Schindler’s List (1993), which presents 
the story of the German industrialist Oscar Schindler who saved over 1,000 
Jews during the war. Spielberg’s hugely popular film adapts aspects from the 
documentary genre. It is made almost completely in black and white, but 
at the end the images switch to color and the viewer is presented with the 
real “Schindler-Jews” (not actors) standing at Schindler’s grave in Jerusalem. 
This documentary scene may serve to justify and authorize Spielberg’s film 
as authentic and real. Lanzmann criticized the film for showing images of 
the Holocaust that do not exist, for example, the gas chambers (Reichel 313). 
This aspect is radicalized in Rees’s documentary where the camera acts as 
the audience’s eyes, thus taking us as viewers into the gas chambers and even 
showing when the doors are shut. While Schindler’s List uses documentary 
codes to enhance the authenticity of the film, Rees’s documentary employs 
dramatic elements to fill the gaps of the visual narrative of Auschwitz.
 Rees’s focus on historical research and primary sources, as well as the 
implementation of original footage and interviews with survivors of both 
sides, make his documentary different from the American fictional televi-
sion series Holocaust (1978). In many ways Rees’s series is situated between 
two important Holocaust series, being more nonfictional than Holocaust 
(and also Schindler’s List where the fictional aspect concerns the form as a 
historical drama, not the story told) and more fictional than Shoah because of 
the dramatizations. I conclude by considering Rees’s series partly as a “docu-
drama” because of the extensive use of reenactment. To the extent possible, 
the reenacted footage is based on realism. Yet in the presentation of meet-
ings, for example, fictional elements are inevitably implemented because of 
the lack of information. The story of Auschwitz is a true story, and Rees’s 
narrative contains a large amount of information collected from primary 
and secondary sources. For Rees, however, reenactments take over where the 
archive does not exist.
 The problem of reenactments concerns the following aspects: First, in 
many cases it is difficult to decide which recordings are original and which 
are dramatized scenes with a view to a large and heterogeneous audience. 
The series was made to reach a wider public, and the dramatizations are a 
way of attracting the attention of different kinds of viewers. And yet we have 
seen that, not least because the reenactments are in black and white, people 
without basic knowledge of the Holocaust can find it difficult to separate the 
reenacted scenes from original recordings; thus reenactments are potentially 
misleading. Second, there are methodological and ethical problems linked 
to the aspects of entertainment on the one hand and historical information 
and rational thinking on the other. Emotional engagement does not neces-
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sarily further critical reflection on the topic of the Holocaust. Leading the 
audience behind a curtain, the series blurs the difference between original 
and reenacted images and scenes, and in several cases the reenacted scenes 
lead to confusion about source materials and references. The effect is similar 
to that of a history book without footnotes, written for an audience without 
background knowledge. If the dramatized scenes were not shot in black and 
white or marked as dramatizations in some way—as in D-Day 6.6.1944—the 
potential confusion would have been avoided. Crucially, narrative strate-
gies as such are not a topic of discussion in the series; it does not comment 
or reflect on the gains and problems of the narrative strategy employed. 
Even though it might be difficult to do this, the absence of such reflections 
removes the series from a main concern of film and literature on the Holo-
caust (Krankenhagen 181–85; Langer, “Die Zeit der Erinnerung” 53). In Bill 
Nichols’s terms, Rees’s film can be characterized as documentary in the par-
ticipatory mode because of the use of interviews and archival footages, but 
at the same time it has important expository segments because of a narrator’s 
verbal commentary (33–34, 105–109, 115–24). The reflexive mode, though, 
is neglected and completely absent in the series (34–35, 125–30).
 The third visual aspect of the series—footage of present-day sites and 
landscapes that play an important part in the strategy of contrasts—has been 
discussed already. A fourth visual aspect consists of the interviews in which 
the interviewees, both former victims and perpetrators, are sitting in a chair 
in their own living room, telling their stories. Reaffirming and strengthening 
both the link and the contrast between “now” and “then,” these interviews 
further increase the impression of the brutality and suffering of the “then”—
the Second World War and the Holocaust. The witnesses of both sides serve 
as transmitters of the past, telling their stories with hindsight “now” and also 
commenting and reflecting on the gruesome events of the past.
“Auschwitz” Revisited?
In conclusion, we may ask how Rees’s narrative—in both form and content—
is related to other narratives on Auschwitz. This narrative contributes to the 
mediation of important aspects of the “historian’s narrative”—aspects that 
to some extent had been taboo—for a more general public, using popular 
transmission techniques such as reenactment, repetition, drama, excitement, 
emotions, and so forth, which move the documentary toward the genre of 
docudrama. While the extensive use of reenactments in this presentation of 
the history of Auschwitz may have triggered the attention and interest of a 
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larger audience, it problematically blurs the distinction between fiction and 
nonfiction and between drama and documentary.
 One fundamental problem in constructing a narrative of Auschwitz more 
than sixty years after its liberation is the absence of presence. For many years 
the survivors have represented a link between the past and the present. In a 
few years there will be no survivors left. Reenactments may serve as an alter-
native strategy to create presence for the past.
 Presenting important facts about the development of the Holocaust as 
a process with different phases and a complex of camps, Rees’s documen-
tary draws the viewer’s attention to “grey zones” of the camp system such 
as brothels, corruption, and Sonderkommandos, and to the insufficient legal 
persecution of Nazi criminals. Important as it is, this focus on “sensational” 
aspects of the story of Auschwitz must not suspend the transmission of 
general facts. Unfortunately, Rees’s narrative of Auschwitz comes close to 
acquitting German industry, which actually played an important role in the 
exploitation and killing of many hundreds of thousands of enslaved laborers. 
The series’ most significant contribution is the transmission of new histori-
cal knowledge to a broader, and specifically to a younger, audience, and the 
presentation of the Nazi genocide not as the killings of madmen but as the 
result of a rational and logical decision process led by human beings.
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[T]he lived body is coterminous with place because it is by bodily movement 
that I find my way in place and take up habitation there.
—edward S. Casey, Remembering: A Phenomenological Study
An older Jewish émigré was asked why he had joined a tour to Auschwitz, 
Majdanek, the Warsaw ghetto, and the Polish village whence he came. Why 
would he travel years later from his adoptive home in the United States to 
these Eastern European sites of killing, sickness, and survival? “‘The same 
reason I did the first time,’” he replied with a shrug, “‘I had to’” (Bukiet 129). 
Or consider an acclaimed special episode of Oprah Winfrey’s popular talk 
show in which her guest is Elie Wiesel and the venue Auschwitz. The two fig-
ures walk arm in arm through the camp, their boots crunching on the drifted 
snow. “When here  .  .  .  the professor speaks very softly, allowing silence to 
have its space,” explains Winfrey in voice-over. Then, as the day wears on, she 
consoles him: “It cannot be easy for you to make this journey.” “I wouldn’t 
have done it with anyone,” he replies. Perhaps he meant to say he wouldn’t 
have done it with “just anyone.” In any case, the statement signals not only 
Wiesel’s appreciation of Winfrey’s sensitivity but also the concomitant diffi-
culty and necessity of his presence in that place of death. Conducted on foot 
and filmed for national and international circulation, this affecting interview 
constitutes a moving testimony of return.
 All around the world people are picking up and traveling to places they 
expected never to see again, and this powerful impulse to go back to a site 
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of origin or catastrophe, just to visit or for good, is finding eloquent expres-
sion in conversation, print, and screen media. Where previous scholars have 
offered inspiring exegeses of post–World War II exilic memory and return 
in literature and photography (Bukiet; Gilbert; Jacobson; M. Hirsch; and 
Hirsch and Spitzer “‘We Would Never Have Come’” and Ghosts of Home, 
Kugelmass, Palmer, Suleiman), the current chapter seeks to designate and 
study a corpus of documentary films that are dramatically shaped by the 
European visits of Jewish refugees of Hitler’s Holocaust to places from which 
they have previously departed, emigrated, or fled; places where they sur-
vived; or places from which they were unwillingly removed or rescued.
 Such a “documentary of return” may begin casually when someone grabs 
a video camera on the way out the door, or more formally with a concept and 
agreement between producers and travelers. In neither case, though, is the 
film a mere record of an autonomous itinerary. Rather, as in Jean Rouch’s and 
Edgar Morin’s cinema verité creation, Chronique d’un été (1960), where vari-
ous gatherings were held for the purpose of filming the ensuing discussion, 
so too in each of these film or digital media projects, words and gestures are 
brought into being, and place itself is enacted.
 The filmmaker also travels. Shoshana Felman has observed in her widely 
recognized and aptly titled chapter, “The Return of the Voice: Claude Lan-
zmann’s Shoah,” that along with Simon Srebnik’s reluctant return from Israel 
to Poland to testify sur place (as one of two survivors among 400,000 mur-
dered in gas vans), the documentary naturally required the “no less difficult 
biographical and geographical return (a return in space) of [Claude] Lan-
zmann” himself for a sustained decade of filming (257).1 Nor is the viewer 
left behind. The motion picture itself is “the very synthesis of seeing and 
going—a place where seeing is going” and where the cinema spectator is 
mobilized for “site-seeing” across a “geopsychic” landscape (Bruno 245, 
15–16). It follows, therefore, that the Holocaust documentary of return, by 
its very premise, represents an over-determined and crucial case of cinema’s 
synthetic seeing/going.
 With this activity, the possibility of a shift opens up: from Holocaust tes-
timony studies as a mentally recursive and diasporic paradigm in which ver-
bal and written testimonies are conducted, filmed, and archived after the fact 
and far from the catastrophic event itself, to testimony as a matter of the here 
and now. I concentrate, therefore, on filmed, situated testimonies delivered 
verbally or bodily from a significant site and in the presence of others; for 
the places to which these (auto)biographical travelers return have persisted 
all the while. They have their own regional histories, practices, physical situ-
ations, and, importantly, current inhabitants.
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 Physical location matters deeply to the full impact of Holocaust testi-
monies of return, but so do insights about the psychic dimensions and the 
unassimilability of place and occurrence. As Cathy Caruth has written, “The 
impact of a traumatic event lies precisely in its belatedness, in its refusal to be 
simply located, in its insistent appearance outside the boundaries of any single 
place or time” or, putting it differently, “in connection with another place and 
time” (9, 8, emphasis mine). Even as locals and returnees reunite in a “fatal 
environment,”2 this anti-essentializing view of place, hinted at by Caruth 
and further developed in the works of critical human geographers, remains 
crucial (Rogoff, Tuan; see also Walker “Rights and Return”). The ground of 
testimony sur place like exilic space, but not to be conflated with it is always 
already “other.”
 This chapter will proceed with a discussion of some of the ethical com-
plexities of situated testimony, unfilmed and filmed, turning then to the 
analysis of two significant, and rhetorically different, Holocaust documenta-
ries of return: The Last Days (1998) and Hiding and Seeking (2004). In their 
respective presentations of bodies and voices along country roads, at the 
thresholds of childhood homes, and on sacred ground, these two nonfiction 
narratives exemplify the felicities and complications of the mode. Analyz-
ing them, I seek to map the transposition and transmission of Holocaust 
testimonies generally, across geographical distance, and into the audiovisual 
space of the moving image.
because i had To
The Uses and Abuses of Private Journeys and “Holocaust Tourism”
Holocaust survivors may feel an “irresistible” urge to “go home” or return 
to the camp (in either case, “to the fire”) as part of an ongoing traumatic 
response to the shock of forcible removal (Brenner 157, 147). The actual 
journey may be an enactment of certain “themes of attachment, loss, reunion, 
and return home” (158). It may be experienced as a pilgrimage, however 
triumphant (“to celebrate my survival in the place that tried to kill me”), 
or, alternatively, “counterphobic” (“I felt empty, cheated  .  .  .  The Germans 
succeeded in Mannheim. It certainly was Judenrein”) (Brenner 156 quoting 
Michel 266, 208–9). In their critically insightful and personally generous 
essay, Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer use the occasion of their trip back to 
her parents’ hometown of Chernivtsi (formerly Czernowitz) to explore the 
feelings and formations of “nostalgia’s complicating other side” (83). “This 
ambivalent desire to recall negative experiences at their place of happening, 
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and to transmit them to sympathetic listeners and co-witnesses,” they sub-
mit, “is a significant motivation for return journeys” (84).
 Those with no personal connection to the Holocaust may also “venture 
back in time” (Bukiet 128) and place as a form of participation in the collec-
tive impulse and effort to memorialize, as hallowed sites, the extermination 
camps of Eastern Europe. “The March of the Living,” started in 1988, along 
with other organized trips provide “an institutionalized way” for successive 
generations to commemorate and work through catastrophic past events 
(Brenner 160).
 Deeply experienced by participants, the personal/genealogical trip and 
the more broadly touristic journey may also produce culturally and some-
times even historically meaningful findings, as when artifacts and long- 
buried memories (which may lead to further questions3) are unearthed on-
site. Hirsch and Spitzer report that only in Chernivtsi did Marianne’s mother 
Lotte tell how a soldier came to the door to announce their deportation 
from the ghetto, and only in Chernivtsi did her father Carl refuse this ver-
sion of events, insisting, “‘Everyone was already outside, we all knew.’” As 
the authors remark, “[T]his detail, about the soldier, and the discrepancy 
between the two versions of the story, emerged there on site: we had never 
heard it before” (88).
 The significance of such moments lies not only in what the returnees 
remember and narrate but also in the physical dimension of return as a par-
ticular kind of testimony and contemporary finding. Consider Edward S. 
Casey’s phenomenological insights: “the lived body is coterminous with place 
because it is by bodily movement that I find my way in place and take up 
habitation there,” and (extending beyond this chapter’s epigraph) “[m]oving 
in or through a given place, the body imports its own implaced past into 
its present experience: its ‘local history’ is literally a history of locales” (180, 
194, emphasis mine). Or, as Joshua Hirsch offers through a filmic example, 
Chronique d’un été, “The past inheres in the relationship between the speak-
ing body situated in a space of memory and the audible and visible signs of 
memory emanating from and written on the body” (67).4 The sequence he 
evokes is the famous one in which Marceline, a concentration camp survivor 
and part of the filmmaking collective, walks by herself at a distance from 
the camera and with a hidden tape recorder over her shoulder through the 
Place de la Concorde and Les Halles—speaking and softly singing her feel-
ings and memories of deportation and return. The “modernist subjectivity” 
of the passage, Hirsch argues, is distinct from the more traditional voice of 
the first Shoah Foundation documentary, Survivors of the Holocaust (1996), 
in which interviews are conducted in a “‘safe’ interior location” (68).5 “In the 
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testimony of this [earlier] witness,” he recognizes, “we discover an archive of 
the past” (67).
 Such “returns in space” may also catalyze encounters that are simultane-
ously new and seeded with past associations: transferential, we might say, 
for the play of earlier conflicts that remerge in the context of a current rela-
tionship. Pointing to the gestures and comments made by Polish residents 
of Chełmno when the largely silent Srebnik returned to their midst, noting 
the prevailing anti-Semitism that must in the past have enabled Jewish geno-
cide, Shoshana Felman explains that “[t]he film makes testimony happen—
happen inadvertently as a second Holocaust” (267). Or, as Linda Williams 
elaborates, filmmakers who stage these types of encounters “do not so much 
represent that past as they reactivate it in images of the present” (17). What I 
would like to emphasize here are the spatial, bodily, and sometimes, but not 
always, verbal dimensions of situated testimony for film, video, and digital 
media: the fact of filmed presence as a kind of a kinesthetic historiography.
 This is not to underestimate the revelations made to relatives and other 
companions on-site without a camera. What I would say, though, is that 
the perceived indelibility of the filmic and videographic media encourages 
or exacerbates the testimonial impulse. From Hirsch and Spitzer’s discus-
sion of Lotte’s observation made for the first time in Chernivtsi and (conse-
quently) disputed for the first time in Chernivtsi, we may conclude that the 
onus of factual accuracy was, if not imported, then at least enhanced by the 
presence of Leo Spitzer’s video camera. “We have to tell the same story,” Carl 
insisted, for posterity (88). On one level and by its very nature, the project 
of a return documentary is to occasion testimony, be it spoken, gestural, or 
silent.
 These, then, are some of the intrinsic qualities and productive uses of 
situated testimony. But the “abuses” alluded to in the section heading are also 
pertinent because return journeys are undoubtedly open to ethical, as well 
as practical, challenges. Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer acknowledge that 
while “affectionate longings for earlier stages and scenes” are complicated, 
real, and enduring, the feelings and discourses around the return journey 
still do reveal a propensity for “indiscriminate idealization of past time and 
lost place that had angered nostalgia’s critics” (82–83).
 Jack Kugelmass, for his part, critiques the “mythic” meaning of certain 
“missions” that “begin by visiting Poland (thus entering the abyss of despair) 
and then conclude by touring Israel (thus experiencing redemption)” for 
failing to recognize disturbing or contradictory present-day realities (211). 
Even more pointedly critical of Holocaust tourism or “atrocity heritage,” 
G.  L. Ashworth characterizes the oft-stated motive for visiting the sites of 
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concentration camps—to prevent the recurrence of similar genocides—as 
“global humanitarian propaganda” (363–64). “Victimization as a founding 
mythology has played a central role in state-building,” he opines; “[t]here 
are  .  .  . dangers inherent in a dominating sense of past injustice [such that 
it] may not be an ideal paradigm for the guidance of future action (363).”6 
A source of the problem is the co-presence of three communities at odds 
with one another in the business of Jewish heritage tourism: “the world-wide 
Jewish community,” “the wider Polish nation,” and “the existing local inhab-
itants” (366). Since there are few Jews currently living in the area Ashworth 
takes as his example (Kraków–Kazimierz), and since the local inhabitants are 
not middle-class Polish Gentiles but rather people from “among the poor-
est groups in the city” including many “re-housed migrants displaced from 
eastern territories lost in 1945,” the much-needed urban renewal would have 
to go far beyond the local economy of restaurants, souvenir shops, informa-
tion sites, and memorials catering to tourists. “The presence of a resuscitated 
Jewish heritage,” Ashworth submits, “raises not only the question of ‘whose 
heritage?’ but also more immediately [and] threateningly ‘whose property?’” 
(366).
 Without buying into the animosity of Ashworth’s brand of anti-Zionism, 
we may still recognize the relationship between the redemptive tendencies of 
some Holocaust narratives and the wider cultural critique of nostalgic funda-
mentalism. The territorial claims of a village, a people, or a nation may well 
function as naïve or self-serving; as a form of “restorative nostalgia” (Svet-
lana Boym’s term); or worse, as a rationale for xenophobic nationalism. The 
affinities among homeland, “ethnic purity,” and so-called hereditary rights 
may be murderous indeed (Marciniak 66, Naficy). But these complexities 
are all the more reason why it is important not to abandon in the rush for 
critical footing the historiographic, geographic, and ethical significance of 
place attachment. Indeed, by virtue of its necessarily spatial and temporal 
unfolding, and because it engages the bodies and imaginations of literal and 
armchair travelers, the documentary film or video of return has tremendous 
potential to stage very tangibly the pulsions and problems of the contested 
territories of the Holocaust and beyond.
The Last Days
On the very ground where the wheels rolled, Bill Basch, in The Last Days, 
bends forward slightly and mimes grasping a handle to illustrate how he 
pushed the tumbrel of heaped corpses to the gate of the crematorium com-
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pound at Dachau. This and other passages exemplify the documentary’s 
function to inscribe history through bodily movements that simultaneously 
reenact what was and what continues to be.
 Irrupting here and there, out of a film also comprising archival and dis-
tant testimonial footage, are two dozen brief sequences depicting visits to 
Europe by the film’s five Hungarian subjects accompanied by their respec-
tive family members. These visits, like that of Elie Wiesel to Auschwitz with 
Winfrey, were made, in large part, to be documented—and I do not mean 
that pejoratively. For here they are now, productively staged (like all filmed 
interviews) to bring into being thoughts, words, actions, and encounters that 
otherwise might have remained unformulated, unexpressed, and unlived. 
And here they are now for communication to the next generation and for 
cinematic sustenance beyond the lifespan of Holocaust survivors and refu-
gees. Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer end their essay with the insight that 
“at the crossroads in Czernowitz, telling and listening became a collaborative 
endeavor.” For their parents Lotte and Carl Hirsch, “‘It would not have made 
sense to return except in this constellation.’  .  .  .  ‘We would not have come 
without you’” (93). The Last Days and other Holocaust documentaries of 
return, for their parts, orchestrate a cinematic telling and listening in which 
it would not have made sense to return without a camera.
 In the film and because of the film project, we see Renée Firestone at the 
Auschwitz archives leafing through a stack of index cards to find the record 
of her sister Klara’s incarceration and death. Obviously anticipated as a sig-
nificant moment that could be documented as it happened, this sequence 
captures the quiet shiver of horror when Firestone reaches Klara’s card. The 
film project also enables Firestone to interview the Nazi Dr. Hans Münch 
about the medical experiments performed on Klara at Münch’s concentra-
tion camp “clinic.” “He was very evasive,” Firestone later summarizes, con-
firming my own impression of the interview.
 Lanzmann’s explanation of his own research process would seem to apply 
as well to that of protagonists in documentaries of return, including this one: 
“If you go to Auschwitz without knowing anything about Auschwitz and the 
history of the camp, you will see nothing . . . In the same way, if you know 
without having been there, you will also not understand anything . . . This is a 
film from the ground up” (Chevrie and le Roux 38–39, emphasis mine). With 
all due respect for the wealth of documentation on industrialized mass mur-
der available at the Auschwitz museum, much of which is effectively geared 
toward meeting the first-time visitor’s need for introduction and explana-
tion, I take Lanzmann’s point that extraordinary knowledge is produced 
from this chemistry of distant or proximate learning and physical gleaning. 
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Moreover, a film sur place can extend to spectators the benefits or horrified 
shivers of “site-seeing.”
hOlOCaUST documentaries of return are in these ways very valuable cin-
ematic interlocutors in the ongoing effort to fathom Holocaust history. But 
there is also a manifest tendency in quite a few of them to capitalize on the 
particular emotional appeal of the redemptive narrative. In The Last Days, 
after having experienced important discoveries with Renée Firestone, we 
come finally to the moment when she returns to her childhood home. She 
spots the house and crosses the street. With the film crew trailing, she reaches 
the gate and presses the handle. “It just doesn’t open . . . it doesn’t open.” She 
bows her head and cries. Later in the film we will observe her lighting a 
memorial candle at Auschwitz. For a hopeful ending, The Last Days offers 
up the new and successive generations: the family members of the five pro-
tagonists who accompany and witness their journeys and the adult children 
and grandchildren home in the United States. Bill Basch has brought his son 
Martin to tour Dachau. In the DVD Outtakes and Behind the Scenes Footage, 
he exacts a promise: “You will bring your children here and they should bring 
their children.”
 These are moving sequences, and it is heartening, for many, to witness 
the return and continuation of a people all but doomed to extinction. But I 
am cognizant as well of the aforementioned problems posed by the redemp-
tive narrative of return with its “dominating sense of past injustice” and dis-
engagement from pressing, current problems and competing claims to land 
and property. However viscerally we may feel the pull of ancestral and child-
hood abodes and the grief of deportation and exile, critical human geogra-
phy teaches us that neither the territory, nor the map, nor the visitor it guides 
is a stable entity with a tangible existence apart from assertions and contesta-
tions of belonging.
 In her aptly titled Terra Infirma, Irit Rogoff charts an “unheimlich” or 
“unhomed geography” where rites/rights of return are not fixed with regard 
to national, religious, and generational features of the landscape. She advo-
cates a shift away from a “moralizing discourse of geography and location, 
in which we are told . . . who has the right to be where and how it ought to 
be so  .  .  .  to a contingent ethics of geographical emplacement in which we 
might jointly puzzle out the perils of the fantasms of belonging as well as the 
tragedies of not belonging” (3). An art historian by training, Rogoff envisions 
a space where “political insights, memories, subjectivities, projections of fan-
tasmatic desires and great long chains of sliding signifiers” can hold sway 
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against “concrete coercions” determined by religious and state apparati (7, 4). 
Contemporary works of art, she believes, may array “alternative strategies” 
through which we can “review our relationship with the spaces we inhabit” 
(frontispiece).
 So, too, may documentaries of return. Watching such films critically, we 
may discern how the “tragedies of not belonging” are indeed intercalated 
with the “perils of the fantasms of belonging.” To some extent, The Last Days 
enables this sort of critically fruitful thinking where competing and even 
irreconcilable territorial claims break a path toward mutual understanding. 
The film is at its most compelling, I believe, when in addition to affirming 
the presence of situated bodies, it also physically documents what Howard 
Jacobson calls the “voluptuous ambition of repossessing nothing” (Jacobson 
7, cited in Palmer 248).
 Prior to the image of Firestone before her gate, there is a sequence involv-
ing Irene Zisblatt’s return to her hometown, now in Ukraine. She testifies 
that she remembers the town as “picturesque and happy.” We see a castle on 
a hill, a man in a horse-drawn cart, and the view from the van as Zisblatt 
travels along. “I’m hoping that I can find some of the people that I knew 
before the Holocaust and maybe that I can talk to them.” Amazingly, we do 
witness her reunion with an old woman, Mariska, who remembers Zisblatt’s 
grandparents, father, mother, and Zisblatt herself. “I was most surprised that 
she remembered me,” the latter reflects in voice-over, “I was really afraid that 
the people were going to be hostile to me. . . .” We cut to an interview with 
Zisblatt at night, in what is probably the van interior, a spotlight on her face 
providing dramatic intensity (as well as the illumination necessary to film) as 
she continues: “. . . that they were going to be accusing me of coming back to 
take something away from them.” Over an image of the countryside: “I was 
asked in a very nice way, am I planning to take my property and come back 
to live there? And I said no.” Back to the van interior: “I just want my chil-
dren to know where I came from and I wanted to see my town where I grew 
up one more time before I die.” Cut to Zisblatt on a rural road, pointing out 
landmarks to her daughter.
 This is information we have when we see Firestone before the closed gate 
and then walking up the road to a former neighbor’s walled home. There, 
Firestone speaks with a man who was a child during the war and his Rus-
sian wife. “Your own house; to take someone’s house. How could that be?” 
he sympathizes. His wife continues, evoking the atmosphere of decades of 
communist rule, the conflicting interests of the current situation, and the 
physical materiality of witnessing: “There would be a lot to tell. But you 
know what they say: even the walls have ears.” The sequence concludes with 
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Firestone’s understandable and revealing reflection about the doubleness of 
home: “At that moment I felt very lucky that I will have a chance to go back 
to the United States, to my home.”
 Blocked from entry into her former home, suspended between the evi-
dence Auschwitz coughs up and the information withheld, and reversing the 
direction of return, Firestone’s trajectory extends beyond any single point 
of arrival. Likewise, Zisblatt’s return to Polena is successful only because it 
is a temporary visit that does not involve the repossession of property and 
because its transposition into film form highlights the rigors (and weirdly 
fortuitous benefits) of confinement, expulsion, and exclusion. Zisblatt, like 
Firestone, may have lived a fuller existence unhomed from Ukraine. Here 
and there among the film’s multiple narratives of return, we sense the energy 
of critical geography: “home” is both a magnetic field that attracts us and a 
molten extrusion of historical and contemporary, regional and national, eco-
nomic and political, ethnic, and religious frictions.
Hiding and Seeking
Hiding and Seeking (2004) is explicitly anti-redemptive in its narrative pat-
terning. The trip and its documentation do not take place primarily to 
interview former neighbors who stood by while Jewish families were taken 
away, or to mourn and memorialize the deceased, or to commemorate the 
Shoah, or to celebrate the triumph of the generations. Rather, film and trip 
were initiated by Menachem Daum (who was raised an Orthodox Jew and 
remains religiously observant) with the aim to combat religious insularity 
and xenophobia in the thinking of his own sons and, presumably, in the 
thinking of some of the film’s viewers. His plan is to engage the sons and 
“us” in the activity of finding and recognizing the family’s Polish rescu-
ers. As with Lanzmann’s return of the “one-time boy singer” to Chełmno, 
Daum’s actions also entail, therefore, a persuasion and a return. And, like 
Shoah, Hiding and Seeking is a “film from the ground up.” But in this more 
recent film, both the grounds for action and the situations of bodies in space 
have been redefined.
 New York–based Menachem Daum with Oren Rudavsky is co-director 
of this thematically progressive, audiovisually inventive, and thereby semi-
autobiographical documentary. The child of a father who survived the Holo-
caust, Daum has constructed an itinerary that begins with him and his wife 
Rifka taking leave of their aging, immigrant fathers and traveling from New 
York to Israel to pick up their two grown sons who live as Orthodox Jews 
J a n e T  w a l k e r  279
with their wives and children. Together, the family then travels on to Poland, 
where they go first to the hometown of Menachem’s father and then to the 
farm where Rifka’s father, Chaim Federman, along with his two brothers, 
survived the genocide hidden by a Polish farmer and his family at the risk of 
their own lives.
 Prior to leaving on the trip, Daum asks for a paternal blessing. “Go in 
peace and return in peace,” his wheelchair-bound father pronounces in halt-
ing Yiddish, affected perhaps by the lingering results of a stroke. Then, sur-
prising us and maybe his son as well: “I want to go with you.” “Where do you 
want to go?” Daum inquires. “To my home,” his father answers. “Where is 
your home?” “Stevchinka 7.” But Daum’s father does not make the journey, 
and his original home is made strange by its presentation in the film.
 In the car, driving along in the Polish countryside, Rifka Daum responds 
to her husband’s repeated whistling and humming of the song, “I’m Going 
Home,” with a very definite: “You may be going home. We’re certainly not 
going home  .  .  .  This ain’t my home.” Her point about having been raised 
elsewhere is emphasized when the group is met with an absence in Daum 
senior’s hometown of Zduńska Wola. The houses and the synagogue that 
used to stand in the Jewish quarter are gone, and a convenience store among 
other shops occupies space near Stevchinka 7A. When Daum folds and 
refolds a paper prayer inscribed with family names and tucks it into the 
crevice between a telephone pole and its concrete base, this is too much for 
his younger son. “I’d like to say . . . I think this is nuts,” he asserts in direct 
address to the camera. “I object.” “I think this is completely ridiculous. A 
complete waste of time. Like the film.” Indeed, he and his brother look very 
much out of place in their black clothing, hats, and payes among the Polish 
young people out on the street.
 It is precisely in and through the resistance of the various family mem-
bers, and in and through the visual evidence of the differences between the 
Jewish visitors and the presumably non-Jewish Polish residents, that the film 
reminds us of the area’s history of anti-Semitism and, following Rogoff, of 
the near-inevitability that a given town or region will be multiply inhabited 
(if not ethnically cleansed). In this and other ways, Hiding and Seeking brings 
to the fore the complicated, spatialized relationships among “the world-wide 
Jewish community,” “the wider Polish nation,” “the existing local inhabit-
ants” and the returning Daums. Particular advantage is made of the motion 
picture’s ability simultaneously to ground and to unleash bodies and spaces 
from one another and, I submit, from an imagined territorial imperative 
where only certain people belong. Specifically, through the use of voice-over 
narration and editorial juxtaposition, the film establishes a productive asyn-
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chronicity between seeing and hearing (image track and sound track) and a 
productive spatial noncontiguity (physical presence and absence).
 As does his father, Daum’s father-in-law remains at home rather than 
making the trip to Europe. But they both return by generational proxy, and, 
especially in the case of the latter, Rifka Daum’s father Chaim Federman, 
by filmic means as well. While Federman is home in the United States, the 
film nevertheless enables the “return of [his] voice.” Prior to the trip, he had 
advised his son-in-law not to go to the farm where he had been hidden, even 
though Federman acknowledged that the farmer and his family had rescued 
him and his brothers: “He saved our lives. Otherwise, I wouldn’t be here.” 
Still, he rationalized, “they forgot already,” and he urged his son-in-law to 
tell the Polish family that he had died. For one thing, Federman had “prom-
ised them the world.” For another, he had good reason to be leery of return. 
After the war, he recalled, “When a Jew came back, they killed him.” “I don’t 
know what’s going on there today. Better, don’t show yourself.” But, of course, 
Menachem Daum and family do make the trip. Over images of the Polish 
countryside we hear Federman’s voice on the soundtrack: “Don’t look. Don’t 
stay on the street. You go by car. You stay outside. Better you shouldn’t show 
yourselves.” Accompanying images of Daum and one of his sons, in a field 
in Poland under partly cloudy skies flouting their patriarch’s advice Feder-
man’s words are heard in haunting voice-over: “I don’t like that you should 
go there.”
 That Chaim Federman is there, paradoxically, in absentia, and that 
his absent presence matters, are also conveyed through another sequence, 
amazing for its condensation of new and old technologies on the filmic win-
dowpane. Pulled over to the side of the road, the Daums, their guide, and 
their driver peer at the map and a laptop computer open on the hood of the 
car. Działoszyce, the town, and then, smaller, Dziekanowice, we make out. 
But how to get there? Menachem Daum reaches his father-in-law back in 
Brooklyn on the cell phone, and, in Polish retained from childhood, Feder-
man describes, apparently to a local of the area passing by, the landmarks 
by which the family (and the film crew) might navigate the narrow roads 
to the farmhouse. We see the Poland end of the conversation and the lit-
tle silver instrument from which the voice emanates. The call exemplifies 
Felman’s assertion that eyewitness testimony holds an “utterly unique and 
irreplaceable topographical position with respect to an occurrence” (206) 
(Federman was [once] there; he and he alone among the visitors remembers 
the way back). At the same time, the call also exemplifies the possibility that 
that position may be one of distance and difference. Lanzmann is critical of 
knowing without going and going without knowing. This film somewhat 
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reflexively presents (audio)visual technologies as a means of collaborative, 
mediated, and, as I will elaborate below, resistant knowing and going that 
problematizes redemptive narration.
 The next sequence is astounding, for the Daums do make it to the home 
of the Polish rescuers and the very spot on earth where the young Chaim 
Federman was given shelter, the cradle of the gathered family. The reunion 
happens very fast on film. First a shot through the front windshield as the car 
proceeds according to Federman’s long-distance directions; then a close-up 
of Rifka in the car with the countryside unrolling behind her; then a long-
shot of a farmyard, a barking dog tied up at the tree. Suddenly the Daums 
have arrived and it is established that the woman on the path in front of a 
substantial home with a beautiful flower garden is the granddaughter of the 
late farmer, Stanislav Matuszcyk. After nearly sixty years, the daughter of 
Chaim Federman and the granddaughter of Stanislav Matuszcyk inhabit the 
same patch of ground where their forebears met, and they also inhabit the 
same filmic shot. As Rifka excitedly questions the woman, “Did [your grand-
father] ever tell stories about that he hid three brothers?” the film cuts to the 
woman’s father, Wojciech Mucha (the now-elderly son-in-law of Matuszcyk), 
rounding the corner of the garden fence, tipping his hat to the visitors with 
Old World manners. With some prompting, he is able to recall at least two 
of the brothers’ names. “Get your grandmother,” says Mucha’s daughter to 
her own daughter, a young person who appears to be in her early twenties. 
Daum’s sons, no longer protesting the ridiculousness of their father’s “quest,” 
shake hands with Mucha just before the film cuts back to the fence corner 
to take in the arrival of Honorata Mucha, daughter of Stanislav Matuszcyk 
and wife of Wojciech Mucha. Completely bent over, she cranes her neck to 
greet the group and then rattles off with decisive speed the names of the three 
brothers. She herself cooked their food, we later learn, and carried it to the 
barn in a bucket so as not to alert the neighbors to the hidden Jews.
 The group then files up the path into the farmyard, halting where the 
barn once stood and where the brothers secreted themselves in a pit covered 
over with hay. We see Honorata Mucha from above, her green headscarf with 
the flowered border bright against the grass in the yard. The bones of her 
body mark the passage of years; her feet retrace steps of long ago—perhaps 
kicking up some particle of dust that had lain on the ground these many 
years—while her gesturing arms conduct the family’s testimony. The Ger-
mans entered the yard, we learn through the translator. The season was late 
autumn or winter, so only one layer of hay remained to hide the entrance 
to the hole. But the family was brave, Wojciech Mucha recalls. The Jew-
ish brothers were not found, and everybody survived. Menachem Daum’s 
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sons, Tsvi Dovid and Akiva, read a prayer for a “place where one’s parents, 
forebears, torah teacher or nation as a whole were miraculously saved from 
imminent danger.” The dog, tied to a nearby tree, barks incessantly over the 
words of the prayer while Rifka Daum and her sons are moved to tears. In 
relation to the film’s plot, thrumming with travel and conversation, this is 
a privileged moment amply illustrating Yi-Fu Tuan’s profound insight: “If 
we think of space as that which allows movement, then place is pause; each 
pause in movement makes it possible for location to be transformed into 
place” (6). From undifferentiated space, post–Holocaustic Europe such as the 
travelers perhaps imagined before the journey, the farmyard takes shape as a 
known and valued place. A year later, inside the house, we pause again when 
Honorata Mucha smiles over the telephone as she speaks with Federman in 
New York. “Good health to you,” she says. “May you live to be a hundred 
years.”
 Bodies exposed to the camera and film exposed to our eyes fix, very 
tangibly, the historical knowledge of a past event, miraculous or miracu-
lously and exceptionally humane. And yet the film is also open to an alter-
nate architectonics where knowledge circulates semi-autonomously from 
the physical proximity of people who “were there” at the time of the original 
events and place. Federman himself did not make the trip. But the film-
ing and the film convey their lessons through the physical transportation of 
second- and further-generation travelers and also, significantly, through the 
physical absence, marked by the audio presence, of Federman.
 As discussed above, Federman counseled his family not to go. He him-
self may have been as unwilling as he was unable to undertake the journey. 
This resistance informs Hiding and Seeking, such that the film may be read 
as countervailing the very materiality of eye-witnessing and mediated-wit-
nessing in which it also revels. We learn from a conversation between the two 
families that the Polish household took in the Jewish brothers out of pity and 
with thoughts of future compensation. Back in New York, Chaim Federman 
had acknowledged, “I promised them the world, [that I can] support them, 
understand?” Now, the granddaughter of Wojciech and Honorata Mucha 
questions why the family had never heard a word from the three brothers 
after the war. Rifka Daum explains that her father “feels bad about it; he 
regrets that he didn’t do more.” “We’re here to correct that,” vows Menachem 
Daum. And so the Daums apply to Yad Vashem and return to Poland one 
year later to participate in a ceremony, included in the film, in which the 
Muchas are presented with the medal for the “Righteous among the Nations.” 
The Israeli Ambassador, himself a Polish Jewish survivor, officiates, and Tsvi 
Dovid gives a speech thanking and honoring the Muchas and offering a fund 
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for the education of their descendants. He also explains that his grandfather 
“has literally become paralyzed to act upon  .  .  . an overwhelming sense of 
insurmountable debt.” Rifka’s and Menachem’s eldest granddaughter, rep-
resenting the fourth generation, presents flowers to Honorata Mucha and 
kisses her on the cheek.
 Juxtaposed with this sequence (preceding it in the order of the film) is 
Chaim Federman’s admission, with all due self-knowledge, that if the situa-
tion were reversed, if Jewish refugees had come to him for a place to hide and 
he would have had to risk his life to give it, he would have refused. But why, 
then, hadn’t he kept in touch with his rescuers, knowing full well what they 
did for him? Actually, from a special feature on the DVD, we learn that fifty 
items of correspondence between Stanislav Matuszcyk and the Federman 
brothers were discovered in the Muchas’ attic a year after the film was fin-
ished. This is a correspondence that ended in 1959, that Federman apparently, 
perhaps symptomatically, forgot and that Matuszcyk apparently never shared 
with his daughter and son-in-law. Some of the letters allude to attempts to 
purchase property for the farmer. One letter in particular is quoted by co-
director Oren Rudavsky. It is a letter from Federman to Matuszcyk that ends 
with the following sentences: “How are you without the Jews? Are you better 
without them?” Federman’s words betray anger, a justifiable emotion under 
the circumstances, many would say. Indeed, it is possible to watch the film 
and wonder whether Federman’s would-be debt wasn’t already canceled sev-
eral million times over by the Polish expropriation of property and lives. 
The incessant barking where the barn once stood underlines that the Daums 
are strangers. The sound bothers the nerves and threatens the audibility of 
reconciliation.
 Without utterly suppressing Jewish anger or Jewish difference (the let-
ters may be confined to the special features, but the bow-wow-wow is live 
action), it is nevertheless the goal of the film to work them through. Near 
the beginning, Menachem Daum plays for his sons a tape of an Orthodox 
Jewish leader advocating separation between Jews and Gentiles and a legacy 
of hatred. Jewish people should “implant in ourselves and in our children, 
hatred to them,” he orates. “Tell our children what the goyim have done to 
us for 1,900 years.” This is precisely the attitude the film is designed to reject. 
We cannot let the religion be “hijacked by extremists,” teaches Daum. And 
yet Daum includes as the penultimate sequence the response of his younger 
son, Akiva, heard in voice-over, accompanying a traveling shot of the road 
through the car windshield as the Daums drive away after their second visit 
to the farm. “What did you learn, Akivala, from meeting these people?” 
inquires Daum. “I learned there’s some very good people in the world. Some 
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very nice people, and a lot of not nice people.  .  .  . That was the truth. You 
want to know the truth? You add a few exceptions to the rule. But the general 
rule of thumb was, you know, to get rid of the Jew was the best thing to do 
and, um, they’d probably do it again.”
 Jewish anger is rarer in Holocaust narratives than are sadness and expres-
sions of victimhood. Survivors and refugees generally take and are often 
ceded the moral high ground. In Hiding and Seeking, the situation is more 
complex and ongoing. The film could have ended triumphantly, with posi-
tive lessons learned from the ceremony of the “Righteous among Nations.” 
But Akiva’s resistance, like Federman’s, is pronounced, and the narrative 
maintains a purposeful lack of closure. Daum describes the trip to Poland as 
his “tzavoah” to his children, “a document; sort of an ethical will,” through 
which he has communicated the important values by which he would like 
them to live. “I think it’s like planting a seed,” he says, in voice-over narration 
as he and Rifka along with their grandchildren stroll under a canopy of trees 
to the edge of a lake. “It can take years and years. But that’s my hope.” Here, 
as in The Last Days, the succession of the generations is presented optimisti-
cally. But Hiding and Seeking takes pains to highlight the ethical complexities 
of religious difference by acknowledging both the humanity of others and 
the hatred that Jewish religious extremism can harbor. The film itself is a 
tzavoah, a document through which these hopes and acknowledgments are 
nurtured.
 Menachem Daum responds to his wife’s emphatic “this ain’t my home” 
with the characterization of himself as a “wandering Jew.” And yet his tra-
jectory is deliberate. As they encounter the generous past actions of the 
Matuszczk family and, by implication, other non-Jewish people, the Daums’ 
“sentiments come to be mapped as physical transformations” (Bruno 245). In 
bringing his religiously insular sons from Israel to Poland, Daum reverses the 
redemptive narrative pathway from the camps of Poland to the Jewish state. 
“Neither the exilic dream of return to organic connection nor the nomadic 
celebration of rootless liberty,” John Durham Peters writes, “offers quite the 
best option for living in a world of differences” (39). Agreed. This is precisely 
why I value the film’s presentation of travel by person and by proxy and its 
use of asynchronous and noncontiguous sounds and images as an innovative, 
critically productive way of bridging the disjunction between over-zealous 
assertions of belonging and commemorative rites of resigned expatriation. 
Through its establishment of an anti-essentializing positionality, Hiding and 
Seeking “teaches the perpetual postponement of homecoming and the neces-
sity, in the meanwhile, of living among strange lands and peoples” (39).
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Conclusion
Certain Holocaust documentaries of return tend to further fantasies of home 
and homeland while avoiding competing claims to physical place and cul-
tural space. But I hope this chapter has shown as well that the Holocaust 
documentary of return may function as a flexible modality that increases the 
dimensionality of seeing, going, and being-there beyond any specific narra-
tive trajectory; certain documentaries of return or portions thereof maxi-
mize their potential to make “more room for lived space and its movement” 
(Bruno 245).
 Along with the personal histories of survivors and refugees that have 
been collected by the various Holocaust video archives around the world 
(and that now contribute to an enormous digital repository), we now have 
the filmically documented visits or situated testimonies of many “who were 
there.” In the form of built or unbuilt environments, places remain that 
returnees and their descendents can point to and say, “it is here, right here at 
this [train] track” (Winfrey anticipating Wiesel’s arrival) or “in front of the 
tree; right here” (on the Mucha farm): this is where it happened.
 But, as I have sought to argue here, neither the physical presence of an 
actual refugee on the soil or pavement that she or he fled or was removed 
from, nor any proliferation of landmarks, can guarantee the fullness or accu-
racy of historical detail. In fact, the absence of persons and structures may 
be particularly telling, as in the case of the ruined synagogue in Zduńska 
Wola or that of Chaim Federman’s failure to write or return. We may take the 
very instability of the documentary of return as an invitation to read moving 
testimonies critically and with renewed vigor. The seed is planted in a “terra 
infirma.”
 The main aim of this essay, then, is to recognize the radical, historio-
graphic possibilities of the Holocaust documentary of return as a material 
form of testimony that nevertheless resists a deterministic view of place. By 
presenting the critically accessible suggestion that “every topography and 
every text is doubly inhabited by often irreconcilable cultural positions,” 
these texts help “undo the universalism that attempted to bind us all together 
under the aegis of the dominant” (Rogoff 110–11). However committed to 
physical propinquity, however engaged with the allure of past haunts—and 
it is so committed and engaged—the Holocaust documentary of return, as 
a film or video text on the move, is also beautifully cut out to mediate our 
experience of testimony and witnessing across the discontinuous geographi-
cal spaces and the multiply inhabited places we call home.
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aUThOr’S nOTe: I would like to express my gratitude to Susan Rubin Sulei-
man for recommending Hiding and Seeking as a film that might further my 
interest in documentaries of return; it did indeed. And many thanks to the 
editors of the volume for their expert comments on this chapter and their 
exceptionally generous working method that included inviting geographi-
cally dispersed contributors to meet and talk in person.
notes
 1. “I did not want to go to Poland,” Lanzmann explained. “I thought that one can 
talk about this from everywhere, from any place, from Paris, from Jerusalem, from New 
Haven  .  .  .  And I said, ‘what will I see in Poland, I will see the nothingness, I will see 
the absence’” (Felman 256 and 256n36, referencing Lanzmann, “Evening” 4–5). But, of 
course, he did make the trip and many more. “The Israelis . . . asked me if I would consider 
undertaking a film about the Holocaust,” recounts Lanzmann; “I said yes rather quickly, 
without thinking very much . . . After I started, it became impossible to stop” (Felman 250, 
referencing Lanzmann, “Interview” 21).
 2. Here I am borrowing Richard Slotkin’s phrase from his book title because it calls 
to mind not only a specific place of genocide but also the mythologizing impulse through 
which that space is continually reimagined.
 3. Elsewhere I have written about the vicissitudes and the “paradox” of traumatic 
memory; see works cited.
 4. The film, Hirsch observes, has not been received “as a significant cinematic rep-
resentation of the Holocaust” (64), and yet it is significant in this regard for revealing the 
inextricable connections between “the technical/formal innovations” of cinema verité and 
“the memory of the Holocaust” and for revealing as well the “impossibility of presenting 
a snapshot of French society in 1960 without either confronting or repressing the unre-
solved collective memory of deportation” (64–65). Chronique d’un été, Hirsch asserts, 
“constituted a crucial moment in the development of a documentary discourse of histori-
cal trauma in Europe” (65).
 5. I would add that in relation to The Last Days and other Holocaust documentaries 
of return of which I speak, Marceline’s is a different sort of return, this time from the camp 
rather than back to it.
 6. By “state-building,” I assume Ashworth is referring to the state of Israel, and I read 
his article as implicitly anti-Zionist. In any case, Holocaust tourism in Eastern Europe 
does seem worth exploring from a critical perspective.
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p a r T  I I I
The holocaust and others

To Write Poetry after Auschwitz, You need the barbarians
John Coetzee’s most memorable novel taught us that we are always Waiting 
for the Barbarians: identifying who and where they are is the best way of 
defining who we are. Aren’t we what is left over after the barbarian is sub-
tracted or banished from our social order? But if we succeed, as C. P. Cavafy 
warns us, “what’s going to happen to us without barbarians? / They were, 
those people, a kind of solution” (18–19).
 For those artists, scholars, and politicians who spent most of their profes-
sional lives staring at the ashes and the aftergrowths of Nazi Europe, Theodor 
Adorno’s statement—“to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric”—estab-
lished epistemological, moral, and political boundaries. First uttered in 1949 
(Prisms 34) and revisited many times in subsequent essays, this dictum pro-
vided “a kind of solution”: the relief of knowing that the barbarians were 
defined—if not confined—by Auschwitz, and the challenge of engaging in 
art that was both dangerous and consequential. As in classical rhetoric, the 
“barbarian” came to exist, “not in himself, but as an idea enabling civiliza-
tion to define itself ” (Goffart 128n63). While the physical borders of postwar 
Europe were being negotiated, contested, and renegotiated in the context of 
the Cold War, its cultural and moral boundaries (and forms of trespass) were 
also being tested. The failures of the past remain the template for the chal-
lenges outside one’s window.
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 The focus of this essay is Israel in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, where 
a similar dynamic evolved into something quite different. In the first part I 
will argue that the sense of urgency that characterized the Cold War debates 
in Europe—and the mandate for healing through boundary consciousness, 
both temporal and spatial—was echoed in, and informed, a robust protest 
culture in Israel that was triggered by the spoils of the June war and culmi-
nated in the last years of the twentieth century. The peace process was more 
than a series of agreements; it was a new mode of accommodation with both 
the “barbarians” at the gates and with the “discarded” members of the col-
lective self. It was permeated by the recognition that extraordinary vigilance 
and mutually recognized borders were needed to prevent one’s own trauma-
tized community from turning xenophobic.
 The second part of this essay will attempt to show how that culture has 
been all but defeated by other dormant but deep-seated forces that were also 
unleashed by the 1967 war and the acquisition of “holy” territory. Sacred 
stories would come to be conflated with sacred shrines to produce a toxic 
narrative in which the shoah would play an increasing role. For Jews haunted 
by unburied “martyrs” from Europe and intoxicated by new proximity to the 
sacred center, a continuum stretches from the biblical topos of the akeda (the 
Binding of Isaac, Gen. 22) through Auschwitz to (back to) the Temple Mount 
in Jerusalem, where the akeda “happened”—an arc that is also a circle. In this 
circle, which radiates out concentrically to endless, borderless vistas, there 
are only two alternatives: to sacrifice or to be sacrificed.
 I am, in effect, defining an historical metanarrative that positions the 
Holocaust as the Ur-event of modern Jewish history and the akeda as the Ur-
“event” of Jewish memory. I will outline the process by which this metanarra-
tive congealed, as the four chapters of Israel’s history, bookended by war and 
political assassination (1948–67, 1967–82, 1982–95 and 1995 to the present1) 
evolved from a “Narrative of Strong Borders” consonant with the statecraft of 
compromise into a “Narrative of Borderlessness” consonant with the stage-
craft of the sacred. Each phase entails parallel shifts in the aesthetics, ethics, 
and politics of memory, representation, and action; the emphasis here is on 
the last two chapters, stretching from 1982 to the present. We are left, at the 
beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, in a “genocidal” 
space of sacrifice. The only way out, I will conclude, is by rediscovering a 
hermeneutic that allows us to read these stories, and these stones, at a dis-
tance—to turn our backs, as it were, on the akeda, on Auschwitz and on the 
Temple Mount with their holy and wholly homicidal mandates and, finally, 
to recapture the narrative of boundaries from the very story that occluded it.
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The narrative of Strong borders
Before 1967, an obsession with borders prevailed in Israel along with a sense 
of claustrophobia and deep existential angst, as the Arab countries continued 
to deny the legitimacy of Israel’s existence and as Israel continued to deny 
responsibility for the expulsion of much of the indigenous population dur-
ing the War of 1948. In this first stage of statehood, the areas beyond Israel’s 
armistice lines were regarded by its citizens as places not only of barbaric 
danger but also of desire and occasional suicidal acts of trespass (Alter 249–
62). The entire country was a narrow strip of land hugging the Mediterra-
nean coastline—and what the poet Yehuda Amichai later called the “supple 
and thin-waisted” city of Jerusalem (“The Land Knows,” Yehuda Amichai: A 
Life of Poetry 464) was the intersection of Israeli politics and geography, the 
holy sites temptingly out of reach in Jordanian hands. Maintaining what we 
might call a kind of “diasporic” distance from the sacred center, Amichai 
describes the pre-1967 “longing [that] floated overhead in the sky / like ships 
whose anchors stuck deep in us, / and sweetly ached.” Divided Jerusalem was 
crossed by “crazy people,” breached by “enemies,” tested by “lovers” (“Songs 
of Zion the Beautiful,” #24, 23 Poems 95). But more important than the long-
ing for what was out of reach was the presence of concrete armistice lines 
that, however tenuous, marked at least the promise of containment through 
physical borders.
 The historical timeline echoed the geographical outline, including its 
blind spots. In an attempt to distinguish between the discarded or murdered 
past and the utopian present, the chronology of modern Israel somehow 
managed to incorporate the past into the present: in its quasi-messianic 
reach and its quasi-therapeutic lexicon, the “phoenix” narrative of Israel’s 
birth—“mi-shoah le-tekuma” [from Holocaust to Rebirth]—seemed to pre-
empt prolonged mourning or guilt through action; to swallow the losers, 
from the victims and survivors of Europe to the Arabs of pre-state Israel, into 
an epic of heroic sublation. On the surface, it appeared to create a boundary 
between the past tense and the present in order to strengthen the fledging 
state without burdening it with a melancholy connection to its memories. 
But its blind spots were in fact signals of something far more sinister and 
widespread. In drawing parallels between the occlusion of the galut other2 
and of the Arab other in the creation of the New Hebrew self, Amnon Raz-
Krakotzkin focuses on a succession of repressive moves in Zionist thought 
and action (“Bein brit shalom” and “Galut”). Both forms of repression begin, 
rather naïvely, in the phoenix narrative.
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 The unlikely victory that ended the war of 1967 inaugurated the second 
phase in Israel’s history, characterized initially by a sense of military invinci-
bility. This was short-lived; the Yom Kippur War of 1973 revealed the cracks 
in the armor, and the invasion and occupation of Lebanon in 1982 effectively 
concluded this chapter with the breakdown of the internal consensus over 
the role of the Israel Defense Forces and the justness of Israel’s military pos-
ture in the world.
 In addition to the evolving discourse on power, a debate on territory 
came to dominate the post-1967 period. The West Bank would soon come 
to be designated in the public rhetoric as “liberated Judea and Samaria” and 
to constitute a new canvas for the Jewish imagination. Over the next four 
decades, the settlement of this territory would be viewed by growing sectors 
of the Israeli populace as “sanctified” by biblical texts and postbiblical acts 
of pilgrimage. The Temple Mount, which had remained the putative but dis-
tant axis mundi of the Hebrew imagination after the destruction of the Sec-
ond Temple, became once again a proximate and palpable anchor for cultic 
Jewish claims, radiating out in concentric circles to other shrines scattered 
throughout what had been ancient Israel—and to the Land itself (see Inbari; 
Ezrahi, “To What”). Archetypal memory based in scriptural narratives began 
to prevail over historical thinking, and mythical claims began to supplant 
political ones.
 The implications of this move were apprehended early on by a cohort 
of politicians, activists, and artists who constituted the Israeli peace camp 
and launched vigorous campaigns meant to make the native residents of the 
occupied territories visible and the territory negotiable. With this exposure, 
the repressed atrocities of 1948 also began to resurface within the “Green 
Line” through acts of excavation and representation (see Slymovicz; Gross-
man, Sleeping).3
 By the mid-1980s, the culture wars had been clearly delineated. In his 
Hebrew novel Arabesques (Hebrew 1986), the Arab Israeli writer Anton 
Shammas defined—and performed—the competition in the here and now 
between the “Jew of Time” and the “Arab of Place” (121–22). Shammas’s 
incursion into the hitherto ethnically homogeneous precincts of Hebrew 
literature4 was a demonstration of the kinds of delicious ironies and amalga-
mations that are possible when conflicting identities are demarcated, recog-
nized, and elasticized.
 Many other daring acts of trespass by Israeli poets, playwrights, and 
novelists were undertaken in the public square. Largely informed by the 
intellectual debates in postwar and postcolonial Europe, they dramatized 
the ways in which Israelis and Palestinians continue to live in a haunted 
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state. In The Yellow Wind, his nonfictional journey through the West Bank, 
and in Smile of the Lamb (Hebrew 1983; English 1990), the first Israeli 
novel to be set in the territories, David Grossman revealed the places 
that the apparatus of occupation had kept hidden from the general Israeli 
population.
 The driving force behind this entire enterprise was paradoxical: stealthy 
border crossings into “closed military areas” by peace groups, echoed in vari-
ous forms of artistic transgression, were meant to lead to the creation of legiti-
mate borders between Palestine and Israel. At the same time, the unburied 
ghosts from Europe were harnessed in order to eventually retire them to 
the pastness of the past. In Michael Rothberg’s words (in regard to Adorno’s 
embrace of the bold transgressions of modernist artists), the “notion of art’s 
barbarity [was] not refuted but enacted in order to present the barbarity of 
the age” (40).
 The barbarity of this age was exposed by chipping away at the self-
immuring forces of paranoia, election, and collective self-exoneration. A 
host of theatrical and literary events in the 1980s demonstrated, often in a 
mechanistic way, how inextricably bound were the Nazi/Jewish and the Pal-
estinian/Israeli self-narrations. The perversities of collective memory were 
exposed in the first place as a meditation on power and victimization:
As he waited in front of the new invention,
Danton said, “The verb to guillotine
(this brand-new verb of ours) is limited
in the tenses and persons of its conjugation:
for example, I shall not have a chance to say I was guillotined.”
Acute and poignant, that sentence, but naïve.
Here am I (and I’m nobody special),
I was beheaded
I was hanged
I was burned
I was shot
I was massacred.
I was forgotten
(But why give an opening to Satan?—
he might still recall
that, morally at least,
for the time being, I’ve won.)
(Dan Pagis, “An Opening to Satan”)
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 The grammar of power: exclusive claims to suffering in the passive voice 
yield (parenthetically, at first) to active projections of responsibility—and, 
hopefully, to a poetics of empathy that could spur political change. After the 
breakdown of the consensus on the uses of Israeli military power and the 
ambitions of Israeli expansionism, the poet Dahlia Ravikovitch led a group 
of writers who exposed the traditional vocabulary of Jewish suffering to con-
tamination and ambiguation:
She
is not your sort.
She’s a Diaspora kind of Jew whose eyes dart around
in fear . . .
On the road.
Caravans pass her by . . .
Once the caravan has crossed,
night will fall and she’ll find her house.
Her feet stub against the sharp gravel—stones,
dust soils her dress . . .
Her eyes are the blue eyes of Khazars,*
her face a broad face,
her body the heavy body of a native woman,**
third generation in the Land of Israel.
June 4, 1982
*The Khazars (the translators’ notes explain) were a “Turkic people from 
Central Asia, commonly believed to have converted to Judaism in the Mid-
dle Ages.”
**“Native. (Heb. “mi-bney ha-makom”). Official code for Israeli Palestin-
ians.”
(“A Jewish Portrait,” Hovering 190–91)
In this radical departure from the proprietary rhetoric of representation, it 
is unclear whether the object of the gaze is Jewish or Palestinian, while all 
assertions of ethnic purity are upended by reference to those intrusive Kha-
zars. The appearance of the woman in this poem is as generic as the claims 
that both sides make to the same fear and the same territory.
 In an even more blatant act of moral ambiguation, Hanokh Levin’s play 
Ha-patriot (The Patriot) conflates the iconic Jewish child from the Warsaw 
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Ghetto and an innocent Palestinian child. Mahmoud, cap on head and hands 
raised, begs for mercy from an Israeli soldier, Lahav. Pointing a gun at the 
child’s head, Lahav addresses his own mother:
He will avenge your blood and the blood of our murdered family, as then, 
mother, when your little brother stood alone in front of the German, at 
night, in the field, and the German aimed his revolver at his head, and your 
little brother, trembling with fear, said (and he sings as he aims the revolver 
at Mahmoud):
Don’t shoot
I have a mother
she is waiting for me at home.
I haven’t eaten yet.
Dinner.
Don’t kill me.
I am a child.
I am a human being like you.
What did I do?
What difference would it make to you if I yet lived?
This passage was excised from the performances of the play by the censor-
ship that still prevailed in those years as a relic from the British Mandate.5
 In David Grossman’s novel See Under: Love (1986), Momik, the young 
child of Holocaust survivors, renders the Holy Land as a palimpsest in which 
“Over There”—Nazi Europe and Jewish Europe—shows through the half-
erased spaces of Israel–Palestine (62). Going on to meditate, as an adult 
writer, on the ways in which the poison of Nazism can infect even (espe-
cially?) its victims, Momik warns of “the LNIY” (the Little Nazi in You) 
(262).
 During this third phase in Israel’s history, the spectral world could be 
invoked as a warning that each of us carries Pagis’s guillotine or Grossman’s 
“LNIY”; writing poetry nach Auschwitz meant, therefore, forging a moral 
universe after Auschwitz but vis-à-vis the new world created in its wake. Put-
ting the past behind us meant first acknowledging and then exorcising, often 
through dangerous acts of impersonation, our potentially fatal impulse to 
repeat it—this time as the victors of history. After having been recklessly sub-
sumed into the narrative of Israeli triumphalism, the fate of European Jewry 
began both to recede into the past as memory—and to inform the present as 
knowledge.6
298 1 3 :  f r O m  a U S C h w i T z  T O  T h e  T e m P l e  m O U n T
 Walter Benjamin would surely have recognized the protest culture of the 
last decades of the twentieth century in Israel as a welcome “intervention” 
in response to a patent “state of emergency,” to the “moment of danger,” as a 
daring attempt to “blast open the continuum of history” (257, 262, 255). One 
imagines that he, and Adorno, would have condoned its various manifesta-
tions as a reprise of the very mindset that was not barbaric precisely because 
it appeared to be so, that which “displace[d] and estrange[d] the world, 
reveal[ed] it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it 
will appear one day in the messianic light”—analogous to the prose of Kafka, 
the poetry of Celan, the plays of Beckett in their day (Adorno, Minima 274).
 Most of the cultural events of the 1980s and 1990s featured elements 
taken from the repertory of comedy and the grotesque while envisioning a 
world more fully reconciled. At that point, some thirty to forty years after 
the liberation of the death camps and some twenty to thirty years after the 
conquest of the West Bank and Gaza, the function of comedy was no longer 
constitutive in the wake of tragedy (“laughter after . .  .”), but hortatory—or 
“homeopathic”—in the face of a new unfolding tragedy. The novels of Gross-
man and Yoram Kaniuk (Adam Resurrected, Hebrew 1969); the dramas of 
Yehoshua Sobol (Ghetto trilogy 1984–90), Shmuel Hasfari (Tasmad), and 
Hanokh Levin; and the poetry of Dan Pagis and Dahlia Ravikovitch demon-
strated—through irony, satire, and the grotesque—the haunting presence of 
the holocaustal past in the unfolding reality of an Israel perpetually at war. 
Like Aristophanes’ Lysistrata in the early fifth century b.c.e. or Chaplin’s 
The Great Dictator in 1940, this is comedy in “real time,” the comic muse 
enlisted to speak truth to power. Indeed, coming increasingly to resemble 
the ancient Athenian amphitheater in the last years of the Peloponnesian 
wars, the Hebrew stage in the last decades of the twentieth century reflected 
the ethical power of the comic imagination to recruit the catastrophic past to 
address the endangered future.
 What remains constant in both the constitutive and the hortatory stages 
of the comic imagination is the demarcation between norm and anti-norm, 
between civilized self and barbaric other. The bipartite structure of the comic 
imagination—what Arthur Koestler calls “bisociation” (37) and what I define 
as the “simultaneity of incompatible worlds, the safe and quotidian with the 
barbaric and monstrous” (“Acts” 18)—presumes boundaries, even as it vio-
lates and attempts to redraw them. Taking as his point of departure Ben-
jamin’s “‘weak messianic values,’” Dominick LaCapra talks of the “crucial 
problem of ethics” embedded in acts of transgression as attempts to establish 
new boundaries—the “relationship between normative limits that you want 
to affirm and the possibility of transgressing those limits, which is the only 
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way .  .  . you get a newer normativity” (154). The new normativity in Israel 
comprised an ethics of empathy accompanied by an aesthetics of trespass 
and impersonation7—and it nearly succeeded.
 This process culminated in the Acco Theatre production Arbeit Macht 
Frei. Directed by Dudi Ma’ayan, the five-hour performance included two 
actors (Semadar Ya’aron-Ma’ayan as “Selma” and Haled Abu Ali as “Mah-
moud”) who in real life and in their stage personae represented the two 
repressed “others” in Israel: the Holocaust survivor and the Arab. After a 
carnival of trespass enacted in every imaginable realm, Selma and Haled 
end in a naked embrace, their two scarred bodies entwined in an exhausted 
pièta. The play ran from 1991 to 1995, had two cinematic incarnations, and 
has been widely discussed by Israeli scholars as a cultural watershed (Ezrahi, 
“Acts”; Bartov; Raz-Krakotzkin, “Galut”; Rokem).
 Exploring the ways in which the shoah was being projected phantasmago-
rically but therapeutically onto the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, one was easily 
convinced, through the mid-1990s, that the resolution of both the haunting 
past and the embattled present was only a matter of time and of mutually 
acceptable borders which, once established, would allow—or force—the col-
lective self to recognize, civilize, or resist the barbarians without and within, 
and to pacify the ghosts from the past (Ezrahi, “Revisioning”). This was 
based on confidence in the historical ability of Jews to reinvent their culture 
in the wake of catastrophe (Mintz) as well as on what appeared to be inexora-
ble political developments in the decades that hosted the peace process. The 
protest movement that began in the wake of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon 
and the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla was spurred on by the first Intifada 
(1987–93) and given legitimacy by the Oslo Accords (1993).
 But the counter-forces that had been unleashed in the wake of 1967 
would largely succeed in derailing this process. Israeli Jews in growing num-
bers came to refract the Palestinian–Israeli conflict through the prism of 
the genocidal past not in order to overcome it but to submit to its deadly 
hold on any claim to the present or the future. Increasingly, the struggles 
between Israelis and Palestinians became a drama not of this time and not 
of this place.8 The early “negationist” impulses in Zionist thought vis-à-vis 
the victims of Nazi Germany and their culture and vis-à-vis the Arabs on 
both sides of the non-border became, after 1967, increasingly annexationist. 
Every Israeli government was complicit in the usurpation of land that began 
in the early 1970s, but widespread public legitimacy for the enterprise came 
about through a radical rhetorical shift that touched a very old nerve. From 
the late 1970s on, led by right-wing governments and the growing religious 
sector, the unburied European past was summoned for its most public task: 
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to explain and navigate the conflict in the Holy Land. In her trenchant analy-
sis of the ways in which the absent presence of the shoah comes to shape 
the ongoing debate over borders, Idith Zertal quotes the claim of the “Gush 
Emunim” [bloc of the faithful] settlers that withdrawal from the territories is 
“withdrawal to the crematoria” (184–208). The category of holiness conflates 
the kedoshim or martyrs of World War II and eretz ha-kodesh—the Holy 
Land.
The narrative of borderlessness
If, from the perspective of 2012, it appears that the culture of protest has been 
all but defeated, it is largely due to the fact that for forty-four years now there 
are no boundaries. The conquest of East Jerusalem in the Six-Day War turned 
the lean city of the 2,000-year-old dream into a “noisy old dowager, all of her, 
/ with her gold and copper and stones, / .  .  . come back / to a fat legal life” 
(Amichai, “Songs of Zion the Beautiful,” #23, 24 Poems 95). During what I 
have delineated as the second, third, and fourth chapters of Israel’s sovereign 
existence, from 1967 to the present, two generations of Israelis have grown 
up without borders demarcating either where Jews end and Israelis begin or 
where Israel ends and Palestine begins. Ongoing acts of cruelty against an 
occupied people take place in an increasingly invisible space, for which the 
only witnesses are mute, conspiratorial, or muzzled—the Palestinians, the 
settlers, and the Israeli soldiers (plus a dwindling handful of intrepid journal-
ists and human rights activists).9
 In March 2004, Hebrew novelist and polemicist A.  B. Yehoshua 
expounded on what it means to be a people without a sense of borders. We 
are driving ourselves and our neighbors mad, he said in an interview in the 
daily Haaretz: “The moment Israel becomes [undefined] it drives the Jews 
crazy and drives the anti-Semites crazy; it drives the Arabs crazy and drives 
the Christians crazy.” At the deepest level, he continues, this is a Jewish quirk: 
“The Jews don’t want borders; Jews want everything to be open. So it will be 
possible to move from here to there. So things won’t be defined. And that is 
exactly why Zionism to me means that we will finally have a border .  .  . to 
free ourselves of our dybbuk of latching onto other nations, and to regroup 
in our territory” (“Interview” 10–11). Toward that goal, Yehoshua was one 
of the early supporters of the “Security Wall” that has, unfortunately, become 
the parody of a border between Israel and Palestine (see Bitton; Brown).
 Indeed, in place of recognized geopolitical borders we now have uni-
laterally imposed fences, walls, and impassable “gates” planted deep inside 
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occupied territory; instead of clear, temporal boundaries we have a confla-
tion of there and here, of then and now, fed by deep reflexes of the Jewish 
imagination that were never retired. I have already noted that before 1967, 
the architects of national memory in Israel had attempted to substitute pres-
ence for absence and gain for loss as both the Arabs of Israel and the Jews of 
Europe were incorporated into the triumphalist Zionist narrative. But loss 
and absence came to overtake the project at the turn of the century. LaCapra 
writes that “when mourning turns to absence and absence is conflated with 
loss, then mourning becomes impossible, endless, quasi-transcendental 
grieving, scarcely distinguishable (if at all) from interminable melancholy” 
(69). The “phoenix” narrative of Israel’s birth defined a deeply flawed and 
hubristic project held in check by the minimal constraints of late national-
ist and colonialist practice. But it would evolve into something even more 
insidious: the mandates of a mythical past and the mournful yearning for an 
eschatological future would once again, as in the first centuries of the Com-
mon Era, overwhelm historical time as primary referent of Jewish memory 
and arbiter of Jewish politics.
 Empathy and compassion are handicapped when the passage of time is 
denied as a major dimension of representation of the cataclysmic past. It is 
the essentializers who keep the victims of the shoah, the survivors and all 
who speak in their name, safe from any implication in the moral challenges 
of the present—who, that is, insist on the eternal, haunting presentness of 
the past. To the already degraded status of the present tense of the Hebrew 
verb “to be”10 are added the reifying and fetishizing acts of memory. The 
consequences of “total recall” are far greater, I have argued, than the risk 
of repressed memory or amnesia (Ezrahi, “Representing”). If from the out-
set there were hardly any representations of the Arab–Israeli conflict that 
were not obscured by unburied phantoms from “Over There,” as the con-
flict morphed into the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, the phantoms hijacked the 
moral ground.
 This development is consistent with the darker forces that Zionism had 
inherited from the deep recesses of the Hebrew imagination. For large sec-
tors of the populace, Israel’s enemies are no longer regarded as recalcitrant 
human adversaries, or even as barbarians to be vanquished or pacified in 
a political conflict, but as new exemplars of the mythological archenemy. 
Because of the peculiar claims of “return” and “recovery” of ancient privi-
leges that guided Zionist thinking, because the map of Jewish desire is iden-
tical to the map of ancient Jewish memory, the modern Arab in his role 
as descendant of Ishmael had long doubled as implacable oriental stranger 
and romantic embodiment of the Hebrew self (Ezrahi, Booking 22). What 
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appeared in its early artistic forms as an innocuous and even respectful, 
though supersessionist, gesture toward the “other brother”—turning colo-
nialist enterprise into one of atavistic self-realization—would become lethal 
by the end of the century.
 It appears indeed that there no longer is an “other,” as all rational versions 
of history—Marxist or Zionist utopian, Enlightened or pragmatic, history 
constructed entirely of acts of human intervention, built to human scale and 
unfolding in the present tense—are under full attack. Looking back, one can 
say that history itself was murdered along with Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. Events 
leading up to and including the Al Aqsa Intifada (2000) sealed the coffin on 
the peace process. During this fourth chapter in Israel’s history, from 1995 to 
the present, archetypal thinking has come to prevail, and linear, open-ended 
apprehensions of Jewish history have been overwhelmed by circular reflexes; 
the “Palestinian–Israeli conflict” itself is being increasingly referred to by all 
sides as a “Condition” (ha-matzav), hardly amenable to human resolution.
 The moment political conflict gives way to apocalyptic surrender is the 
most dangerous in the annals of any polity. The modern Jewish apocalyptic 
has its origins in two biblical prototypes: Ishmael [Gen. 21] and Amalek [Ex. 
17, Deut. 25]. If in early Zionist representations of the Arab other in art and 
literature s/he is the romantic embodiment of the primordial self, in later 
representations, the Arab is the implacable enemy. When Yasir Arafat was 
added to the lineage that goes through Hitler back to Amalek, the demonic 
other was reincarnated. But whether the enemy is identified as the discarded 
(br)other, Ishmael—whose task it was to handle the estate for as long as it 
took the chosen one to return and reclaim it—or as the embodiment of the 
archenemy, Amalek, the result in the context of occupation and religious war 
is the same: the transformation of historical into archetypal adversaries, the 
abandonment of political and geographical containment for the expansion-
ist myths of election and divine promise. Effacement is achieved by various 
mental and physical acts of “ethnic cleansing” or by an ostensibly gentler 
form of aufhebung. Even the “gentler” mode turns genocidal when the broth-
ers return to the place of sacrifice and sacred narratives come to reinhabit 
sacred space.
Sacrificing isaac/ishmael
The shift from historical to mythical thinking and from political to sacred 
geography places a particular story and a particular site at the center of 
consciousness. In the two warring religious traditions, Isaac and Ishmael 
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exchange roles as preferred/discarded brother; the center of each story is a 
small hilltop referred to in one tradition as Mt. Moriah or the Temple Mount 
and in the other as Harim al Sharif (Golgotha is but a stone’s throw away . . .). 
If before 1948, Zionism had a profoundly ambivalent approach to the car-
tography of holiness (Saposnik), and if between 1948 and 1967 the physical 
distance from the Old City of Jerusalem perpetuated a healthy “diasporic” 
engagement with the actual sites, after 1967 and the reterritorialization of 
a literary topos, the akeda on “Mt. Moriah” would prove to be the biggest 
obstacle to the viability of political discourse and geopolitical borders. I will 
conclude by briefly examining the sacrificial claims at the heart of this phe-
nomenon and by arguing that the story-that-won’t-go-away contains a secret 
that could help us out of the impasse to which the engorgement or efface-
ment of the Palestinian other and the annihilating and all-consuming fury of 
the shoah have brought us in this part of the world.
 Nearly twenty years ago, A.  B. Yehoshua—the same writer who would 
argue fecklessly for unilaterally constructed borders—tried to exorcise the 
haunting figure of Isaac on the altar. The last character in Yehoshua’s novel 
Mr. Mani (1990),11 the enigmatic Joseph Mani, lives in Jerusalem in the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century and is obsessed with the need to “remind” 
the “forgetful Jews” (i.e., the Ishmaelites) of their Judaism (337). This same 
Joseph will soon be killed—whether at the hand of the Ishmaelites or that 
of his own father is not clear, but what is clear is that this murder is both 
a “realization” of the akeda and a conflation of the story of Isaac and Ish-
mael—meant to make two murderous stories go away. In interviews after 
the appearance of this controversial novel, Yehoshua claimed that he had 
decided to “annul the sacrifice of Isaac by its fulfillment”:
When I wrote the “Fifth Conversation” for Mr. Mani, we were in the first 
difficult months of the Intifada, before we became inured to atrocity, and 
every dead Palestinian child still caused us sleepless nights. At the time, I 
recalled that at the beginning of Zionism, Ben Gurion and President Ben 
Zvi came up with the peculiar notions that Yosef Mani propounds—that 
the Arabs of the country were merely converted descendants of Jews who had 
remained devoted to the land after the destruction of the Second Temple. And 
that perhaps due to their attachment to the land they gave up their loyalty 
to the faith of their fathers. Yet now we torture our brothers of old with the 
afflictions of the occupation. (“Mr. Mani and the Akedah,” emphasis mine)
 Here we meet, explicitly, the Arab other as autochthonous Jewish self, 
an intensified version of the supersessionist view I outlined above, which 
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Yehoshua attributes to Ben Gurion and Ben Zvi. It is, perhaps, a way of 
returning Ishmael to the equation—this time not as the other brother or 
“cousin” (as he is designated in Talmudic and modern Hebrew), but as an 
incarnation of Isaac himself. But of the many curiosities in Yehoshua’s state-
ment, the most curious is his claim to be the first to try to resolve the akeda 
by realizing or literalizing the topos of sacrifice—to annul the sacrifice by its 
fulfillment. He does not take into account the fact that virtually every invoca-
tion of the akeda in postbiblical Jewish literature is an enactment of the sac-
rifice, and, therefore, a profound and fatal misreading of the original biblical 
story. Even the biblical story carries traces of an accomplished sacrifice that 
may have been overwritten by the redactors of Genesis. The slaughter that 
didn’t take place in Genesis 22, that was interrupted at the last minute by a 
divine voice, is represented in Christian art and exegesis as the “sacrifice of 
Isaac,” foreshadowing the Crucifixion. But in Jewish literature as well, from 
Talmudic times to the present, it is the presumed death of Isaac that has 
become a template for Jewish martyrdom (Spiegel).
 Modern philosophers have been as mesmerized as writers and artists by 
this story. Jacques Derrida invokes the akeda while standing, as it were, on 
Kierkegaard’s shoulders: “The sacrifice of Isaac is an abomination in the eyes 
of all, and it should continue to be seen for what it is—atrocious, criminal, 
unforgiveable; Kierkegaard insists on that. The ethical point of view must 
remain valid: Abraham is a murderer” (85).
 Even as careful and clever a reader as Derrida designates this topos as the 
“sacrifice” of Isaac and labels Abraham’s act “murder.” He acknowledges the 
miraculous intervention, but indicates that the ultimate sacrifice, amount-
ing to a kind of suicidal self-denial on the father’s part, has already been 
performed. And, moreover, that it has since become commonplace: “Is it not 
inscribed in the structure of our existence to the extent of no longer con-
stituting an event  .  .  .  the sacrifice of others to avoid being sacrificed oneself 
[?] . . . In the discourses that dominate during . . . wars, it is rigorously impos-
sible, on one side and the other, to discern the religious from the moral” 
(85–87, emphasis mine).
 The sacrifice of others to avoid being sacrificed oneself. The sacrificial space 
knows only one thing. Taken together, chapters 21 and 22 of Genesis create 
an echo chamber in which first one brother and then the other is nearly 
killed—saved at the “last minute” by divine intervention. Some time later, 
their younger brother from Nazareth comes to the site and is not spared. 
Thus all their descendants are candidates for murder. “The warring factions 
are all irreconcilable fellow worshippers of the religions of the Book,” con-
tinues Derrida. “Does that not make things converge once again on Mount 
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Moriah over the possession of the secret of the sacrifice by an Abraham who 
never said anything? Do they not fight in order to take possession of the 
secret as a sign of an alliance with God and to impose its order on the other, 
who becomes for his part nothing more than a murderer?” (85–87, emphasis 
mine).
 The “secret of the sacrifice of Isaac” is, according to Derrida, “the space 
separating or associating the fire of the family hearth and the fire of the sac-
rificial holocaust” (88). That space contracts the closer we come to consum-
mating our physical claims to—that is, domesticating—the sacred center. 
In the more benign version, as we have seen, one brother incorporates the 
other; in the more pernicious version, the one annihilates the other. Both 
versions are being enacted daily on the bloody streets of the Holy Land.
Toward a new narrative
A Comic Reading of the Akeda
What shapes the riddle of filicide that lies at the heart of all three mono-
theisms—the riddle that refuses to disappear or to be resolved—is based, 
then, on a gross misreading of the constitutive story. The original version is, 
I submit, theatrical and comic: the aborted sacrifice of Isaac is framed in the 
biblical narrative as a “test,” and the murderous act is preempted in classical 
comic fashion by the appearance of a deus ex machina.12 Different versions of 
the Hebrew word for laughter, tz-h-k, appear twenty-one times in the chap-
ters that frame the story (Gen. 17–22). But even if in modern Hebrew lit-
erature the akeda has been secularized and nationalized as an internal affair 
between Israel and its destiny, or its government, or between fathers and sons 
(Feldman; Kartun-Blum), the interrupted holocaust13 is still deemed inad-
equate to the task of representing Jewish martyrdom, having been replaced 
long ago by the tragic, sacrificial version.
 In Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic, Terry Eagleton argues that the 
sacrificial and the tragic are inseparable in Western imagination. With Cara-
vaggio’s graphic Sacrifice of Isaac on its cover, Eagleton’s book demonstrates 
the close relation between the sacrificial figure, the pharmakos—Isaac—and 
tragic figures such as Oedipus, Antigone, and Lear (274–97). At its heart, the 
ultimate act is still a sacrifice of brothers to the insatiable God on the Moun-
tain.14 Raz-Krakotzkin has argued that the suppressed temple cult continues 
to bubble just below the surface of secular Zionism (“Bein”). Idith Zertal has 
shown how the “process of sanctification . . . of the Holocaust, coupled with the 
concept of holiness of the land, and the harnessing of the living to this two-
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fold theology, have converted a haven, a home and a homeland into a temple 
and an everlasting altar” (8).
 Dan Pagis was one of the few writers in Israel who, in treating the time/
place of the shoah, not only (as we have seen) insisted on the moral equa-
tions of power, but also turned his back on both the Temple Mount and the 
akeda. In place of Abraham and Isaac and the covenant of sacrifice, Pagis 
foregrounds Cain and Abel and the arbitrary, pre-covenantal fratricide of 
brothers. Cain and Abel are imagined as interchangeable; the Nazis (and, by 
implication, all demonized enemies of Israel) are humanized and divested of 
their mythological status while the Jews are stripped of their immunities and 
their sacrificial designation: “here in this carload /I am eve / with abel my 
son / if you see my other son / cain son of man / tell him that I” (“Written in 
Pencil in the Sealed Boxcar”; see also “Autobiography” and “Brothers”).
 But we have seen that as the millennium turned and the political hold 
on sacred space congealed, there was no way to disengage from the gravi-
tational pull of the altar, or from the story that “took place” on that altar. I 
will, therefore, suggest that we can emancipate ourselves from its genocidal 
grip only if we learn to read it differently. “I am .  .  . against originary eth-
ics,” writes John Caputo, “having lost all contact with the First Beginning 
and everything Originary” (1–2). His “originary ethics” comes close to what 
I have defined as the supersessionist logic that loops back to original per-
sons, places, and stories. When Caputo describes “obligation” as replacing 
“ethics,” he too implicitly returns to the story of Abraham and Isaac, and to 
Derrida and Kierkegaard—though with a possible way out. “For Derrida 
as for Kierkegaard,” he argues, “ethics ought to be sacrificed in the name of 
obligation . . . Obligation calls, but its call is finite, a strictly earthbound com-
munication, transpiring here below, not in transcendental space (if there is 
such a thing) . . . [but rather] wherever we are, in the middle of the fix we find 
ourselves in . . . Obligation is . . . the feeling of being bound (ligare, ob-ligare, 
re-ligare)” (ix, 7, 15, 21).15
 In Hebrew akeda literally means binding. Returning the story to its 
original language and action allows binding and intervention once again to 
preempt sacrifice. Human obligation, the “feeling of being bound,” creates 
boundaries. In the akeda restored as comedy, the angel appears as human 
projection to stay the murderous hand:
Abraham: Isaac, my son, do you know what I’m about to do?
Isaac: Yes, Abba, you are going to slaughter me . . .
Abraham: I am afraid I have no choice . . . I am doing this only as God’s 
messenger.
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Isaac: Of course as messenger, Abba. Get up as messenger and raise the 
knife as messenger on your son, your only one, whom you love . . .
Abraham: Great, that’s really what I deserve at my age. Put all the blame 
on me if it’s easy for you, on your old and broken father who has at his 
age to climb the mountain with you, bind you on the altar, slaughter 
you, and on top of everything else to tell your mother everything. You 
think I have nothing else to do at my age? . . . That’s the way you toy 
with the feelings of one who is about to become a bereaved father? . . .
Isaac: Slaughter, kind and merciful Abba’le, slaughter me, saintly 
Abba’le . . .
Abraham: Kill your father, gangster! Just kill him! [Catches Isaac by 
the throat] Lie down!
Isaac: A voice! A voice! I hear a voice!
Abraham: What kind of voice? Lie down!
Isaac: A voice from heaven!
Abraham: What voice from heaven?! Lie down!
Isaac: I don’t know. It said: “Lay not thy hand upon the lad.”
Abraham: I didn’t hear a thing.
Isaac: Your hearing has been bad for some time. Here it repeats, “lay not 
thy hand upon the lad.” . . . Abba, I swear I heard a voice from heaven.
Abraham [after a pause]: Nu, if you say you heard it, you must have 
heard it. I, as you pointed out, am a bit deaf.
Isaac: One hundred per cent. You know that for my part I was ready, but 
a voice is a voice. [Pause] You saw yourself that I was okay with this. 
[Pause] Both of us were okay. [Pause]. Right, we were both okay? 
Everything turned out well, Abba, why are you sad?
Abraham: I think about what will happen if other fathers will have to 
slaughter their sons, what will save them.
Isaac: A voice can always come from heaven.
Abraham: Nu, if you say so . . .
(Hanokh Levin, Malkat ambatia 91, translation mine).16
This exchange appears in Hanokh Levin’s controversial satirical revue, Mal-
kat ambatia (Bathtub Queen), first performed in Tel Aviv in 1970. The play, 
a massive attack on Israel’s sacred cows, appeared in the euphoric aftermath 
of the Six-Day War. Levin’s akeda remains one of the few comic renderings 
of this constitutive story in Jewish literature, flanked on one side by Woody 
Allen and on the other by Franz Kafka.
 Allen’s prankish God and humorless Abraham replay the drama in its 
“original” form, with an American eye toward the abuse of power. After the 
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Lord “stayed Abraham’s hand,” He blames Abraham for his lack of a sense of 
humor. “‘But doth this not prove I love thee, that I was willing to donate mine 
only son on thy whim?’” answers Abraham in shame. “And the Lord said, ‘It 
proves that some men will follow any order no matter how asinine as long as 
it comes from a resonant, well-modulated voice’” (23–24).
 Kafka’s Abraham, generated after reading Kierkegaard, is, perhaps, the 
ultimate comic figure for our time: one who cannot obey the call-from-with-
out because he is too embedded and obligated in this world. He may be 
“prepared to satisfy the demand for a sacrifice immediately” but is simply 
“unable to bring it off because he could not get away, being indispensable; 
the household needed him, there was perpetually something or other to put 
in order, the house was never Ready . . .” (172). 
 The phantoms of the genocidal past can still be contained, indeed, if 
household needs take priority, if the present tense is stretched and territory 
contracted to accommodate temporal and geographical borders and rec-
ognized selves and others. I am suggesting, however, that it will take more 
than a reinstatement of political, “historical” thinking to counter the mythic-
apocalyptic turn in Israeli culture. I am offering nothing less than a paradig-
matic shift in the hermeneutic as in the political–ethical sphere of regained 
Jewish sovereignty, a shift as radical as that performed by the Rabbis in the 
first centuries of the Common Era to cope with the loss of sovereignty. The 
comic critique can of course break the pathos of mythic thinking that is so 
dysfunctional for the democratic polity. But in this case, in retiring the super-
sessionist, apocalyptic impulses, we are also returning to the strictly “literal” 
construction of the akeda—to a comic, bounded, “bisociated” reading of 
the Abrahamic legacy—and one that, going forward, respects boundaries 
even when (especially when) it attempts to transgress them for purposes of 
achieving a “new normativity.”
 No one on the comic stage dies, no one is dispensable. Even if getting 
back to a “fundamentalist” reading of Genesis 22 as comedy appears quite 
daunting, it is, I believe, the only salvation we need.
aUThOr’S nOTe: For responses to earlier drafts of this essay, I wish to thank 
the participants in the Berlin seminar on “After Testimony,” and the par-
ticipants in the Van Leer Seminar and Conference on “The Shoah and Glo-
balization” (2007–9); for responses to later drafts, I am particularly grateful 
to Susan Rubin Suleiman, Ronit Peleg, Amos Goldberg, Marianne Hirsch, 
Michal Ben-Naftali, Sacvan Bercovitch, and Bernard Avishai.
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notes
 1. Three of these dates refer to Israel’s wars: the 1948 War of Independence, the June 
war of 1967, and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (subsequently called the “first Leba-
nese War”); 1995 refers to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin.
 2. “Galut” is the Hebrew term for Jewish existence in the Diaspora after the destruc-
tion of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 c.e. In contemporary Hebrew, galut desig-
nates the condition of Jews outside the State of Israel, specifically in this instance the Jews 
of Europe before or after the Holocaust.
 3. Early literary mappings of the nokhahim nifkadim—the official term for “absent 
[Arab] presences”—include the stories of S. Yizhar, written before the smoke had cleared 
from the battles of 1948, and the fiction of A. B. Yehoshua (“Facing the Forest”) and Ben-
jamin Tammuz (“The Orchard”). See the afterword by David Shulman to a recent English 
edition of Yizhar’s “Khirbet Khizeh,” which highlights the perennial urgency of this classi-
cal Israeli text and its biblical intertexts in light of the ongoing violations in the occupied 
territories (121–22). The Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwich relates in interviews in La 
Palestine comme métaphore (Palestine as Metaphor) that his native village of Birwa was 
“rayé de la carte dès notre départ forcé” (erased from the map after our forced departure). 
Admitting that he has not been able to reclaim his “personal patrimony,” Darwich sings 
the collective history of the whole of Palestine (13, 9). But he also speaks (in Hebrew!) of 
his affinity for Hebrew poets, from H. N. Bialik to Y. Amichai.
 4. There seem to be only one or two Arab or Palestinian writers per generation (the 
poet Salman Masalha and novelist/journalist Sayed Kashua are contemporary examples) 
who venture into Hebrew territory, but they signal the possibilities of a major cultural 
meeting ground.
 5. From the Program Notes of Levin’s The Patriot. The echo chamber in which the 
shoah and the Palestinian naqba resonate found one of its earliest dramatic expressions in 
Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani’s story “Return to Haifa.” A central character in that 
narrative is, through a quirk of fate, the son of “both” shoah survivors and naqba survi-
vors. Many years after this story appeared, and long after Kanafani’s death at the hands 
of the Israeli military, Israeli writer Sami Michael published Yonim be-trafalgar (Pigeons 
in Trafalgar Square), which implicitly continues Kanafani’s narrative. See also the Arab 
Institute for Holocaust Research and Education, run by Khaled Mahameed. “The world 
will not see our naqba before we can feel for their Holocaust,” Mahameed is quoted as say-
ing in The Heart of the Other, an English language documentary on this institute: http:// 
jerusalemnewyork.com/_wsn/page12.
 6. “‘When knowledge comes, memory comes too, little by little,’” writes Saul Fried-
länder, quoting Gustav Meyrink in the epigraph to his Holocaust memoir, When Memory 
Comes. I am suggesting that the process may also be reversed and that knowledge or 
wisdom comes to supersede memories that confine the individual or the collective to a 
vindictive, hermetic space. On the “theology” of memory and its implications for ethics 
and politics in contemporary Israel, see Adi Ophir, 12–50.
 7. See also LaCapra’s “empathic unsettlement” (78) and Martha Nussbaum, who has 
been at the forefront of a new discourse that defines empathy and compassion as an insis-
tence on “similar possibilities,” a refusal to regard the other as non-human (34–35).
 8. Not of This Time, Not of This Place is the English title of an ambitious novel by 
310 1 3 :  f r O m  a U S C h w i T z  T O  T h e  T e m P l e  m O U n T
Yehuda Amichai that probes the haunted life of a young soldier in pre-1967 Israel who re-
turns to his German hometown to search for his childhood love who had been lost in the 
Nazi inferno; meanwhile, his doppelgänger, who stays in Jerusalem, gets blown up when he 
steps on a mine on Mt. Scopus.
 9. In exploring the discourse on the bystanders’ indifference during the shoah, and 
its implications for other situations, Carolyn Dean points to the “institutionalized forms of 
everyday violence that normalize the dehumanization of specific groups of people in ways 
mostly invisible to others . . . who are not its targets, even when [such violence] takes place 
right in front of them” (95–97, 101).
 10. The present tense hardly exists in classical Hebrew, and in the modern Hebrew 
imagination, the present—squeezed between the engorged past and the inflated future—
has always had a hard time forging its own space. “Between the eve of the holiday and the 
final day / the holiday itself gets squeezed,” writes Yehuda Amichai; “between/ longing for 
the past and longing for the future / the spirit is ground up as if by two heavy grindstones” 
(“I Foretell the Days of Yore,” #7, Open Closed Open, 13).
 11. This Mr. Mani is technically the first Mr. Mani, since the novel is a series of one-
sided “conversations” that move backward in time. This is not the first time that A. B. Ye-
hoshua explored this subject; see his novella, Early in the Summer of 1970.
 12. Although construing the akeda as comedy is far from common, there are a few 
biblical critics who have suggested similar directions. See Whedbee, 64–93.
 13. The technical Hebrew term for the sacrifice Abraham is commanded to bring is 
olah, the whole-burnt offering, which is translated in the Septuagint as “holocaustum”: 
“Tolle filium tuum  .  .  .  Isaac  .  .  .  etque ibi offeres eum in holocaustum . . .” Clementine 
Vulgate, Gen. 22:2. The common Hebrew term shoah, used to designate the Nazi genocide 
of the Jews, is devoid of these sacrificial connotations, but failed to put the brakes on the 
sacrificial cult that evolved after 1967.
 14. Much of the contemporary discourse on sacrificial elements in contemporary 
culture is a response to the work of René Girard, Violence and the Sacred. Eagleton’s Holy 
Terror examines the modern manifestations of martyrs and scapegoats; his reading of the 
“suicide bomber” as expression of a sacrificial impulse touches on the same phenomena I 
am exploring here: “the terrorist is not the pharmakos; but he is created by it, and can only 
be defeated when justice is done to it” (140). I am insisting on the distinction between 
the sacrificial victim and what Giorgio Agamben calls “homo sacer”—common life that is 
deemed universally “sacred” and therefore “may be killed but not sacrificed” (114–15). See 
also Paul W. Kohn.
 15. The longer version of this debate over ethics and obligation, with the akeda as point 
of departure, meanders through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-François 
Lyotard.
 16. In the original stage script, after Isaac asks his father why he is sad, the exchange 
ends with the following:
Abraham: I am thinking of the future generations. I wonder what will be when 
other fathers send their sons to be killed, what will save them?
Isaac: It’s always possible that God will come and say, “lay not thy hand upon 
the lad.” 
Abraham: But you know that there is no God.”
(Malkat ambatia, 1970 stage script, n.p.)
S I d r a  d e k O v e n  e z r a h i  311
Works Cited
Adorno, T. W. Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life. London: NLB, 1974.
———. Prisms. Translated by Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1967.
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel 
Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
Allen, Woody. “The Scrolls.” In Without Feathers. New York: Random House, 1975.
Alter, Robert. Defenses of the Imagination: Jewish Writers and Modern Historical Crisis. 
Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1977.
Amichai, Yehuda. Not of This Time, Not of This Place. Translated by Shlomo Katz. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1968.
———. Open Closed Open. Translated by Chana Bloch and Chana Kronfeld. New York: 
Harcourt, 2000.
———. Poems of Jerusalem. Bilingual edition. Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1987.
———. Yehuda Amichai: A Life of Poetry, 1948–1994. Translated by Benjamin Harshav and 
Barbara Harshav. New York: HarperPerennial, 1994.
Bartov, Omer. The Jew in Cinema: From the Golem to Don’t Touch My Holocaust. Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 2005.
Benjamin, Walter. “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” In Illuminations: Essays and 
Reflections. Edited and with an Introduction by Hannah Arendt. New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1968: 253–64.
Bitton, Simone. The Wall. Film, 2005. http://www.wallthemovie.com/.
Brown, Wendy. Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. New York: Zone Books, 2010.
Caputo, John. Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Refer-
ence to Deconstruction. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Cavafy, Constantine P. Collected Poems, Revised edition. Edited by George Savidis. Trans-
lated by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992.
Coetzee, J. M. Waiting for the Barbarians. New York: Penguin, 1980.
Darwich, Mahmoud. La Palestine comme métaphore [Palestine as Metaphor]. Translated 
from Arabic by Elias Sanbar and from Hebrew by Simone Bitton. Paris: Sinbad, 1997.
Dean, Carolyn. The Fragility of Empathy after the Holocaust. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2004.
Derrida, Jacques. The Gift of Death. Translated by David Wills. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995.
Eagleton, Terry. Holy Terror. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
———. Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
Ezrahi, Sidra DeKoven. “Acts of Impersonation: Barbaric Space as Theatre.” In Mirroring 
Evil: Nazi Imagery/Recent Art. Catalogue of The Jewish Museum (NY) exhibition. 
Edited by Norman Kleeblatt: 17–38. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press and 
The Jewish Museum, 2001.
———. Booking Passage: Exile and Homecoming in the Modern Jewish Imagination. Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 2000.
———. “Representing Auschwitz.” History and Memory 7, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 121–54.
———. “Revisioning the Past: The Changing Legacy of the Holocaust in Hebrew Litera-
ture.” Salmagundi (Fall 1985–Winter 1986): 245–70.
312 1 3 :  f r O m  a U S C h w i T z  T O  T h e  T e m P l e  m O U n T
———. “‘To what shall I compare thee?’ Jerusalem as Ground Zero of the Hebrew Imagina-
tion.” PMLA 122 (2007): 220–34.
Feldman, Yael. Glory and Agony: Rewriting Isaac/Sacrifice in Tel Aviv. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010.
Friedländer, Saul. When Memory Comes. Translated by Helen R. Lane. New York: Avon, 
1979.
Girard, René. Violence and the Sacred. Translated by Patrick Henry. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1977.
Goffart, Walter. Rome’s Fall and After. London: The Hambledon Press, 1989.
Grossman, David. See Under: Love. Translated by Betsy Rosenberg. New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1989.
———. Sleeping on a Wire: Conversations with Palestinians in Israel. New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1993.
———. Smile of the Lamb. Translated by Betsy Rosenberg. New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1990.
———. The Yellow Wind. Translated by Haim Watzman. New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1988.
Inbari, Motti. Jewish Fundamentalism and the Temple Mount: Who Will Build the Third 
Temple? New York: SUNY Press, 2009.
Kafka, Franz. “Abraham.” In The Basic Kafka. Introduction by Erich Heller. New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1979: 172. From letter to Robert Klopstock, June 1921. 
Franz Kafka: Briefe 1902–1924. Franz Kafka/ Gesammelte Werke. Hamburg: S. Fischer 
Verlag, 1966: 332.
Kanafani, Ghassan, Barbara Harlow, and Karen E. Riley. Palestine’s Children: Returning to 
Haifa and Other Stories. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
Kartun-Blum, Ruth. Profane Scriptures. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College, 1999.
Koestler, Arthur. Insight and Outlook: An Inquiry into the Common Foundations of Science, 
Art and Social Ethics. New York: Macmillan, 1949.
Kohn, Paul W. Sacred Violence, Torture, Terror, and Sovereignty. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2008.
LaCapra, Dominick. Writing History, Writing Trauma. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 2001.
Levin, Hanokh. Ha-patriot [The Patriot]. Malkat ambatia [Bathtub Queen]. In Ma ekhpat 
la-tzipor: satirot, ma’arkhonim, pizmonim I [What Difference Does it Make to the Bird? 
Satires, Revues and Songs I]. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz hameuhad, 1987.
———. Malkat ambatia. Stage script. 1970 (n.p.).
Michael, Sami. Yonim be-trafalgar [Pigeons in Trafalgar Square]. Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2005.
Mintz, Alan. Hurban: Responses to Catastrophe in Hebrew Literature. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984.
Nussbaum, Martha. “Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion.” Social Philosophy and Policy 
1 (Winter 1996): 27–58.
Ophir, Adi. Avodat ha-hoveh: masot al tarbut yisraelit ba-zman ha-ze [Working for the Pres-
ent: Essays on Contemporary Israeli Culture]. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz hameuhad, 2001.
Pagis, Dan. “Autobiography,” “Brothers,” “Written in Pencil in the Sealed Boxcar.” In Points 
of Departure, translated by Stephen Mitchell. Introduction by Robert Alter. Philadel-
phia: Jewish Publication Society, 1981: 3, 5, 23.
———. “An Opening to Satan.” Variable Directions. Translated by Stephen Mitchell. San 
Francisco: North Point Press, 1989: 30.
S I d r a  d e k O v e n  e z r a h i  313
Ravikovitch, Dahlia. Hovering at a Low Altitude: The Collected Poetry of Dahlia Ravikov-
itch. Translated by Chana Bloch and Chana Kronfeld. New York: W. W. Norton, 2009. 
Raz-Krakotzkin, Amnon.“Bein brit shalom u-vein beit ha-mikdash” [“Between Brit Sha-
lom and the Temple”]. Teoria u-vikoret [Theory and Criticism] 20 (2002): 387–413.
———. “Galut be-tokh ribonut: le-vikoret ‘shlilat ha-gola’ ba-tarbut ha-yisraelit” [“Exile 
within a Sovereign State: Towards a Critique of ‘Negation of Exile’ in Israeli Culture”]. 
Teoria u-vikoret [Theory and Criticism] 4 (1993): 23–55, and 5 (1994): 113–32.
Rokem, Freddie Rokem. Performing History: Theatrical Representations of the Past in Con-
temporary Theatre. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2000.
Rothberg, Michael. Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
Saposnik, Arieh Bruce. “Wailing Walls and Iron Walls: The Wailing Wall as Sacred Symbol 
in Zionist National Iconography.” In 1929: Mapping the Jewish World. Edited by Gen-
nady Estraikh and Hasia Diner. New York: New York University Press, 2010.
Shammas, Anton. Arabesques. Translated by Vivian Eden. New York: Harper and Row, 
1988.
Slyomovics, Susan. The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998.
Spiegel, Shalom. The Last Trial: On the Legends and Lore of the Command to Abraham to 
Offer Isaac as a Sacrifice. Springfield, NJ: Behrman House, 1979.
Tammuz, Benjamin. The Orchard. Translated by Richard Flantz. Providence, RI: Copper 
Beach Books, 1984.
Whedbee, J. William. The Bible and the Comic Vision. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998.
Yehoshua, A. B. Early in the Summer of 1970. Translated by M. Arad and P. Shrier. New 
York: Doubleday, 1977.
———. “Facing the Forests.” In Three Days and a Child. Translated by Miriam Arad. Lon-
don: Peter Owen, 1970.
———. “Interview.” Haaretz Magazine (March 19, 2004): 10–11.
———. Mr. Mani. Translated by Hillel Halkin. New York: Doubleday, 1992.
———. “Mr. Mani and the Akedah.” Translated by Rivka Hadari and Amnon Hadari. 
Judaism (Winter 2001). http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0411/is_5_49/ai_ 
73180736.
Yizhar, S. Khirbet Khizeh. Translated by Nicholas de Lange and Yaacob Dwek. Jerusalem: 
Ibis Editions, 2008.
Zertal, Idith. Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood. Translated by Chaya Galai. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
i.
The state of Israel rose from the ashes of the Jewish people of Europe in the 
most literal and blood-chilling sense, out of a desperate need for communal 
survival, under the motto “never again.” But the first fifteen years which fol-
lowed the establishment of the state were marked by a “pact of silence” that 
sealed off the present from the immediate past: the silence of those who 
knew, and the silence of those who did not want to know; the silence of sur-
vivors who could not break through the unspeakable horrors or who desper-
ately tried to protect own their children from that devastating knowledge; 
and the silence of people who could not face what could not possibly be com-
prehended, who felt guilty at their own survival and—worst of all—deeply 
ashamed at the thought of their people who had been—to use the expression 
current at the time—“led like lambs to the slaughter.”
 Nowhere is the poverty of our vocabulary more apparent than when we 
try to articulate the unspeakable. The Shoah, as Yolanda Gampel writes, is 
“analogous to nothing”; it cannot be “assimilated into the individual’s range 
of inner representations” (“Interminable Uncanniness” 86). In the face of this 
enormity, when the devastation is so total as to fill up the entire world and 
extend to its furthest horizons, one can make a case for repression, rather 
than “working through,” as the only viable response. The pact of silence 
about the Holocaust can also be understood as an unconscious collective 
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strategy of survival through repression: the small Jewish community in Israel 
could not carry the burden of knowledge; it could not get sucked into the 
black hole of the Holocaust. It had to create, perhaps to fabricate, the kind of 
communal identity and myths that would empower rather than weaken it in 
the struggle for its very existence. And it was thus that the formative years of 
my own generation, native children of the young state, whose parents were 
not Holocaust survivors, and who grew into adolescence in the 1960s, were 
lived in the benign shadow of an overwhelming desire for normality. We 
were tertiary characters, safely removed from the edge of the gaping abyss. 
In the implicit hierarchy of testimonial authority, we haven’t earned the right 
to say anything about it. And yet we, too, are a generation of the Holocaust.
 We were the lucky ones. Coming back from school, we would sit at 
the kitchen table with our homework assignments. The radio was always 
on, a background noise inseparable from the pattern on the formica top 
of the dining table and the smell of frying onions or scorched eggplants. 
The lunchtime radio programs were regular and invariable: first came the 
daily program for “the search of missing relatives”: messages posted by Holo-
caust survivors giving out bare details of their loved ones, in the desperate, 
mad hope that they had somehow, by some miracle, managed to escape: 
name, place, and date of birth, and sometimes the names of their parents. 
The announcements were uniformly laconic: “last seen,” “anyone who has 
any information of the whereabouts,” “please get in touch.” There were odd-
sounding names that recurred in the messages like encoded signals: Warsaw, 
Bialistock, Lublin; Auschwitz, Dachau, Birkenau. This broadcast was imme-
diately followed by the merry opening tune of “Out on the Town This Eve-
ning,” an entertainment guide made up of taped pieces of advertised plays, 
mostly comic dialogues and recorded laughter or applause. Then we heard 
the one o’clock news bulletin. And then we had our lunch. Life was perfectly 
normal.
 But our post-Holocaust normality could be attained only at the cost of a 
nearly complete severance of our own identity from that of the Jewish, Dia-
sporic past. In adolescence, we saw ourselves as Israeli rather than Jewish, 
as natives of the place, brought up on the heroic myths of the reclamation 
of the land, the struggle for independence, the few-against-the-many. We 
believed we had discarded 2,000 years of uprooted, Diasporic existence that 
had come to its inevitable conclusion in the crematoria. After millennia of 
spiritual existence, we finally had a body and a home. When we thought of 
our historical heritage, it was the exotic ancient people of the Bible we had 
in mind, not the human wrecks who had been “there,” in what came to be 
known after the Eichman trial as “the other planet.”
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 Our very entitlement to a generational identity is premised on this dis-
tinction, heavily marked and unmistakable, between the Diasporic/Jewish 
and the Israeli/Zionist mode of being. This collective, new identity was, to 
borrow the cultural diagnosis of Pierre Nora, “a break with and subversion of 
the past,” a declaration of freedom from the “laws of filiation and the require-
ments of continuity” (515). This symbolic rupture with the past entailed, 
as it always does, “a secret acquiescence on the part of the older genera-
tion in its own failure, its own incompleteness, its members’ own individ-
ual self-destruction.” It was, in fact, a “drive for fulfillment by proxy,” and 
a “summons to complete the fathers’ work by killing them off ” (518). Our 
generational self-consciousness was both “imbued with history to its very 
core” and “crushed by history’s weight” (524), grounded in “a sense of lack, 
something in the nature of a mourning,” and held together by a “common, a 
painful, never-ending fantasy” (525) of giving birth to ourselves.
 The cultural transmission of the Holocaust and its literary articulations 
were mediated, as Yael Feldman observes, through “mythization, collectiv-
ization, ritualization; in short, all processes that would embed the particular 
within the general and surrender the individual to the community—thereby 
endowing the narrative with a meaningful, life-affirming closure” (229). It 
was the story of heroic partisans and ghetto fighters, a story of resistance and 
pride, which was
the first story we were told—in public ceremonies, in school anthologies, 
in radio programs—and it was clearly exhilarating despite its tragic dimen-
sions. It told of the victory of the spirit; it was easy to identify with; it was 
protective. Endowing loss and death with meaning, with a purpose, this 
story made our world a good place to grow up in. And of course it was 
totally Hebraic. Everyone in this story spoke Hebrew: the ghetto mother 
singing a lullaby in the shadow of Ponar, the leaders of the Jewish resis-
tance, and even the Polish underground. . . . The language was the message. 
It was our story: another link in the Hebrew-Israel self-representation, 
emplotted in a tale of a goal-oriented, victorious struggle. (224)
 It was only in the 1980s that the tide had turned. Following a series of 
ideological crises in the wake of the 1973 War and the Lebanon War in 1982, 
Israeli literature broke away from this paradigm of silence, assimilation, and 
suppression, and began the process of deconstructing the arch-opposition 
between Jew and Israeli. Oddly, perhaps, the break was made by “native 
novelists with no personal or direct familial experience of the Shoah,” who 
“recast the Shoah” in a “new script” in an attempt to release it “from the 
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shackles of the collective and reclaim it as a subjective experience” (Feldman 
234–35, 236).1 Since the 1980s the Holocaust has become a major preoc-
cupation of Israeli literature and culture, a phantom, or—to use the Yiddish 
expression—a dybbuck that has come back to haunt the collective conscious-
ness (Sicher 56–60).
 This eruption of the Holocaust after two decades of virtual silence can 
be understood as a cultural version of what psychologists recognize as an 
intergenerational transmission of trauma. The fluidity of psychic borders, 
evident in studies of the second and third generations of survivors who have 
the reservoirs of their parents’ untold story, has generated terms such as 
“double realities” (Kestenberg 788), “radioactive identification” (Gampel, 
“Thoughts about the Transmission” passim, and “Interminable Uncanni-
ness” 95), “deposited representations” and “psychological genes” (Volkan and 
Vamik 258–59, 270–71)—strikingly apt for the description of this collective 
literary awakening as well. “All children,” Yolanda Gampel writes, “act out a 
scenario of which they have no knowledge, a scenario that is not theirs but, 
in fact, belongs to the history of their families, and especially of those that 
have survived the Holcaust” (“Daughter of Silence” 120).2
 For those of us who were not second and third generation, the trauma 
was not the stark fact of the Holocaust but the imperative of repression that 
was transmitted through the split consciousness of our parents, the great 
divide between the Jewish/Diasporic and the Israeli modes of being. That 
split may have been necessary for our survival and protection: it enabled us 
to consign an impossible mourning to collective “memory sites”; it allowed 
us to sever ourselves from the line of filiation, and granted us an almost nor-
mal life. Almost, but not quite. By the mid-1980s it became clear that we, too, 
were radioactively infected.
ii.
Five years after the 1986 publication of David Grossman’s See Under: Love, 
the definitive Shoah novel of Israeli literature, Grossman published The Book 
of Intimate Grammar, a story of adolescence in 1960s Jerusalem, spanning 
several years in the life of Aron Kleinfeld, a bright, sensitive boy, from about 
a year-and-a-half before his Bar Mitzvah to the age of sixteen.3 Unlike Gross-
man’s previous work, this novel does not relate to the Holocaust in any obvi-
ous way. In fact, the glaring absence of references to this black hole in a 
narrative that takes place less than two decades after the Shoah might have 
raised some serious questions as to its historical authenticity: for us, the 
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generation of the 1960s, the very air we breathed was made of those dark 
invisible particles, oblique and insidious reminders of what, paradoxically 
but powerfully, had to be forgotten. I would suggest, however, that far from 
a strategy of avoidance or suppression, what the novel offers is a poignant 
inscription of a dead end in the brief history of the Jewish people after the 
Holocaust, a cultural pathology born out of the desperate need for commu-
nal recovery and normalization.
 The Book of Interior Grammar has been widely read—with some encour-
agement from the author himself—as a bildungsroman or a kunstlerroman, 
a “portrait of the artist” as a young adolescent. But Aron Kleinfeld, as his 
surname implies, does not grow up. He remains as small as a ten-year old, 
his voice does not break, and he does not go through puberty, right to the 
very end of the novel. He remains trapped in the body of a little boy, frozen 
in time. Aron’s story is, in fact, an anti-bildungsroman, a story of arrested 
growth, of non-continuity.
 No realistic, medical, or genetic explanation is offered to account for 
what seems to be an evil spell, a curse that has interrupted the natural process 
of maturation and growth. At some point the mother relates to it as part of 
the give-and-take of destiny and offers up the grandmother in exchange for 
the removal of the curse. Aron, too, sometimes perceives himself as a freak 
of nature and forms unspoken alliances with other “freaks”: David Lipschitz, 
the slow albino kid who is later discreetly removed and transferred to an 
institution (32–33, 54); Edna Bloom, the lonely, artistic spinster who plays 
the piano, fills up her flat with artifacts, statuettes, and reproductions, and 
finally goes mad; and Lilly, the wild, demented grandmother who dreams 
of her bohemian youth as a cabaret dancer in Poland, embroiders gaudy, 
obscenely exotic pillowcases that no one would buy, and obstinately refuses 
to die.
 At the same time, however, Aron is intensely reluctant to grow up. When 
his mother lovingly talks of his becoming a man, and he is reminded of the 
promise of the father’s shaving kit, “the army shaving kit with the razor and 
the shaving soap and the little tray he used in the Sinai campaign” passing 
on to him as a special gift for his coming of age (18), he feels alienated and 
depressed, “as though she wanted to lock him inside the future and jangle the 
keys in his face” (24). And so, when his mother despairs of his ever growing 
up and maliciously turns on him in her brutal but acutely intuitive way, hiss-
ing “you’re doing this to us deliberately” (49), she is not entirely wrong. It is 
the central thesis of this essay that Aron’s arrested growth is another way of 
speaking the unspeakable, both a symptom of pathology and a mode of ideo-
logical resistance. It is, to put it briefly, a refusal of the kind of suppression 
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that has made it possible for the Jewish people to recreate itself in Israel. To 
understand this apparent paradox, I would now turn to the metaphychologi-
cal theory of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, which hovers—somewhat 
uneasily, but always suggestively—between psychoanalysis and literature and 
may offer some insights as to the dynamics of Grossman’s novel and to what 
follows “after testimony.”
 The epigraph to the novel is a sentence from Rilke’s Letters to a Young 
Poet: “Those who live [with?] the secret falsely, wickedly—and there are 
many of those—lose it only for themselves, but pass it on unknowingly, as 
one passes on a sealed letter.”4 Indeed, there are many secrets in this novel: 
the secret of the mentally retarded cousin who had been put away in an insti-
tution by her parents (115); the mother’s attempts to conceal the demented 
grandmother, the family’s shame (111); the secret history of the father’s 
imprisonment and escape. During the sad Bar Mitzvah celebration, Aron 
realizes that “everyone knew everyone else’s secrets, everyone was a hostage 
in someone else’s hands, at their mercy or in their cruelty.  .  .  . The air was 
full of tiny darts, phrases waiting to burst with poison, compliments with 
false bottoms, the caress of secrets shared, and carefully circumvented top-
ics” (121).
 But these are merely the secrets one would find in any society, skeletons 
in the cupboard, dirty family linen, secrets born out of the need to keep up 
appearances and remain within the boundaries of respectability. I would 
suggest that the kind of secret to which the epigraph alludes, the secret that 
is unknowingly passed on to others “like a sealed letter,” is of an entirely 
different substance and magnitude, much closer to the concept developed 
by Abraham and Torok. Rather than a hushed-up fact, or some dark story 
that may come to light, the secret is “a trauma whose very occurrence and 
devastating emotional consequences are entombed and thereby consigned to 
internal silence, albeit unwittingly, by the sufferers themselves. . . . It desig-
nates an internal psychic splitting” (Nicolas Rand, Editor’s Note on “cryptic 
mourning and secret love” 99–100). The buried secret relates to a segment 
of reality that is “untellable and therefore inaccessible to the gradual, assimi-
lative work of mourning.” This unconscious refusal to mourn produces “a 
sealed-off psychic place, a crypt in the ego  .  .  .  comparable to the forma-
tion of a cocoon around the chrysalis” (Abraham and Torok, “‘The Lost 
Object-Me’” 141).5 This psychic formation is variously called in Abraham 
and Torok’s work “the illness of mourning,” “melancholia,” “incorporation,” 
or “preservative repression.” As we shall see, all of these terms are relevant to 
our discussion: “The words that cannot be uttered, the scenes that cannot be 
recalled, the tears that cannot be shed—everything will be swallowed along 
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with the trauma that led to the loss. Swallowed and preserved. Inexpressible 
mourning erects a secret tomb inside the subject. The objectal correlative of 
the loss is buried alive in the crypt as a full-fledged person, complete with its 
own topography” (Abraham and Torok, “Mourning or Melancholia” 130).
 Being buried alive, incarcerated in a box, shut up inside a sealed coffin, 
or imprisoned in a cave are recurrent motifs in Aron’s story: the story of a 
young blacksmith in Armenia who had been buried alive (23), the spy in the 
suitcase (50); Rabbi Yohanan Ben-Zakai who was smuggled out of Jerusalem 
in a coffin (39), and—most prominently—the Houdini act, which Aaron 
often performs for his friends at school parties (37, 44, 50, 54, 91, 98, 107, 
148). All of these stories involve the image of enclosure inside a crypt and a 
fantasy of escape, which is also a fantasy of rebirth. “All through the disaster 
there had been a comforting aura about him, a corridor of hope, the secret 
wish of a tunnel from which he would emerge a new and different being, and 
maybe somewhere, amid the darkness and confusion, a miracle would occur, 
an invisible hand would reach out and switch the suitcase, and wave a wand 
and change the secret orders, so that when Aron reached the light he would 
meet the new him out there” (280).
 Aron Kleinfeld is a cryptophore, the carrier of a secret made up of 
unspeakable words. But, like Oscar Mazareth in Gunter Grass’s The Tin 
Drum, or Trudy Montag in Ursula Hegi’s Stones from the River (1995), he 
carries in his stunted body both the pathology and the potential resistance of 
an entire generation. Abraham and Torok’s theory of the “transgenerational 
phantom” is, once again, relevant in this context, not only for its account of 
the unconscious transmission of private trauma, but also in its explanatory 
potency in relation to the split consciousness of Israeli culture, the form of 
generational melancholia that has developed as a substitute for the impos-
sible mourning (see Nicolas Abraham’s “Notes on the Phantom” 173–75; and 
Maria Torok’s “Story of Fear” 181). Having broken with the Diasporic past 
for the sake of normality and survival, the native Israeli generation has cut off 
the line of filiation. Orphaned of its heritage, it has had to give birth to itself, 
to invent itself. The paradigmatic literary inscription of this autochtonous 
fantasy is the elegiac opening sentence of Moshe Shamir’s semi-autobio-
graphical novel, Be-mo Yadav: “Elic was born from the sea.”6 (1). The myth 
of the young sabra is made up of such flimsy stuff: the regime of normality, 
the protective cocoon of young Israelis, has become a crypt, harboring the 
phantom of the discarded Jewish self.
 Recalling Freud’s “Studies on Hysteria” (1895), whose point of departure 
is the three-way exchange between the psychic, the verbal, and the bodily, 
Abraham and Torok suggest that the messages between these layers of sub-
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jectivity move in both directions, in a process of “dual inscription” (“Con-
ceptual Renewal” 91), allowing psychosomatics or “endocryptic” patients, 
who “have no way of indirectly evoking the contents of their crypt,” to con-
vert the psychic into the somatic (“Self-to-Self Affliction” 163–64). Aron’s 
arrested growth is also a literalization or a somatization of language. The 
“interior grammar” of the body is the inscription of the psyche. The mes-
sage, I would reiterate, is not only a private pathology: it is a single-handed 
challenge to the regime of normality, which seems to operate in collusion 
with the laws of nature, with the biological and cultural imperatives of inter-
generational continuity, sexuality, and filiation. The arrested body becomes 
a text of refusal.
 Aron’s fascination with the English present continuous tense, which does 
not exist in Hebrew, is an obvious instance of this refusal:
Last year in English class they learned the present continuous. Aron was 
thrilled, I am go–eeing, I em sleep–eeing. You don’t have that eeng tense 
in Hebrew. . . . It was like being in a glass bubble. . . . And inside you feel 
private, intimate, and the people watching you, pressing their faces against 
the bubble, wonder what’s going on; they stand on the outside looking in, 
puzzles and sweaty and filthy, and again he asks himself what it will be like 
when his bar mitzvah comes around in a year and a half, will he start grow-
ing those stiff black hairs all over. . . . and he vows that even when he’s big 
and hairy some day, with coarse skin like Pap and other men have. . . . he 
will still whisper, at least once a day, I am go–eeng; I am play–eeng; I am 
Aron–eeng; and that way he will always remember the individual Aron 
beneath the generalities. (36–37; see also 92)
Being an individual, being himself—as opposed to the collective law-abiding 
subject—is also linked to the refusal of filiation and of the progression of 
time and the inevitability of growth and decline. Time itself is out of joint.7
 Aron’s vision of himself is shadowed by recurrent images of a sleeping 
boy, a curled-up fetus, a cocooned chrysalis. Forced by his mother to try 
on the outgrown clothes of his cousin Giora (who has matured into an all-
Israeli, tall adolescent), he looks at himself in the mirror and has a vision 
of “little white boy, so white he was almost blue” sailing “out into a craggy 
moonscape,” and of the fetus from science lab floating in formaldehyde, 
“slowly decomposing and blinking its tadpole eyes” (48).
 As his friends grow up and lose interest in make-believe, spy games, and 
escape acts, Aron is left behind, trapped in his stunted body. He curls up 
around himself and whispers at the imagined urging of Gideon’s voice: “No, 
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no, I can’t come yet. . . . You see, I’m going away for a while, I’m entering the 
chrysalis phase of my disaster, Aroning into a cocoon” (108). At the close of 
the novel, he will curl up in a fetal position inside an old derelict refrigera-
tor, in a final gesture of refusal. Although Grossman himself has claimed in 
interviews that this is a prelude to a rebirth of the artist, this last scene, with 
everything that has led to it, is much more powerfully suggestive of suicide. 
Aron’s last Houdini act, performed with no audience, literally puts the lid on 
the escape fantasy. The cocooned self is invariably a stillborn (Abraham and 
Torok, “Self-to-Self Affliction 21, 48), a buried phantom that cannot come to 
light.
 The ostensible normality of the “model family” is questioned at the very 
beginning of the story, at the first intimation of Aron’s “curse.” On the same 
evening when he is told to try on last year’s old boots and has to face his 
mother’s dismay as she realizes that he has not outgrown them, Aron discov-
ers in one of his parents’ drawers a stack of pornographic cards covered with 
greasy finger marks, which he suspects of having been put there by some 
unknown spy, traitor, or an enemy agent. The family supper scene turns into 
a nightmare in Aron’s mind: “From the pantry he watched them sit down to 
supper, reflecting how cozy the kitchen was at times like this, with everyone 
eating and talking at once, but the wistful scene dissolved before his eyes, and 
an arctic fog descended, full of ghoulish apparitions, naked bodies, tangled 
limbs, a dog on top of a woman; he suddenly felt the blood drain from his 
hand as he picked a boot up and reached into the lining with its smell of old 
fur” (26). As the familiar domestic scene becomes a terrifying inferno, the 
heimlich turns into the unheimlich. The Freudian Uncanny makes its first 
appearance.
 Most readings of the novel have focused on the nearly monstrous figure 
of the mother, who ruthlessly controls her family in what seems like a crude 
parody of the proverbial Jewish mother. I would suggest, however, that the 
question of paternity, inversely related to any paternal presence in the lives 
of the boys in this perfectly normal neighborhood, is far more significant in 
this text. Unlike the literally or virtually absent parental figures in the lives of 
his friends (Gideon’s father, who forms an odd alliance with Aron, is prob-
ably a latent homosexual and seems to be indifferently passive when his wife 
is drawn into an affair with their lodger; and Zacky’s father works in Africa 
and is away throughout his son’s adolescence, while his wife entertains other 
men), Aron’s father is almost unbearably present in his son’s life, but cannot 
form a bond of paternity with him. Their alienation is profoundly tempera-
mental: the father, who has managed to escape his imprisonment in the Rus-
sian taiga and survive against all odds, is an all-masculine, intensely physical, 
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and inarticulate character, who has nothing but contempt for intellectuals 
and artists—“inallactuals,” as he mockingly calls them (4, 16–17, 69)—and 
what he sees as their inherent weakness. The son—artistic, musical, wildly 
imaginative, and intellectually curious—is both incomprehensible and disap-
pointing for this man, who sometimes acts as a surrogate father for Zacky, 
the “normal” boy (13, 22, 63).
 This is not only a personal and temperamental opposition. Both of Aron’s 
parents are themselves orphans who have managed to survive by their wits 
(310), and the history of the family begins with the anecdote of the mother 
as a young woman who had sold her father’s cherished prayer book—the 
Venice Machzor—in order to feed the starving refugee into a virile man-
hood and turn him into the father of her children (137). The meaning of 
this transaction goes far beyond that of the family: it is deeply rooted in 
the equation of Zionism with the “normalization” of the Jewish people. The 
father’s disdain of bookishness and art; the mother’s prohibition on the use of 
Polish and her censorship of the father’s past (135, 220); the parents’ refusal 
to replace Aron’s broken guitar or let him take music lessons (112, 219); the 
consignment of books to the storage loft (112, 128)—anything associated 
with the Jewish, Diasporic identity, anything that smacks of spirituality, art, 
and learning, is perceived as an obstacle to survival and suppressed under the 
regime of normality.
 The complicated relationship between Aron and his father is played out 
in the sea:
Papa was a terrific swimmer, you could always tell he was in the water by 
his powerful kicking and splashing and the pranks he played, like diving 
down and attacking their card friends. . . . Aron was very careful never to 
go in the water while Papa was there, he had secretly decided that only one 
of them should be in the water at a time; besides, he suspected pap liked 
to piss in the sea, and even when Aron came out and sat on the sand, he 
felt as if Pap’s piss had followed him; and once, in the middle of a tranquil 
swim, far away from the crowd, just him and the open sky, he had a sudden 
apprehension that something was chasing him, he knew it couldn’t be, that 
he was imagining things, but still he felt it slithering beneath the waves; at 
first he thought Papa was down there, trying to scare him, which made him 
panic and kick and splash and swallow water, but then something rough 
and rubbery circled his waist like a sinewy arm, or the trunk of a giant 
elephant, trying to pull him down, and when he crawled up on the shore, 
he knew he hadn’t imagined it, that something very strange had happened 
in the sea. . . . and he searched for Papa but couldn’t see him, he was reading 
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the paper under a beach umbrella, and he didn’t even look up when Aron 
shuffled over wrapped in a towel and sat shivering beside him and said, 
It was just a cramp, and when Papa didn’t answer, Aron sobbed and said, 
It could have happened to anyone, but still papa wouldn’t look at him, he 
merely rolled over with his face in the paper. (44–45)
An echo of this near-drowning scene is later evoked when, during his last 
vacation in Tel-Aviv, Aron talks his cousin Giora and his friends into build-
ing a raft, which sinks right away: “the children bailed out and scrambled 
ashore, looking stunned and devastated. There was one scary moment, when 
Aron and Giora were sucked into an eddy together, and Aron was almost 
sure Giora had pushed him down to save himself. The wind blew cold, and 
the children shivered. No one actually blamed him outright, but Aron felt as 
though a big hand had just snuffed out the candle in his darkened cell” (47). 
He will later go back to this episode in his mind, time and again, and wonder 
whether this was not “the beginning of everything” (47, 66, 117). The recur-
rence of this scene, being held under water in the grip of a stronger man—
first the father and then the grown-up, all-Israeli cousin—is telling: when we 
recall Elic, the paradigmatic sabra, who was “born from the sea,” it appears 
that Aron’s near-drowning scene is indeed “the beginning of everything.”
 When Aron’s friends and cousin discover sex and seem to be obsessed 
with nothing else, Aron remains oblivious, wondering about the meaning 
of those signs and signals that seem to be part of an alien language (63–65). 
His realization of his parents’ sexuality hits him like lightning: “In a flash 
he understood: Papa’s hand reached out of the waves, dripping with tangled 
seaweed. They were unmistakably his father’s hand’s dangling ape-like at 
his side, and now he imagined them stroking his hair, tending to the fig 
tree, leaving greasy fingerprints on the pictures . . .” (69–70; see also 118). In 
the ensuing fight with Giora, Aron is beaten up. Going back to Jerusalem, 
past the rusty auto wrecks left by the roadside to commemorate the heroes 
of the War of Independence, he is sick and imagines that the other pas-
sengers on the bus accuse him of “being disrespectful to our valiant dead,” 
of not being patriotic. The proximity of these incidents—the realization of 
his father’s sexuality, the painful defeat in the fight with Giora, the sense of 
alienation from the communal national ethos—is not only temporal. When 
Aron finally gets home, he realizes that the plans his parents had made for 
his grandiose Bar Mitzvah—the ritual coming of age—have been put aside 
(60, 83–84).
 But this is not a paradigmatic, oedipal situation. Significantly, the father 
is portrayed as a potential healer of almost supernatural powers on more 
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than one occasion. He saves a blind kitten and brings it back to life by feed-
ing it gently and patiently through a dropper (87); he tries to heal the sick fig 
tree by cleaning its sores and rubbing the scars with a medicinal ointment for 
seven days (9–15). And finally, in one of the most powerful and longest epi-
sodes in this novel, he is chosen by Edna to demolish the walls of her dainty, 
virginal flat, to awaken her into a sensual life (128–217). Edna—a feminine 
counterpart of Aron—is a “wisp of a woman, floating embryonically in her 
sac of skin,” hungrily looking at the powerful body of the father, and then 
falling asleep, “winding around herself as though she had no bones,” sucking 
her thumb “with a dreamy, faraway look on her face” (135, 140). She is forty, 
and desperately alone. The demolition of the walls is her last gift to herself in 
an attempt to cross over the threshold to a normal life, from sterile, hyper-
refined gentility into a bodily existence. Aron’s father, bull-like and virile, 
becomes a savior figure (144).
 Throughout these healing episodes, the father is perceived as distinctly 
un-Jewish. Seen from the back when he is up on the fig tree, he is a giant with 
“hefty legs,” a “thick neck” and a “fleshy nape.” The adjective used by Gross-
man to describe the back of the father’s neck—untranslatable, perhaps—is 
“aarel,” which means “non-Jewish” and literally—“uncircumcised” (17; in 
the original Hebrew 22).8 Indeed, there are scattered suggestions in the novel 
that he might, in fact, have been born to a non-Jewish father. When the 
half-demented grandmother tells her grandchildren of her bohemian life 
as a cabaret dancer and her many “cavaliers” before the war in Poland, she 
seems to be quite vague about the paternity of her son whom she calls Mau-
ritzy, after a particularly dashing Polish officer (76). “Back in Poland he was 
strong . . . the Polacks never guessed he was a Jidovksy” (76–77). And Edna’s 
perception of this man, who is so powerfully sensual and masculine, is satu-
rated with pagan, mythical allusions (142, 144, 162, 175). The association of 
the father’s healing powers and his non-Jewish, corporeal quality is a distinct 
echo of the conception of Zionism as a project of healing the extraterrito-
rial, disembodied, and uprooted Jewish people; of making them normal, like 
other people.
 During the drama that develops between the father and the two women, 
the intense erotic rivalry between the mother and Edna takes the form of a 
feeding competition, as they stuff the father in turns with a variety of meat 
dishes and heaps of exotic delicacies. In the midst of this Rabelaisian drama, 
Aron, the vegetarian, is badly constipated and sleeps through the afternoons, 
as if hibernating. He seems to be suspended, curled up on bed with his swol-
len belly, his “little pregnancy,” waiting to give birth to himself (187–89), or 
to a spectral twin (222). At the rage of his parents at his refusal to eat “so that 
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he can grow up to be normal” (201), Aron “shuts his ears from inside, Aron-
ing slowly down, till suddenly they’re speaking a language he doesn’t under-
stand” (201). Having the meat forced down his throat, he imagines himself 
as a martyr, acting out the recurrent scenario of Jewish history.
 In the regime of normality, the freaks are defeated. Edna’s flat is entirely 
demolished, and Edna herself, finally out of her virginal chrysalis, but 
demented rather than liberated, is turned into a catalyst for a rekindling of 
the erotic bond between the parents. As Edna is led away from the ruins of 
her flat, Aron’s mother is pregnant again, and Aron listens as she anxiously 
interrogates the demented grandmother about the family history: “Leibaleh’s 
brother, what’s-his-name, the one you told us about who was killed by the 
Germans, remember? . . . The one you said there was something wrong with, 
do you remember what it was? What? Show me by nodding. Was he, eppes, 
deaf? Was he epileptic? If yes, nod; was he crippled from polio? Was he a 
midget?. . . . An albino?. . . . Feeble-minded?” (326). This interrogation takes 
place as the mother is unraveling Aron’s sweater so that she can reuse the 
wool for another knitting project, perhaps for the baby who will take Aron’s 
place, who will eat meat, grow up normal, and perpetuate the family line 
(318).
 Aron’s suicide, his final cocooning of himself, follows after the eve of 
Independence Day, a time of collective celebration, when he finds himself 
amidst the dancing crowds, at the lowest ebb of his own isolation. It is also, 
significantly, the eve of the 1967 War, the Six-Day War, which was perceived 
at the time as a glorious victory of the few-against-the-many—the culmina-
tion of the sabra myth—and which turned out to be a tragic turning point 
in the short history of Israeli society. For Aron, at this moment of collective 
unity, everything is falling apart (298). His parents have given up on him. His 
friends have gone ahead and grown up, leaving him behind.
 Losing all hope for a miraculous metamorphosis that would make him 
normal, Aron now knows “from the pangs in his heart and the coded com-
munications, the idiom of his most intimate grammar, that this was no tem-
porary delay, it was becoming, God forbid, the thing itself, and just as he 
had felt chosen somehow before his problem started, now he felt chosen, too, 
same difference, which gave his disaster a dark and twisted logic: it was his 
disaster, out of which he had been fashioned” (303). The Jewish, Disaporic 
echoes of this interior, private monologue are loud and clear, and the land-
scape of Aron’s mind at that moment of final resignation is a post-Holocaust 
landscape: “the tender boy, misty and white, fades out as he slithers over the 
chilly ash-or-frost-dabbled earth, creeping cautiously over the crimpled ter-
rain and the pearly-gray craters” (307).
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iii.
Abraham and Torok’s metapsychological theory begins with a distinction 
between Ferenzi’s concept of “introjection”—a working-through of loss in a 
process of “naming,” a transition from the lost object to its linguistic, semi-
otic or symbolic representation—and their own concept of “incorporation,” 
which moves in the opposite direction, through the literalization of language 
in “oral-cannibalistic and anal-evacuative processes” (Torok, “The Illness of 
Mourning and the Fantasy of the Exquisite Corpse” 111), a de-metaphoriza-
tion of both food and excrement (Abraham and Torok, “Mourning or Mel-
ancholia” 131–32). When words fail, an imaginary thing is inserted into the 
mouth (128–29). The relevance of this description to the Kleinfeld’s house-
hold, endlessly preoccupied with what goes in and out of the body—with 
food, constipation, diarrhea, gaining and losing weight—is obvious, literal, 
and concrete (260).
 But if melancholia, the “illness of mourning,” is a loss of language, a soma-
tization and literalization of meaning, the cure may be found in an inverse 
process of re-metaphorization that would recover the power of words. This 
is where the metafictional aspects of the novel take over (somewhat heavy-
handedly, perhaps). For Aron, the innocent narrator, is both a scapegoat and 
an authorial figure, a potential writer who takes on the deadly task of mak-
ing the silence speak. No wonder, then, that the father flies into a rage when 
Aron innocently provides the term “salt cellar” as a correction of the father’s 
“whatsit.” The eruption of physical violence is, in fact, a response to what this 
inarticulate, intensely corporeal man intuitively perceives as the ultimate ges-
ture of defiance: the missing word is the son’s only weapon, but the challenge 
is real enough (200–202, 224).
 At a moment of intense pain, Aron remembers the tiny piece of golden 
thread given to him by his demented grandmother as though it were a pre-
cious family heirloom (58–59). The grandmother, too, is a freak of nature, 
an artist who refuses to be domesticated and civilized by the mother (74, 80). 
She, too, has resisted the laws of time and nature and remained obstinately 
alive, “clogging up the bowels of the death” (204). The golden thread is gone. 
It is merely a word now, but still—in Aron’s mind—a token of resistance to 
normality.
The question is whether that mouth could manage a word like “thread,” 
and Aron pictures a golden thread shining in the sunlight, dripping honey, 
like a guitar string still aquiver with the melody a moment after it was 
strummed. Threa-d, murmurs Aron with fine-drawn lips, with deep devo-
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tion, threa-d, like a string plucked out of his depths, lyrical and sweet, but 
airy too, and hazy like the halos around those people in his negatives, and 
he can easily slip through any crack, through a needle’s eye. He tilts his 
head, eyes shut, lips parted like the mouth of an urn, uttering “Thread,” like 
the whistle of the wind, gentle but cutting, and he smiles to himself: Papa 
can’t get in, like a thread with a knot at the end. (225)
 The last-ditch recovery of the magic of words and their power climaxes 
in a moment of pain and release, as Aron injures himself with the potato 
peeling knife and—still bleeding—empties himself on the kitchen floor vio-
lently and uncontrollably in front of his horrified parents. At the moment of 
release, he feels that he is “giving birth to himself, a small, beloved, stinking 
self; rid at last of the horrible anguish, the harsh dark secret, not his own, 
he had been forced to keep inside” (226–27). It is—to return to Abraham 
and Torok—the secret of what cannot be named and mourned, because if 
it were, “the whole world would be swallowed up in this cataclysm,” whose 
emergence in words may lead to madness (“The Topography of Reality” 158, 
159–60). But the golden thread, now turned into a word and thus into an 
emblem of continuity, becomes an erotic gift:
Certain words, if you know how to pronounce them in a special way, not 
from the outside but as though you were calling their names, right away 
they turn to you, they show you their pink penetralia, they purr to you 
and they’re yours, they’ll do anything you want; take “bell,” for instance, he 
rolls it over his tongue as though tasting it for the first time ever, “bellll,” 
or “honeysuckle,” or “lion” or “legend” or “coal” or “melody” or “gleam” or 
“velvet,” melting on his tongue, sloughing off their earthy guises, till sud-
denly there is red heat, a cinder of memory spreading its glow as it slowly 
disappears into his mouth, for Lo, this hath touched thy lips, and thine ini-
quity is taken away, and thy sin is expiated. (225)
 The last line of this interior monologue is a passage out of Aron’s Bar 
Mitzvah text, a verse from the book of Isaiah, where the prophet’s mouth is 
touched by burning embers so that he can speak out in the name of God. 
This is, at long last, the rite of passage though blood, pain, and fire. With 
the re-empowerment of language, Aron, whose stunted body has borne the 
inscription of cultural pathology and challenged it, and who is about to die 
in a few pages, has finally come into his legacy of word-magic and prophecy. 
His authorial surrogate will take up this legacy, and—to misquote Adorno—
go on to rattle the cage of normality.
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notes
 1. For discussions of this break with the Diasporic past, the need to assimilate the 
Holocaust into the Zionist ethos of a heroic struggle, and the collective translation of the 
trauma into the terms of homecoming and renewal, see Yael Feldman, Sidra DeKoven 
Ezrahi, and Ephraim Sicher.
 2. Significantly, Gampel resorts to the Freudian conception of the “Uncanny”—lo-
cated somewhere between psychoanalysis and literature—in her discussion of the inter-
generational transmission of the trauma.
 3. As indicated by the title of this essay, I take issue with the English translation of 
Grossman’s Hebrew title and will therefore use the familiar translation only in italicized 
references to the English title of the book, but modify it in the body of my own text.
 4. For some reason, the epigraph does not appear in the English translation of the 
novel.
 5. In a comprehensive study of Israeli Holocaust literature, Iris Milner cites Abraham 
and Torok, noting the recurrent motif of entombment (hidden boxes, enclosed spaces, 
cellars) in novels written by second-generation writers. I would suggest, however, that 
Milner’s reading of the secret—as an event or a story that is concealed and may come to 
light—involves some reduction or simplification of Abraham and Torok’s theory, whose 
point of departure is precisely the non-substantive quality of the secret, its being unrepre-
sentable by definition.
 6. Like Uri, the protagonist of Moshe Shamir’s best-selling 1947 novel, Hu Halach 
Ba-Sadot (He Walked though the Fields), Elic is an ideal-type Sabra. Both of these literary 
characters were the much-sung heroes of Israeli collectivity during the first decade after 
the establishment of the state.
 7. Aron’s Rip Van Winkle fantasy (34), his imaginary transportation to the time zone 
of America (112), and the poignant passage when he casts himself into an imaginary fu-
ture as a prisoner in the frozen taiga of Russia—as his father was—remembering his own 
childhood, are additional instances of the same time loop.
 8. I am grateful to Emanuel Berman, who has pointed out that the use of this seem-
ingly odd adjective to describe the back of the father’s neck reinforces the suggestion of 
Aron’s disgust with his parents’ sexuality.
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In the concluding lines of André Schwarz-Bart’s novel A Woman Named 
Solitude (La mulâtresse Solitude, 1972), the narrator recalls the “humiliated 
ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto” while describing the site of a failed Caribbean 
slave revolt (Woman 150). Schwarz-Bart, who died on September 30, 2006, 
was a French Jew of Polish origin who lost his family in the Nazi genocide 
and who remains best known for his novel of Holocaust and Jewish history, 
The Last of the Just (Le Dernier des Justes, 1959). In the wake of the surpris-
ing success of that prize-winning novel, Schwarz-Bart, in collaboration with 
his Guadeloupian wife Simone Schwarz-Bart, set out on an ambitious, mul-
tivolume project to write a comparative fictional history of blacks and Jews 
in diaspora. Only sections of that project were ever published—besides A 
Woman Named Solitude there is the co-authored Un Plat de porc aux bananes 
vertes (1967)—but the questions Schwarz-Bart’s work raises echo to this day.1 
What happens when different histories of extreme violence confront each 
other in the public sphere? Does the remembrance of one event erase others 
from view? When memories of colonialism bump up against memories of 
the Holocaust in contemporary multicultural societies, must a competition 
of victims ensue?
 Many discussions of collective memory today are based on a zero-sum 
logic in which the evocation of one group’s history is said to block other 
groups’ histories from view. In typically provocative fashion, the literary 
critic Walter Benn Michaels presents a sharp version of this argument in a 
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discussion of the political significance of the United States Holocaust Memo-
rial Museum. Evoking the perspective of certain African Americans alleg-
edly frustrated by the absence of commemoration of their traumatic history 
on the Mall in Washington, Michaels asks if “commemoration of the Nazi 
murder of the Jews on the Mall [might not be] in fact another kind of Holo-
caust denial” (289–90). Analogizing collective memory to the occupation of 
real estate, Michaels assumes that both memory and the public sphere are 
defined by a logic of scarcity: in this scenario, too much Holocaust memory 
entails not enough memory of other histories. Although few people would 
put the matter in such controversial terms, many other commentators, both 
inside and outside the academy, share the understanding of collective mem-
ory articulated by Michaels. I contrast this model of competitive memory 
with a theory of multidirectional memory that redescribes the public sphere 
as a field of contestation where memories interact productively and in unex-
pected ways. By making visible an intellectual and artistic counter-tradition 
that bucks the dominant zero-sum game and links memories of genocide 
and colonialism, I reveal how the public articulation of collective memory 
by marginalized and oppositional social groups provides resources for other 
groups to articulate their own claims for recognition and justice.2
 In this essay, I focus on the novels and travel writing of Caryl Phillips, 
prime literary examples of multidirectional memory that help reveal some 
of the crucial narrative strategies through which such memory takes shape. 
The author of a dozen books in the last twenty years, Phillips was born in the 
Caribbean, grew up in England, and now lives much of the time in the United 
States, although he travels regularly across the globe. His aesthetic concerns 
refract that geographic displacement and range between past and present, 
old world and new, and black and Jewish themes.3 In his fiction Phillips 
seeks, like Schwarz-Bart, to “people” history’s abysses through risky acts of 
imagination, and, like his predecessor, he does so through an anachronistic 
aesthetics that explores links between seemingly disparate times and places. 
Nevertheless, the lessons Phillips draws from the past are more ambigu-
ous than those espoused by Schwarz-Bart. In Phillips’s oeuvre, the frontier 
between victim and victimizer is never as clear as it is in Schwarz-Bart’s. 
Scrambling the forms of historical comparison he finds in Schwarz-Bart, 
Phillips’s works situate blacks and Jews not only outside or at the margins of 
Europe, but also inside, at the center.
 Those works also lead us to pose a question central to the investigation 
of Holocaust literature “after testimony”: they force us to ask what narrative 
forms correspond to and express the work of intercultural remembrance. 
Paying particular attention to intertextuality and the fragmentation of nar-
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ration, I argue that Phillips’s project is not to establish an equation between 
black and Jewish history, or even strictly parallel histories, as can be found 
in Schwarz-Bart. Rather, Phillips uses what Rebecca Walkowitz has called an 
“anthological” aesthetic to highlight both similar structural problems within 
those histories and missed encounters between them. Through his particular 
juxtaposition of blacks and Jews in a transnational narrative frame, Phillips 
alludes to Schwarz-Bart’s oeuvre in order to decompose it; he thus produces 
a fractured form of relatedness characteristic of the Holocaust’s multidirec-
tional legacies in a globalized, yet unevenly developed, age. His narrative 
strategies strike at the roots of competitive understandings of memory by 
revealing all histories as beyond appropriation and outside the logic of the 
zero-sum game.
mediated identifications
The European Tribe
Fifteen years after Schwarz-Bart conjured the ruins of the ghetto from a site 
of Caribbean trauma, Phillips also wrote about visiting Warsaw. In his 1987 
travel report The European Tribe, he tells of a yearlong journey through the 
Europe of the mid-1980s that included a stop in Poland. Phillips writes from 
a Europe different from the one Schwarz-Bart abandoned for Guadeloupe, 
yet his sense of both the racist legacies of the past and the foreboding of the 
racial and ethnic violence of the near future seems to echo the French writer’s 
insights.
 The European Tribe provides various keys to understanding Phillips’s 
investment in the Holocaust. At the most explicit level, a chapter titled “Anne 
Frank’s Amsterdam” brings together black and Jewish experience through a 
model of identification. Here Phillips describes the inspiration for his first 
fictional work:
I was about fifteen when Amsterdam first began to fascinate me. There was 
a programme on television, part of the World at War series, which dealt 
with the Nazi occupation of Holland and the subsequent rounding up of 
the Jews. . . . One thing I could not understand about the programme was 
why, when instructed to wear the yellow Star of David on their clothes, the 
Jews complied. They looked just like any other white people to me, so who 
would know that they were different? As the programme progressed my 
sense of bemused fascination disappeared and was supplanted by my first 
mature feelings of outrage and fear. These yellow stars were marking them 
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out for Bergen-Belsen and Auschwitz. I watched the library footage of the 
camps and realized both the enormity of the crime that was being perpe-
trated, and the precariousness of my own position in Europe. The many 
adolescent thoughts that worried my head can be reduced to one line: “If 
white people could do that to white people, then what the hell would they 
do to me?” (66–67)
Phillips refers here to Occupation: Holland, 1940–1944, the eighteenth of 
twenty-six episodes in The World at War British TV series, and possibly to 
Genocide, the twentieth episode, both of which first aired in March 1974. The 
passage is dense with multiple acts of looking that indicate different levels of 
narration and focalization: the narrator looks back at his teenage self as that 
younger self watches a television film constructed out of diverse sources of 
archival and postwar footage. Phillips’s staging of race and visuality moves 
beyond the face-to-face encounter with racism famously depicted by Frantz 
Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks into a world characterized by multiple 
layers of mediation: the fifteen-year-old migrant child in England does not 
directly face the racist gaze, but looks on as the flow of a television program 
concatenates archival imagery with postwar narration and interviews.4
 In order to comprehend the complexity of this viewing scene, it is impor-
tant to be aware of the sources of the imagery in these two episodes of The 
World at War. Occupation begins with the narrator reading quotations from 
Anne Frank against the backdrop of color shots of contemporary Holland, 
but it then goes on to draw on a mixture of archival images and present-day 
“talking heads” interviews. The episode’s themes are ones that will indeed 
come to haunt Phillips’s oeuvre: complicity and resistance. It includes images 
produced by the Nazis themselves, including the famous footage of deporta-
tion from the transit camp Westerbork, also used in Alain Resnais’s Night and 
Fog, and stills from the extermination camps; selections from propaganda 
films such as The Eternal Jew; and interviews with eyewitnesses (including, 
on the one hand, survivors, and, on the other hand, relatives of former Dutch 
Nazis). Two weeks later, the Genocide episode adds rare footage of mass exe-
cutions and well-known scenes of bulldozers burying masses of emaciated 
corpses, which were taken on liberation by Allied soldiers and also featured 
in Night and Fog. While the Nazi footage might be more or less assimilable 
to the racist gaze of which Fanon speaks, the interviews and Allied footage 
raise different types of problems involving the framing of testimony and 
the depiction of abject victimization. Most significant in Phillips’s account, 
though, is the representation of the viewer’s relationship to these images of 
extreme racialization: it is simultaneously decentered and decontextualized, 
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not only by the overlap of non-synchronous perspectives staged in the film, 
but also, more importantly, by the fact that the viewer is a black child from 
the former colonies in a post-Imperial metropolis whose response to the 
images fluctuates between identification and distanciation.
 Yet it is precisely the film’s lack of sense for the young Phillips—its depic-
tion of victimization at the limits of understanding and its mobilization of 
contradictory perspectives—that proves productive, that produces a writing 
subject. Musing on the film leads the young Phillips to produce his first fic-
tional work: a short story about a young Dutch boy in occupied Amsterdam 
who resists wearing the yellow star. Ultimately, during “resettlement” to the 
east, the boy escapes from the cattle car and is saved when “the sunlight 
shining on his yellow star . . . attracts a kindly farmer’s attention” (European 
Tribe 67). Phillips later writes of this story, “The Dutch boy was, of course, 
me” (“On ‘The Nature of Blood’” 6). This phrase echoes a key moment in 
Occupation in which the Dutch survivor Rita Boas-Koopman narrates the 
deportation of her young brother to the extermination camps in the east. 
She describes how, fearing for his life, she gave him her coat and boots; as 
he walked away from her, she reports, “He looked like me.” In Phillips’s tell-
ing, his first significant exposure to the Holocaust—an exposure importantly 
mediated by televisual images—takes place on the cusp between “adolescent 
thoughts” and his “first mature feelings.” Through a process of identifica-
tion, the history of the Holocaust helps to form Phillips as an adult subject 
and as a writer. At this moment of his youth, Phillips’s relationship to Jew-
ish history carries the hallmarks of what Diana Fuss, following Freud, has 
called the “obviousness” of identification, its “predicat[ion] on a logic of met-
aphoric exchange” (1, 5): “The Dutch boy was, of course, me.” Such a logic, 
while understandable from the perspective of a fifteen-year-old boy, might 
be considered to carry the danger of appropriation, the full-scale metaphoric 
substitution of one identity or history for another. The unmarked echo of 
Boas-Koopman’s words in Phillips’s “mature” reflections signals the ongoing 
risk of that appropriation.
 But The European Tribe, like Higher Ground and The Nature of Blood, 
the novels that emerged from it, also demonstrates a more complex logic, 
one that reminds us that, for Freud, identification is much more ambivalent 
and indirect than the simple process of metaphoric substitution. In fact, the 
identificatory processes at work in both the travel book and the novels are 
more strongly metonymic than metaphoric. This more complex notion of 
identification is captured in Eve Sedgwick’s assertion, “The paths of allo-
identification are likely to be strange and recalcitrant”: “to identify as must 
always include multiple processes of identification with” (59, 61). The paths 
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and multiple processes in Sedgwick’s formulation correspond to the met-
onymic displacements that underwrite Phillips’s approach to the otherness 
of Jewish history and the Holocaust. Tracing those paths of displacement 
reveals the stakes of identification in these texts. Metonymic identification is 
both enabled and made necessary by the deficit of representations of black 
suffering in the England of Phillips’s youth. As he also writes in The European 
Tribe, “The bloody excesses of colonialism, the pillage and rape of modern 
Africa, the transportation of 11 million black people to the Americas, and 
their subsequent bondage were not on the curriculum, and certainly not 
on the television screen. As a result I vicariously channeled a part of my 
hurt and frustration through the Jewish experience” (54). At stake, in other 
words, is less the will to take the place of the other than the desire to map out 
the uncanny geographies of diasporic life; Phillips’s diasporic subject shares 
spaces and histories with various others without developing a sense of being 
at home in that terrain. In Phillips’s work, metonymic identification helps to 
capture the contingent contiguities of diasporic experience and its necessar-
ily multiple locations and syncretic cultures.
 Not only is Phillips’s interest in the Nazi genocide revealed in The Euro-
pean Tribe, but also an ongoing fascination with the figure of Othello and 
the history of Venice. Following this intertextual route returns us to the 
Holocaust, but in a more roundabout way. Phillips’s visit to Venice forms 
something of a turning point in his travel book: “I saw only one other black 
man in Venice. He looked nothing like Othello. . . . How did Othello live in 
this astonishing city? Sixteenth-century Venetian society both enslaved the 
black and ridiculed the Jew” (45). While Phillips is clearly interested in the 
common experience of racism suffered by blacks and Jews in Europe, this 
chapter is nonetheless called “A Black European Success.” Despite the obvi-
ous irony, that title tells us something about what is important for Phillips: 
not simply the existence of a hatred that can turn genocidal, but the produc-
tive presence of racial others in the midst of Europe. Venice is a significant 
choice, not only because of the two relevant Shakespearean figures it con-
jures up—Othello and Shylock—but also because of its place in the world 
economy of its day. Indeed, for the sociologist Giovanni Arrighi, the Vene-
tian city-state stands as “the prototype of the leading capitalist state of every 
subsequent age” (84). Othello’s presence in the early modern Italian city thus 
represents a historical mirror for Phillips’s own condition as a “black Euro-
pean success” who now lives in two of late modernity’s global cities, New 
York and London.
 But Venice also has further significance because it was the location of the 
first Jewish ghetto and indeed of the origin of the word “ghetto.” In the twen-
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tieth century, the concept of the ghetto has provided one of the most salient 
links in the identificatory chain connecting blacks and Jews. The lexical con-
nection also leads Phillips to explore those other ghettos, the ghettos estab-
lished by the Nazis as part of the genocidal destruction of the Jews of Europe. 
The associations fostered by The European Tribe are not simply grounded in 
a metaphoric identification of racism against Jews with racism against blacks, 
although this link is not excluded. Nor are many of the historical associations 
of a sort that would be accepted by the discipline of history. Rather, this travel 
book leads us to identify a metonymic chain of multiple identifications that 
works through more accidental associations of history, geography, and liter-
ary reference and puts anachronism to work. Shifting from a metaphoric to 
a metonymic conception of identification helps to bring the mediated nature 
of Phillips’s historical references to the fore: the Holocaust arrives via a televi-
sion documentary; Venice is as much a literary space (Shakespeare’s Venice) 
as it is a geographical place.
 Phillips’s more recent fictional work continues to chart this new imagi-
native terrain. As the references to school curricula, canonical literature, 
and television programming in The European Tribe indicate, the project of 
diasporic mapping undertaken by Phillips involves an engagement with mul-
tiple forms of textual culture and the appropriation and reconfiguration of 
dominant narratives. Such acts of engagement and appropriation, however, 
are not meant to render history or identity as entities that can be “owned,” 
either by individuals or by groups. Phillips’s reconfiguration of dominant 
narratives signals that multidirectional exchange takes place beyond the 
forms of cultural ownership that motivate competitive struggles over the 
past.
missed encounters
Higher Ground
In Higher Ground, his first novel after the publication of The European Tribe, 
and in The Nature of Blood, Phillips returns to related historical terrain in 
order further to fracture the lines of identification. Phillips’s “Jewish” novels 
have received mixed reviews, with detractors asserting (as in the title of one 
review) that “black is not Jewish” and proponents lauding Phillips’s “attempt 
to mix different cultures and traditions into a diverse whole.”5 In contrast 
to these positions, I argue that Phillips’s project is not to establish an equa-
tion between black and Jewish history, but rather to highlight both similar 
structural problems within those histories and missed encounters between 
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them. Despite moving toward a more fractured form of relatedness, however, 
the fictional texts still maintain the sense of urgency that lies behind black– 
Jewish identification in the earlier travel report.
 Higher Ground consists of three disconnected, novella-like parts. The 
first is narrated from the perspective of an African man who works in a 
slave fort as a go-between and translator. The second is made up of letters 
from Rudi Williams, an African American man discovering the philosophy 
of Black Power while imprisoned during the late 1960s for having stolen 
forty dollars during an armed robbery. The novel concludes with the story of 
Irene, a Polish Jewish refugee in England, who seems to have lost her family 
in the Holocaust and who struggles with madness and depression. Higher 
Ground’s three separated stories bleed into each other and suggest a desire 
for contact across identities and histories. Most relevant here, Rudi deploys 
Nazi- and Holocaust-inflected figures in an attempt to make sense of his 
situation, while Irene yearns for a connection with Louis, a sympathetic but 
distant Caribbean immigrant. Yet, despite the different desires for contact 
evinced by these characters, the novel ultimately stages a series of missed 
encounters. Although Bénédicte Ledent has shown that common themes 
and problems cut across the three sections of the novel (54–79), I argue that 
what unity the novel has derives primarily from what is absent, both within 
and between the sections: that is, its unity is a function of traumatic ruptures 
and missed encounters instead of “positive” presences.
 The theme of the missed encounter is established in the first section, 
“Heartland,” set during the slave trade. The narrator, an African collaborator 
with the British, seeks to carve out a zone of normality within a situation of 
radical extremity and violence. After falling in love with a village girl who 
has been abused by the governor’s deputy, the narrator smuggles the girl (as 
he calls her) into the fort and attempts to lead a “domestic” life within this 
site of inhumanity. His plans are doubly foiled, first when one of the soldiers 
discovers the presence of the girl and takes advantage of her and the narra-
tor’s vulnerability; second, when the soldier betrays them and lands them in 
the slave hold. Shipped to America, the narrator ends up as one of “the prime 
nigger heathens” on the auction block, “resigned to the permanence of [his] 
separation” from the girl. In the last lines of the section, he recognizes that 
his “present has finally fractured; the past has fled over the horizon and out 
of sight” (Higher Ground 60). The narrator finds himself displaced and frac-
tured by history, but his experience makes him neither innocent victim, nor 
heroic resistor, nor martyr. Hence, I disagree with Bryan Cheyette’s asser-
tion, in an otherwise excellent essay on Phillips, that the “construction of an 
endless victimization of both the Jewish and black minorities” characterizes 
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Phillips’s oeuvre (60). Rather, those minorities tend to occupy an in-between 
space characterized by complicity and moral ambiguity.
 The narrator’s missed encounter with his beloved—inevitable given his 
misrecognition of his place in history—finds its echo in the succeeding sec-
tions. Rudi, the letter-writing protagonist of part two, “The Cargo Rap,” is 
no collaborator with oppression, but he similarly misconceives his place in 
history. To be sure, as a working-class African American man, he is certainly 
a victim of the same system of racialization that in an earlier phase claimed 
the life of the narrator of “Heartland.” Yet his attempts to carve out a place for 
himself in history—attempts made from the none-too-spacious confines of a 
maximum-security prison cell—leave him even more imprisoned. In letters 
to his family and the few strangers who take up his cause, Rudi frequently 
figures himself in the place of Holocaust victims. In a letter to the president 
of his “Defense Committee,” Rudi introduces himself as serving “one to life 
in a concentration camp of their [the State’s] own choice” (92). In prison, 
which Rudi refers to on several occasions as “Belsen” (69, 84, 145), Rudi suf-
fers tortures that, he suspects, closely resemble those inflicted in Nazi Ger-
many (72).
 Rudi’s references to the Holocaust ultimately serve neither the interests 
of history nor those of his own liberation. Although Rudi uses the “oppor-
tunity” of prison to read important works of black, anticolonial, and left-
ist resistance, all of which he recommends to his family in self-righteous 
and didactic terms, he ultimately succumbs to madness and despair. His last 
letter, written to his mother after she has already died, demonstrates that 
overidentification with victims of the Holocaust is premised on an anach-
ronistic reading of African American history. Here, as in his opening letter, 
Rudi imagines himself a slave; but while the opening letter uses the language 
of slavery metaphorically, in his confused state the metaphor is literalized: 
“Dear Moma, / The overseer has a horse named ‘Ginger.’ The plantation is 
wide and stretches beyond the horizon. . . . The master is cruel, but nobody 
‘knows’ him better than his slaves. There is strength in this” (172). Besides 
importing a sly reference to Hegel, Rudi’s final letter demonstrates a com-
plex, but ultimately self-defeating, logic of identification; his identification 
with Jewish victims is premised on a prefigurative identification with slaves 
that founds his identity in the first place. While such identifications can pro-
vide sources of selfhood that allow for survival and resistance, they also can 
lead into polarized and static discourses. Such discourses replay narratives 
of trauma so insistently that they become structural features in the present 
instead of historical legacies that are susceptible to working through. If, then, 
“Rudi’s recurrent references to Nazism . . . reinforce his dehumanisation by 
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echoing the holocaustic horrors that suffuse the last story” in the novel, as 
Ledent has argued (65), this is so in a different sense than intended. Phil-
lips’s point, I would argue, is that part of the horror lies in the very “recurrent 
references”—not because Rudi is doing violence to Jewish history in loosely 
appropriating it to his own situation, but rather because he is doing violence 
to himself by trapping himself in a rhetoric of absolute victimization that 
ultimately eliminates all agency.
 In “Higher Ground,” the third part of the novel, the Jewish immigrant 
through whom the story is focalized also remains trapped in the past, but 
for quite different reasons. In contrast to Rudi, who contributes to his own 
entrapment through overidentification with African American as well as 
European Jewish history, “Irene” is overwhelmed by the split that marks her 
life, a split that inheres in her very name, or what she calls “the Irene-Irina-
Irene-Irina-Irene-Irina-Irene problem” (183). Sent from Poland to England 
on a Kindertransport—a transport of Jewish children away from the Nazi 
threat—the young Irina soon becomes Irene, “for English people were too 
lazy to bend their mouths or twist their tongues into unfamiliar shapes” 
(183). Phillips highlights the ensuing split by referring to his protagonist as 
Irina during flashbacks and as Irene for the period after her move to Eng-
land. Separated from her family, whom we are led to believe have been mur-
dered by the Nazis, and assimilable into English society only at the cost of 
losing part of her identity, Irene is trapped into an unhappy marriage and 
then suffers a breakdown that sends her to a psychiatric hospital for ten 
years. The present of the novel finds her living in a rooming house and work-
ing in a library, but falling back into madness and about to be sent back to 
the hospital. Her persistent foreignness seems to draw her close to Louis, a 
brand-new West Indian migrant suffering in the alien English landscape. 
The logic of the story seems to be leading toward contact and bonding across 
black and Jewish differences—a supposition reinforced by the novel’s use of 
colonial discourse to describe Irene’s condition, as Ledent has shown (68), 
as well as by shifts in focalization between Irene and Louis, which seem to 
promise a melding of imaginative horizons. But once again the novel turns 
away from such a redemptive possibility; black and Jewish histories do not 
actually intersect but approach each other and then veer away asymptotically. 
Although drawn to Irene, Louis has already decided to return home to the 
Caribbean: “She touched him, but he knew that he must steel himself and 
step out into the crisp, sweatless, fresh, cold, white, snowy night  .  .  . Then 
at dawn he would return to the men’s hostel and take his bag and his leave. 
It was probable that this woman would extend and demand a severe loyalty 
that he could never reciprocate. Not now. Sorry” (216). Louis refuses—or 
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at least defers indefinitely—Irene’s offer of contact and solidarity and leaves 
Irene “for ever lost without the sustaining love,” waiting for the nurse to take 
her back to captivity in the hospital (218).
 Although thematically unified in its exploration of forms of imprison-
ment, displacement, and racialized violence, Higher Ground refuses redemp-
tive closure and easy analogy across histories and identities. Even as it 
encourages readers to search for links between the various stories staged in 
the novel, the narrative discourse also keeps them isolated from each other, a 
point we find allegorized in the missed encounter between Irene and Louis, 
where shifts in focalization finally signal alienation of one from the other. 
In the final story, differences of gender, social status (refugee vs. migrant), 
ethnicity, and nationality overrule the commonalities that nonetheless draw 
the two characters together. Victimization proves not to be the best grounds 
for solidarity because processes of victimization take multiple, contradictory 
forms and erode the bases of selfhood necessary for relationship with others 
(as illustrated by Rudi’s descent into fantasy and Irene’s madness). In addi-
tion, as the case of the narrator of “Heartland” demonstrates, possessing the 
status of the victim does not grant immunity from complicity or prevent the 
occupation of other subject positions, such as collaborator. In the fragmented 
stories of Higher Ground, the position of victims is revealed as unstable and 
shifting, and therefore not susceptible to the construction of facile linkages.
intertexuality and Stratified minoritization
The Nature of Blood
In The Nature of Blood Phillips refashions the materials of The European 
Tribe and Higher Ground, as well as many other texts, into a fictional narra-
tive that spans 400 years and links Nazi Germany, fifteenth- and sixteenth-
century Italy, and contemporary Israel. The novel focuses primarily on Eva 
Stern, a young German–Jewish woman who survives the death camps before 
succumbing, like Irene, to madness after the war and a tragic end in England. 
The novel also presents us with Eva’s uncle Stephan, a doctor who leaves 
Europe before the war and is part of the Jewish underground in Palestine; 
he also shows up many years later in Israel. Interwoven with the story of the 
Sterns is a chronicle-like account of a fifteenth-century Venetian ritual mur-
der case and a first-person narrative by none other than Othello. All of this 
is recounted in a fragmented text characterized by rapid shifts in perspective, 
a dense intertextual fabric, and alternation between carefully constructed 
historical milieus and deliberate anachronism.
342 1 5 :  f r a C T U r e d  r e l a T i O n S
 Working from the same chain of associations that stands behind the 
interlocking histories of blacks and Jews in The European Tribe, The Nature 
of Blood extends the earlier book’s exploration of diasporic identity. What is 
most striking about the novel is the narrative form that exploration takes. 
The novel employs more than a dozen different narrative voices and shifts 
perspective several dozen times. It also mobilizes a markedly interdisciplin-
ary set of cognitive genres, from the clinical diagnosis of Eva’s doctor in Eng-
land to interpolated dictionary definitions of key terms such as “ghetto” and 
to the disturbingly blasé historical voice of the chronicle-like ritual murder 
case. Characterized by discontinuity between multiple forms of knowledge 
and multiple forms of violence, The Nature of Blood testifies to the existence 
of new possibilities for thinking the relatedness of the unrelatable.
 How can we make sense of the juxtaposition of histories in The Nature 
of Blood? Like The European Tribe, with its staging of two different forms of 
identification, the novel also contains two different logics of comparison. 
On the one hand, the title, The Nature of Blood, gestures at a commonality 
that links the different stories as essentially the same. A transhistorical racist 
imaginary obsessed with purity of blood seems to unite the various Jewish 
and black victims across time. This sense of commonality is reinforced by 
certain textual echoes that link the stories to each other—as when the Jews 
of fifteenth-century Portobuffole recite the same prayer while being burned 
at the stake as the Jews who arrive at a Nazi camp (155, 164), or when Eva’s 
suicide echoes Othello’s. Were this logic to dominate, the novel would risk 
reproducing the racist discourse that it obviously seeks to contest. But, on the 
other hand—and whether intentionally or not—the differences between the 
stories ultimately overwhelm the apparent similitude suggested by the title. 
The novel’s primary focus is not the simple binary between perpetrators and 
victims of racist violence. Instead, the novel emerges as an exploration of 
ambivalent modes of belonging and exclusion in which accidental contiguity 
plays a greater role than correspondence of historical essences.
 The first word of The Nature of Blood is “between,” and indeed the novel 
begins in the interstices, in a liminal zone between geographies and histories. 
The opening scene takes place between the end of the war and the beginning 
of a new era. It is set on the still-contested island of Cyprus, between Europe, 
Africa, and the Middle East, in camps established by the British for refugees 
refused entrance into Palestine. Stephan, the doctor, is talking to Moshe, a 
young survivor of the camps.
Between us a small fire sputtered. . . . The new kindling snapped, and the 
flames rose higher and illuminated the boy’s face. He spoke quietly.
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 “Tell me, what will be the name of the country?”
 “Our country,” I said. “The country will belong to you too.”
 The boy looked down at the sand, then scratched a short nervous line 
with his big toe.
 “Tell me, what will be the name of our country?”
 I paused for a moment, in the hope that he might relax. And then I 
whispered, as though confessing something to him.
 “Israel. Our country will be called Israel.” (3)
In this scene, Phillips describes the moment of transition when a collective 
“we” is being formed, a new nation imagined and named from a non-national 
space. The narrative begins between the waning days of one colonial regime 
and the establishment of a new state that will be perceived as independence 
and homecoming by some and as occupation and displacement by others.
 While the novel quickly leaves behind twentieth-century Cyprus, the ten-
sions of place and time evoked by this opening persist. Indeed, we return to 
Cyprus in the second half of the novel when Othello sails there in order to 
counter the Ottoman Empire’s threat to Venice. It becomes clear at this point 
that, as in The European Tribe, Othello’s position in the novel is double. He 
has certainly been marked out as “alien” in Venice and has suffered because 
of it, but he is also portrayed as driven by a will to assimilate and a willing-
ness to be exploited in the fight against other, more “dangerous,” outsiders. 
Upon arrival in Cyprus, Othello finds that the Ottoman fleet has drowned 
in a storm, allowing Othello to reflect on his situation there: “This island of 
Cyprus, to which fate had deposited me safe in both body and mind, would 
serve as the school in which I might further study the manners of Venice, 
before eventually returning to the city to embark upon my new life. However, 
my first action as both General and Governor was to order that revels should 
commence within the hour to celebrate both the drowning of the hereti-
cal Turk and the happy and fortuitous marriage of their commanding offi-
cer to fair Desdemona” (166). The conjunction of death and marriage does 
not seem to bother Othello or distract him from his revels. By suggesting 
that the consolidation of Othello’s identity as “black European success” takes 
place through possession of a “fair” prize, through the mimicry of normative 
manners, and through the fatal disappearance of another “foreign” group, 
Phillips initiates a critique of minority consciousness under diasporic con-
ditions. Phillips’s work, in other words, does not simply celebrate diasporic 
consciousness. Rather, the contingent association of the two Cypruses allows 
Phillips to probe the formal problems of the diasporic subject who is ambig-
uously situated between home and exile. The historical palimpsest of the 
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still-contested island of Cyprus provides an imaginative space for rethinking 
the ways that binary relationships—such as self/other, victim/perpetrator—
can become transformed into more complicated configurations such that 
new figures come into view: the other of the other, the victim of the victim.
 Yet, The Nature of Blood also makes clear, there is a limit to the logic 
of assimilation and complicity. While both Stephan and Othello represent 
ambiguous minority figures caught between racialized exclusion and the 
demands of state and empire, Eva, the surviving victim of the Nazi camps, 
comes to embody a more radical history of annihilation as well as the prob-
lems of narrating such a history. Phillips attempts not to write “parallel” 
histories of minoritization but rather to bring into view a “stratified” map of 
difference, to adopt the terms of critical race theorist Susan Koshy, in which 
the accidental contiguity of some experiences is matched by the incommen-
surability of others.
 Other than its end in suicide, Eva’s story is quite unlike Othello’s, but, 
like Othello, Eva is more a product of the literary imagination than she is 
a historical figure. Although a greater portion of the novel is narrated in 
Eva’s voice than in any other, her depiction is still ultimately indirect. The 
Holocaust sections are, for example, scattered with intertextual borrowings 
from accounts of Holocaust survivors, such as Primo Levi and Elie Wiesel, 
and from other Jewish writers, such as Cynthia Ozick. The indirection of the 
novel’s account of the genocide becomes even more marked as Phillips nears 
the center of the disaster. When Eva enters the cattle car that will transport 
her to the death camps, the narrative switches from first to third person and 
then back (155, 163). As the train approaches and then enters the camps, the 
narrative and, implicitly, Eva’s consciousness start to fragment into a collec-
tion of dispersed voices:
The boxcar was near the locomotive, so Eva was able to listen to the engine 
die. Silence. The world remained silent. And then, some hours later, a roar 
and a shudder, and once again the locomotive tugged against the weight 
of the train.  .  .  . A long-drawn-out whistle. Then a loud crash and a jud-
der. The darkness began to echo with barked orders. Then the doors to the 
boxcars roll open.  .  .  .  Already, a loudspeaker is blasting instructions to 
remove all clothing. Remove artificial limbs and eyeglasses. Tie your shoes 
together. Surrender any undeclared valuables and claim a receipt. Children 
go with the women. Where are we? The thin and the handicapped, this way, 
please. All gold rings, fountain pens, and chains. Roll up. Where is God? 
Where is your God? . . . A uniformed adolescent kicks an old man. Then 
he laughs. The old man stops and stares. I am your father. He reloads his 
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weapon. I am your father. Each time he fires the young man laughs louder. 
(161–62)
In this passage we see the dark inversion of the scene of identification in The 
European Tribe. Here, mediation and intertextuality do not create possibili-
ties for identity formation and solidarity but instead index dehumanization. 
Even as the narrative discourse suggests that this passage might be taking 
place within the frame of Eva’s consciousness, it undermines the unity and 
“authenticity” of that consciousness by bringing together a mixture of mate-
rials that could not have been accessible to Eva. The references, for example, 
to the Yiddish title of Wiesel’s memoir (Un di Velt Hot Geshvign [And the 
World Remained Silent]) and to the archetypal questioning of God and the 
father/son conflicts that mark that memoir do not so much call upon author-
itative survivor testimony as stage the collapse of all (patriarchal) authority in 
the face of an inhuman, genocidal machine. The narrative’s dispersed voices 
correspond to the disembodied voice of the loudspeaker and its command 
to disassemble an already artificial body. There is, of course, an implicit and 
perhaps appropriate modesty in Phillips’s approach. He does not attempt to 
portray realistically a scene he can never know; thus, the ultimate site of hor-
ror, the gas chamber, is portrayed in a distanced and an a-subjective third-
person voice (“The process of gassing takes place in the following manner” 
[176]). Most crucially, Phillips’s generalized intertextual approach to history 
accomplishes two things at the level of form: it evokes a mode of narration 
that refuses to gloss over the disruption it portrays, and it opens itself to the 
global circulation of memories beyond competition and identitarian conflict.
 The novel’s indirect, intertextual technique is thus not simply a matter 
of playful postmodern pastiche. Rather, this indirect mode gestures toward 
another crucial feature of the diasporic condition shared by blacks and 
Jews: at the limit, diaspora frustrates all forms of metaphoric identification 
because it is rooted in, or—better—uprooted by, traumatic history.6 While, as 
Cathy Caruth suggests, trauma may provide “the very link between cultures,” 
that link is premised on an initial violence that installs loss at the origin of 
diaspora (11). Loss—which Dominick LaCapra helpfully distinguishes from 
absence—is related to the specificities of historical trauma (43–85). Any met-
aphoric identification with specific losses will always perform a kind of vio-
lence. But Phillips’s strategy is to juxtapose particular losses—such as those 
of Eva and Othello or those of Jews of the fifteenth and twentieth centuries—
through indirect invocation. This indirect, metonymic form of reference to 
unrepresentable extreme violence not only is a mark of the contingencies of 
diasporic geographies but also signals the disruptions of traumatic history. 
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That history in its “presence” is significantly “lost” and definitively unrecov-
erable, but its effects register nonetheless.7
 The disruptions of traumatic history indexed by The Nature of Blood 
become particularly clear through comparison with what may be the novel’s 
most significant unremarked intertext: Schwarz-Bart’s The Last of the Just. 
Like Phillips, Schwarz-Bart links the medieval and modern persecution of 
Jews. Yet, The Last of the Just presents that link as a thousand-year genealogi-
cal “biography” of the Levy family that unfolds in a continuous chronicle of 
pogroms, persecutions, and autos-da-fé. Such a continuous narrative form 
cannot fully acknowledge the traumatic losses that call it into being—it risks 
becoming a version of what Eric Santner has called “narrative fetishism,” 
as, in fact, the more disjunctive narrative of A Woman Named Solitude also 
suggests. Acknowledging the force and form of discontinuity, Phillips decon-
structs—takes apart and reconfigures—Schwarz-Bart’s first novel, maintain-
ing the contact between different histories of persecution without rendering 
them as pieces of a totalizable collective biography. This resistance to nar-
rative fetishism also helps explain the foregrounding in Higher Ground of 
missed encounters, one of the forms in which trauma “appears,” according 
to Lacanian psychoanalytic accounts.
 While in The Last of the Just Schwarz-Bart draws on the unfolding tem-
porality of the chronicle, Phillips can be located within the multi-temporal 
space of an “anthological” aesthetic, to draw on terms developed by Rebecca 
Walkowitz. Walkowitz situates Phillips’s oeuvre within an emergent cate-
gory of self-consciously global works that she names “comparison literature.” 
As she notes, Phillips is suspicious of claims to uniqueness, yet he remains 
“engaged with debates about historical distinctiveness, such as whether the 
Holocaust can be usefully compared to other examples of racism and geno-
cide” (537). Engaged in this dialectic between distinctiveness and compari-
son, Phillips turns especially to the form of the anthology: “Phillips’s novels 
and nonfiction works are like anthologies in that they sample and collate sto-
ries of racism, slavery, European anti-Semitism, and recent violence against 
immigrants. But unlike other anthologies, which create a single series, Phil-
lips’s books tend to promote various microseries within them. In addition to 
collating the lives of several migrants, his books also represent the life of any 
single migrant, including their author, as yet another collated account” (539). 
The infinite regression of the microseries—the fact that each element of the 
series is itself defined by another series ad infinitum—distinguishes Phillips’s 
aesthetic of anthological collation from both the linear history of The Last 
of the Just and the parallel histories evoked at the end of A Woman Named 
Solitude.
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Conclusion
Multidirectional Memory and the Work of Narrative
Common to multidirectional memory and Phillips’s narrative discourse is 
a rejection of the proprietary relationship to the past. Although Phillips’s 
works sometimes seem motivated by a desire to collapse historical particu-
larity, they ultimately reveal that desire to be part of a larger movement of 
exchange between dispersed histories and memories that preserves particu-
larity without fetishizing difference. That exchange is multidirectional not 
only because of its crosscutting transnational and transhistorical scope but 
also because it avoids the traps of competitive victimization, cannibalizing 
appropriation, and aggressive abjection of the other’s story. Such avoidance 
derives in turn from concrete narrative strategies that collate stories “antho-
logically” without smoothing over their jagged edges.
 Phillips’s fragmentation of perspective, his montage of media and modes 
of discourse, and his sometimes playful, sometimes serious intertextual allu-
sions constitute radical acts of depropriation, in which, as Timothy Bewes 
writes, characters are rendered “incapable of speaking ‘authentically,’ on 
their own account or in their own voices” (43). According to Bewes, Phillips 
consistently deploys clichés and “ventriloquism” instead of individualized, 
“realist” voices in order to enact “the systematic evacuation of every dis-
cursive position that might claim freedom from implication in colonialism” 
(46). While Bewes correctly stresses the complicity in colonialism that marks 
much of Phillips’s work, the implications of Phillips’s narrative depropriation 
are even more far-reaching: Phillips’s intertextual aesthetic also produces 
complicity between different histories and sets the stage for the articulation 
of multidirectional memory. Rejecting “ownership” of the past at the level 
of form as well as at the level of content, while simultaneously tracking our 
ongoing and inevitable implication in history, Phillips treats the past as a 
shared heritage of cultural memory. Wandering anachronistically through 
the ruins and traumas of modernity, he forces readers to confront the com-
mon legacies of violence that persist beyond the age of testimony.
notes
 1. For a more detailed consideration of Schwarz-Bart’s work, see Rothberg, Multidi-
rectional Memory. The present essay is a revised version of my discussion of Caryl Phillips 
in that book. I am grateful to the editors of this collection for their helpful comments and 
to Stanford University Press for permission to reprint.
 2. For a full discussion of the contrast between competitive and multidirectional 
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memory, see the introduction to Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory. For a contrasting 
scholarly articulation of competition as the essence of disputes over historical victimiza-
tion, see Chaumont.
 3. For other critical works that helpfully describe these and other aspects of Phillips’s 
oeuvre in the texts I discuss, see Cheyette, Dawson, Ledent, Whitehead, and Zierler, “Caryl 
Phillips” and “‘My Holocaust Is Not Your Holocaust.’”
 4. For a discussion of Fanon that considers race and visual culture in relation to both 
colonialism and the Holocaust, see Rothberg, “In the Nazi Cinema.”
 5. The reference to the book review comes from Zierler’s account of the critical recep-
tion of Phillips in “Caryl Phillips,” 936–37. The second quotation comes from Cheyette, 63.
 6. For more on intertextuality, trauma, and memory, see Rothberg, “Dead Letter Of-
fice.”
 7. Such indirect reference bears a resemblance to what, in a discussion of Holocaust 
memoirs, I have called “traumatic realism.” See Rothberg,Traumatic Realism, chapters 3 
and 4.
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All narratives need to address the issue of beginnings and endings. Dur-
ing her adventures in Wonderland, Alice is given the advice “begin at the 
beginning, continue until you reach the end, then stop.” This seems simple 
enough, but what is a beginning? Where does a story really start? At what 
point can one become aware of the fact that an event constituted a begin-
ning? Can one truthfully tell the complete story of a single event? Brian 
Richardson notes that when used about fictional narrative, beginnings are 
“provisional concepts, inherently unstable, typically elusive, and always capa-
ble of being rewritten” (124–25). Beginnings, narrative theory has taught us, 
are structured by the end to come and are thus always chosen in hindsight. 
Not surprisingly, then, endings in narrative have received far more atten-
tion by theorists than beginnings. It is “the last stage in a plot that confers 
meaning upon that story” (Carrard 62), thus enabling us to categorize it as 
either a comedy or a romance, a tragedy or a satire. Consequently, the ending 
holds a stronger sway over the ordering of the narrative than the beginning. 
In discussions of historical narrative, too, endings have received more atten-
tion than beginnings. In his analysis of narratives of World War II, Philippe 
Carrard observes that historians are always aware of their narratives being 
“open-ended” and thus write their narratives with the knowledge that new 
events and new insights can emerge to demand that the story be rewritten. 
However, says Carrard, historians seem to display a “lack of self-reflexivity” 
(73) when it comes to the nature of their narratives’ beginnings. Histori-
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cal narratives, he points out, are not only open-ended; they are also “open-
begun” (76). What strategies do historians rely on to launch their account, 
and do historians reflect on the arbitrariness of their stories’ beginnings?
 Contrasting with German narratives of war, this essay will examine the 
narratives of one apocalyptic ending, the bombing of Hiroshima, as these 
narratives are conveyed in contemporary Japan. I will focus on the story 
of Japan’s war as it is told in Hiroshima and its memorial sites—the Peace 
Memorial Museum and the Peace Park with its monuments. Narratives of 
Hiroshima, the essay will show, make assumptions about both the story’s 
beginning and its ending, thus privileging some elements while repressing 
others. A significant constituent element of my method will be to use stra-
tegic comparisons between narratives about Hiroshima and German narra-
tives about the bombing of German cities during the war. When it comes to 
the memorialization of the Second World War, Japan offers an interesting 
contrast to Germany, since both countries’ story of war share many parallels 
while at the same time representing important differences in the historical 
record. These similarities and contrasts can in turn provide useful insights in 
our understanding of narratives’ importance in our collective remembering 
of historical events. As I will show, in order to understand how narratives 
affect our memory of historical events, it is important to scrutinize not just 
the narrative’s end but also its beginning.
 There are three major parallels between the two countries’ war experi-
ence. First, both Japan and Germany were principal aggressors of the war. 
Second, both countries experienced heavy Allied bombing aimed at civilian 
sites, resulting in large-scale destruction of major cities. Finally, Japan and 
Germany are linked also through their association with the two major tropes 
for catastrophe in the twentieth century: the Holocaust and Hiroshima. With 
these links, then, both countries can be said to hold the dual roles of victim 
and perpetrator during the war. And yet the manner in which these dual 
roles are dealt with in the respective countries’ narratives of war, and thus in 
their collective memories, are fundamentally different. Let us start by taking 
a closer look at these historical parallels, before putting the telling of their 
historical tales closer under scrutiny.
 First the association to catastrophe: as an instance of atrocity, Hiroshima 
is often linked to the Holocaust with the conjunction “and”—Hiroshima and 
Auschwitz, the atomic bomb and the Holocaust. In his comprehensive study 
of A-bomb literature, John Treat notes that “subsuming now as they do all 
other sites of mass murder,” the names Hiroshima and Auschwitz “are terms 
that symbolize a reduction of history into two names no longer merely places 
but ideas, tropes of a new fact within the human condition: a condition 
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compromised by our ability, in a mater of respective hours and seconds, to 
eliminate whole ghettos and cities of people” (9). However, there is an obvi-
ous imbalance in this relationship between Hiroshima and the Holocaust 
and in their respective associations to Japan and Germany. For one, in Hiro-
shima the Japanese were victims of atrocity, while Germany’s relationship to 
the Holocaust is one of perpetrators of violence. And second, whereas the 
experience of the atomic destruction of the city of Hiroshima is a uniquely 
Japanese experience, the Holocaust certainly does not “belong” to Germany 
in any similar fashion.
 More appropriately, perhaps, Japan and Germany are joined by the same 
conjunction, “and,” in their wartime role as principal aggressors, as enemy 
of the Allied forces. In the Pacific, it was Japan that started the aggressive 
expansion against its neighboring countries, and it was Japan that brought 
the United States into the war through its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941. In common with Germany, Japan too faced at the war’s 
end responsibility for atrocious crimes against humanity committed during 
the war years. The Nanjing Massacre, where Japanese troops in the course of 
a few December days in 1937 mutilated, slaughtered, and raped tens of thou-
sands of Chinese civilians is no doubt the most famous example, but it was 
by no means an isolated event. Japanese soldiers were responsible for similar 
incidents throughout China, as well as in Korea, the Philippines, and the 
Pacific Islands. Though in no way as systematic or anywhere near the scale 
of the Nazi extermination camps, these actions by the Japanese exemplified 
a brutalization justified by a similar belief in national superiority.
 While the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is the culmination of 
a prolonged effort to put an end to Japanese aggression through so-called 
morale bombing, Germany too had already been subjected to such bombing 
by the Allies for many years before the war’s end. Almost all major cities were 
targeted, and many experienced more than 50 percent destruction. Estimated 
death tolls in Germany range from three hundred to more than five hundred 
thousand, and the burned-out rubble of German cities in the end measured 
several hundred million cubic meters (Vees-Gulani 2). In Japan, too, most 
major cities were destroyed, and the death toll on account of bombing by 
conventional bombs far exceeds that of the two atomic bombs. It is estimated 
that more than half a million were killed by firebombs across Japan, and at 
least five million were left homeless. In Tokyo alone, Allied bombing killed 
more than one hundred thousand civilians and left more than one million 
homeless. As a historical event, Hiroshima could just as well be coupled with 
Dresden or with other cities subjected to Allied bombing.
 Considered as a memorial site, then, Hiroshima offers both a parallel and 
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a contrast to memorials of the Holocaust. Yet in the telling of this particular 
historical event, it seems difficult to provide a balanced picture: the focus—
depending on who is telling the story—tends to be either on victimization 
(Hiroshima as apocalyptic catastrophe) or on war responsibility (Japan as 
perpetrator). The controversy at the Smithsonian offers illustrative examples 
of the dual nature of the narrative and of the consequences of choosing one 
over the other. For the anniversary commemorating the fiftieth anniversary 
of the end of World War II, the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum 
decided to organize an exhibition displaying the Enola Gay aircraft together 
with other exhibit items related to the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima. 
The exhibit plans caused immediate reactions, with criticism coming both 
from war veterans and from academics and peace organizations. The cura-
tors’ original plan to combine the exhibit of the bomber aircraft with items 
from Hiroshima displaying the destructive force of the bomb was met with 
fury by war veterans. A commemorative exhibition of the war’s end, they 
said, should display the Enola Gay with pride and should therefore not 
include negative perspectives. The museum subsequently altered their plans, 
suggesting instead the incorporation of information about Japan’s military 
invasions and colonial atrocities as a background for America’s decision to 
drop the bomb. But once again, the plans were met with protests, this time 
from historians and peace activists. After a long debate, the commemorative 
exhibition was cut down to a bare minimum, with the airplane displayed 
virtually on its own, stripped of any historical commentary.
 Among the elements scratched from the exhibit plans were details about 
the discussions among U.S. leaders and military commanders regarding the 
decision to use the atomic bomb; information and photographs showing 
Japanese atrocities in Asia; items and photographs demonstrating the mate-
rial and human devastation caused by the bomb; and information about sub-
sequent development of nuclear weapons and the rise of the atomic age. The 
story of the Smithsonian exhibition has often been cited as a prime example 
that demonstrates how sensitive historical narration is and how difficult it is 
to tell the final events of a story unless one at the same time also has a clear 
picture of how one should envision its beginning. In Japan, the memorializa-
tion of Hiroshima has to a great extent focused on the story of Japanese vic-
timization. In the following I will first outline how two parallel stories—the 
bombing of Dresden and the bombing of Hiroshima—have followed diver-
gent paths. Next, I will identify and discuss some significant forces that have 
shaped the dominating story of Hiroshima.
 The focus of my analysis will be sites of memory—museums, monu-
ments, and commemorative ceremonies. In his influential study of Holo-
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caust memorials, James E. Young points out how memorials of World War 
II seem to become increasingly more prominent the further the historical 
events recede in time. Testimonial accounts have been written, but the wit-
nesses of the events of the war are decreasing in number and will soon be 
gone altogether. Hence the public memory of this time is now instead “being 
molded in a proliferating number of memorial images and spaces,” memori-
als that evoke the past “according to a variety of national myths, ideals, and 
political needs” (1). Memorials represent events and experiences of the past, 
but perhaps more importantly they reflect “the current lives of their com-
munities, as well as the state’s memory of itself ” (1–2). By looking at the way 
history is presented through memorial sites and monuments, then, one can 
come closer to an understanding of the way in which a given community 
seeks to preserve the memory of its past. This can be described as “cultural 
memory,” as Mieke Bal does in her influential essay on the topic. Memory, 
she writes, is both a cultural phenomenon and an individual one, and cul-
tural memorialization should be viewed “as an activity occurring in the pres-
ent, in which the past is continuously modified and redescribed even as it 
continues to shape the future” (vii).
 Along with many others who have explored the subject of cultural mem-
ory, Young and Bal focus on the experience and the memory of the Holo-
caust, and particularly on the various processes for memorialization that 
have taken place in Germany. Since the end of the war Germany has engaged 
in a thorough process of remembering and accounting for its misdeeds. Like 
“a massive tongue, seeking out, over and over, a sore tooth” (Buruma 8), the 
war in Germany is remembered on TV and radio, in schools and museums. 
Again and again, their crimes are rehearsed, reenacted, and remembered. 
Memories of war in Germany, writes Ian Buruma, are accompanied by a 
sense of being betroffen. To be betroffen, Buruma explains, indicates a sense 
of guilt and shame, perhaps even embarrassment. “To be betroffen is one way 
to ‘master the past,’ to show contriteness, to confess, and to be absolved and 
purified” (21).
 The focus in Germany on wartime responsibility is reflected also in the 
way the country remembers its own victims. In her analysis of the literature 
of wartime bombing in Germany, Vees-Gulani points to what has been gen-
erally regarded as accepted truth in Germany: “one cannot write responsibly 
about the bombings without also writing about the Holocaust” (4). Writing 
about German victimhood after World War II, she points out, has always 
been intertwined with a deep sense of guilt and remorse, so much so that the 
topic has been avoided by many. It has even been claimed by some that Ger-
mans need to build their identity on the past of the Third Reich and that the 
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country “can remain a successful democracy only if the memory of the past 
is kept alive in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes” (54). Overall, in 
representations of war in Germany there is a strong sense of purpose relating 
to owning up to past iniquities and facing the crime of the Holocaust.
 Considering the brutality of the war Japan waged on its neighboring 
countries, one might expect that the narratives of war memories in Japan 
would be accompanied by a similar sense of guilt and remorse. After all, 
the military tribunal held in Tokyo after the war had received broad press 
coverage, making the many acts of war crimes committed by Japanese dur-
ing the war known to the public. However, when the story of war is told in 
Hiroshima, the story is first and foremost a story of victimization. How could 
a nation responsible for brutal crimes against humanity and an aggressive 
war of expansion end up in its own eyes only as a victim? One could offer 
the simple, obvious answer to this question: the Japanese, and in particular 
the people of Hiroshima, see themselves as victims of World War II because 
they were, indeed, victims. When civilians become a target in a war, they 
will always be victims. And surely the survivors of the infernos caused by the 
firebombs and the two atomic blasts have every right to convey the horrors 
of their experience. Isn’t their narrative of victimization understandable?
 Yet the issue is not so simple. A comparison with the German experience 
of wartime bombing will show just how complicated the dual role of vic-
tim and perpetrator can be. In Germany, it is the story of the extermination 
camps, and of German responsibility, that have come to the fore, in particu-
lar since the “explosion of critical self-examination” (Moeller 15) began in 
the late 1960s. In face of the enormity of the Nazi crimes, other stories of the 
past—the memories of German victimization—have since stood in a compli-
cated relationship to public memorialization of wartime responsibility and to 
the feelings of shame and guilt that accompany the acknowledgment of such 
responsibility.
 In February 2005, when the city of Dresden ventured to commemorate 
the sixtieth anniversary of the Allied bombing of the city, the plans were 
met with riots and protests both from the extreme right and from the left. 
The anniversary, and the attempt to commemorate it, writes one journal-
ist, “unleashed an anguished response from Germans unsure whether they 
should cast themselves as victims or continue silently to shoulder the blame 
for wartime atrocities” (Connolly). The ceremonies themselves were dis-
rupted by demonstrators from both extremes: while the right wing wanted 
Dresden’s victims to be recognized as victims of “mass murder,” the left wing 
called for a tearing down of the Frauenkirche church under slogans such as 
“no tears for krauts.”
356 1 6 :  h i r O S h i m a  a n d  T h e  h O l O C a U S T
 Some months later, on August 6, 2005, the city of Hiroshima held its 
annual Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony in memory of the bombing 
of the city. This ceremony has been conducted every year since the end of 
the war, on the morning of August 6. The ceremony itself follows a fixed 
pattern, starting with a reading of new names to be added to the register 
of fallen A-bomb victims, addresses by the mayor of Hiroshima and rep-
resentatives from the Japanese government; then one minute of silence at 
precisely 8:15, followed by the sounding of the peace bell, the reading of 
the peace declaration, the releasing of doves, and peace songs by school-
children. The 2005 ceremony was not much different from the one held the 
year before, or the following year, with public addresses calling for world 
peace and expressing hope that the suffering the people of Hiroshima had 
been subjected to would never again be experienced by mankind. While 
the ceremonies in Dresden were disrupted by demonstrators from both 
political extremes, the sixtieth anniversary of Hiroshima was followed by 
an international gathering of “Mayors for world peace.” In Germany, the 
story of civilian suffering seems inseparable from the story of responsibil-
ity for the Holocaust. One rarely speaks of one without also speaking of the 
other. Conversely, in Japan it seems that the story of Hiroshima has been 
given a place of its own, independent of the story of Japanese guilt and 
aggression.
 Many forces were at play in the shaping of the two countries’ narratives 
of war. However, two elements in particular can account for the very differ-
ent directions the two narratives have taken: the degree to which military 
and political leaders were forced to take responsibility for their crimes and 
the “rhetoric of peace” that seems to have dominated the dissemination of 
the story of the destruction of Hiroshima. Let us first take a look the nature 
of the war trials in the two countries, especially the position of the nations’ 
political leaders before and after the war. These two elements are closely 
linked. As Ian Buruma puts it, “Germany lost its Nazi leaders, Japan lost only 
its admirals and generals” (63). The American occupation forces in Japan 
decided to keep the emperor as the nation’s symbolic head, and as a result 
quite effectively blocked any possibility for the nation to take full respon-
sibility for its wartime aggression. Many of its military leaders were tried, 
convicted, and executed, but their leader remained in place—albeit with his 
powers significantly weakened, as he was forced to publicly denounce his 
god-like status. “The fact that Hirohito not only escaped punishment for his 
participation in this war of aggression and destruction, but appeared to take 
no responsibility whatsoever for any of his actions, made it hard for any-
one else in Japan to acknowledge truthfully what they themselves had done 
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during the conflict” (Rees 143). Japan has often received well-deserved criti-
cism for failing to unequivocally own up to its crimes committed during its 
many years of aggression toward its neighboring countries, and the results 
of this can still be seen today in the form of strained political relationships 
between Japan and its Asian neighbors.
 Still, the nature of the war trials and the emperor’s lack of responsibil-
ity cannot adequately account for the different directions the narratives of 
war have taken in Germany and Japan. The most important factor is the 
shaping of the narrative of the atomic bomb, as it was created both in the 
United States and in Japan. This narrative endowed the bomb, paradoxically, 
with a positive meaning for having ushered forward Japan’s surrender, thus 
saving the many lives a prolonged war would have cost. At the same time, 
the narrative lauded the leaders of both countries—President Truman and 
Emperor Hirohito—as great men who secured peace for their people and for 
the world. Although the story of the atomic bomb is certainly incorporated 
into the two countries’ national histories in very different ways, they share 
a remarkable number of elements, and both stories embrace a surprisingly 
similar rhetoric of peace and heroism.
 In the Japanese narrative, the emperor is made the hero, the one who took 
action and accepted the American demand for surrender. For, even after the 
devastating effect of the bomb was made known, Japanese military leaders 
were not ready to give up their fight. The meeting of The Supreme Council 
of Japan thus reached a deadlock, with three members opting for an immedi-
ate surrender—still with the condition that the emperor be retained—while 
the other three wanted to include three more conditions in their terms of 
surrender: Japan’s right to disarm her own soldiers, the right to conduct her 
own war trials, and a limitation of the forces of occupation. In the end it was 
the emperor who, stepping out of his apolitical role, broke the deadlock and 
spoke up for an acceptance of the Potsdam declaration and of the demand 
for Japan’s surrender. In the Japanese narrative, the emperor’s decision is 
presented as a “divine intervention,” one that saved Japan and the Japanese 
people from utter destruction: without the emperor’s benevolence, more Jap-
anese lives would have been lost. The emperor, the narrative stresses, under-
stood the significance of the bomb’s message and interpreted it wisely, for the 
best interest of his subjects.
 The American narrative too casts its leader into a heroic role: Truman’s 
decision to use the bomb is presented as a “sacred moment in American his-
tory,” with the bomb being a “benevolent weapon that ultimately saved mil-
lions of lives” (Igarashi 22). In this narrative the history of the bomb itself, 
and of the processes involved in the development of this powerful weapon, 
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are all but erased. Here, as in the Japanese version, history is simplified into 
a story of one man’s great decision.
 Although these two narratives are told from diametrically opposite points 
of view, they share a larger point: because of one man’s heroic act—President 
Truman in the American version, Emperor Hirohito in the Japanese—lives 
were saved. Ultimately, the lesson of both of these narratives gives the atomic 
bomb one essential role only: the bomb ended the war. Truman and Emperor 
Hirohito were the agents who deciphered the message of the bomb. It is not 
difficult to recognize how both the United States and Japan, and not least 
their postwar relationship, depended on a narrative that cast the bomb into 
such a positive role. Only by endowing the bomb with the power to end the 
war could its devastating effect be given meaning, and thus only could the 
“sacrifice” of the peoples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki be made comprehen-
sible. “It was not the destructive power of the bomb per se,” writes Igarashi, 
“but rather the narrative that ‘the bomb ended the war’ that brought the 
war to its denouement” (24). The bomb becomes what brought peace to 
the Pacific, and through the bomb, Japan goes from being the United States’ 
starkest enemy to becoming its closest Cold War ally.
 With these narratives, Hiroshima is transformed into a city of peace, and 
the atomic bomb into a harbinger of that peace. Japan’s story of the Second 
World War thus takes a very different path from German narratives of war, 
although the raw material from which those narratives are constructed could 
very well have led to narratives that are quite similar. What are the conse-
quences of the Japanese narrative? In my opinion, two major factors continue 
to shape the way the story of Hiroshima is told and passed on to future gen-
erations. The first is the inseparable link created between the bomb—and the 
city of Hiroshima—and a concept of peace, even world peace. The second 
is a redefining of the belief that the bomb brought to an end a conflict that 
existed solely between the two countries of Japan and the United States, a 
belief that omits all other narratives of war in the Pacific in the process.
 Let us look at the second point first. In the introductory chapter to an 
anthology of studies of the Asia–Pacific War(s), the editors write that Pacific 
War memories have been “systematically silenced by global, national, and 
masculinist narratives of the major warring powers” (Fujitani, White, and 
Yoneyama 3). Histories of the war, they point out, have a tendency to limit 
its temporal scope to 1941–45, having the war start with the attack on Pearl 
Harbor and end with the atomic bomb dropped on the two cities of Japan. 
Thus the account of the war is rendered in a “framework of a binary clash 
between Japan and the United States and its allies” (6), ignoring the fact that, 
for Japan, the conflict started as early as 1931, when Japanese forces invaded 
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Manchuria. It is precisely because of this dominating framework that Japan 
continues to be cast as a victim of World War II, while all the narratives of 
Japanese aggression are pushed into the background: “other lands and peo-
ples are simply background or, more precisely, battlefields for the clashes of 
the great powers” (6). As long as the narrative of the Pacific War as a binary 
clash between major powers is allowed to dominate, these other stories will 
remain in the background.
 The rhetoric of peace that surrounds the dissemination of the Hiroshima 
story is equally responsible for allowing these “minor” stories to remain 
minor. Ever since the very first commemorative ceremony was held at Hiro-
shima’s epicenter only two years after the bomb wiped out the city, the focus 
of the memorialization of the bomb has been on a didactic message of peace. 
Understandably, this focus was encouraged by American occupation author-
ities. The focus on peace, and on the A-bomb as somehow a harbinger of that 
peace, was important to the American occupation, not only in order to make 
their presence more acceptable to the Japanese public but also because the 
linking of the bomb to peace became an important element in the Cold War 
rhetoric upon which America built its postwar supremacy. As Lisa Yoneyama 
has pointed out, “The textual production of Hiroshima as the A-bombed city 
that revived as a Mecca of world peace thus helped disseminate the view that 
the world’s peaceful order was attained and will be maintained not by diplo-
matic efforts or negotiations, but by sustaining a menacing military force and 
technological supremacy” (20).
 With the focus on peace, the message of the A-bomb is redefined as one 
with a universal appeal. Thus, Hiroshima, and by association all of Japan, 
becomes a beacon to the world. Redefined as a master code for catastro-
phe in the twentieth century, the subject remembering Hiroshima, through 
slogans such as “never again Hiroshima!” is all of humanity, whose remem-
bering is expressed through a notion of universally shared emotions and sen-
timents unlimited by cultural boundaries and united in what Yoneyama has 
coined “nuclear universalism” (15). This sentiment is reflected, for example, 
in the commitment to peace prepared for the commemoration ceremony at 
the sixtieth anniversary: “we renew our determination to carry on the quest 
of the hibakusha [A-bomb victim], to continue telling the world about the 
horrors of nuclear weapons, to learn and pass on the Hiroshima story, until 
we build a world at peace” (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony). In the 
coupling of the experience of Hiroshima to world peace, the city’s symbolic 
role as the site for the birth of the nuclear age becomes something over 
and above the specific, historical Japanese situation. The peace rhetoric of 
Hiroshima effectively pushes the specific Japanese context—the stories of 
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Japanese aggression—into the background, into oblivion. Thus the sym-
bolic function of the apocalyptic ending dictates the beginning of this war 
narrative.
 From the moment one steps off the train in Hiroshima, one is met by 
the city’s focus on the message of peace: the main east–west avenue is called 
Heiwa-ôdôri (Peace Boulevard), and at the center of the city one finds the 
Peace Park and the Peace Memorial Museum. The power of the peace rheto-
ric is mirrored in the Peace Park both in rather subtle and in more explicit 
ways. Two illuminating examples are the construction and architecture of the 
park itself and the Children’s Peace Monument located centrally in the park. 
Both elements in their own way contribute to the one-sided focus of the 
A-bomb’s memorialization in Hiroshima, and either implicitly or explicitly 
they give voice to a narrative that casts Japan in the heroic role as messenger 
of peace, thereby covering over Japan’s aggressive warfare and militaristic 
past.
 The Peace Park is located at the heart of Hiroshima, at the epicenter of 
the atomic blast. Standing in front of the cenotaph at the southern end of 
the park, with one’s back to the Peace Memorial Museum, one can enjoy the 
simple but elegant symmetry of the park’s main elements. However, most 
visitors to the park, myself included, are unaware of the background for the 
park’s design—a design that embodies a direct link to Japan’s militaristic his-
tory. According to the historian Inoue Shôichi, Lisa Yoneyama explains, the 
Hiroshima Peace Park’s stylistic origin can be traced back to a “nearly identi-
cal ground plan that had been adopted three years before Japan’s surrender as 
part of a grand imperial vision, the Commemorative Building Project for the 
Construction of Greater East Asia” (Yoneyama 1). Both plans were designed 
by the architect Tange Kenzô, though under very different circumstances 
and for very different purposes. In 1942 the first plan proposed a “grandiose 
Shintoist memorial zone” at the foot of Mount Fuji, dedicated to the celebra-
tion of the Greater East Asian Empire. Yoneyama has traced the similarities 
between this planned park and the Hiroshima Peace Park. The parallels are 
striking—in shape, placement of buildings, entrance, and the “worshipping 
line” running from the main buildings to the central commemorative monu-
ment, with the Atom Bomb Dome functioning as the contemporary version’s 
main point of worship.
 The connection of these two plans, through the architect himself and 
through the many similarities between the two designs, is obvious enough 
to those who are aware of the Peace Park’s history. But most visitors are not. 
What then is the significance of the connection? Doesn’t the symbolism of 
the park work well enough within its present set of signifiers? There is a great 
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beauty to the way in which the arch over the central cenotaph frames the 
bombed-out iron structure of the Atom Bomb Dome, with the eternal flame 
burning between the two points of vision. Every time I visit the park, I am 
moved by the simplicity and beauty of its architectural design. Why should 
it matter where the plans for the park originated? The answer is obvious: 
the design and structure of a commemorative space—a monument, park, or 
museum—is never innocent. In his study of Holocaust memorials, Young 
remarks that memory “is never shaped in a vacuum; the motives of memory 
are never pure” (2). Therefore, he continues, when speaking of monuments 
one needs to take into consideration not only the monument’s exterior, but 
also such elements as the time and place it was conceived, its actual construc-
tion within its political and historical realities, its final finished form, and its 
place in national memory (14). Only then can one begin to grasp the mul-
tiple meanings it generates. Speaking for myself, the knowledge of the park’s 
origin has planted a seed of resistance enabling me, on subsequent visits, to 
take a step back and to reflect on the problematic relationship of Japan’s war 
responsibility to Hiroshima memories.
 Combined with the origins of the architectural design, the choice of archi-
tect becomes an integral part of the park’s meaning production. When the 
planners behind the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park chose Tange, with his 
design so strikingly similar to the plans developed for the commemoration 
of the Japanese Empire, a link—intentional or not—was established between 
the ideology of the “Greater East Asia War” and Hiroshima’s contemporary 
celebration of peace. Tange’s design, which once was hailed as the vision that 
best represented the sublime objective of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, could, it seems, be redefined only a few years later as a symbolic rep-
resentation of a city’s, and a country’s, prayers for peace. Although Tange’s 
name is mentioned in tourist pamphlets, the story of the design’s origin is 
not. The connection, Yoneyama points out, is thus important on two levels: 
on the one hand, it embodies the continuity between imperial prewar Japan 
and peaceful postwar Japan; on the other hand, it demonstrates how this 
continuity remains largely unrecognized: “Hiroshima memories have been 
predicated on the grave obfuscation of the prewar Japanese Empire, its colo-
nial practices, and their consequences” (3).
 The amnesiac relationship to Japan’s recent colonial past, so illuminat-
ingly exemplified through the park’s design and construction, is further 
enhanced through the emphasis that Hiroshima’s monumental form places 
on peace and on victimization. In particular, this emphasis is visible in the 
manner in which the stories told through the park’s museum and through its 
monuments tend to move from a focus on individual suffering to a collective 
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call for peace. Let us pause for a moment on one of the most famous stories of 
individual suffering: the story of Sadako. Sadako’s story is first and foremost 
told through the monument raised for all child victims of the A-bomb, the 
Children’s Peace Monument (also called the Tower of a Thousand Cranes). 
The monument, a bronze statue depicting a young girl holding a huge paper 
crane in her outstretched arms, was raised in 1958 by Sadako’s classmates. 
But who was Sadako? Sasaki Sadako was two years old the day the bomb fell 
on Hiroshima; ten years later she fell ill from leukemia, also known as the 
Atom Bomb Disease, due to her exposure to radiation from the bomb. While 
in hospital, she learned that folding one thousand paper cranes was a symbol 
for good luck and long life, and she decided that if she managed to fold so 
many, she could survive. Sadly, she died less than a year after she first fell ill. 
Inspired by her strong will to live, Sadako’s classmates wanted to do some-
thing to honor her and all other children who became victims of the atomic 
bomb, and they set about collecting money in order to raise a monument 
to her memory. Through the monument, and through the Sadako story, the 
paper crane has become a symbol not only for the suffering of the people of 
Hiroshima but also for peace and the fight against nuclear weapons. Every 
day, new paper cranes are donated by visitors and placed at the foot of the 
monument. More than any other story, the story of Sadako demonstrates the 
erasure of the line between individual and collective suffering.
 Of all the children who were killed by the atomic blast, why did Sadako, 
a girl who died a decade after the explosion of an illness that children suc-
cumb to every day around the world, become singled out for this symbolic 
role? Maybe it was a matter of timing.
 At the time Sadako became ill, the American occupation had ended, and 
the censorship on writing anything that could be conceived of as a criticism 
of the occupation authorities was lifted, allowing room for a freer discus-
sion of the atomic bomb. Furthermore, the international political climate of 
the 1950s—the Korean War and American tests of nuclear weapons in the 
Pacific—gave rise to peace movements and antinuclear movements across 
the globe. After a Japanese fishing boat was caught in the fallout from the 
nuclear testing on the Bikini Atoll in 1954, the Japanese public’s interest in 
the damage from the atomic bomb gained increased momentum. When 
Sadako died in 1955, antinuclear movements and peace organizations in 
many countries had already begun to turn their eyes toward Hiroshima. 
Sadako’s classmates’ movement to build the monument thus became a part 
of this larger peace movement in Japan.
 Today, the story of Sadako has become one of the best known victim 
stories from Hiroshima, and monuments to her memory have been erected 
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throughout the world. The monuments, in addition to books and films, are 
accompanied by websites where one can find information about Sadako, 
learn how to fold paper cranes (which one is encouraged to send to Japan), 
and join forums such as “Peace Club” and “Kids Peace Plaza.” In the Kids 
Peace Plaza one is guided through activities such as “talking about peace,” 
writing “letters to Sadako,” and observing the “peace studies presentation 
room.” Sadako’s death thus is transformed from the death of a young girl—a 
friend, classmate, and daughter—into the death of a beacon for peace and 
hope for the whole world.
 The same pedagogical and didactic message of peace that can be seen 
in the story of Sadako is present also in the Peace Memorial Museum itself. 
The overall message and purpose of the museum is presented to the visitor at 
the very beginning of the exhibit, where one is met in large print across the 
first wall: “Having now recovered from that A-bomb calamity, Hiroshima’s 
deepest wish is the elimination of all nuclear weapons and the realization of 
a genuinely peaceful international community” (Hiroshima Peace Memorial 
Museum). Step by step, the museum proceeds to guide the visitor through 
exhibits that will help him or her reach that awareness. The museum exhibit 
unfolds like a narrative, starting with exhibits showing Hiroshima before 
the war, followed by information on the development of the bomb and the 
Manhattan Project. Next, after taking the visitor through facts about the 
destruction of Hiroshima and “the nuclear age,” there is an exhibit called 
“the path to peace.” Here the visitor is presented with the “spirit of Hiro-
shima” and explanations of how this spirit has fostered “the unwavering 
hope for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of lasting 
world peace” (museum pamphlet). Although Japan had inflicted great pain 
on its neighboring countries, the text reads, it must “find a way to make our 
mutual pain a positive gift for the future” (museum exhibit text). According 
to the narrative of the museum, then, there is a natural progression from the 
development of the bomb via destruction to the “path to peace.” Presenting 
this narrative’s development, the exhibit clearly seems to be downplaying 
Japan’s responsibility for the war, and thus serves to condone the lack of 
official public apologies in Japan. In the final part of the museum the visitor 
is confronted with the individual fates of bombing victims and their stories 
of suffering. The exhibits include melted glass, burned clothes and school 
lunches, and twisted scraps of metal, accompanied by stories about young 
boys and girls who lost their lives in the inferno of flames. In the museum’s 
narrative, it is not the apocalyptic ending of the atomic blast that constitutes 
the narrative’s ending but the rise to awareness and a call for world peace. 
This overall message frames both the museum’s beginning and ending, and 
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all exhibits are interpreted within this framework. The information that the 
exhibit includes about Japan’s expansion and militaristic rule is downplayed 
in favor of the “path to peace” that Hiroshima later followed.
 Despite the intrusive pedagogy, it is hard to leave Hiroshima’s peace 
museum without being moved, without feeling that the people of Hiroshima 
were unjustified victims of war. Incontestably, they were; civilians always 
are. And yet I always leave the museum with mixed feelings. Naturally the 
survivors of Hiroshima must be allowed to tell their stories, and their stories 
must be treated with respect. Still, there is something undeniably self-righ-
teous about the way Hiroshima poses as a city of peace. And, as I have tried 
to show, there is something fundamentally problematic in the way the story 
of Hiroshima is told there. As long as the stories of individual suffering are 
brought to the forefront, I believe they will continue to overshadow other 
accounts of Japan’s war. James Orr acknowledges that the “Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki bombings privileged the Japanese nation with an exclusive claim to 
leadership in the global ban-the-bomb movement and provided the country 
with its first powerfully unifying national myth after defeat” (7). But Orr 
also points out that alongside the atomic bomb victim exceptionalism that 
started in the 1950s, Asian suffering and Japanese wartime aggression have 
been a “vital concern of both progressives and conservatives in many dis-
cursive fields, including war victimhood” (175). In Hiroshima, however, the 
Peace Park and the Peace Memorial Museum, already in the choice of names, 
establish from the outset a focus and a purpose that perhaps blind the visitor 
to critical accounts that certainly exist in historical and political discourse.
 The memorialization of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima today, then, 
lacks the self-reflexive scrutiny that has ridden German memories of war. 
For while new “countermonuments” in Germany display “the torturous com-
plexity of their nation’s relationship to its past” (Young 27), Hiroshima as 
memorial site seems unable to reflect any similar complexity. Perhaps “the 
most stunning and inflammatory response to Germany’s memorial conun-
drum is the rise of its countermonuments: brazen, painfully self-conscious 
memorial spaces conceived to challenge the very premises of their being” 
(27). One example is Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz’s Monument 
against Fascism in Hamburg, which was unveiled in 1986. This monument, a 
12-meter-high pillar of aluminum, was designed to challenge memorial con-
ventions by itself being, gradually over the course of a number of years, low-
ered into the ground, and thus in the end vanishing completely from sight. 
“As if in mocking homage to national forebears who planned the Holocaust 
as a self-consuming set of events—that is, intended to destroy all traces of 
itself, all memory of its victims—the Gerzes have designed a self-consuming 
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memorial that leaves behind only the rememberer and the memory of a 
memorial” (31). But while the Hamburg monument was shrinking, Hiro-
shima’s monuments seemed to be “growing,” with new names being added 
yearly to the cenotaph and donations of paper cranes piling up around the 
Children’s Peace Monument.
 Yet it is important to acknowledge the existence of counter-narratives 
also in Japan and the difficulties they have faced in their struggle to be heard. 
One such narrative can be found in the peace park itself, not far from the 
Children’s Peace Monument, although one needs to read between the lines in 
order to truly take in its counter-message: the cenotaph for Korean victims of 
the atomic bomb. This monument, the explanatory plaque tells us, is raised 
in memory of Korean colonial subjects who had been forcefully brought to 
Japan and who subsequently lost their lives in the atomic blast. It was not 
until 1999 that this monument was included in the park, having initially 
been given a space outside the Peace Park. With its short explanatory note, 
this monument implicitly tells the story both of Japanese colonialism and 
of postwar discrimination. What name one gives the war also reflects how 
one wishes to frame the major historical events: rather than referring to the 
war as the Second World War or the Pacific War, for example, an increas-
ing number of people in Japan now refer to the war as the “fifteen year war,” 
thus acknowledging a different start for the narrative. Furthermore, there 
have always been voices in Japan—political, academic, and journalistic—that 
have attempted to counter and to criticize what became the dominating story 
of war. Sadly, however, some of these voices have been met by intimidating 
opposition. For example, when the mayor of Nagasaki, Motoshima Hitoshi, 
suggested in 1988 that the emperor bore responsibility for the war, a right-
wing fanatic attempted to assassinate him. Others who have spoken openly 
of their wartime crimes have been met by so much harassment from the 
political right that they have had to move from their homes (Chang 213–14).
 Despite the existence of counter-narratives, there is no doubt what nar-
rative has been allowed to dominate the dissemination of the Hiroshima 
story in Hiroshima: the story of the major powers. This story has in turn 
become completely intertwined with the narrative of postwar peace. Igarashi 
has called this narrative the “foundational narrative” of United States–Japan 
postwar relations and points to how their respective versions of the story 
have served the interests of both nations, in a sense exonerating them from 
wartime guilt. In the case of Japan, the narrative “managed to cloak Japan’s 
defeat in the guise of strategic necessity and concern for humanity at large” 
(20), thus providing the Japanese wartime leadership with a “narrative that 
could explain away the tension created by its acceptance of defeat” (20). For 
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the United States, on the other hand, this narrative transforms the atomic 
bomb into “a benevolent weapon that ultimately saved millions of lives” (22).
 Concluding, I concur with James Young’s observation that “once we 
assign monumental form to memory, we have to some degree divested our-
selves of the obligation to remember.” Hiroshima—with its park, museum, 
and monuments—continually appeals to our obligation to remember. How-
ever, the monumental form that the story of Hiroshima has to a great extent 
taken gears our remembering toward one interpretation and one story. This 
essay has attempted to explain the very different directions the memorializa-
tion of war has taken in Germany and Japan, despite the existence of con-
siderable parallels, by examining the structure and creation of Hiroshima’s 
narrative. I hope to have shown that how we remember a historical event 
depends not only on how we understand the story’s end but also on how we 
envision its beginning. In choosing a narrative’s beginning, one is to a great 
degree also determining which parts of the story are to be included and 
which are to be left outside of the narrative. One major consequence of such 
choices can be the erasure of other important elements of historical record. 
Comparing Germany and Japan is one way of examining, and understand-
ing, the different roads the dominating narrative of aggression and defeat can 
take, and the dissimilar ways in which the roles of victim and perpetrator can 
be incorporated into national narratives. More importantly, the comparison 
can teach us something about the consequences narrative choices have for 
the creation of collective identity-forming narratives.
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